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PREFACE
Between February 1988 and February 1991 I was employed, by 
the Metropolitan Police, as a police superintendent at 
Streatham Police Station. It was during this period that 
I began an experimental police project for dealing with 
domestic violence,especially crimes involving minor injury
In the course of writing this thesis, creating and 
implementing the subsequent policy, I would like to 
acknowledge the help, assistance and advice I was given 
from the following people. Doctor Susan EDWARDS, from the 
University of Buckingham, who gave me wise counselling and 
encouraged me to pursue my original idea and write this 
thesis. Professor David DOWNS and Professor Paul ROCK for 
their advice, patience and supervision throughout the 
project and the preparation of this thesis. The creation 
of the policy would not have been possible if it were not 
for the support and encouragement of Roger STREET, Chief 
superintendent in charge of Streatham Division, who had 
done so much to progress the policing of domestic violence 
in the Metropolitan Police Service.
The enhanced support given to the victims of domestic 
violence owes much to the dedication and commitment of 
those officers who helped me set up the procedure, i.e. 
Inspector Don BROADBERY, Police Constable Maggie WILSON 
and Police Constable Annie MERCHANT. It was indeed very 
encouraging to have the interest, the backing and support 
of the operational officers at Streatham Division. Most 
adapted to the change of policy in a way which can only 
give encouragement to others to adopt a similar approach.
To Mrs Elizabeth JACKSON, Streatham Police Division, for 
her hard work and good humour whilst typing several drafts 
for this thesis.
Finally I would like to thank all the men who offended and 
especially to the victims, whose views formed such an 
important part of this study.
ABSTRACT
The aim of the project was to find a more effective and 
efficient police response for dealing with domestic
violence where there was minor injury to the victim.
Background
A number of research findings influenced the creation of a 
new policy. In North America some research suggested-arrest 
acted as a deterrent and was essential, as a first
step in breaking the cycle of violence by offenders.
Historically victims were reluctant to report these cases 
and when they did so they could well have suffered 
physical abuse up to 35 times before calling police. In 
this country police response was negative, officers 
disliked dealing with domestic violence which they often 
judged from a male moral view, and did not regard, or 
report it, as a crime. When crimes were reported official 
statistics rarely reflected the report rate. One of the 
reasons for this was the extensive use by police of 'no 
criming*. Even when cases appeared before a court many 
prosecutions were dropped and sentences, when imposed on 
offenders, were light.
In the late 80's police in this country began to make
greater use of adult cautions as a means of processing 
offenders. This was seen to be as effective as an
appearance before a court so I considered the possibility 
of using this procedure as a means of processing minor 
injury domestic violence cases.
The Policy
At Streatham a positive policy, which promoted early 
intervention of offenders, was encouraged by me. Those
arrested were dealt with as criminals, taken to the police 
station, their fingerprints and photographs taken and 
then, if a set criteria was met, police deferred the 
decision to prosecute or caution for two months. This 
period allowed police to make further enquiries about the 
circumstances of the assault and enabled time for the 
victim and offender to seek help, advice and guidance from 
other agencies. It was only after this process that a 
final decision was made about the outcome of the case.
Evaluation
The scheme was evaluated from a qualitative and 
quantitative perspective. The arrest, prosecution, and 
'no crime' rates were calculated. These were compared to 
a previous period and to another police area which did not 
operate a similar policy. The re-offending rates of those 
cautioned was checked and compared to those who were 
charged. Statistics for police injuries on duty were 
examined to ascertain if enforcement of policy had any 
adverse effect on the number of assaults on officers 
dealing with domestic incidents.
Objective analysis was seen as vital so researchers, from 
outside the police service, interviewed offenders, victims 
and police officers to assess the impact of the policy. A 
questionnaire, which all officers were invited to 
complete, was anlaysed.
INTRODUCTION;-
My original idea of developing a more positive Police 
approach for dealing with minor injury cases of domestic 
violence emanated from studying family law at the Ealing 
College of Higher Education. I was influenced by the 
research which showed a pattern of poor response and 
attitude by many Police Officers towards the victims of 
this crime. I believed adult cautioning could be 
developed as a supportive service to victims by Police as 
well as acting as a deterrent to offenders, so I discussed 
this with my Family Law tutor, Mrs Sue GUILD, She agreed 
and advised me to speak to Doctor Susan EDWARDS who had 
conducted previous research in the area of policing 
domestic violence. (EDWARDS 1989).
At my first meeting with Susan EDWARDS, amongst many 
issues, we assessed the options available, to me, to 
evaluate the effectiveness of my proposed cautioning 
policy. It was felt that any findings would hold more 
weight and credibility, if an independent element was 
brought into the evaluation, especially in the conducting 
of interviews with the victims, offenders and Police 
Officers who were operating the scheme. It was somewhat 
opportune that, at about this time, the Home Office Police 
Requirements Support Unit invited applications for the 
funding of Police related research projects. I applied 
for and was eventually granted, the necessary financial 
support, to use independent interviewers in my evaluation 
of my project. I have used the findings of that report 
(BUCHAN, EDWARDS 1990) as a base for this thesis.
My role in this scheme could be described as the project 
leader. I considered my main task was to lead, to enlist 
and co-ordinate support for the project and to write up 
the subsequent evaluation. My own professional leadership 
style was aimed, as far as possible, to work within a team 
environment.
7The concept was developed by John ADAIR 1982 and was 
focused upon in the Metropolitan Police Leadership Guide 
1990. Basically the principle was the best way to achieve 
a task was to develop a positive team environment, and 
atmosphere, in which it was equally important to listen 
to, and appreciate, the contribution by individuals. The 
tasks in policing terms were many and challenging. 
Different people brought different skills to the 
organisation from the 'innovator with ideas' to the person 
with a 'structure and systems approach' for 'evaluation 
and monitoring'.
I've always felt a good leader was the person who could 
act as the 'fulcrum' of a team. It was this strategy I 
adopted in leading my management team on my Police 
Division. I believed it worked so I adopted the same 
approach to this project. Before each part of the project 
was progressed I held a team meeting between the relevant 
interested parties to obtain views and ideas before 
agreeing to the process which was to be adopted. Through 
this management process I received invaluable help, advice 
and guidance in the implementation and measurement of the 
experiment. Equally important, in my view, was to keep a 
team motivated and interested in the progress and the 
changes which had to be made, so I also held other 
meetings to monitor and evaluate what we were doing.
An example of this 'team' process was my approach in 
establishing the content of the questions which were to be 
put to the interviewees. The interviewers. Doctor Susan 
EDWARDS, Lynn BRADY and Gary ARMSTRONG were all 
experienced in this field. They had worked together in a 
previous domestic violence research project at Holloway 
Police Station (EDWARDS 1989). An initial meeting took 
place, from which a draft list of questions was prepared, 
between us, and the final version was agreed upon. After 
the first few interviews a progress meeting took place and 
some of our original strategies were changed eg., after
8
first six weeks it emerged our plan was unrealistic to 
interview all victims, and with offenders it was found 
more efficient and effective to interview them without 
having to work from a set list of questions.
After the interviews with victims and offenders took place 
the interviewer prepared a tape of the content of the 
meeting. These tapes were given to me to be transcribed 
and when completed the interviewer prepared a draft of 
what was considered to be the 'main findings'. I checked 
the findings against the transcripts and after another 
meeting I wrote the section of the thesis which was based 
on the interviews.
Other examples of this 'team' or 'co-ordinated approach' 
were in Police Officers questionnaires where I worked 
with the Metropolitan Police Department of Management 
Services. In the example of the self help group for 
offenders I worked with a local vicar and his church 
group.
My role as leader encompassed consultation, taking 
advice, co-ordinating and also that of giving advice and 
direction before being the final decision maker. At 
Appendix 13 I have prepared a breakdown of the division of 
labour involved in producing this thesis. It illustrates 
the role which each member of the team took in helping me.
In this thesis I have arranged my work into a literature 
review which considered the research findings for a joint 
agency approach to domestic violent, the effectiveness of 
the Police arrest strategies, the practical effects of 
Police policy and practice in this crime before describing 
the background pressures for bringing about the changes in 
the Police approach.
I then discussed my policy of cautioning and the 
evaluation process of the project before describing the 
quantitative and qualitative findings which ensued from
9the process. The next part illustrated the other aspects 
such as a case study, the publicity; the work of my 
domestic violence office and the efforts I made to
develop a self help group for offenders.
Finally, I looked at the findings from another Police 
strategy in another Police area, outside London, after 
which I drew some conclusions and made a number of
recommendations.
Some commentators eg., SHERMAN 1992, have found that the 
results from research into the Police response to
domestic violence can vary from area to area. I will
therefore take the opportunity in this introduction, to 
describe, briefly, my own policing Division at
Streatham.
Streatham Division was one of the four Police Divisions 
located in the Borough of Lambeth and lay within 7 miles 
of Westminster Bridge. It was described as a semi-inner 
London Division. The Police Divisions which bordered 
Streatham - were Brixton, Clapham, South Norwood and East 
Dulwich.
The size of the Police Division was 4.5 square miles and 
the population was estimated, in 1986, to be 92,000 based
upon a census which was completed in 1981. The
population was of mixed origin. The 1981 census data
showed that the ethnic origin of 14% of the population 
was black (ie., non-white). This group comprised of 
people with a family background from India, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and Afro-Caribbean. There was reported
incidents of racial tension but these were local in 
character and never manifested into public riots or 
demonst rat i ons.
Police consultation with local people took place at three 
levels. On a Borough basis there was the Community 
Police Consultative Group, which I attended monthly in 
public at the Lambeth Town Hall. At Divisional level I
10
met local community representatives on a quarterly basis 
and at a neighbourhood level the local Police Inspectors 
and Police Officers met their residents at Sector 
Working Parties.
The policing problems of the Division included high rates 
of burglary, street robbery, vice and violence. To put 
this in context with the other 68 Police Divisions in 
London, Streatham Division was approximately tenth
busiest. The area was policed by 247 uniformed officers 
and 26 CID officers who were supported by 45 civilian 
staff.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Before moving on to a consideration of the policy I 
adopted in London and an evaluation of its impact, it is 
necessary first to set the scene regarding recent 
developments of police approaches to domestic violence.
My aim in this introduction is to provide a backcloth to 
my research by considering some of the various police 
methods of tackling this issue. Traditionally, the 
attitude of police policy makers and practitioners has 
been negative. It favoured non-involvement coupled with 
poor reporting and recording procedures. This resulted in 
the high level of domestic violence never being officially 
recognised.
However, in recent times a more positive and encouraging 
series of strategies has been tested. Perhaps the most 
important of these has been the recognition of the poor 
police response, working jointly with other agencies 
whilst promoting improved arrest performance and recording 
practices. The impetus for change in this country was 
provided by a number of interesting strides and 
initiatives in America. Most sought to provide a better 
and safer service for the victims of this type of crime. 
In this section I will consider some of these processes 
before going on to review the emerging police response in 
this country. Some of these research findings were 
important in providing the philosophy behind my Streatham 
policy.
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JOINT AGENCY APPROACH

CO-ORDINATED APPROACH
A co-ordinated approach entailed a number of agencies 
working together with an agreed, or joint, strategy, 
objective and tasks. The goal was usually a common one 
with each agency approaching tbe problem from its own 
standpoint.
Family violence involves a number of complex issues which 
often require professional help from various agencies such 
as law enforcement, health and social services in addition 
to the support available from the voluntary sector. In 
North America the need for co-ordination of these agencies 
has been recognised both at a national and local level. 
In Canada the government regarded itself as providing a 
leadership role in identifying the emerging social issues 
and problems whilst encouraging innovative ways of 
responding to the concerns of family violence. The 
government issued a strategy which defined the federal 
role in developing a coherent national approach. In 1988 
the government granted an additional 40 million dollars to 
help address the problem. In announcing this allocation 
of extra money Mr EPP, the Health and Welfare Minister, 
set out the aims of the government:-
"We have to commit ourselves to 
looking for more than a single answer 
to this problem. Step by step we 
have to move towards a comprehensive 
solution",
Co-ordination was also organised on a local basis. One 
such scheme was the DULUTH DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION 
PROJECT (D,A,I,P,) which involved the agencies of law 
enforcement (police), criminal justice (courts) and human 
services (victim and offender support). Their joint
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purpose was to adopt a common set of policies and 
procedures aimed at providing a uniformed response to 
deal with assailants under the umbrella of D.A.I.P. Nine 
agencies set the objective to reduce the number of 
victims experiencing continued assaults by their 
partners. The intention was to make police and the 
criminal justice system responsible for controlling and 
regulating the offender's conduct, offering educa - 
tional and support services to change the assailants beha­
viour, whilst increasing options for women victims.
The whole process, in the first instance, depended on the 
arrest of the offender. Police policy was fully to 
utilise police powers of arrest. The law allowed 
officers to make arrests on domestic assault calls 
involving co-habiting adults, if the arrest was made 
within four hours of the alleged assault and there was 
visible signs of injury to the victim. Although officers 
initially resisted the concept that discretion to arrest 
should be eliminated, it was found that such a policy had 
a significant effect on repeat calls. Data showed that 
there was a gradual decrease in repeat calls to victims 
whose partners had been arrested. It was found that 
before the policy was started police had prior contact 
with 73% of the assailants. During the six months 
following the adoption of the policy this figure dropped 
to 38% and, 7 - 1 2  months afterwards, it had 
significantly reduced to only 16%. The suggestion was 
that the arrest policy appeared to have a deterrent 
effect on many of the offenders. However, one must guard 
against such assertions based on such a short period of 
evaluation.
The prosecution of the case was dealt with by a dedicated 
advocate who was assigned to work with each victim from 
the time of his or her initial contact with the City
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Attorney’s Office. The advocates office did not adopt a 
stringent "no drop" approach but favoured a "case by 
case" policy. The previous practice of dropping charges 
against the assailant, upon the victim’s request in 
writing, was eliminated. One of the results of this 
approach was a higher rate of guilty pleas at court. 
Researchers discovered there was no coercion of 
defendants and apparently the most frequent reason given 
for pleading guilty was that he had been caught ! Whilst 
I would accept that these findings may also indicate an 
increase in plea bargaining, I would argue that the 
important lesson was that many more defendants were being 
convicted as a direct result of better co-operation 
between the agencies.
The judiciary agreed that offenders who appeared before 
them would be dealt with by way of three sentencing 
options
1. jail sentence with no probation
2. a stayed jail sentence which included as part of a 
probation condition;
a) chemical dependency treatment and
b) participation in counselling and educational 
programme and
3) a jail sentence, partially stayed, with probation 
attached to the D.A.I.P. as a condition
Initially some clients failed to attend the counselling 
sessions but, when probation officers reported the facts 
to the court, the offenders were then given jail 
sentences. Such a positive stance had a profound effect 
on the increased attendance of subsequent convicted 
offenders. A criticism of this type of court mandated
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system was that coerced treatment was usually less 
effectual than treatment given to participants who 
volunteered. This was a very difficult area because few 
men will admit they have a problem and will therefore be 
reluctant to attend such voluntary sessions. This 
aspect is further discussed by me in my section on "Self 
Help Group for Men".
Counselling was done jointly by four separate 
counselling agencies under a joint co-operative 
agreement. This avoided setting up and financing a new 
agency. The strategy for counselling was on the 
offender and not on the marriage or relationship. PENCE 
(1982) believed that traditional counselling agencies 
had perhaps done a disservice to victims and 
perpetrators of battering by using marital or couples 
counselling which focussed on the family system and 
relationships as the cause of battering. The initial 
goal for offender counselling was to end the violence; 
once the violence had ended, relationship counselling 
was offered to couples having on-going contact with the 
agency.
Therapists were interviewed after six months of the 
programme and were convinced that focussing on the
violence as a first treatment goal was very beneficial
to assailants. One of the monitoring measures showed
there was a reduced number of subsequent reported 
assaults by offenders who had attended the counselling 
sessions.
PENCE considered that there were two main reasons which 
trap a woman in an abusive relationship, i.e. lack of 
information about battering and lack of opportunity, for 
at least a short time, to stand outside the 
relationship. In 1977 a women’s collective was
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established and they formed a "safe house" (called a 
shelter) where emergency housing and advocacy services 
were available to women victims of domestic violence. 
After much discussion the shelter collective decided to 
support a mandatory arrest policy and a vigorous 
prosecution effort. They believed that a community 
response, which actively employed court sanctions to 
control the assailant's continued use of violence was a 
first and necessary step in eroding cultural and 
community messages that had in the past ostensibly 
legitimised the use of violence in domestic 
relationships.
Two additional services were provided by the shelter 
collective. First, weekly educational groups for women 
were made available and, second, a 24 hour, on call, 
community advocacy programme was maintained to provide 
immediate home visits to victims following the arrest of 
an assailant.
In 1983 the Minnesota State Legislature developed a 
system of protection and support to victims. The law 
was extended to give the police power to make an arrest 
without warrant for domestic abuse inflicted by 
offenders against former spouses, persons with whom they 
had lived in the past and persons who had borne a child 
regardless of whether they had been married or had lived 
together at an time. This was a very significant 
extension of the definition of abusing victims to 
include ex-cohabitees and ex-spouses whom it was found 
were just as frequently assaulted by their ex-partners. 
This was a view which was embraced in policy, some while 
later, by the Metropolitan Police in London.
In conclusion, the D.A.I.P. scheme focussed, inter alia 
on recognising all domestic violence as a crime.
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encouraging positive action by the police to arrest, 
supporting victims by way of providing shelter and 
advocacy advice whilst offering court mandated 
counselling support to offenders. I believe the most 
effective approach to reducing domestic violence must 
come from a joint strategy between agencies but as will 
be seen later, unfortunately, I did not have such co­
ordinated help available to me in Streatham.
As will be seen in the next section, another good example 
of agencies working together, to provide an effective 
service for victims of spousal assault, was found in London, 
Ontario where "Crisis Intervention" was the approach to the 
problem.
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CRISIS INTERVENTION
Crisis intervention theory postulated that crises are
temporary periods in which a person is under extreme 
stress, resulting in a disruption of that person's
lifestyle. A state of disequilibrium, helplessness, and 
acute emotional upset are not uncommon in victims. The 
theory was that these emotional difficulties could be 
overcome with the help of others, e.g. trained social 
worker, psychologist, or counsellor. ROBERTS (1983) 
suggested that crisis intervention could help a battered 
woman to focus on the stressful situation and, during
the short time of intensive intervention, learn new
coping methods. ROBERTS, however, highlighted the
dangers in relying solely on these schemes to provide an 
answer to the problems of victims. He said:
"Crisis intervention can certainly be 
beneficial and may result in improved 
coping and functioning. However, it 
should be noted that crisis
intervention with battered women is 
not a cure all. Too often crisis
intervention is seen as the final 
rehabilitative step for battered 
women. On the contrary, intervention
programmes are only the beginning in
the establishment of a comprehensive 
network of services for abused
women".
Before describing how one of these crisis intervention 
projects linked in with the police it is relevant to make 
a few comments about the influence of the women's 
movement, particularly in Canada, which brought to the 
fore the great need for society to give co-ordinated help 
to women victims of violence.
During the 1970's and 80's the women's movement,
particularly the battered women's movement, challenged the
25
criminal justice and social service system about its 
historic response, or lack of response, in wife abuse 
cases, e.g. LANGLEY & LEVY (1985) reported that arrest 
occurred only in 3% of cases, SMITH (1989) suggested 
police had "traditionally adopted a formal non-arrest 
policy". Partly as a result of this lobbying effort by 
women the Canadian government began to respond and a 
variety of new programmes and policies were implemented 
both at a national and local level. Whilst some feminists 
were critical of state interference because they argued 
that it de-politicised the issue, others viewed the 
state's interest as converging with women's interests, 
e.g. URSEL (1990). ROCK (1987) described the work of 
these pressure groups as an important confluence of 
policies and politics and that it was the feminists who 
began to address the problems of the victimised woman. He 
contended that what feminists accomplished in the instance 
of "crisis intervention" was the "transformation of a 
burdensome and hazardous operational problem of law 
enforcement into an illustration of existential situation 
for women". ROCK considered that up until the time 
feminists put pressure on the government police were at a 
loss about how to proceed and there was a sense that local 
service agencies were ill co-ordinated and inadequate. 
This was a view that was shared by URSEL (1990) who saw 
the greatest success, of the battered women's movement, as 
being the level of legitimacy which the issue of wife 
assault had acquired in the public eye. This legitimacy, 
URSEL emphasised, created the political will to proceed 
with the development of these victim initiatives.
One such initiative was organised at London, Ontario where 
the police were assisted by the FAMILY CONSULTANT SERVICE 
whose main objective was:
"Immediate assessment of, and
intervention in, crisis situations
26
and arrange referrals to appropriate 
community resources".
Other aims included facilitating increased understanding 
and co-operation between mental health and law 
enforcement professionals and towards this specific goal 
they provided "in service" and field training for police 
officers in the area of crisis theory.
Most importantly the family consultant service was 
located at the police headquarters. It operated 7 days a 
week and almost 24 hours per day. The staff consultants 
were mobile and in constant radio contact with police 
communications. This allowed for immediate assistance 
when police were involved in calls needing the expertise 
of the consultants. At the time of writing this thesis 
the service has been operating for nearly 20 years. 
BROEMLING (1986) said of the project that its primary 
mandate, crisis intervention, capitalised on both the 
mobility and immediacy of contact by the police and the 
available community resources in the mental health and 
criminal justice systems. She thought the service 
endeavoured to provide a sensitive and therapeutic 
bridging between these systems. JAFFE (1984) described 
the consultants as "service brokers" in the sense that 
they identified the appropriate community resource to 
match the needs of the client and thereafter referred, or 
negotiated, with the other agencies involved in the 
delivery of the most relevant service to the victim. 
Research on the effectiveness of the service found that 
the family consultant involvement reduced the number of 
calls back by the police to the same address regardless 
of the form of resolution. By reviewing calls to police 
20 months before and 20 months after the intervention 
researchers found that repeat calls were reduced by one 
third. In fact these repeat calls were further analysed
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and it was found that few related to repeat domestic 
violence. It is true to say that the reduction could be 
interpreted in more ways than one, e.g. it could be that 
victims wanted to have less to do with the police. SMITH 
(1989) was also critical of this research. As she 
pointed out there were many reasons for people failing to 
make calls back to the police. That said, I believe 
these research findings should not stand alone but should 
be considered with other comments made about the scheme. 
JAFFE, FINLEY and WOLFE (1984) highlighted that previous 
research, completed with the family consultant service, 
showed a positive correlation between repeat calls and an 
increasing likelihood of family violence. This finding 
was important in that it underlined the importance of 
police and other agencies doing everything possible to 
prevent repeat calls. JAFFE, FINLEY and WOLFE thought 
that the evaluations of this scheme had been very
encouraging and they pointed to the attitude surveys of 
police officers. These repeatedly indicated that the 
Family Consultant Service was considered to be a valuable 
and integral part of the police force's response to 
domestic violence. JAFFE (1984) wrote that a crucial
factor in the development of this programme was the 
receptiveness of the ideas by the police force,
especially at chief and senior officer level. Support 
was spread throughout the force by the initial training 
programme and the informal contacts made between the 
police and the family consultants.
Another important part of this programme was the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of police policy which 
directed officers to lay charges where reasonable and
probably grounds existed that the assault took place. 
The result was a dramatic increase, in police laying 
assault charges, from 2.7% in 1979 to 67.3% in 1983. The 
proportion of cases which were heard in the criminal
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court rose from 1 in 16 to 3 out of 4. BURRIS and JAFFE 
(1983), whilst writing about the Ontario scheme, 
concluded that the traditional attitudes to domestic 
violence, which resulted in their non-enforcement of the 
criminal law, could be changed provided police officers 
had clear policy guidelines encouraging such decisive 
action. SMITH (1989) however was more cautious. She 
thought that changes in police behaviour might have been 
seen as more dramatic, but, changes in attitude were more 
ambivalent.
When victims were interviewed by researchers, a 
significant number feared retaliation or increased 
violence from their spouse, as a result of the police 
laying charges policy. What actually happened was the 
opposite. It was found that victims were more likely to 
be faced with new threats and/or assaults when no charged 
were laid. This policy change resulted in a considerable 
decrease in women seeking to withdraw charges and an 
increase in victim satisfaction with the positive arrest 
policy shown by police.
Two reservations should be made about these particular 
data. Firstly, London had considerable professional and 
counselling services available to give back up support, 
especially for victims. Victims, therefore, knew if they 
came forward they would get long term help and support. 
Second, the results were presented in the form of group 
data. Individual case satisfaction may well deviate 
depending on the number of variables applied to that 
particular case, e.g. the nature of the victim, the 
alleged offender, the history of police interventions and 
the nature of community support services.
Finally there were some very important lessons, for the 
police policy makers, emanating from this project. They
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included that the traditional and negative police 
behaviour and attitudes could be changed with clear 
policy guidelines and arresting and charging offenders 
were very important to victims who were more likely to be 
threatened or assaulted, if no charges were laid.
I will next consider other research to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the "arrest” approach by police to these 
types of crimes.
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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE POLICE ARREST
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ARREST STRATEGIES - EARLY POSITIVE RESULTS
As an experienced police officer I have always felt that 
our most effective weapon against crime was the arrest of 
the offender. I would contend that the average police 
officer is not equipped, and has not been trained, in 
social work, marriage guidance or counselling skills. 
Undoubtedly at the scene of a crime most police officers 
can give victims advice, compassionate help and guidance, 
however, I believe an equally important role for the 
officer is to take every step to find and arrest the 
perpetrator. So I was particularly interested in reading 
the research findings into the effect of arresting 
offenders of domestic violence.
An important step forward in the policing of these 
incidents was seen in Minneapolis where a change of policy 
in 1984 attracted important research by SHERMAN and BERK. 
The experiment was conducted to discover which of the 
three alternative policing approaches of mediation, 
separation or arrest was the most effective in reducing 
subsequent violence against victims. Prior to the project 
local police officer's response to these incidents was 
influenced, in at least three different ways. The 
officer's colleagues might have recommended forced 
separation as the best way of achieving short term peace. 
Alternatively, an officer's trainer might have recommended 
mediation as a means of getting to the underlying cause of 
the dispute and alternatively, local feitiminist groups were 
insistent that the police role was to arrest the offender 
to best protect the victim.
The design of the experiment was centred on simple 
domestic assaults where both the suspect and victim were 
present when the police arrived at the scene of the crime. 
Thirty four police officers volunteered to take part in
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two busy Minneapolis precincts which had the highest 
density of domestic violence. The officers agreed to give 
up their arrest discretion and take whatever action was 
dictated to them by a random adjudication of either 
arrest, separation or giving some form of advice. The 
method attempted to ensure that those arrested, advised 
and ordered out of the house were roughly comparable in 
age, education, income, rate of offending, percentage of 
black or white and whether intoxicated.
Two "outcomes" were measured. One was the "police 
recorded" failure of the offender to survive a six month 
follow up period without the police having to generate a 
written report on the suspect for domestic violence. This 
was measured through an offence, or arrest report, written 
by any officer in the department through a subsequent 
report to the project. Second, there was a series of 
interviews with the victims in which they were asked if 
there had been any repeat incidents with the same suspect. 
Broadly speaking the definition of a further incident 
included an actual assault, threatened assault or property 
damaged.
The researchers found that each police intervention 
resulted in no repeat violence in the 24 hours following 
the incident. Over the next six months the arrested 
offenders were half as likely to commit repeat violence as 
the non-arrested offenders. About 18% of all offenders 
repeated their violence, while only 10% of those arrested 
committed further assaults in the experimental period. 
This research tended to show that arresting offenders, as 
a policing strategy, had the greatest deterrent effect. 
These findings were subject to some reservations and 
SHERMAN and BERK drew the following conclusions from their 
work:
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a) There was no evidence that deterrence will work in 
general but swift imposition of a sanction, of 
temporary incarceration, may deter male offenders in 
domestic assault cases.
b) The police fears that arrests in domestic violence 
cases can make violence worse, were largely 
groundless.
c) The police felt that making an arrest was a waste of 
their time without the application of swift and 
severe sanctions by the courts. They felt arrest and 
booking alone, had no bite. However, results at 
court indicated that only 3 of the 136 arrested 
offenders were formally punished by fines or 
subsequent incarceration. This gave some weight to 
two propositions. Firstly, initial incarceration 
alone may produce a deterrent effect regardless of 
how the courts treated such cases and second, arrest 
can make an independent contribution to the 
deterrence potential of the criminal justice system.
d) The police policy makers had to be wary about making 
policy based on a single experiment.
SHERMAN, whilst conceding that further experiments could 
change the conclusions, argued that the police would be 
negligent in failing to arrest now that there was some 
evidence that arrest can have a deterrent effect on an 
assailant.
The methodology and reliability of the findings in 
Minneapolis have been scrutinised by other specialists 
HORLEY (1989) was critical of the six month evaluation 
period which she argued was inadequate to assess re­
offending rates. This was particularly so when one
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considered other research which showed how men can deceive 
woman about their behaviour patterns. WALKER (1981) found 
that a cycle of violence existed in most domestic violence 
situations. This process, which can occur over a 
considerable period of time, was described by FERGUSON 
(1987). He said that, following an assault by her social 
partner, a woman would frequently ask officers to arrest 
him and be willing to prosecute. The arrested man, after 
being released from police custody, or court detention, 
and perhaps feeling guilty about his actions, would over 
the next few weeks or months, be as an accommodating 
partner as possible to the woman. She might well then be 
deceived into thinking that he has changed his violent 
ways and might then regret having him arrested and 
charged. Often, at about this same time, the court case 
came to trial. A woman victim, who had been deceived by 
an assailant, would then decide not to testify because the 
man was apparently "sorry for what he had done". The 
court case would invariably be dismissed, the man released 
without sanction and, within a period of time, he would 
resume his cycle of violence against the victim. If this 
theory, which has gained much support, was accepted then 
great caution needed to be attached to any conclusion 
about re-offending rates over such a short period of time.
EDWARDS (1989) was also critical in a number of ways. She 
suggested that the requirement of random assignment meant 
that the more serious cases were excluded and, in any 
case, officers may have left out certain cases themselves 
by not reporting them. This was born out by the 
researchers who had noted that most officers only reported 
two or three cases, whilst three officers accounted for 
nearly 28% of the sample. EDWARDS also pointed out that 
the deterrent impact of advice and information would vary 
considerably depending on the quality of advice and effort 
made by the individual officer.
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The results might well have been very different had there 
been a special back up counselling system such as could be 
found in Duluth. The experiment was also criticised for 
its use of volunteer officers the significance of which 
was that little was done to change the attitude of the 
vast majority of other officers, many of whom still held 
entrenched negative views about this type of crime.
SMITH (1989) considered the research findings from another 
angle. She thought it could well be the case that arrest 
may be a more effective deterrent for different types of 
offenders. For instance, men who did not have a long 
history of abusing their partners, or men who had not 
previously experienced any officer reaction, might well be 
more influenced, and thus more deterred by arrest than men 
who had previously experienced arrest. She also concurred 
with SHERMAN and BERK in that the findings may not apply 
to other types of cities or areas, with perhaps different 
population types, levels of crime and different victim 
support services.
That said, further research in other parts of North 
America tended to agree with the theory that arrest can in 
itself act as a deterrent. As an example in Winnipeg in 
1983, a similar vigorous arrest policy was favoured by 
police. In that year the Attorney General of Manitoba 
directed police to lay charges in all reported cases of 
spouse abuse when there was reasonable and probable 
grounds that an assault had taken place. Prior to this 
directive, wife abuse cases, were treated differently from 
general assault cases in that a victim usually had to 
request that charges be laid against her assailant. Part 
of the research completed by URSEL (1990) revealed that on 
average 70% of individuals arrested for domestic violence 
had prior police records. A high proportion had records 
of assault, either domestic or general. Of particular
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interest was the declining percentage of offenders with 
prior police records for domestic assault after the policy 
was implemented. The statistics tended to suggest that a 
vigorous arrest policy can even have a deterrent effect on 
those offenders with prior police records for domestic 
violence. Again, such conclusions can be criticised as 
they rely on reported, and not actual, crime. The 
following figures illustrate this pattern:
Year 1983 1985 1987
Sample Size 373 522 253
% Prior Records 
for domestic 
assault
44 34 16
URSEL (1990) considered these figures and thought that the 
most optimistic interpretation was that the arrest policy 
was reducing the rate of recidivism in wife assault cases. 
URSEL qualified this by making the somewhat cautious 
comment :
"While there are some studies that 
suggest this pattern, (SHERMAN & BERK 
1984, JAFFE, WOLFE, TELFORD & AUSTIN 
1985), more detailed follow-up 
studies would be necessary to confirm 
that this is the case".
Before moving on to mention further studies, it was 
interesting to note also in Winnipeg, the increased rate 
of victim co-operation with the criminal justice system. 
This was in the light of a positive arrest and 
prosecution policy which seemed to show that the victims 
had greater confidence and satisfaction in this police 
method of dealing with this crime. The following table 
illustrates this:
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Year 1983 1985 1987
Sample Size 373 522 253
Total Charged 629 859 922
% of Court 
Dismissal for 
want of 
prosecution
18% 9% 1%
Stays of 
Prosecution
32% 31% 32%
Victim/Reluctance 
as reason for stay
95% 30% 18%
The table shows that as the arrest policy progressed, the 
charges increased, court dismissal of cases lessened and 
there was a dramatic decrease in the number of victims 
"dropping out" of cases.
The next stage in testing the deterrent theory of arrest 
came from a series of six replication studies in America. 
The findings of the first replication study in 1989 at 
Omaha, have been published. Domestic violence assailants 
received one of three different police actions, i.e. 
arrest, separation or mediation. Approximately 300 couples 
were re-contacted during the six month period after the 
date of the assault. The victims were asked if there had 
been any new episodes of violence after the original 
offence and police records were reviewed and compared 
against victim self report information. Unlike Minneapolis 
no difference was found between the three police approaches 
when measured against repeat domestic violence incidents. 
Arrest, in this experiment, was found to be no better or 
worse a deterrent than separation or mediation.
It is worth noting that, in conjunction with the arrest 
policy, the department developed a plan, with the county 
court system, to apply for arrest warrants for suspects who
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had left the scene prior to the arrival of police. This 
plan alleviated the financial and emotional burden on the 
victims by taking the responsibility for pursuing a 
prosecution away from them. Research showed that in cases 
where a warrant was issued there was twice as much chance 
of the offender being arrested. It was also found that 
when a warrant for arrest was not issued suspects in this 
category were nearly twice as likely to be reported by 
victims for subsequently injuring them when compared to 
cases where warrants were sought.
This was a good illustration of a positive joint response, 
by the courts and the police, which resulted in the victim 
receiving a better a safer service.
Omaha Police Division then reviewed its policy in the light 
of the findings from their own experiment. Since arresting 
the suspect at the scene of the crime did not appear to 
reduce repeated domestic violence, the logical decision for 
police might have been to pursue a non-arrest policy. 
Nonetheless, Omaha found that arresting suspects did not 
produce any added risk of harm to victims, and the policy 
was not perceived as being counter productive to the 
objectives of policing. The positive policy of arrest 
remained and in a press release the department stated:
"Although arrest may not act as a 
deterrent to continued domestic 
violence, often arrest is one 
necessary step in a co-ordinated 
process to break the cycle of 
violence".
This was a most important statement as it recognised the 
vital arrest role the police had in dealing with domestic 
violence. Arrest was seen, by the police policy makers in 
Omaha, as an important intervention process in providing
the most effective help for the victim, as one of many
stages in attempting to alter the behaviour of the 
offender and finally to link in with other agencies in a 
joint strategy to break the cycle of violence.
A discussion of the other studies, some of which challenge 
"Minneapolis" is covered in the next section.
Whilst some states were advocating an arrest policy others 
went further and implemented a mandatory arrest policy for 
police. As an example, in 1979, the state of Washington 
declared its objective for dealing with this type of 
crime :
"It is the intent of the legislature 
that the official response to cases 
of domestic violence shall stress the 
enforcement of the law to protect the 
victim and shall communicate the 
attitude that violent behaviour is 
not excused or tolerated and that 
criminal laws be enforced without 
regard to whether the persons 
involved are or were married, co­
habiting, or involved in a 
relationship".
The state passed a law which made it mandatory for police 
to record all family disturbances handled by them. 
Officers and their supervisors were guided by departmental 
policy and procedures and were expected to exercise 
discretion in deciding which situations should result in 
arrest. The intention of this reporting procedure was to 
bring to notice those cases in which support could be 
given by way of crisis intervention specialists who could 
assist in resolving the conflict. This process backed the 
notion that domestic disputes were better resolved through 
social intervention than by legal action.
By 1984 it was apparent to the authorities that the 
mandatory reporting of incidents was not enough. The
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number of reported incidents greatly increased to show the 
problem was much more serious than had previously been 
realised. As a consequence, in 1984 the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
PREVENTION ACT, was made law. It specified that a "police 
officer shall arrest and take into custody a person who, 
within the preceding 4 hours, had assaulted that person's 
spouse, former spouse or other person with whom the person 
resided or formerly resided". This power was similar to 
that which had been made law in Duluth. FERGUSON (19 87) 
suggested that the impetus behind the policy was the 
belief that the impact of arrest was needed to break the 
cycle of violence. As part of the new policy victims 
received counselling from victim advocates who provided 
close support. FERGUSON noted that this change to a very
positive arrest policy by police had a significant "knock
on" effect on the resources of the processing agencies, 
i.e. police, courts, jail and social services. The 
SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT tried to measure the estimated 
additional cost and found for 1984 and 1985 they would 
have needed an extra 645,000 dollars. In manpower terms 
this would be nine extra policemen ! However, I would 
argue that although such a policy may have additional 
manpower costs in the short term, in the long term the
reverse would probably be the result. My point of view is 
that in the short term more reports would be made by 
police as victims reported more crimes, more arrests would 
be made requiring more police manhours to process the 
cases, but if the arrest process did have a deterrent
effect then eventually the number of reported crimes, 
arrests etc., would fall so that there would be a saving 
of police time. Perhaps most significant in terms of 
police time would be the reduction of police manhours in 
dealing with less "repeat calls". The figures produced by 
URSEL (1990) tended to support this opinion, but, much 
more extensive research would have to be done over a much 
longer period to prove or disprove my belief.
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The results from the Washington project were quite 
dramatic. Domestic violence arrests in 1985 showed a 
520% increase over the same period as 1984 and successful 
prosecutions increased by 300%. It was concluded that 
the increase in successful prosecutions was not due 
solely to the increase in the number of arrests but also 
to the fact that the prosecution was taken out of the 
hands of the victims. Almost all arrests resulted in at 
least one court appearance.
This arrest policy was viewed by some commentators as 
only a provisional solution to the long term problem. 
BITTNER (1985) felt the Police responsibility lay in 
stopping the violence, whilst it was the task of other 
agencies to try and eliminate the causes which led up to 
the assault. BITTNER opined that the role of the Police 
ceased after arrest and that the long term solutions lay 
in the support given to the victim by other agencies.
The development of the mandatory arrest approach was very 
much increased after the Tracy Thurman case in 1985. She 
was the victim of a domestic assault and was awarded 2.6 
million dollars in a liability action against the town of 
Torrington in Connecticut. This historic case set a 
precedent for holding the Police accountable for their 
action, or rather lack of actions, as in the Thurman 
case, when called to investigate domestic violence. 
BANGMAN (1986) writing about Police policy after the 
Thurman case said, "the bottom line is two-fold, the new 
social costs domestic violence will touch every segment 
of society and mediation is no longer an acceptable 
option." BANGMAN, who was Chief of Police in Farrington,
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Connecticut, heralded that the case ended the traditional 
law enforcement approach towards domestic violence and 
suggested the following points of guidance for police 
officers :
a) First, police officers must approach domestic 
violence in the same way as they do any other crime. 
Looking for signs of probable cause puts the focus of 
the Police investigation in a new perspective.
b) Emphasis shall not be on mediation but whether there 
exists probable cause of arrest. Because of the 
nature of domestic assault, and the offender's 
ability to terrorise the victim, the officer should 
give the benefit of the doubt to the victim even 
though this may result in a "false arrest law suit".
c) The administration must establish a written arrest 
policy that mandates arrest when probability cause 
exists. He stated many Police administrators blamed 
courts for not taking cases seriously but, he 
questioned this view, arguing that if the Police 
continued to mediate the arrests the courts would 
never know there was a problem.
The Thurman case was probably the watershed of Police 
response in North America. It changed the traditional 
Police response which was shown to be totally inadequate 
and, indeed, negligent. Police owed a duty of care to 
the victim. This, it was decided, was best carried out 
by arresting the offender.
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However, whilst a mandatory arrest policy ensured an 
offender was arrested, if he was present at the scene of 
the crime, it also sometimes resulted in the victim being 
apprehended (eg., in Connecticut this was reported as 
high as 14% - SHERMAN 1992). Such dual arrests could
therefore run counterproductive to a policy of 
encouraging women victims to come forward the report such 
crimes. SHERMAN 1992 stated that in some cities where 
dual arrests were made the children were put in foster 
homes.
Some States tried to solve this problem by legislating 
for the arrest of the "primary aggressor" but as SHERMAN 
1992 found when he observed the Colorado Springs 
experiment, this too can work against the victim. In one 
case a man was arrested after a woman had hit him, 
apparently he had started the argument and Police deemed 
him the ^primary aggressor*!
So whilst accepting the unfairness of dual arrests, I 
would conclude from this section that arrest was 
generally considered a vital step in breaking the cycle 
of violence, so much so that some States made it 
mandatory. Arrest appeared to act as a deterrent (but 
not always so), the process gave satisfaction to most 
victims and victims did not suffer from any retribution 
by arrested offenders. However, as I will now describe, 
later research findings, from the other replication 
studies, cast some doubt on the deterrent theory of 
arrest.
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ARREST STRATEGIES - REPLICATION STUDIES
The previous section considered some of the results of 
the positive police arrest strategies. In Minneapolis, 
Winnepeg Manitoba and Washington, arrest seemed to show 
real benefits for victims and acted as a better deterrent 
on offenders when compared to other methods for dealing 
this type of violence. However, many of these studies 
were guarded when drawing definite conclusions from their 
analysis of this 'legalistic' approach. Most favoured 
further research (SHERMAN & BERK 1984, URSEL 1990) to 
discover if arrest really was best approach from Police 
to adopt.
This section, therefore, first overviews the findings 
from another positive arrest strategy in Ontario, Canada 
before considering the replication studies of the 
Minneapolis experiment.
An opportunity is taken to focus again on the main 
findings of what SHERMAN and BERK originally found in 
Minneapolis and this is, followed by what was concluded 
at OMAHA, CHARLOTTE, MILWAWKEE, COLORADO SPRINGS and 
MIAMI.
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LONDON ONTARIO 1986-90
The study examined the effectiveness of police officers 
laying charges in domestic violence cases when they had 
reasonable and probably grounds to believe that an 
assault had taken place. The police instructed officers 
to lay charges regardless of the wishes of the parties 
involved. The policy was assessed by inter alia 
interviewing 90 women who were victims of wife assault in 
1988 or 1989 in London Ontario. There were three types 
of police intervention (a) police intervention and 
charges laid, (b) police intervention and no charges laid 
and (c) no police intervention with no charges laid.
The percentage rates of charges in these cases increased 
dramatically from 2.7% in 1979 which was before the 
policy began to 89.9% in 1990. There was some 
significant findings which included that victims were 
more likely to follow through court appearances when 
police laid charges compared to victims laying charges, 
fewer cases were withdrawn during court proceedings when 
police laid charges but more importantly for this thesis, 
victims reported a significant reduction in violence 
after police laid charges than compared to the other two 
approaches. JAFFE, REITZEL, HASTINGS and AUSTIN 1991 
laid caution about these findings and pointed to the need 
to monitor results over a longer period of time. They 
also drew attention to the small percentage of minority 
groups involved in experiment (5%) and to the small 
sample size of those where 'no charges were made'.
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There was also a Co-ordinating Committee set up in 1980 
which found that many professional services were not 
co-ordinated in their approach to family violence. Their 
work not only encouraged co-ordination of services but 
encouraged new services eg., group counselling for 
batterers and a Battered Womans advocacy programme. The 
London Police Force also had a Family Consultant Service 
which was a civilian crisis unit of the police force to 
assist officers to deal with crisis situations such as 
domestic violent. Therefore, during the policy period, 
better support services emerged to help victims and 
offenders. This may have affected the overall results, 
especially when compared to other areas without such 
services.
JAFFE, REITZEL, HASTINGS and AUSTIN 1991 described the 
situation as
"Abused women in London are far more likely to be 
treated with greater understanding and 
sensitivity, provided with consistent information 
and referred to appropriate services than victims 
elsewhere in Canada."
65% of the victims expressed satisfaction at this style 
of police response, a marked increase from 1979 when it 
was 48%. 87% of victims stated they would call police
again.
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Significantly, the researchers found that it was rare 
that there was a complete termination of violence and 
suggested that a greater deterrent impact may come from 
additional community and other interventions rather than 
leaving to police charging strategy.
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MINNEAPOLIS
As discussed earlier, the project was funded under a 
grant from the National Institute for Justice, for the 
Minneapolis Police Department to conduct a randomised, 
controlled experiment from early 1981 to mid 1982. 
SHERMAN 1992 described it as -
"This meant that, as in medical experiments in 
which some randomly selected patients are given a 
new drug while others are given a standard drug 
or placebo, the decision to arrest a person was 
determined by a systematic equal probability 
lottery method."
The experiment tested three different Police responses to 
minor assaults which made up the bulk of Police calls to 
domestic violence call outs. The responses were to 
arrest, attempt to counsel both parties or sending the 
assailant away from home for several hours. Two kinds of 
measure for repeat violence were used by the researchers. 
The first was a six month follow-up period of recorded 
offender repeating domestic violence according to reports 
on Police records and interviews with victims of this 
crime.
The results by official Police records found that sending 
the suspect away produced 24% of cases domestic violence 
was repeated, advising produced 19% and arrest 10%. The 
percentage of repeat violence from victim interviews 
produced slightly different results; 33%, 37%, 19%
respectively. Both official records and interviews of
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victims showed that 'arrest worked best' and acted as a 
better deterrent than the other two methods. The 
researchers pointed to a number of factors which 
suggested a cautious approach should be made in 
interpreting results. They recommended amongst other 
things, that Police should make warrantless arrests in 
misdemeanour domestic violence cases and this was later 
adopted in Maryland and eleven other States.
The researchers recommended against mandatory arrest for 
Police, based on the results, but suggested that other 
replication studies should be carried out in different 
cities with different economic and demographic 
conditions. SHERMAN 1992 concluded that the experiment 
did not prove that arrest worked best in every community 
or for all kinds of people. However, the experiment had 
a significant impact on Police policy makers on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Arrest was seen as the best 
deterrent and this project provided a watershed for 
Police policy making in favour of a positive approach 
away from the traditional Police response of doing as 
little as possible. Interestingly, despite the 
researchers' reservations, sixteen legislatures
thereafter enacted mandatory arrest laws.
After much public debate on the findings, the National 
Institute for Justice supported other replication studies 
at OMAHA, CHARLOTTE, MILWAUKEE METRO-DADE and COLORADO 
SPRINGS. The effectiveness of the 'arrest is best' was 
tested in different areas. Some of the results were
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quite different from Minneapolis and it was these results 
which have thrown doubt on the deterrent theory of 
arrest.
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CMAHA
The experiment started in 1986, 194 officers were
assigned to operate it during the hours 4pm - midnight. 
The criteria for cases to enter the scene were that a 
Police Officer had probable cause for an arrest for 
misdemeanour assault, the case involved a clearly 
identifiable victim and suspect, both parties were over 
18, lived together sometime during the proceeding year 
and neither had an arrest warrant on file.
The outcome of the cases were randomly assigned to 
mediation, separation for eight hours or arrest. The 
results were assessed through official Police report 
records and victim interviews twice over a six month 
period to measure -
(1) Fear of injury;
(2) pushing/hitting; and
(3) physical injury.
It is interesting, from this perspective of this thesis, 
to consider the views of the victims to the Police 
arrest. Ninety seven victims responded to this aspect of 
the survey, sixty per cent indicated that they did not 
want the Police to arrest. Sixty five per cent reported 
that the suspects blamed them for the arrest and twenty 
one per cent indicated that suspects threatened them 
because of the arrest. Ninety three per cent reported 
that Police presence stopped the violence and sixty six
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per cent cited arrest as the reason for the restoration 
of the order. The researchers, however, also concluded 
that victims, whose partners were arrested were no less 
likely to experience repeated violence from their 
partners than had they received any of the other two 
outcomes.
In both Police records and victim interviews the study 
found, unlike Minneapolis, that arresting suspects had no 
more effect on deterring future arrests of complaints 
than did separating or counselling them. DUNFORD, 
HUIZINGA and ELLIOTT 1990 were cautious about these 
results. They thought the findings could not be 
generalised beyond OMAHA nor beyond the types of cases 
defined during the hours of the experiment.
OMAHA had attempted to replicate the Minneapolis study 
but DUNFORD et al were guarded about making comparisons 
because there was significant differences in the 
experiments. SHERMAN et al 1992 pointed to the apparent 
different results obtained from offenders with different 
social status in the prevalence of repeat official 
violence.
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Social Status Arrested Not Arrested
Employed 19% 28%
Unemployed 57% 53%
Married 29% 18%
Unmarried 35% 48%
High School 24% 34%
Drop-out 48% 32%
Whites 17% 27%
Blacks 55% 54%
SHERMAN et al 1992 compared the results to Milwaukee.
He argued that there was a clear deterrence of persons 
with a higher stakes in conformity and much weaker 
evidence of escalation effects of arrest for 'less 
marginal* people. If this opinion was accepted then the 
deterrence impact of arrest for domestic violence 
appeared to have some correlation with the social status 
of the offender.

53
CHARLOTTE
This project started in 1986. It tested the efficacy of 
three different Police ways of handling domestic violence 
cases. The Police action was randomly assigned using one 
of three approaches to either (a) Advising, and possibly 
separating the couple; (b) issuing a citation to the 
offender; or (c) arresting the offender. Measures of 
recidivism were obtained for a period of at least six 
months after the original crime, through official Police 
statistics and victim interviews.
In relation to Police records the prevalence and 
incidence of arrest recidivism after 6 months from the 
date of the incident was 11.8 for the advise/separate 
19.2 for citation and 18.2 for arrest. 76% of offenders 
were re-arrested for assaults against the victim. The
HIRSCHEL 1991 concluded that statistically arrest was not
significantly better or worse than these other two 
treatments. They considered that there was some 
indication that the advise/separate treatment was more 
effective than the other two at reducing subsequent
recidivism on the part of the offender.
After viewing the results from different statistical 
perspectives the report concluded
"Nearly all of the statistical analysis we 
conducted failed to detect any significant 
difference between the treatments. Furthermore, 
the great majority of women have not been 
victims of a repeat incident within the six
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months follow up, and the differences which do 
exist between the treatments in terms of time 
to failure are in our judgement not 
substantially significant These findings in no 
wav would justify Police moving to an informal 
response to spouse assault as a preferral 
action"
The result from the interviews was of a similar pattern. 
Each victim was interviewed twice. First, soon after the 
incident and second after six months. In the second 
interview victims were asked about whether the offender
(1) threatened to hurt her; (2) actually hurt or tried 
to hurt her; (3) threatened to hurt any member of the 
family; (4) actually hurt or tried to hurt any member of 
the family; (5) threatened to damage property; and (6) 
actually damaged property. The type of recidivism 
reported most frequently by victim were threatened to 
hurt, tried to hurt and actually hurt the victim.
HIRSCHEL 1991 found that of all the examples of 
recidivism arrest only appeared to be the best deterrent 
in the category of 'threat to property* but this was not 
found to be statistically significant. In a similar way 
to the Police records the researchers concluded that 
arresting offenders was no more effective than the other 
two treatments in deterring subsequent abuse, nor was it 
any the less effective.
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The researchers opined
"The results are decisive and unambiguous and 
indicate that arrest of misdemeanour spouse 
abuser is neither substantially nor 
statistically a more effective deterrent to 
repeat abuse then either of the other two 
Police responses".
The researchers attempted to speculate on why their 
results might have been different from Minneapolis. 
Perhaps the main question which needed an answer was why 
was arrest seemingly a deterrent in one place and not 
another. They attempted to do this. First they
highlighted that the majority of male offenders had 
previous criminal records so arrest was not an unusual
experience for them. Second they found that for many of 
the couples, abuse was a common rather than occasional 
occurrence. Third, they found that arrest was not backed 
up by much "time in jail" with many having a quick 
release, and fourth they found few offenders were found 
guilty and given a custodial sentence. All of, or some
of these, may have contributed to giving a different
result from Minneapolis.
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MILWAUKEE
The controlled experiment took place in districts of the 
city which were racially and economically diverse but 
most of the cases came from the poor black areas. An 
analysis of the offenders illustrated this seventy six 
per cent were black, sixty four per cent never married to 
the victim, fifty five per cent were unemployed and fifty 
per cent had a prior Police record. The project compared 
a standing verbal warning to the offender at the time 
with arrest and detention for three and twelve hours. 
Unlike the Minneapolis experiment, where offenders were 
kept overnight, it was intended to also determine 
whether different periods of detention affected the
results. Whilst the official findings have yet to be 
published SHERMAN, SCHMIDT, ROGAN, SMITH, GARTIN, COHN, 
COLLINS, BACICH 1992 reported that this experiment found 
no evidence of an overall long term deterrent effect of 
arrest. There was some evidence of a deterrent effect
for up to thirty days, but by one year later arrest and
both sets of detention produced an escalating effect when 
compared to the warning. The first reported act of
violence, following an arrest occurred on average 20% 
sooner than it did following the warning treatment. The 
researchers also drew attention to the different effect 
arrest had on different groups of people. SHERMAN 1992 
referred to these groups as 'The Haves' and 'The Have 
Nots'. The employed, married, high school graduates and 
white suspects were less likely to have any incident of 
repeat violence if they were arrested than if they were 
not. Unemployed, unmarried, high school drop outs and 
black suspects on average were reported much more
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frequently for domestic violence if they were arrested 
than if they were not. The magnitudes of the increased 
domestic violence with this latter group associated with 
arrest were substantial in some categories. SHERMAN et 
al 1992 was cautious about the significance of these 
results as the social background of re-offenders of other 
offences was not known. In other words this pattern may 
be replicated in other offences, types and would have 
little bearing on the offence of domestic violence. 
SHERMAN et al 1992 thought the short term implications of 
this dilemma for public policy were daunting. Arrest can 
escalate violence, not deter, and they concluded that 
there was a need for other approaches to the control of 
domestic violence amongst socially marginal groups.
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COLORADO SPRINGS
In Colorado Springs the experiment randomly assigned one 
of the four treatments of (1) arrest of the suspect 
coupled with an emergency protection order (to stay away 
from the victim) and issued by the Police at the scene.
(2) Immediate crises counselling for the suspect at 
Police Headquarters coupled with an emergency protection 
order but no arrest. (3) An emergency protection order 
and (4) restoring order, advising at the scene with no 
arrest, counselling or protection order. SHERMAN et al 
1992 highlighted differences in this experiment from the 
others, one of them being that an assault had only 
occurred in 38% of the cases. There was also more use 
made of protection orders in three of the categories.
At the time of writing this thesis the official report 
has not been published. SHERMAN et al 1992 reported that 
the official data showed that the arrest process did not 
deter repeat violence. However, the victim interviews 
showed that arrest was a deterrent.
SHERMAN thought this result may be due to the fact the 
experiment went, in relation to offence type included in 
collection data, beyond assault reporting (harassment 
formed 54% of all reports, menacing 3% and false 
imprisonment 2%). His inference being that the arrest 
may have a deterrent impact on harassment rather than 
assault. Unfortunately the full data breakdown was not 
available to further break down this analysis. He did 
use the data to support his "have" and the "have not"
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theory. There was, as an example, a stronger deterrent 
effect among the employed and married that the unemployed 
and unmarried.
MIAMI METRO DADE
In Miami, the Minneapolis results were very closely 
repeated. Two out of the three outcomes measured showed 
the deterrent effect of arrest.
The experiment randomly assigned four different 
treatments. The first was arrest with no follow-up, the 
second arrest with a follow-up visit by a special Police 
unit, the third no arrest and the fourth no arrest with a 
follow-up visit by the Police unit.
The official Police report record showed no increase in 
repeat violence indicating that arrest had no impact on 
deterrent rates. SHERMAN et al 1992 opined this could 
well have been due to the poor Police response of 
officers not reporting the violence when the suspect had 
gone.
However, the victim interviews showed quite different 
results. At the time of the initial interviews, 18% of 
no arrest victims reported at least one repeat incident 
in which the suspect hit, slapped, hurt or tried to hurt 
the victim. This compared to 10% in the arrested group. 
At the six month interview, 27% of the no arrest group 
reported repeat violence whilst there was only 15% of 
victims suffering repeat violence in the arrest group.
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The numbers of repeat offences however, was low. Out of 
the 465 arrested persons, only 5 were re-arrested for at 
least one offence.
At the time of writing this report the Miami report has 
not been released but SHERMAN et al 1992 speculated that 
one reason for this figure might be the high level of 
marriage rate (79%) indicating there was a high degree of 
conformity in this group who had, as he saw it, a real 
stake in society.
In conclusion, these replication studies focused on the 
different results which emanated from the arrest 
strategies by the Police. SHERMAN 1992 compared the war 
on domestic violence to the war against cancer. He 
thought that domestic violence was a complex as cancer 
and equally difficult to treat. He suggested that if he 
conclusion was accepted, the there was a need for many 
more experiments. He wrote
"As of 1987, only 10 chemical substances had been 
found moderately to highly effecting cancer. 
Approximately 500,000 potential substances had 
been tested to discover those 10 effective 
treatments. So far, the number of different 
treatments of misdemeanour domestic violence we 
have subjected to controlled experiments is eight, 
the number found always effective is zero."
I will now go on to consider the advantages and
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disadvantages of 'arrest' as a Police strategy before 
considering other evidence whether arrest is effective on 
its own to deter future violence.
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OTHER VIEWS ON THE USE OF POLICE ARREST
Although arrest was viewed as having many advantages it 
seemed that for the Police policy maker other additional 
strategies needed to be explored to enhance any deterrent 
impact of arrest. This view was expressed by EDWARDS 
1989 who thought if criminalisation of marital violence 
was the way forward, arrest and prosecution policy 
unaccompanied by other measures to protect victims from 
repeated violence would have 'disastrous consequences'. 
She suggested inter alia that shelters and emergency 
accommodation were urgently required together with 
greater co-operation between agencies. SMITH 1989 
thought an effective domestic violence response involved 
more than medically treating injuries and ensuring the 
law was enforced. She pointed out that research had 
shown that the attitudes of those involved with agencies, 
which assisted domestic violence, favoured women in a 
subordinate role to men. She thought these attitudes 
needed to be confronted before domestic violence was to 
be successfully tackled.
A similar opinion was expressed by STANKO - "No matter 
how sensitive and sympathetic the Police became they will 
never be able to provide protection against everyday 
violence". She viewed domestic violence as the struggle 
against womens' oppression and that women demanded they 
no longer had to face the risk of physical and sexual 
abuse at the hands of men who promise protection. In the 
fight against male violence she said it was important 
also that 'women defined' strategies be aimed at 
intervention on every level of society. First she
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expressed the importance of strategies aimed at 
encouraging friends, co-workers , counsellors to help 
break the cycle of silence which surrounded this crime by 
listening to and supporting victims. eg., HOFF 1990 in 
her research found that close relatives strongly 
disapproved of domestic violence and were generally 
supportive of daughters and sisters and willing to help. 
Second she drew attention to the obstacles found in 
legislation and Court procedure eg., defence Attorneys, 
discrediting female witnesses by referring to previous 
sexual behaviour. Third to change institutional prejudice 
shown against women by challenging those in decision 
making capacities which she said contained heavily 
entrenched male points of view, eg., monitoring Police 
behaviour or participating in the training of Police or 
Court personnel.
These views supported the need for a multi agency 
approach, not just to tackle the symptoms but, to reach 
the causes so that multi agency strategies could be 
adopted to deter violence. HOFF 1990 however, found that 
formal networks, except womens' shelters, for the most 
part were either negative or indifferent to women 
victims. The women victims who were interviewed, sensed 
that institutional representatives eg., housing 
authorities, regarded battering as 'taboo' and that they 
were shunned rather than helped. SMITH 1990 wrote that 
solutions, including deterrence, had to go beyond the 
machinery of the criminal law to be really effective.
"In short, an integrated response by the whole
community was required".
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An example of this type of structured and co-ordinated 
response was recommended by McGIBBON, COOPER and KELLY 
1989.
In their final report on the support services in the 
Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham when they listed some 
of these services and strategies as follows
General Council Policy
(1) Produce a full and detailed Council policy on 
domestic violence.
(2) Set up a working party to monitor Council response 
to domestic violence
Black and Ethnic Minority Women
Information on domestic violence and local services to be 
available in all languages in written and typed form.
Older Women
All Council information on domestic violence to reflect 
the fact that women may decide to seek support, leave
violent men at any age, sometimes after many years of
suffering abuse.
Women and Disabilities
All information produced to be available on tape and in
brailles with interpretating services to include sign 
language.
Lesbians
All training should include discussion of violence to
lesbians.
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Housing
Extending 'move on' offers to both local refuges to be 
seen as a matter of priority, in order that they can 
function effectively as crisis provision.
Refuges
The Council should commit itself to securing the future 
of both groups, financially, should other sources of 
funding disappear.
Law and Enforcement
There is a need to produce and monitor full statistics 
about the Police response. There is a need for more 
women officers to handle domestic violence 
incidents.There is a need to research 'the Police 
practice* as opposed to policy.
Voluntary Sector
Investigate the possibility of funding a 24 hour crisis 
support service for woman and children who have 
experience of domestic violence.
There was a need for networking between voluntary groups 
and that it be publicised.
Similar conclusions were reached by the National Victim 
Support Scheme which set up a working party in 1990 to 
see whether the services currently available to victims, 
of this crime, met their needs. Their Inter Agency 
Working Party on Domestic Violence recommended that a 
Government Department should be given responsibility and 
resources to co-ordinate work on domestic violence.
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Locally a multi-agency domestic violence forum should be 
set up with clear aims, objectives and funding. All the 
organisations in the community, which hade contact with 
such victims should improve and widen their local
knowledge about sources of help in order to increase
access to those services. They endorsed the notion of 
arrest by stating that offences of domestic violence 
should be treated with no less seriousness than crimes of 
violence in other contexts. The Police, they 
recommended, should do all in their power to ensure the 
safety of women, both immediately and in the future.
Most of these commentaries recognise the need for a
co-ordinated multi-agency support strategy was necessary 
to give help to victims of this crime and none opined
that the answer solely lay with the Police or Criminal 
Justice System.
My final contribution in this section is to examine the 
impact of the Police arrest in other countries.
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INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF ARREST STRATEGIES
The purpose of this part is to take a ’snapshot* at the 
effectiveness of arrest in two other countries, i.e., 
Australia and the Netherlands.
Some of the responses in Britain, Canada and USA are 
covered in other parts of this literature review.
An example of the Australian perspective can be viewed 
through the research completed in New South Wales. The 
New South Wales Domestic Violence Committee in 1983 
evaluated the legislative needs in 1983 and thereafter in 
1987 the Law Reform Task Force on Violence Against Women 
and Children looked at the need for legislative changes. 
This law then clarified Police powers and included rights 
of entry and if refused a radio telephone warrant could 
be obtained from a Magistrate. A Protective Order which 
lasted for six months, could also be applied for and 
officers were given a power of arrest if there was a 
breach. The sum of the legislation was described in the 
1985 in the report of the New South Wales Domestic 
Violence Committee as:-
. **A clear determination to make the Police and the 
Courts more effective in dealing with domestic 
violence’*.
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HATTY 1989 researched the results by specifically looking 
at the promotion of the law as a primary means of 
addressing male violence. She questioned 500 general 
duty police officers, observed a random sample of 
officers actually dealing with 238 incidents and 
interviewed them following each incident. She also 
placed a questionnaire addressed to women victims in 
national family magazines with an extensive female 
readership.
She found a large divide between the intention of the 
policy makers and the action of police officers in
practice. She found that even when women were injured
arrest only occurred in 36% of cases and even then Police 
were most reluctant to use their powers under the new 
domestic violence laws,but tended to use other 
legislation which was traditionally used to control 
behaviour in the public domain (eg. drunkeness). Officers 
displayed misogynist attitudes and behaviour towards 
female victims. They divided the community into 
'deserving victims' and 'hopeless families’. Within 
these categories officers often attributed responsibility 
to the women for the violence or showed disrespect for
her position. The results were often manifested in
failure to arrest or placing the onus on these women to 
initiate legal proceedings. HATTY found three main 
Police beliefs about women victims which influenced 
Police non action. Officers conceptualised any behaviour 
departures of the women from the accepted standards of 
mothering and housekeeping as contributory factors 
towards violence. The second was the male perception of 
the woman’s responsibility for the violence. Officers
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did not seek to understand the behaviour from a from a 
woman's viewpoint. Third, and HATTY thought most 
'potent' was most officers believed that women, subjected 
to abuse, were psychologically abnormal and 
psychiatrically disturbed. She also found that officers 
found excuses for male behaviour such as merely reacting 
to a cluster of social stresses. HATTY said:-
"The Police, then, construct and perpetuate a 
dichotomous set of beliefs in which women are 
cast as failures or oppressors and men as heroic 
victims"
From the questionnaire she elucidated that women adopted 
a series of well considered tactics to placate the 
violent male, a situation found in other parts of the 
world, STANKO 1985, HOFF 1990. Women cited financial 
and social dependency, protectiveness towards children, 
shame and fear as factors which deterred them from 
leaving their relationship. The respondents thought 
police officers conceptualised victims as either 
manipulative, vindictive or masochistic and denied the 
sadist behaviour of violent men and the degree to which 
women abhorred violence. Women reported a 'pronounced 
distrust' of the criminal justice system and 
disappointment and frustration at police performance.
EDWARDS 1989, in discussing the New South Wales Police 
response, thought that whenever traditional police 
attitudes remain uncontested, although policy directives
70
gave the appearance of change, real change would only 
occur in dealing with the more serious cases and not 
minor assaults.
HATTY 1989 concluded that the juxtaposition of police 
attitudes and womens' experiences, in New South Wales, 
revealed an enormous disparity between male belief and 
'female reality'. She thought it signalled the futility 
of promoting the law as the primary solution to violence 
against women.
This example of an Australian Police approach illustrated 
the need for policy to be monitored and evaluated to 
ensure that the intention of the policy maker happened in 
practice.
In the next section a consideration is made of the Police 
approach in the Netherlands where there was an absence of 
policy.
The effect of both strategies has been observed as not 
being very encouraging from the perspective of the woman 
victim ZOOMER 1989, HATTY 1989.
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The policing of women battering in the Netherlands was 
researched by Olga J. ZOOMER in Eindhaven, which was the 
fifth largest town with a mixed population in excess of 
nearly 200,000. The research was funded by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs. Some of the questions the research 
addressed was to (a) find the rationales underlying 
police actions and, (b) was advocating more arrests in 
accordance with what battered women actually wanted?
ZOOMER was critical of the government because it had not 
issued police guidelines for dealing with domestic 
violence but had confined their policy to giving 
directions for victims of rape and sexual assault. This 
was disappointing because a study conference, which was 
followed by a series of government papers, had advocated 
a stronger position for victims of violence through 
legislation, better police performance combined with a 
more active prosecution policy. She pointed out that the 
traditional police response strategies was around 
'conflict management', dispute settlement skills, crisis 
intervention and mediation. A change of Police approach 
was not pioneered by their government but ZOOMER 1989, 
suggested a more positive police role had been influenced 
by the workers from the local refuges. They acted as a 
pressure group and were insistent police should point out 
more often to victims there was the option of making a 
formal complaint.
The project consisted of analysing police files and 
conducting interviews wit 47 Police Officers and twenty 
two women who had been victims.
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The police files showed that when Police were called to 
the scene of a domestic disturbance they were most likely 
to limit their response to calm the parties down, mediate 
or do nothing. There was, however, despite this, a 
significant increase of arrests from 6% in 1984 to 40% in 
1985. She found that n 40% of the calls Police had 
previously been summoned to the address for the same 
reason. There was not a well considered Police policy as 
she found therefore, that different Police Officers were 
giving different advice to the same victims. The service 
therefore lacked consistency in the approach.
In a similar way to other studies (EDWARDS 1989 HATTY 
1989), she found negative attitudes and assumptions 
inherent in officers. They placed domestic violence into 
two categories 'just arguments' and 'real woman beating'. 
The following summaries of the views stated by officers 
best describe their lack of sensitiveness to the plight 
facing domestic violence victims.
'Domestic violence is more or less a natural 
outgrowth of marital relations"
"Wife beating is a legitimate means of control for a 
husband"
"Women are unreliable complainants"
"Most of them saw the victim as partly responsible" 
"Woman beating is incidental, unattended and 
unfortunate events that are best forgotten about as 
soon as possible"
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ZOOMER considered that officers did not see men as 
offenders nor women as victims. She got the impression 
that officers were not as much concerned for the welfare 
and care of the women victims, as they were for 
conserving Police resources by taking no action and 
thereby cutting down Police paperwork!
She described this poor approach as:-
"By denying themselves a law enforcement role and a 
social work role the Police seem to have manoeuvred 
themselves into a role of helpless witness".
Some officers, however, expressed the view that a harsher 
approach might have had a deterrent effect in certain 
situations where the man had not beaten up his wife 
before or where he had no former Police contacts. This 
was one of the views espoused in the later research from 
the Minneapolis replication studies, SHERMAN 1992.
When the women victims were interviewed 40% of them 
stated they had been assaulted on a previous occasion. 
Calling Police was a last resort with fear, shame and a 
feeling they should be able to solve their own problem 
being the main reason for this. Most women called Police 
because they wanted "help", meaning more than mediation 
and a referral to a social agency. Some women wanted the 
man to get his "just desserts" and hoped that Police 
action would somehow put a limit on the man's violent 
behaviour.
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In most cases Police calmed down the situation but women 
were critical of them for "doing nothing"; a feeling 
ZOOMER suggested, manifested because they seldom took 
legal action. Only a few women were happy with the 
Police intervention and most thought Police were not 
understanding and supportive.
In general women were more positive about the response 
they received from the community type Policeman probably 
because listened and found out what kind of help was 
needed.
ZOOMER drew a number of conclusions from her study. She 
concluded that battered womens' interests were not very 
well served by the reserved approach, however it was not 
obvious to her that more arrest with a possible
prosecution and conviction are what women actually
wanted. Only a few women wanted the offender prosecuted 
and punished yet they sought more than mediation and a 
referral to another agency. Women wished the immediate 
threat removed and that protection be offered to them. 
Nevertheless she argued that women should not pin their
faith to a system that was designed to preserve the
established social order rather than to change it and 
therefore was seen, in itself, as part of the problem.
ZOOMER opined that real changes could only be achieved by 
altering the overall unequal power balance between men 
and women. However, until that problem was addressed she 
saw nothing wrong with demanding that the Police do their
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job. She thought this included treating injured parties 
as victims of crimes, and therefore by implication 
treating offenders as criminals.
Having viewed the Police response, in terms of 
effectiveness of arrest, strategies especially in 
different parts of the world, the fact remained there was 
no mandatory arrest procedure in this country, and up 
until the late 1980's few Chief Constables had policies 
even advocating arrest. Therefore, any change of Police 
practice would have to be preceded by a change of policy. 
I have already mentioned that policy could go some way to 
altering Police behaviour, however, in this country there 
were a number of entrenched obstructions which had to be 
overcome before Police practice could reflect Police 
policy. In the next section I will look at some of these 
problems.
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ARREST STRATEGIES - ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
DISADVANTAGES
Arrest, especially the use of mandatory arrest, can cause 
increased violence, compared to other forms of Police 
intervention. SHERMAN 1992 alluded to this in the 
commentary he made about some of the six replications 
studies. HAMMER et al 1989, thought that some women 
judged an arrest as a way to escalate violence by adding 
to the grievances of the man with whom she intended to 
continue the relationship.
FERRARO 1989 considered that some women did not want 
their husbands arrested, but called Police because they 
either wanted assistance in leaving the premises with 
their children or simply wanted their husbands to be 
taken elsewhere to sober up. Olga ZOOMER, 1989 found 
most women in the Netherlands called Police because they 
needed 'help'. They called Police as a desperate last 
resort. First of all they wanted Police to end the 
crises and bring the case back to manageable proportions 
after which they often preferred to solve their own 
problems. The help they wanted usually implied more than 
medication but didn't necessarily mean arrest and 
prosecution. STANKO 1969 stated that presumptive arrest 
strategies did not maintain a women's autonomy and did 
not give a woman control over the situation. HANMER et 
al 1989 - considered that the only way a woman would be
satisfied by the outcome of Police intervention was if 
she achieved a degree of control over her life following 
the arrival of Police. FERRARO 1989 opined that criminal
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justice system was not designed to, and did not, empower 
women but maintained traditional family structures which 
had it's roots in patriachal dominance and maintained 
women's subordination within the nuclear family. She was 
also of the view that increased policing of wife battery 
had the potential to divert attention away from the real 
sources of violence to the individual perpetrator. HANMAR 
et al 1989 thought presumptive arrest promoted the 
general lack of awareness and understanding of the power 
dynamics behind a womans' need for assistance. This was 
the case despite much educative work by feminists. The 
policies, such as presumptive arrest, which were not 
located within a recognition of gendered power relations 
can result in further oppression of women, under the 
guise of a Police even handedness or equality. They were 
critical of the enduring Police ideology that divided 
women into groups of 'deserving' and 'undeserving' of 
Police attention. The latter category being those women 
who 'asked for', provoked or enticed assailants into 
victimising them and the former where women were seen (as 
viewed by Police) as behaving appropriately in their 
hetro sexual relationship.
CHATTERTON 1983 found Police made similar moral 
judgements when dealing with general assaults.
Another disadvantage of an arrest policy was that Police 
Officers discretion resulted in subjective interpretation 
by them leading to inconsistency and frustration by 
victims. FERRARO 1989 found Officers looked for excuses 
for not arresting. These varied from finding lack of 
evidence, police time spent in tracking down offenders, a
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belief that women would not press charges and that the 
case would not be prosecuted to conviction. FERRARO 1989 
also found that officers' actions depended on their views 
of those involved being either from 'deviant' or 'normal' 
families. If they viewed the family as 'deviant' then 
they felt Police could not do anything but if they were 
from a normal family that was a legitimate Police 
concern. Even in this latter category, she found Police 
questioned women victims (several times,) about whether 
they really wanted to give evidence. This questioning 
acted as a deterrent, to women to demand arrest.
HANMER et al 1989 stated that the benefits of arrest were 
often only short lived and often the man returned to the 
home. Their opinion was in some ways validated by some 
of the findings in the six replication studies. In 
Omaha, Milwaukee and Charlotte there was evidence of 
short-term deterrent impact of arrest, however, the long 
term result of such a policy, when compared to others, 
was that arrest increased violence.
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ADVANTAGES
Arrest had disadvantages and some research had shown 
that it had only a limited deterrent effect on the 
offender. However arrest formed an important part of the 
caution policy so any advantages of an arrest strategy 
had to be clear and signalled to both Police, victims and 
offenders for positive attitudes to be engendered. Some 
of these were as follows.
STANKO 1989 stated that arrest gave women victims 
breathing space. It particularly assisted women who were 
in acute danger because it removed the assailant from the 
scene of the crime. HANMAR et al 1989 put it another 
way, arrest permitted women to obtain safe space in which 
she could consider the options available to her. STANKO 
1989 pointed to the immediate deterrent effect of 
arrest, a point also made by SHERMAN 1992, when he 
referred to some of the Minneapolis replication studies. 
EDWARDS 1989 drew attention to the earlier findings of 
the National Crime Survey in USA between 1978 and 1982 
where, victims of spousal assault who called Police, 16% 
later reported further victimisation within six months 
compared to 23% who suffered further violence as a result 
of not calling Police. EDWARDS 1989 suggested that the 
mere calling of Police can act as a short-term deterrent 
for further violence. ZOOMER 1989 thought that the 
arrest and time spent in Police Custody allowed some male 
offenders the opportunity to cool down and to think about 
their violent actions.
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Arrest, STANKO 1989 felt, was the consensus opinion as 
the best solution to simple battering, and was the 
preferred response of policy makers. Police Chiefs and 
femminists. HANMAR et al 1989 thought it's significance 
was that it gave a positive focus on the fact that 
violence in the home was a crime. SMITH 1989 agreed with 
this and thought that vigorous arrest policies 
demonstrated to offenders the general disapproval of such 
crimes. Arrest strategies gave an important, clear and 
distinct policy to the Police Officers according to 
ZOOMER 1989. She thought that arrest was to be a 
deterrent by some Police Officers if the offender did not 
have former contact with the Police. She also felt that 
it did away with the unsatisfactory situation where 
Police gave contradictory advice to the victim and it 
sent a clear message to offenders that Police will take 
positive action when dealing with such cases. JAFFE 
REITZEL et al 1991 found in London, Ontario, Canada that 
the positive arrest and charge policy created a more 
positive attitude in officers who traditionally did not 
view this type of work as real policing.
FERRARO 1989 stated the arrest policy showed, in a very 
symbolic way, that women would get support if they turned 
to Police for help. She said that the extra Police 
protection, given by arrest helped to reduce the fear of 
such crimes in female victims. HIRSCHEL et al 1991 in 
their final report of the CHARLOTTE replication study 
wrote that although arrest in their experiment did not 
prove to be a deterrent they considered that arrest may 
have had a general deterrent effect on others although 
not necessarily on their specific cases. Conversely, they
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said that non-arrest may have sent message to offenders 
that it was not a matter which Police took seriously. 
They concluded the arrest policy and practice placed 
Police in a vital lynch pin role, connecting the offender 
and victim with other social, community and criminal 
justice resources.
HANMER et al 1989 stated that the arrest practise defined 
men as criminals and helped considerably to get over some 
of the main assumptions about male and female 
relationships. Finally, SHERMAN 1992, doubted if other 
agencies outside the Police, would get the necessary 
funding to provide a bitter alternative or even equally 
effective alternative to arrest 1
This section has highlighted some of the contrasting 
views on the effectiveness of Police arrest from a point 
of view of deterring further violence. My opinion was 
that arrest stood the best chance of success when it was 
only one part of an overall strategy by society to combat 
this crime. In the next part I will consider some 
similar views expressed by other commentators.
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THE POLICE POLICY AND PRACTICE
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CHANGING POLICE PRACTICE THROUGH POLICY
There exists in most organisations a difference between 
written policy and what actually happens in practice. 
Policy obviously has considerable influence on practice, 
however, in my opinion there invariably exists a number of 
obstructions which have to be overcome by managers to 
ensure that their intentions, as set out in the policy, 
are practiced by the operators. As a starting point the 
policy maker ought to be aware of the hurdles so that an 
implementation plan can be adopted to overcome these 
practical difficulties. The policing practice, in 
relation to domestic violence, is no different. As 
BOURLET (1990) pointed out many forces had arrest policies 
but as HORLEY (1988) and EDWARDS (1990), had shown, there 
was a considerable divide between what the chief constable 
had written in his policy and what the officers did out in 
the street.
My intention in this section is two-fold, first I will 
consider the general position of policy making in the 
police and the freedom which a chief superintendent has to 
make his own policy, second I will reflect on some of the 
influences which surround a police officer when making a 
decision on whether or not to arrest an offender who has 
committed a crime of domestic violence.
There is no common policy of mandatory arrest, charging or 
prosecution in this country. Two of the more important 
reasons for this is the constitutional position of the 
chief constable and the important balance of power in our 
society which gives independent powers to the legislator, 
the executive and the judiciary. These safeguard any 
interference with the considerable discretion, which the 
law allows, the chief constables in carrying out their
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function. Their legal position was articulated in the 
famous judgement of Lord Denning (Regina -v- Metropolitan 
Police ex-parte Blackburn 1968 CA 1 all ER 763) when he 
said:
It is the duty of every chief 
constable to enforce the law of the 
land. He must take steps to post his 
men so that crimes may be detected, 
and that honest citizens may go about 
their affairs in peace. He must 
decide whether or not suspected 
persons are to be prosecuted, and if 
need be, bring the prosecution or see 
that it is brought. In all these 
things he is not a servant of anyone, 
save the law itself. No minister of 
the crown can tell him that he must, 
or must not, keep observation on this 
place or that, or that he must, or 
must not, prosecute this man or that 
one. Nor can any police authority 
tell him to do so. The
responsibility for law enforcement 
lies on him. He is answerable to the 
law and the law alone".
It would seem to follow that the forty three chief 
constables in England and Wales could issue their own 
quite separate policy on how they would wish their 
officers to deal with domestic violence. However, in 
reality, some uniformity of approach was achieved as a 
result of a number of influences which were exerted on the 
discretion of chief constables. First there was public 
opinion which had been articulated in a number of forms in 
recent times. These have included public opinion surveys, 
consultative groups, the press and in very recent times a 
growing influence from some of the feminist groups. Much 
of their attention was focussed on the plight of victims 
of crime and in domestic violence cases the lack of a 
positive police response.
Second was the advisory content of Home Office Circulars 
which emanate from the Home Secretary, usually after 
consultation with professional bodies involved in the 
subject area of the document. As an example, Home Office 
Circular 69/1986 gave advice on "domestic violence":
"There must be some over-riding 
concern to ensure the safety of 
victims of domestic violence and to 
reduce the risk of further violence, 
both to the spouse and to the 
children who may be present, after 
the departure of police from the 
scene of the incident. Police 
officers will be aware of the powers 
of arrest which are provided in 
section 24 and 25 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984".
These sections gave police powers of arrest in situations 
where it was necessary to protect "vulnerable" persons.
Third was the reports of HER MAJESTY’S CHIEF INSPECTOR OF 
CONSTABULARY who were required, under the Police Act 
1964, to inspect each force as to its efficiency. Part 
of the Force Inspection may well have been an analysis of 
its response to domestic violence. BOURLET (1990) 
suggested this would probably come about in response to a 
matter of public concern or a media campaign which was 
beginning to gather momentum. BOURLET (1990) speculated 
that the personal career prospects and development of a 
chief constable could also have affected some of the 
policies issued by him or her:
"Anyone (referring to chief 
constables), seeking to mount 
crusades or develop policies, which 
do not carry the tacit approbation of 
the Home Office or the public, may 
well find themselves ploughing a 
lonely furrow".
He pointed out that any intemperate remark, lack of
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judgement or inconceived decision could well blight a 
promising career because chief constables could still 
progress to command larger forces, to become 
commissioners, or to be inspectors of constabulary; 
indeed, the recognition of outstanding service can also be 
acknowledged through the Honours List.
The slow development of this corporate type of approach 
was illustrated in the research done by BOURLET. He 
compared the number of domestic violence policies issued 
by chief constables in England and Wales in 1985 with 
1989. He discovered that, in 1985 20% of all forces had 
either in advisory type of policy or some forcewide order, 
whilst in 1989 this number had risen to 78%. In 1985 52% 
of forces had a policy on action under the Domestic 
Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 and the 
Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates Courts Act 1978
whilst in 1989 this had dropped to 17%. Regrettably, 
BOURLET*s research did not go further and examine the 
actual content of the various constabulary policies, 
however, other research has shown there to be a
considerable disparity, between forces, whether to arrest, 
or not, offenders of domestic violence. This fact was 
highlighted in a POLICY STUDIES INSTITUTE SURVEY (1989) 
when the researchers visited, and interviewed, a number of 
police officers attending one of the regional training
centres at Ashford in Kent. Officers, from different 
forces, gave details of totally conflicting force 
instructions, varying from arrest of a violent person in 
all cases to arrest only as a last resort. This 
divergence of police practice was also highlighted by 
Sandra HORLEY, a Canadian who had been Director of 
Chiswick Women's Family Rescue since 1983 and who had made 
a significant contribution to the police policy debate. 
In 1989 she personally addressed the A.C.P.O. annual 
conference and argued for the need to follow the North
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American experience and create a national vigorous arrest 
and prosecution policy. She argued that this was the most 
cost effective way of reducing police time and saving 
resources and also the most likely to give real protection 
to battered women and children. HORLEY (1989) suggested 
the success of the North American approach was dependent 
on training. She pointed out that all the solicitors, 
crown prosecutors, magistrates and judges, as well as 
social workers and the police, underwent training courses 
in domestic violence to ensure a consistent and informed 
approach to their work. However, up until the writing of 
this thesis there was little evidence to suggest that the 
lessons from the U.S.A., particularly the SHERMAN and BERK 
1984 study in Minneapolis, had been adopted by many forces 
in this country.
It is very relevant to note an observation that was made 
in the P.S.I. study. The researchers considered that 
there ought to be a middle way between the two extremes of 
police policy, i.e. arresting and taking no action. They 
pointed out that a woman who had been assaulted by her 
partner faced many disadvantages and difficulties if she 
sought to prosecute him. These included her financial and 
emotional dependence on the man and, in some cases, the 
weakness of the evidence that an assault had taken place. 
The study sought to argue that it seemed wrong that police 
reluctance to give support to a prosecution should be seen 
as yet another disadvantage to a woman. The P.S.I. 
mentioned two other sanctions that were available to the 
police, i.e. arrest for breach of the peace and immediate 
adult caution. It was precisely this "middle” course
which the Streatham policy sought to follow. Finally in 
this part, it is pertinent to mention the recent efforts 
made by the Metropolitan Police to change policing 
practice through issuing policy. It was this impetus 
which fuelled various developments in London.
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In 1984 the Metropolitan Police set up their own internal 
Working Party on Domestic Violence. The group included 
representatives from many outside organisations. After 
meeting for two years the group produced a final report 
which included a number of recommendations and suggested 
some fundamental changes in the areas of crime recording, 
training, victim support and information. It was from 
these recommendations that in 1987 new guidelines were 
produced and Commander BOREHAM, described the background 
of the new philosophy;
"Nothing is more insidious than the 
circumstances of a woman subjected to 
violence in the place where she 
expects to be safe - her own home.
We have been carefully looking at the 
issue for some time now and our
policy is designed to tackle the
problem".
The policy made some important changes. These included 
improving recorded practices; officers were required to
report the domestic incident in the crime book or else in
an incident report book. Officers were encouraged to use 
their power of arrest, under Section 25(6) of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act and also to improve the support 
and help given to the victims of this crime. HALL (1987) 
took the main thrust of the policy as the instruction to 
officers that they should regard an attack in the home as 
much a criminal act as one that may have taken place in 
the street. Detective Superintendent Roger STREET, of the 
Community Relations Branch at New Scotland Yard, stated 
the guidelines were part of the "wider approach" to the 
problems of women as victims of crime.
In practice the effectiveness of the new policy depended 
to a large extent on the change of traditional negative 
attitudes shown by many officers. EDWARDS carried out 
research at two London divisions in 1988 and compared the
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results with previous research that she had completed on 
the same divisions in 1984. She found that the results 
were encouraging. There was increased recording of 
incidents, of crimes, of arrests and fewer allegations of 
domestic assault were being "no crimed". However, still 
over 60% of cases fell into this latter category. 
BROTCHIE (1988) thought that a major obstacle remained in 
that there had been no significant change in the number of 
cases reaching prosecution. Overall the study highlighted 
the problem facing police managers in changing well 
established practice through the issuing of new policy. 
After assessing the different results achieved at each 
station, the report found that there was still a tendency 
towards diverting cases away from criminalisation, by 
avoiding making arrests, referring parties to other 
agencies, and in many cases, doing no more than attending 
the call and stopping any violence in progress. EDWARDS 
(1989) summed up the reluctance of the police to become 
involved;
"Translating policy into action was 
one of the main problems facing all 
police initiatives. The
effectiveness of police policy 
depended on creating a climate of 
awareness and commitment, within 
individual stations where police were 
supported by senior management and 
where its spirit was kept alive by 
junior officers and officers on the 
ground".
She thought the problem of reluctance to intervene and 
prosecute was compounded by the reluctance of the 
complainant to prosecute once having made a complaint. 
She opined that this probably affected the police non­
intervention, including prosecution avoidance, and 
considered these difficulties were translated into the
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police culture permeating at every level, including the 
police recording practice.
Poor recording practice had been identified as a problem 
and, in October 1988, the Metropolitan Police formulated 
policy to improve the situation. They actually followed 
the example set by police forces in North America. The 
new policy included a definition of "actual bodily harm", 
quoted from the case of Regina v Miller, QBD 1954 282, as 
"an injury that may be inferred if pain, tenderness or 
soreness results from an act even if no physical injuries 
were visible". It was sufficient if the violent act 
merely caused psychological injury such as hysterical or 
nervous condition. The procedure also laid down that all 
other types of assault were also to be recorded in the 
crime book. The aim was to fully and accurately record 
all assaults which were reported to the police and thus 
improve the service, give consistent advice to victims 
and assist managers to monitor police performance.
The next policy development was the setting up of
specialised units of police officers, at local stations, 
to assist victims. The first was located at Tottenham 
Police Station. City Limits (1988) reported that the
unit encouraged officers to arrest, e.g. in March/April 
1988 out of 36 cases of physical assault the unit claimed 
that 29 arrests were made; gave victims advice on
criminal prosecutions and information on help that was 
available from other agencies e.g. A.S.H.A.; kept victims 
informed of the bail conditions of the offenders and 
generally gave them support. HORLEY, in the same
article, was cautious about the initiative and stated 
that there had been only small signs of change since the 
force order of 1987. However, the number of local 
domestic violence offices continued to increase on a 
local basis and in 1990, Sir Peter IMBERT, Commissioner
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of the Metropolitan Police, made it one of his annual 
priorities to establish more domestic violence "Units", 
Subsequently the number continued to increase and at the 
time of writing this report, out of a total number of 68 
divisions over 50 claim to have their own domestic 
violence office. As interest in this particular aspect 
of policing increased, the Metropolitan Police in 1990 
issued a comprehensive set of Guidelines and 
actual best practice for dealing with domestic
disputes. It catalogued all the ad hoc local working 
practices which had sprung up in different parts of 
London. Many of these initiatives resulted from the 
formation of these domestic violence units and I have 
devoted a separate section to describe and assess their 
current role, effectiveness and development.
Other forces in the U.K., were meanwhile, developing 
their own local policies and practices. DEVONPORT (1990) 
reported that in May 1988 the first police domestic 
violence unit, outside London, was started by the 
Northumbria Police. Their force approach was different 
in as much as they worked with other agencies such as 
Marriage Guidance Counselling, and the Alcohol and Drugs 
Advisory Centre in which the emphasis was placed on 
tackling the underlying causes of the violence. Another 
example was the contribution made by the West Yorkshire 
Police Authority. They commissioned HANMER and SAUNDERS 
to research the local police approach to domestic 
violence and, in November 1987, their report was received 
by the Authority. The result was that the Chief 
Constable re-organised his police response and in 
December 1990 HANMER produced a follow-up report which 
evaluated, rather critically, the effect that the force 
changes had made in practice. The West Yorkshire Police 
response is described more fully at Chapter 14.
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So it was that different policies were being practiced in 
this country. Some were based on arrest, some on
mediation, whilst others favoured a co-ordinated approach 
with other agencies. Surprisingly, there was no central 
body, either at the Home Office, A.C.P.O. or the 
Inspectorate which appeared to be monitoring and
evaluating all these different approaches. It was for 
this reason that I have suggested the National Police 
Staff College, at Bramshill, ought, as a starting point, 
to organise short courses on the subject of "police 
approach to domestic violence". It was believed that 
much positive progress could be made by the cross­
fertilisation of police ideas and experiences which were 
invariably generated at these courses. I concluded from 
this section that policy alone would not alter practice. 
Basic attitudes of practitioners e.g. constables, can
only be changed if police managers ensure:
a) Constables are given the reasons for changing to a 
positive policy so that traditional, misinformed 
assumptions can be altered.
b) A common, positive policy which favours one
strategy, e.g. arrest, is adopted.
c) Recording procedures must complement police
practices. This can be achieved only through 
classifying all allegations of assaults as crimes.
d) Monitoring and evaluation programmes are set up to 
ensure the purpose of any policy change is 
manifested in practice.
All of these recommendations were within the scope and 
power of chief superintendents to implement in their 
local police area. It is this freedom, which was given 
to local police commanders to issue local policy, that I 
will discuss next.
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TTTR POLICY MAKING ROLE OF THE CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT
The purpose of this next section is to describe the policy 
making role of Chief Superintendents in charge of police 
land divisions particularly in the context of the 
Metropolitan Police. It will explain the devolved power 
w^ich an officer of that rank has to create'his, or her,own 
local policy. -My Streatham project was a good example of this
The organisation of the Metropolitan Police had three 
tiers, i.e. headquarters at Scotland Yard headed by the 
Commissioner, 8 areas each headed by a Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner and within each area a number of divisions 
(approximately 8 in number) each with a Chief 
Superintendent in charge. There are 68 land divisions in 
London.
In 1983, as a result of the Commissioner's Annual Report 
to the Home Secretary, a project team was formed to review 
the force organisational structure. Their objectives 
included rationalising command and functional 
responsibilities and considered adaptations which were 
required to improve management practices. The project 
team produced a report entitled "Force Organisation and 
Management Review" (F.G.M.R.) which was critical of the 
divisional command structure at that time. The
researchers found that the emphasis on supervision tended 
to be from a retrospective perspective with divisional 
officers in command viewing their functions as supervisors 
as opposed to managers. Part of the fault lay with the 
traditional job descriptions in which there was little 
mention of responsibility for objective setting, strategic 
planning, experimenting with new initiatives or for 
adopting a proactive approach to problem solving. Instead 
they found there was a negative theme which tended towards
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routine checking of records and constant involvement in 
the mechanics of station procedure at a very basis level. 
Most station procedures were laid down in a very 
comprehensive, and rigid, set of organisational rules 
written in "General Orders". This emphasis on rule 
keeping was written into the first paragraph of the chief 
superintendent's job description which stated that chief 
superintendents had responsibility for ensuring that 
"General Orders" were complied with.
Before 1983 there was no suggestion of autonomy in 
divisional policy or any guidelines which indicated the 
standards by which local decisions should be judged. The 
report writers pointed out that there was a need for local 
policies which were more sensitive to, and in line with, 
the needs of a local community. This was one of the main 
issues found in the Scarman Report (1981) and led to the 
birth of local community consultative groups.
The team also found that chief superintendents were often 
performing mundane clerical tasks and sought to re­
distribute this work to more appropriate levels. The team 
drew attention to the poor management practice which made 
chief superintendents accountable for tasks, which were 
dictated from the centre of the organisation, but without 
giving them the control of resources which were necessary 
for their completion.
A number of solutions were recommended, accepted and 
implemented in 1985 by the Commissioner. Some of these 
had a far reaching effect on the policy making role of the 
chief superintendent. I will describe some of these as 
they enabled me at Streatham Division to have the freedom 
to research, plan, develop and create new policy for 
dealing with minor cases of domestic violence.
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Most authority for managing the police organisation was 
devolved from the headquarters to the division. The 
division was viewed as fundamentally the most important 
unit in the policing of London. Additional resources were 
made available to carry out tasks which were the 
responsibility of the division. A comparison had been 
made with commercial organisations which had long 
recognised the key role played by the outset which 
represented the contact point with the customer. After 
all it was that unit which ensured that the benefits of 
the policy actually reached the customers. At the same 
time it was recognised that certain centralisation was 
necessary to combat forcewide problems which were 
unrelated to local boundaries, however, it was highlighted 
that local managers could feel frustrated if their freedom 
was curtailed to use their initiative. The report 
emphasised also that when policy was received in the form 
of details and precise instructions, rather in the form of 
guidelines, this could totally stifle any management 
initiative and flair. "General Orders", which were two 
lengthy books of orders were replaced by one instruction 
manual which gave guidelines and not orders. Police 
Orders, which were issued twice weekly and gave specific 
instructions were replaced by "Administration and 
Reference Notices" which again tended towards guiding and 
advising as opposed to laying down rules for all 
contingencies. Resources, including police overtime, were 
devolved to local management who were also given control 
of thirty local financial budgets with the power to vire 
between different capital accounts and between revenue 
accounts. As an example the Streatham annual police 
overtime budget was £500,000, and the Chief Superintendent 
was allowed to vire up to £10,000 into other revenue 
budgets, e.g. to make local purchases or to develop local 
publicity.
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The role of the chief superintendent thus dramatically 
changed after 1985 and this was best reflected in an over­
view of the new job description. It is worth citing three 
items from this job description which will illustrate the 
shift away from a "retrospective supervisor".
1. Forward planning for the division, devising divisional 
changes and objectives within the Force Policy goals 
and the needs of the community.
2. Develop close contact with local people, organisations 
and the media; to liaise and manage community conflict; 
obtain feedback from the community and from members of 
the management team to ensure the necessary adjustment 
is made to divisional goals.
3. Setting personal objectives, developing own skills, 
keeping aware of professional knowledge together with 
changes and trends in society.
F.O.M.R. listed some key skills which were necessary for 
realising this new job description. These included:
Creativity
Flexibility
Innovation
Ability to think forward and plan 
Listening
Resolving conflict
Keep aware of changes in society
Therefore, from 1985 the force organisation was changed to 
give more power and control to local managers who were 
encouraged to develop strategies, objectives and tasks 
which were more in keeping with the needs and requirements 
of the local communities. The voice of the minority
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groups could now begin to influence local policing 
approaches to problems. Such groups applied pressure to 
improve police response to such issues as racial 
incidents, rights of prisoners, homophobic crimes and 
victims of crimes. This latter group included victims of 
domestic violence.
It would be wrong of me not to mention some of the checks 
and balances which were built into the system to make the 
chief superintendent give account for his or her policy 
and practices. Chief Superintendents had to consider 
these before embarking on any local initiative. There 
were three levels of internal checks which operated at 
headquarters, area and local levels.
First at a local level the Chief Superintendent produced 
two types of annual report; one, which was very 
comprehensive, was for the area Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner who assessed the content and progress of the 
divisional performance before the officer submitted the 
report to the Commissioner's Office. These reports from 
the 68 divisions formed the basis for the Annual Force 
Report to the Home Office. The other report, which 
contained many local performance indicators, was a 
document which was produced for the local community. Both 
reports covered the details and progress of the yearly 
objectives. These reports were also debated and discussed 
in a public forum at the monthly local consultative groups 
where chief Superintendents invariably had to answer 
questions, from the public, on local policing.
Most of these annual police station objectives were made 
within the spirit of the guidelines set at the beginning 
of the planning year by the Commissioner. However, they 
could also be outside these parameters and be of a purely 
local nature. The police policy and actions were often of
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public interest and attracted questions from local 
counsellors and M.P's e.g. council meetings. Question 
Time at the House of Commons. The publication of the 
police answers also played a part in stirring and 
influencing public opinion. The reaction of the local 
community then, in turn, guided future policy.
At area, force and national levels there was internal 
inspection teams who monitored, evaluated, advised and 
reported on police performance. Although they performed a 
reporting function if a chief superintendent adopted a 
policy which was against the spirit of either a Home 
Office Circular, a force or area guideline, then no doubt 
"pressure" would be applied to the Chief Superintendent to 
change his local procedure.
Like most organisations a department head is always 
answerable to the "boss". The police service was no 
different. Many force procedures required higher 
authority before embarking on a particular strategy e.g. 
the area Deputy Assistant Commissioner had to authorise 
any plain clothes operation to combat allegations of 
homophobic crimes. Before granting such permission the 
D.A.C. would require that every other avenue of approach 
has been tried before resorting to plain clothes 
observations. This type of "supervision" of divisional 
policy ensured a standard approach was adopted and made 
divisional Chief Superintendents internally accountable 
for their management approach as well as performance. The 
Commissioner was ultimately responsible and accountable to 
the Home Secretary for the organisation of the 
Metropolitan Police and therefore could not afford the 
possibility of "Maverick" divisions working at odds with 
the declared central policy.
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To sum up the power and control inherent in the position 
of chief superintendent, I would suggest that he or she 
had local flexibility in policy making but this was set in 
the context of guidelines from the centre of the 
organisation and suggestions from the local community. 
The local Streatham policy for dealing with minor cases of 
domestic violence was within the spirit of the guidelines 
set by Home Office Circulars, within the spirit of the 
Metropolitan Police Order of 1987 and the 1990 Best
Practice Guidelines, and were the result of listening and 
adapting suggestions from the local community in an 
attempt to improve performance in this area of policing.
Having briefly described policy making in the police both 
at national and local level my intention now is to return 
to the difference between policy and practice. Its my 
experience that the following issues have promoted a 
negative attitude by police officers to the policy of 
arresting domestic violence offenders:
1. Many of these cases were not followed through to
prosecution and no sanction was therefore put on the 
offender.
2. Officers rarely saw an "end product" to their effort
and work put into dealing with these crimes.
3. Police records, did not reflect police performance.
4. It was perceived by the police that positive arrest 
policies led to more officers being injured.
5. The whole police culture and management did not view 
these crimes as a priority.
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Therefore, in my opinion, the police policy maker, if he 
is to be successful in the implementation of his policy, 
must adopt a strategy which will overcome these obstacles 
and so promote a positive attitude from a negative one. 
But first, the policy maker must understand why these 
attitudes have developed in the police service. To this 
end I will now expand on some of these issues. I will 
discuss the role of the Crown Prosecution Service, the 
police officer's attitudes, the role of cautioning as an 
end product for minor cases, the statistical level of 
assaults on police officers in dealing with domestic 
violence and police record keeping.
1 0 1
LEGAL PARAMETERS - THE ROLE OF THE CROWN PROSECUTION 
SERVICE
Policing policy and practice must first be examined in the 
context of the legal constraints binding police 
performance. In the field of domestic violence, a 
seemingly useful provision was introduced by Section 80 of
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Section 80(3)
made the husband or wife a compellable witness for the 
prosecution if the offence charge involved an assault on, 
or injury or threat of injury to, the wife or husband of 
the accused. This legislative provision seemed to give 
the prosecution an opportunity of getting the victim, who 
was reluctant to have a change of heart, to appear before 
the court. But, I would argue, implementation was
obstructed by later legislation under the Prosecution of 
Offences Act 1985. This act established the Crown 
Prosecution Service and took the responsibility for
criminal prosecution away from the police. Section 23 
allowed for the discontinuance of cases by the Crown 
Prosecutor and Section 10 set out the principles upon
which the Crown Prosecutor can exercise discretion to 
prosecute or not. These principles are set out in the 
Code for Prosecutors 1984. They include sufficiency of 
evidence, reasonable prospect of conviction, public
interest and credibility of the victim. A closer 
examination of this Code, which controlled C.P.S. 
practice, may provide reasons as to why only a small 
percentage of domestic violence offenders were pursued
through to prosecution.
Section 5 stated that the Crown Prosecutor, in evaluating 
the evidence of the case, should have regard to the 
following matters:
"Does it appear that a witness is
exaggerating, or that his memory is
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faulty, or that he is either hostile 
or friendly to the accused or may 
otherwise be unreliable.”
Section 9 stated that:
"In some cases it will be appropriate 
for the Crown Prosecutor to have 
regard to the attitude of the 
complainant who notified the police 
but later expresses a wish that no 
further action should be taken. It 
may be that in such circumstances 
proceedings need not be pursued 
unless there is a suspicion that the 
change of heart was actuated by fear 
or the offence was of some gravity".
So it could be, that in the application of the principles 
contained in these sections, within the context of 
prosecuting domestic violence cases, a Crown Prosecutor 
may well have decided to drop a prosecution case. The 
C.P.S. may well have regarded a woman victim who has left 
the matrimonial home, and sought relief in a women's 
refuge, as "hostile" to the accused. Conversely, the 
victim may well be viewed as "friendly" to the accused if 
she returned to live with the offender. Also, a woman 
victim, for a number of reasons, may well have felt a 
change of heart about continuing with a prosecution. 
Within the guidelines, all these circumstances gave good 
reason for stopping a case being prosecuted and 
invariably this decision was taken after police have 
summonsed or charged the offender.
This vulnerability of the victim, was compounded by the 
Crown Prosecutor who was encouraged to use his legal 
discretion, under Section 3, not to pursue a prosecution 
unless there was a likelihood of getting a conviction. 
Section 3, which gave authority for the Crown Prosecutor 
to withdraw a case stated:
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"Crown Prosecutors at every level in 
the service will have great scope for 
the exercise of discretion at various 
stages of the prosecution process and 
in respect of many different 
functions. The responsible use of 
that discretion, based on clear 
principles, can better serve with 
justice, the interest of the public 
and the interest of the offender, 
than the rigid application of the 
letter of the law. The misuse of 
discretionary powers, on the other 
hand, can have severe consequences 
not only on those suspected of crime, 
but also on the public at large and 
their application of justice and the 
service itself".
The Crown Prosecution Service, unlike the Attorney 
General in Canada, had not issued any principles which 
were sympathetic to the plight of the victim of domestic 
violence. The code appeared to provide ample
justification for the exercise of discretion by the Crown 
Prosecutor and legitimised the withdrawing of many such 
cases. This view was expressed by EDWARDS (1989) who 
quoted my research findings at Streatham Division in 
1987. I looked into all police charges and summonses, in 
1987, in which offenders were due to appear at court. My 
aim was to find out what happened to cases when police 
handed the prosecution over to the C.P.S. This was at a 
time when the police did not have a strong arrest policy 
and therefore most of the cases involved assaults where 
the injury was more serious. I discovered that in 46% of 
cases a prosecution was not continued and, therefore, 
there was no punishment of the offender. Unfortunately I 
was not able to get sufficient information from the 
C.P.S. as to the reasons for this poor prosecution rate, 
but verbally I was informed that victim withdrawal 
usually featured high on the list. However, I would
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infer that the legal constraints built into, and 
practiced by, the C.P.S. mitigated against the pursual of 
domestic assault cases through to conviction. This small 
piece of research suggested that the efforts of police in 
arresting offenders and bringing them before the courts 
was being thwarted by the legal discretion exercised by 
the C.P.S.
This issue was further complicated by each of the thirty 
one crown prosecution areas who made their own decisions 
and set their own policy within the Code of Practice. It 
was this authority which EDWARDS (1989) believed led to 
inconsistency in the handling of cases. This
unsatisfactory state was quite different from the policy 
pursued by the Ministry of Attorney General in Ontario, 
Canada. It is worth being reminded of their philosophy, 
which was in stark contrast:
"Crown Attorneys may proceed with a 
prosecution against the wishes of the 
complainant. The Crown Attorney 
should accede to a request by the 
complainant not to proceed only after 
giving the request careful and 
serious consideration. This is
clearly in line with the view that 
domestic violence is in the realm of 
other criminal offences and must be 
treated as equally serious and not 
regarded solely as a private family 
matter".
HORLEY (1989) also highlighted this "strange 
contradiction" in the policies between the police and the 
Crown Prosecution Service:
"We need a stronger co-ordinated 
policy with the judiciary because the 
police have found that the C.P.S. is 
reluctant to accept cases of domestic 
violence. This should not happen: 
it demoralises the police and women 
concerned".
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Although there has not been specific research into this 
area, it did appear that the C.P.S., through their 
interpretation of the Code of Practice and discretion, may 
well have adopted some of the traditional police attitudes 
to this crime. Whilst it was accepted that the C.P.S. was 
an independent body, and therefore beyond the control of 
police, the message for any police policy maker wishing to 
influence the C.P.S. discretion may be to create a 
positive arrest system and inform the C.P.S. of the 
reasons for such an approach. This type of inter-agency 
approach can be discussed at liaison meetings between the 
police and the Crown Prosecution Service and also at Court 
User Groups. This strategy may eventually influence the 
Crown Prosecution Service to change their "probability of 
conviction" stance to one of vigorous prosecution and thus 
give greater support to victims. I suggest that any new 
police innovation in domestic violence must be supported 
by a strong prosecution policy against those charged by 
police.
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POLICE ATTITUDES
The purpose of this section is to describe briefly the 
prevailing police attitude towards domestic violence, 
consider some of the research that has been undertaken in 
this area and I shall attempt to account for this attitude 
and approach by officers in this country.
PAHL (1982) found the police emerged as the least helpful 
of all the main agencies to which women turned for help 
before going to a refuge. The London Strategic Policy 
Unit (1983) thought the police used a jaundiced view of 
women’s willingness to pursue complaints as an excuse for 
taking no action themselves. FARAGAR (1985) studied the 
police response in the communications room at two urban 
police stations and observed twenty six calls for police 
assistance in domestic disputes. In ten of these cases 
there had been an infringement of the legal code, five 
involved assault. In only two of these cases was an 
arrest made. FARAGAR thought that in many of these cases, 
where no arrest was made, officers had taken on the role 
of acting as judge and jury.
The Policy Studies Institute (1988), in a study which 
attempted to evaluate the police work, spoke to few 
officers who "liked" dealing with domestic incidents. 
More typical the police attitude was that officers found 
domestics were a "pain" to deal with and "a waste of our 
time and the court’s". A number of officers who were 
interviewed said that this type of work was "time 
consuming" and not satisfying, particularly the repeat 
calls to deal with incidents between the same people. 
REINER (1985), wrote that many officers regarded domestics 
as "rubbish". EDWARDS (1989) confirmed that the rank and 
file officers were "ambivalent": she thought that it was
understandable because officers were not always wanted at
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the scene. She found that only few officers ever 
considered arrest appropriate and even "when appropriate" 
still did not arrest. BOURLET (1990) discovered that 
police officers generally had a negative attitude to this 
type of work and were reluctant to accept it as part of 
what they perceived to be "real police work".
There are many factors which influence the discretion of 
officers. Some are personal and some are professional. 
It is therefore worthwhile to examine briefly two of these 
factors, which may have encouraged a negative outlook and 
hopefully this will identify the part of the problem and 
lead on to what can be done to change this approach.
CONFLICT OF APPROACH STRATEGIES
In the vast majority of cases the decision to arrest and 
charge an offender lay with the constable. In making the 
decision, the officer was accountable to the law. As I 
have said there is no mandatory arrest policy in this 
country. The police, in exercising their discretion, may 
adopt a number of courses. They may decide to take no 
further action or refer the matter to some other body such 
as the Social Services Department, issue a formal caution 
either written or verbal, or report the matter to the 
Crown Prosecution Service. It was in this area of 
exercising their discretion that many commentators have 
been critical. As an example PAHL (1982) found that 
police did not treat assault in the home as serious as an 
assault in the street by a stranger and found there was a 
conflict in the course of action open to officers, i.e. 
the role of the law enforcer or that of just being a 
peace-keeper. This was best perhaps explained by the 
different demands of the victim. Some victims wanted the 
law enforced, but others simply wanted the offender calmed 
down, some wanted to be taken to a place of safety, while
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Others wanted information about their legal position if 
they remained at home. The difficulty facing an officer 
was to decide what action was best and most appropriate in 
the interest of the victim.
This conflict of strategies, or options, was made even 
more difficult for an officer who made a decision with 
only limited information, and facts, about the situation 
as seen reported to him or her.
ASSUMPTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS
Many personal assumptions and perceptions are built upon 
personal and professional experiences. In the Police 
Force I have always found that the views of my peer group, 
sometimes referred to as the police "culture", have played 
a strong influence on my decision making. A number of 
researchers have examined these assumptions and 
perceptions and my aim in this section is to highlight 
some of them.
HAMMER and SAUNDERS (1989) found that police officers had 
a "crude and simple" assumption that society was clearly 
divided into the good, the bad and the ugly. They 
discovered that this simple yardstick, in judging people, 
was often applied to crimes committed in public places, 
however, in people's homes officers experienced 
uncomfortable feelings about being an intruder. The 
roles, which influenced their conduct out in the street, 
became "unclear". Officers, as a result, inevitably 
relied on their own personal experiences, as members of 
their own families, into home based interventions with 
their own pre-conceptions about what they considered were 
acceptable forms of behaviour in the home. Officers 
perceived being called to such incidents as attending a 
"domestic" rather than responding to a crime. They were
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expected, by their supervisors, to mediate between parties 
and only if it was a serious assault would it get reported 
as a crime.
HANMER and SAUNDERS also found a different approach to 
domestic violence between male and female officers. A 
typical response for a male officer was, "why do we have 
to sort out marital problems ?" But female officers 
tended to say "I'd like to think that if I was being 
beaten up somebody would come and rescue me". HOMNENT and 
KENNEDY (1985) in the U.S.A. and EDWARDS (1989), in this 
country, came to the same conclusion. They surmised that 
perceptions of a situation influenced the action taken by 
officers thus if officers perceived a domestic dispute as 
a marital problem, they were likely to act as "poor and 
unqualified social workers". However if their perception 
was of being called out to deal with a crime they would 
more than likely attend as police officers dealing with a 
crime and appropriately administer justice.
FERRARO (1989) also found that police officers tended to 
divide the community into normal and deviant citizens. 
Normal citizens abided by society rules through 
maintaining employment, sobriety, family and a modestly 
clean home. They were normally heterosexual, white and 
spoke English. Deviants, on the other hand, were 
invariably intoxicated or high, homeless, involved in 
crime, lived in run down houses, had atypical family 
structures and/or spoke a foreign language and habitual 
problems were endemic in their lifestyle. FERRARO 
suggested this idea of stereo-typing emerged through 
police practice. She suggested that officers would arrest 
if the offender was a "normal citizen" because they 
believed that such suspects may be deterred by arrest 
because both violence and arrest were extra-ordinary and 
undesirable events for such people. However arrest and
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violence were viewed as routine events for deviant men. 
She found officers on patrol often referred to Mexicans, 
Indians, gay men and people in housing projects as "low 
lifes", "scum", or, "these kind of people". Officers 
believed arrests were a waste of time, and meaningless for 
these people, because violence was a way of life for them.
FERRARO also found that police officers held stereo-types 
about battered women. One repeatedly expressed to her was 
the idea that battered women were likely to drop any 
charges that might be filed. She found that police 
officers believed that battered women chose to remain in 
abusive situations and most thought that adult women could 
leave violent situations if they wanted to. That said, 
officers expressed to her a range of attitudes from being 
sympathetic through to being neutral, towards battered 
women. Unlike HANMER and SAUNDERS, she found a wide range 
of attitudes expressed by women officers. The majority of 
women officers expressed their disdain for family fight 
calls and many held antagonistic views towards an arrest 
policy as a means of dealing with such incidents.
It has to be accepted, by any policy maker, that attitudes 
cannot be changed overnight. I believed written
guidelines could change behaviour which may eventually 
lead to an alteration in attitudes.
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RECORD KEEPING BY THE POLICE
Whilst much valuable operational time was spent by police 
officers in handling domestic violence at the scene of the 
crime, often in the past, this has not been reflected in 
the number of police records. It was these records, 
rightly or wrongly, which were often regarded as a 
performance measure of the police. I believed that it was 
this apathy in record keeping that contributed to the 
negative approach by some officers and it was my intention 
in this section to draw attention to some of the research 
that has been done.
I would contend that the high level of domestic violence 
was not known. A number of researchers have variously 
estimated this figure. As an introduction, I will reflect 
on some of these findings. The British Crime Survey 
(1989) found that 18% of all crimes of violence were 
incidents involving family, lovers or ex-lovers. The 
report acknowledged that both domestic and sexual assault, 
against family members, was very much "under-counted". An 
earlier crime survey in Islington discovered that only 27% 
of all domestic crime was reported to the police. 
NEUSTATER (1988) estimated that 60% of all married women 
were subjected to physical abuse and that 25% of all 
battered women suffered violence through pregnancy. JAFFE 
and BURRIS (1983) showed that women were battered, on 
average, thirty five times before they reported the 
incident to police or left their partner, or both. They 
pointed to various research studies which indicated that 
between 10 and 50% of all women who live with a male 
partner will be assaulted at least once during their 
relationship.
SAMPSON and FERRELL (1990) conducted a victimisation and 
crime prevention survey on an inner city area to assess.
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inter alia, the under-reporting of crime seen and heard by 
600 residents. Whilst there may, of course, be issues on 
how residents went about knowing what they had seen or 
heard, their findings confirmed the vast under-reporting 
of domestic violence, especially when compared to other 
crime:
Burglary Street
Arrests
Domestic
Violence
Proportion of 24j 181
residents who have 40% 91% 30%
seen or heard an
incident
Proportion of 88 158
incidents not 28% 36% 87%
reported to police
Whichever figure was correct, no doubt, much of it was as 
a result of the non-reporting by the victim, however, some 
of it was due to the poor reporting practice adopted by 
the police officers. This has had a profound effect on 
the under-reporting of the crimes which reached official 
statistics.
SMITH (1989) wrote, that despite the considerable demand 
on police resources, there was very poor record keeping 
and it was not possible to retrieve figures from official 
Home Office statistics to show trends and levels of 
domestic violence. BOURLET (1990), was critical of the 
Home Office for not linking the relationship between the 
victim and the assailant in their Home Office statistics. 
He emphasised the fact that this was one of the 
recommendations made, but not yet implemented, by the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Violence in Marriage 
in 1975. He rightly pointed out that such statistical 
data could easily be organised, and produced, to enable 
social services, probation service, local authority
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housing service, police and other agencies to assess their 
policies and resources which could then be planned 
according to the problem. He suggested that it would 
possibly allow those agencies to make provision to deal 
more effectively with this issue, rather than rely on 
estimates. Whilst accepting there was no current official 
crime classification of "domestic violence", it was 
nevertheless relevant to consider the amount of case 
attrition at each level of the reporting system. I hoped 
to illustrate the "odds" against a domestic crime of 
violence reaching the official statistics, albeit in one 
of the assault classifications. Research had been carried 
out at the different stages of reporting. It was shown 
that, at each stage, there was a significant number of 
crimes which were "cuffed" out of the system and so never 
reached official Home Office crime figures. Each stage 
will be briefly discussed.
The level of reported domestic violence depended, almost 
entirely, on the reaction and response of the public and 
victims to inform police of the crime. As discussed, at 
the beginning of this section, only a small percentage of 
victims reported the crime to the police.
Second, at the point of contact with the police, officers 
often used their discretion in favour of not reporting the 
incident. Researchers found, for instance, that radio 
controllers and telephone operators often screened out 
calls. PARNAS (1971) found that this was particularly so 
for domestic violence, especially if the police were busy. 
DUTTON (1977) found that if the victim phoned the police 
for assistance there was only a 50% chance of getting 
help, other than just advice. Although this research was 
conducted in America,it is my experience that there is very 
little difference in policing practice in this country. 
SMITH (1989) suggested that when an officer arrived at the
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scene he or she may well have exercised discretion and 
decided that the circumstances did not warrant completion 
of a crime report. Conversely, research at a much later 
date by EDWARDS (1989) found that this only happened 
infrequently and that some forces had eliminated this 
discretion by making reporting in crime books mandatory, 
e.g. Metropolitan Police Policy 1987. Nevertheless, 
CHATTERTON (1985) produced an interesting analysis of 
policing and styles that operate in relation to the 
arresting and charging of offenders in assault cases in 
Manchester, He adduced from his observations that persons 
involved in assaults clearly expected police to adopt an 
adjudicatory role when dealing with such incidents. He 
concluded that there was much more at stake, and more to 
be considered, than the formal procedures when officers 
were making a decision on whether to submit a crime report 
or not, e.g. their relationships with colleagues, C.I.D., 
and senior officers. He found there were various policing 
styles adopted by different officers, particularly in 
arrest situations. These styles, which he called
snatching, dodging and negotiating, affected the outcome
of cases. "Snatchers" believed that they had to produce
an above average arrest rate to convince supervisors that 
they were committed. "Dodgers" put their own individual 
interests and convenience before those of the job. The 
majority, he thought, were "negotiators". CHATTERTON put 
their philosophy as:
"Identifying not only the legally 
relevant features but also those 
relevant to their concern to assess 
culpability. Experience confirmed
that the legal victim did not always 
prove to be the moral victim".
It- is my opinion that these three different policing 
styles, probably contributed to many offenders, whilst 
legally guilty, not being arrested by officers who viewed
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and judged the incident from a "moral perspective". I 
would suggest it is also not an unreasonable assumption, 
that because of the type of work, calls to domestic 
violence would attract "negotiators". "Dodgers", no 
doubt avoided attending these calls as would "snatchers" 
because they would not be able to see a forthcoming 
arrest. Lastly, at the station itself, many crimes were 
blotted out of the books by the police classification of 
"no crime". EDWARDS (1989) stated that when she 
researched two London police stations in 1984/1985 she 
found that up to 83% of allegations of domestic violence 
were in this category. This confirmed earlier research 
by McCLINTOCK (1983) in London. He found that "no crime" 
was widely used in the classification of other crimes. 
STEER (1981) similarly looked at recording practices in 
Oxford and found the category of "no crime" extensively 
used when allegations of crime could not be substantiated 
for a number of reasons e.g. evidence was weak because 
the injury was not visible, to where the injury was 
visible but the complainant decided not to prosecute. 
SMITH (1989) took issue with the different habits of 
operational officers in dealing with domestics and 
suggested that such practices e.g. allowing for a cooling 
off period before reporting, asking victim in front of 
the offender whether she wished to press charges, or 
repeatedly asking the victim if she really wanted to 
proceed "encouraged victims to withdraw allegations which 
were then no crimed". This position was well described 
by the London Strategic Policy Unit (1986). They stated 
that "no criming" made nonsense of the accurate recording 
of criminal offences. By "no criming" the police did not 
mean to imply the offence did not occur, but rather that 
they were not pursuing the charge. Logically, they 
argued, the offence should be recorded as "detected, not 
proceeded with". It was this procedure which was 
followed by some forces outside London, i.e. Kent.
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There was no standard policy, across U.K. police forces, 
about "no criming". SMITH (1989) made the excellent 
suggestion that consideration should be given to treating 
domestic violence in the same way as laid out in the Home 
Office Circular number 69/1986 on rape. In other words, 
the assault allegation should be "no crimed" only if 
there was a complete retraction of the allegation by the 
victim and an admission of fabrication. Crimes should be 
classified on the original statement made by the victim 
or the witness. I completely concurred with SMITH, and 
as will be seen later, the Streatham Policy took account 
of this suggestion and appropriate local instructions 
were issued.
It is very relevant, at this point, to mention that there 
was no common policy between police forces for "clearing 
up" crime. CHATTERTON*s research showed that when 
officers were investigating a crime, where it was 
unlikely to produce a result, the C.I.D. thought it quite 
reasonable in the circumstances to "cuff it". He 
considered the C.I.D. were understood to be the "keeper 
of books" with ultimate responsibility for ensuring that 
they balanced at an acceptable detection rate ! The 
detection rate was calculated by the total classified 
crimes being divided by the arrest clear up rate and this 
was expressed as a percentage. There was, therefore, an 
incentive to keep the total classified crimes down and so 
improve the detection rate. It was probably for this 
reason that C.I.D. officers "no crimed" as much crime as 
possible.
The official Home Office counting rules stated that where 
the guilt of an offender was clear, and the victim was 
reluctant to press charges, then the matter should be 
cleared up. EDWARDS (1989) suggested that confusion and 
great ambiguity still abounded about this issue. She
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gave as an example South Wales, where the police 
routinely entered domestic assaults as a crime and then 
cleared up the allegation. However, in London, she found 
that police still treated many of these such allegations 
of crime as "no crimes" and therefore, failed to take the 
opportunity of classifying the crime as a "clear up". 
She suggested that confusion, and therefore scope for 
ambiguity, arose from the term "where the guilt of the 
offender was clear" as contained in the counting rules. 
She strongly argued for a uniform police policy to be 
adopted across the country. The guilt of the offender 
should be inferred from the victim's complaint allegation 
alone and there was no need for the police to obtain 
other evidence, e.g. from a witness or an admission of 
the suspect, before classifying a crime of domestic 
violence. It was exactly this proposal that I adopted in 
the Streatham divisional policy.
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ASSAULTS ON POLICE
Whilst a policy maker can issues instructions to improve 
reporting and records keeping, I would contend that the 
real challenge was to break down the myths that abound in 
the police culture. One such myth was in relation to the 
number of officers that are assaulted whilst dealing with 
domestic violence. These myths were often referred to as 
"rumour control", the content of which was often based on 
anecdotal evidence and not fact. Nonetheless "rumour 
control" has had either a negative, or a positive effect 
on how police went about their operations. A policy maker 
cannot afford to ignore it !
It has long been recognised by police officers, including 
myself, that the handling of domestic disturbances posed 
difficulty and danger. This was particularly so because 
of the unpredictable and volatile state of those 
concerned. On occasions the verbal or physical abuse of 
the people involved will be re-directed towards the 
intervening officer who can be assaulted themselves and 
suffer from the resultant injuries. So, if a policy was 
to be changed particularly for more "arrests" then, I 
doubt if it could be accepted in practice if the rumour 
was that it was going to add more danger to their work. 
It is the aim of this section to consider briefly the 
research findings in this area in an effort to ascertain 
what was behind "rumour control".
In the U.S.A., the F.B.I. reported one fifth of all deaths 
of patrolmen while on duty fell into the category of 
"family disturbance" and nearly 30% of assaults on 
officers occurred in these type of situations.
Another survey in the U.S.A. by DOLAN (1986) of police 
officer’s attitudes revealed that domestic violence was
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regarded as a real threat to their safety. SMITH (1989) 
wrote that this was one reason why police were reluctant 
to become involved in domestics. GARNER and CLEMMER 
(1986) re-analysed the statistical evidence in the U.S.A. 
and concluded that the danger to police had been over 
stated. When domestic incidents were separated from
disturbance calls, data revealed that there were fewer 
police officer's deaths actually associated with domestic 
assignments than there were other types of domestic calls. 
They estimated that police deaths which occurred during 
domestic disturbances were less than one third of the 
number commonly found in the previous literature. STEWART 
(1986) looked at police contemporary training for domestic 
disturbance calls and found that danger to the police was 
a major theme in such programmes. His research revealed a 
good deal of police work and training had been based on 
anecdote and assumption. He thought that GARNER and 
CLEMMER's research, which had given new information on the 
limited threat to officers from domestic disturbances, 
freed police managers to explore more effective ways of 
dealing with domestics. ELLIS (1987) further analysed 
assaults in the U.S.A. for 1982 - 1983 and attempted to 
put the assault figures in perspective. He found that for 
every police officer assaulted at the scene of a domestic 
call, five were assaulted whilst attending a non-family 
disturbance. LEVY and DUTTON (1978) in Vancouver,
examined police injury figures and their findings also 
contradicted the myths which had developed in the police 
culture. They discovered, of all the injuries on duty,
during a six month period in 1975 there were only 29 
reports of officers being injured on duty and that only 
two were from the scene of a domestic dispute. In both 
incidents the injuries were of a minor nature.
Unfortunately, there were no official British statistics 
which illustrated the levels of, or trends in, police
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officers being assaulted on duty whilst dealing with 
domestic incidents. In fact, there were no official 
statistics which showed the level of police officers being 
assaulted on duty. This was confirmed by WHITEHEAD (1989) 
who conducted research into this subject for the Police 
Review Magazine. He wrote:
"No-one knew how many officers were 
assaulted each year. Enquiries to 
the Home Office, the Inspectorate,
Association of Police Officers and 
even the Police Federation, all drew 
blanks".
WHITEHEAD decided to collate figures for the Police Review 
Magazine. A questionnaire was forwarded to all the U.K. 
police forces who provided the necessary data, but the 
researchers found that there were differences even in 
recording practices. This made comparison between forces 
impossible. Their survey did show that 20,000 officers 
had filed a report showing that they had been injured on 
duty in 1988. However, there was insufficient recorded 
detail to show how many officers were injured whilst 
dealing specifically with domestic disturbances. The lack 
of research in this particular part of the subject was 
rather disappointing. I felt that this was such a 
fundamentally important issue in getting policy adopted in 
practice that I conducted local research to find out the 
facts and this will be discussed later.
Having considered some of the research findings 
surrounding the subject of domestic violence, I shall move 
on to another aspect which was at the heart of my policy, 
i.e. the use of a caution as an end product to the police 
response for this type of crime.
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ADULT CAUTIONING
A frustration felt by many police officers was to see no 
end product to their work. In the area of crime police 
officers in my experience were relatively satisfied if an 
arrested person was charged and taken before a court. In 
police cultural parlance this was called putting a person 
"on the sheet". This term came from charge sheets which 
were the fore-runner to custody records. Officers were 
judged, by their peer group, if their arrests were shown 
to have a positive end product, e.g. charge, summons or in 
recent times caution. This end product often indicated to 
them, and their peer group, that their actions were 
justified.
The aim of this section was to describe the recent origins 
and growing use of an official adult caution as a means of 
disposing of cases. Of course people have always been 
"warned" by police but it is only in recent years that 
proper police records have been kept. I will argue that a 
caution had a place particularly in dealing with the less 
serious offences. I have already discussed arrests, 
record keeping practice and prosecuting and I suggested, 
in theory, if the conditions of an adult caution were 
satisfied, this procedure may be used to good effect as an 
outcome to arrest for cases of domestic assault where the 
injury was of a minor nature. It was this idea which was 
a focal point in my Streatham approach.
An official adult caution for crime was usually given by a 
senior police officer, in uniform, under formal 
circumstances. The offender was warned about his criminal 
behaviour, informed a record would be kept for three 
years, and that information about the caution would be 
given to a court by way of antecedent history should the 
offender subsequently be convicted of an offence.
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There was no set format for a caution. The HOME OFFICE 
WORKING PARTY GROUP 1984 advised:
"We feel that this (form of caution) 
should very much depend on the 
individual case and that the police 
should judge the best method of 
issuing a caution according to the 
character and circumstances of the 
offender. Often a formal reprimand 
at a police station will be 
appropriate but, in other
circumstances, perhaps particularly 
with the elderly and those "at risk", 
it may be considered a more informal 
procedure would be more appropriate, 
the caution perhaps taking place in 
the offender’s home".
The administrative procedure for cautioning a person 
entailed the offender having to sign an official form 
admitting the offence, fingerprints and photographs taken 
and a central record kept for three years. There was no 
national index, similar to the National Identification 
Bureau for criminal records, of persons who received 
cautions. It is therefore possible, at present, for an 
offender to be cautioned in one force area and those 
details not being available to another constabulary should 
the person re-offend elsewhere. (I have made it one of 
the recommendations of this thesis that a national index 
be set up and operated at the National Identification 
Bureau).
Cautions ranged from a short, sharp and stern warning from 
a senior officer to a lengthy interview where professional 
and personal advice was given. The caution can take place 
in private or in the custody suite of a police station. 
Offenders were often referred on to other agencies. 
However, this was only be on a voluntary basis and not 
conditional to accepting a caution. Experience of 
cautioning for domestic assaults at Streatham, had shown
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that the offender, normally male, may well be accompanied 
by his partner or his children when he returned to the 
station. He may want to discuss the background 
circumstances of the crime, or have a "man to man" talk 
about his current domestic situation, or conversely will 
not be prepared to communicate at all. At Streatham the 
police officer carrying out the caution would allow half 
an hour for interviewing the offender.
Recent background research on the police use of cautioning 
was completed by a Home Office working party in 1983. The 
terms of reference were to recommend a basis for a more 
consistent and effective cautioning practice. Their 
report said that a caution:
"Has its roots in the discretion of 
police whether or not to initiate 
criminal proceedings when an offence 
is disclosed and is generally 
regarded as an alternative course to 
prosecution".
The Home Office found that most forces made some use of 
cautioning procedures for dealing with adult offenders. 
This was particularly so for elderly offenders and for 
those who were mentally disturbed or under "particular 
stress". Some forces extended cautioning into groups of 
offenders who were sometimes known to be "at risk". This 
group included people who were under emotional distress 
perhaps suffering from "severe domestic difficulties". 
Lord Shawcross, when Attorney General in 1983, whilst 
drawing up guidelines for prosecution, commented "It had 
never been a rule that a suspected criminal offence must 
automatically be subject to prosecution, rather "the 
dominant consideration" must be the requirement of public 
interest". The Home Office researchers found significant 
disparities in cautioning rates: Firstly, among different
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age and sex groups and different types of offences, and 
second by different cautioning rates among different 
police forces within the same group of offenders. Such
disparities in dealing with offenders were similarly
highlighted by the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
which stated that the general fairness and consistency in 
prosecution should be subject to a uniform policy
throughout the country. After examining the research 
findings, especially the impact of Home Office Circular 70 
of 1978, the working party concluded, that, to bring about 
a more consistent practice, the way forward was to prepare 
revised and expanded guidelines on cautioning. It 
considered a more important factor in determining the
level of cautioning was whether there was a clear 
presumption indicated in favour of cautioning. It said of 
policy:
"What in the end counts, is how a 
particular policy is applied on the 
ground".
Certain forces had significantly affected the cautioning 
rates by deliberate changes in policy. The working party 
concluded:
"While differences in local 
circumstances are likely to continue 
to bring about variations in 
cautioning rates, these rates can be 
affected by the attitude of the 
police towards cautioning and
inconsistencies in cautioning rates 
can be caused by variations in 
policy".
The working group thought that if an individual had broken 
the law and did not rank for prosecution, there was every 
advantage in registering a mark of society's disapproval 
in respect of the offence. The study suggested a caution 
should be readily distinguishable from a conviction but it 
should also be something different from a simple "let
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off". The report concluded that a caution could be 
regarded as a form of punishment with consequences for the 
individual, e.g. cited in court, and considered that a
caution was not as severe a penalty as a conviction and 
sentence, but that it did carry some weight.
The implications for the criminal justice system were that 
cautioning did not usurp the function of the courts
because the question was, not so much how offenders should 
be punished but whether they should be prosecuted. As I 
have mentioned previously, police had always used their
discretion on whether to give an offender advice, a
warning or a severe "ticking off" and this process has 
always, albeit unofficially, sat comfortably alongside the 
official prosecution system. The working party thought 
there would only be a limited saving on court time because 
if the caution cases were taken to court, the prosecution 
would normally be straightforward and probably 
uncontested. Interestingly enough, the group thought that 
a more consistent and effective cautioning practice may 
have led to an enhancement of public confidence in the way 
that the criminal law was applied.
As a result of the recommendations of this group, the new 
guidelines were produced in 1985 and revised in 1990 - see 
Appendix 1.
Whilst there has been much research on juvenile 
cautioning, there has been little analysis of adult 
cautioning after the 1985 guidelines. Some limited 
research was carried out by Avon and Somerset Constabulary 
in conjunction with Bristol Polytechnic. They conducted a 
study into adult cautioning after developing the Home 
Office guidelines. Their system of adult cautioning 
disregarded previous cautions and convictions of 
offenders. The only criterion for cautioning was the
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seriousness of the offence. The force policy held a 
presumption in favour of cautioning of young adults up to 
21. Albeit the research period was only for six months 
and there was no evidence to confirm it, the impression of 
WESTWOOD (1990) was that there was no increase in the 
recidivism of offenders as a result of the policy change 
to cautioning. It was also significant that there was no 
difference in the level of reported crime as a result of 
using the caution policy. Whilst I would accept that the 
evaluation time was too short, and that reported crime was 
not a good indicator of a rise and fall in crime, this 
result had importance in as much as it challenged the 
presumptions of some officers who had doubts about the 
effectiveness of caution especially when compared to court 
appearances. It had to be conceded, however, that more 
detailed research needed to be done to test more 
conclusively the cause and effect of an adult caution. 
WESTWOOD thought the most immediate practical advantage 
was the saving of police time particularly in the 
preparation of case papers. He also found there was an 
increased job satisfaction for arresting officers who made 
recommendations, in their own cases, to the inspector. It 
was also interesting, that officers made recommendations 
that included a caution, as they saw it, as a legitimate 
means of disposing of a case.
But even accepting this limited amount of research, about 
the effectiveness of the caution, statistics from the 
office of Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabularies showed 
that a number of forces were making a significant use of 
official cautions. As an example, the following table of 
comparative caution rates of 6 forces illustrated the use 
of cautions as a means of proceeding with criminal 
offences.
Caution Rates 
1989
Avon & Somerset
Hampshire
Kent
Lancashire 
South Wales 
Thames Valley 
National Average
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Total no of 
persons involved 
in criminal 
proceedings_____
25,026
28,086
17,491
28,929
28,521
26,364
17,494
Total persons 
cautioned for 
indictable 
offences
961
1769
1603
1696
1248
1862
1215
(4%)
(6%)
(9%)
(6%)
(9%)
(7%)
(7%)
As can be seen from these figures, in 1989 7% of
offenders, who had committed indictable offences, had 
their cases processed by way of adult caution.
In London, the Metropolitan Police was also making an 
increased use of adult caution for all types of criminal 
offences. Statistics had been kept since 1985 and the 
annual totals reflected this as follows:
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Total
Notifiable
Crimes
109,786 103,084 109,587 108,706 101,42C
Total
Cautions
7,444
(6.7%)
9.101
(8.8%)
9,674
(8.8%)
9,926
(9.1%)
11,102
(10.75%)
Individual caution records were only kept for three years 
so a detailed analysis of the figures before 1988 was not 
possible. However, an analysis of the data since that 
year showed that the number of cautions for assaults had 
increased in the last two years from 577 in 1988 to 858 in 
1989. A breakdown of the figures revealed cautions were 
administered to a wide range of offenders who committed 
assaults. The breakdown, by age, for cautions and assault 
cases in 1989 in London was as follows:
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Age Group No of 
Cautions
%
Of Total Cautions
17 - 21 149 17
22 - 30 292 34
31 - 40 228 27
41 + 190 22
These figures show that 78% of all offenders who received 
cautions were under 40.
Having considered the evidence about cautions in other 
police forces and the Metropolitan Police, I made a brief 
comparison with Streatham in 1988. I took a sample of 
nine days police custody records at the beginning of 
October. It showed that of the 102 persons arrested, 42% 
were charged, 15% were cautioned, 13% involved no further 
action being taken and the rest had other action taken 
against them, e.g. bailed out for further enquiries. This 
analysis tended to show that there was already a healthy 
acceptance of the principle of cautioning at Streatham. 
Of those cautioned, 50% had committed a crime which was 
recorded in the crime book.
Regrettably, there was insufficient recorded details to 
establish any pattern on the use of cautions for domestic 
violence. One of the main reasons for this was that there 
was not a separate crime classification for domestic 
violence. It was suggested by SMITH (1989) that there was 
a good case for having such a specific Home Office crime 
classification of assault which showed if the 
circumstances of the crime were in a domestic context, 
e.g. "A.B.H. - domestic". It followed that forces could 
then have kept accurate details of crimes for this type of 
offence. It was suggested only then that commentators 
could begin to realise the high number of offences that 
were being committed in our community.
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Whilst cautioning was greatly welcomed for many offence 
categories, I must point out its application in domestic 
violence cases was a matter for considerable controversy. 
HORLEY (1990) criticised the use of adult cautions as a 
means of dealing with domestic violence. She maintained 
that cautioning downgraded the offence. In consequence 
she feared that officers may have not seen this type of 
offence as important and may have ceased to take action. 
She stated that it conveniently avoided contact with the 
Crown Prosecution system which was not prepared to 
prosecute those cases which they saw as weak. She also 
hinted that police officers may have "net widened" minor 
assaults to include crimes where a more serious injury had 
been inflicted on the victim. She saw two reasons why 
police officers might have been tempted to take this 
course. First, because of the ambiguity in defining the 
word "minor" and second, officers might have downgraded an 
assault so that it could fit into the cautionary procedure 
and so avoid a court appearance.
It was my view that a caution had all the characteristics 
of a formal sanction. Its success, no doubt, depended on 
the deterrent impact that it had on the offender. While 
"minor domestic assaults" were not at all minor for the 
victim, I would argue that the courts never considered it 
appropriate to sentence such offenders in a draconian way. 
I believed that some offenders could be deterred from 
committing further crimes by the salutary effect of their 
arrest, detention, the taking of fingerprints and the 
formal caution. I argued that there was an incentive to 
the arrested person, who was cautioned, in that there was 
no permanent police records, provided he or she did not 
re-offend. Finally, I contended that the caution process 
could have encouraged offenders and victims, to seek 
counsel from other agencies such as Relate and Alcoholics 
Anonymous without having to go through the formal court
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procedure. At this point I have concluded my Literature 
Review. The next stage will be to discuss the background 
pressures which caused police forces to look at their 
response to domestic violence then explain the background 
and development of my new policy at Streatham before going 
on to expand on the actual mechanics of the scheme.
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BACKGROUND PRESSURES AND REASONS FOR POLICE CHANGE
There was no one reason to explain why the Police Service 
(in the last twenty years) had been slowly changing its 
approach to domestic violence. A combination of resources, 
pressures and influences had all probably played their part. 
There had been academic reasearch findings into the Police 
response; there was a Police Service which had been 
questioning its role in society whilst it endeavoured to 
consult, listen and adapt so as to be in tune with the 
community it served; there was the voice of feminism and 
women, together with a Government which had enacted laws and 
provided guidance in an effort to improve the overall 
service given to the victims of crime.
I will illustrate some of these influences by focusing on 
the recent impact of Police and public consultation, the 
effect of more women officers joining the Police Service and 
the growing importance of victim support on the role of 
Police in the context of supporting domestic violence 
victims, the growth of feminism, the National Commission on 
Violence Against Women and the work surrounding rape 
investigation.
POLICE AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION
Lord SCARMAN enquired into the Brixton riots of 1981 and 
produced a report which signified a watershed in 
police/community relations. He found that prior to the riot 
there had been a breakdown in Police relationships with the 
local community. This was a contributory factor to the 
disorders. As a result, he proposed that a statutory system 
of local Police consultative groups should be set up to 
ensure "the Police, their policies and operations keep in 
touch with, and are responsible to, the community they 
police." Afterwards the Home Office drew up guidelines for 
this consultation process. In the opening paragraph the 
guidelines stated:
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"Effective policing depends on such 
consent (of the community) being given 
and being seen to be given and on the 
Police Service making decisions which 
are in tune with the needs of the local 
community".
Viscount WHITELAW, Home Secretary in 1983, told the House of 
Commons how this form of consultation was intended to 
improve the quality and effectiveness of policing. It also 
enabled the Police to respond more directly to the concerns 
and anxieties of local people and encouraged Police and the 
public to co-operate in action to reduce the crime in their
area. Since 1981 these consultative groups have been an
important forum in which Police representatives listened to 
the views and concerns of the community. Often these groups 
took up issues and as a result influenced the Home Office, 
or Police, to reconsider their position and change a 
particular policy. Examples of this direct and indirect
influence were found in such policing areas as ethnic 
recruiting. Police handling of racial incidents, lay
visitors, equal opportunities. Police training and, in 
recent times, domestic violence. The influence of 
consultative groups was best illuestrated by quoting from 
the first paragraph of the 1991 "Home Office Guide on Police 
and Community Consultation". The paragraph heading was 
"Tacking Crime In Your Community" and showed the status 
which the Home Office gave to domestic violence alongside 
other crimes:
"What can be done about burglaries, 
vandalism, street robbery and crime in 
your area? Or the complex social 
problems of racial harassment, domestic 
violence, child abuse and drug and 
alcohol abuse?"
The next part of the guide described the reason for setting 
up consultative groups:
"They have been set up all over the
country so that people can get
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given and being seen to be given and 
on the police service making 
decisions which are in tune with the 
needs of the local community”.
Viscount Whitelaw, Home Secretary in 1983, told the House 
of Commons how this form of consultation was intended to 
improve the quality and effectiveness of policing. It 
also enabled the police to respond more directly to the 
concerns and anxieties of local people and encouraged 
police and the public to co-operate in action to reduce 
the crime in their area. Since 1981 these consultative 
groups have been an important forum in which police
representatives listened to the views and concerns of the 
community. Often these groups took up issues and as a 
result influenceed the Home Office, or police, to 
reconsider their position and change a particular policy. 
Examples of this direct and indirect influence were found 
in such policing areas as ethnic recruiting, police
handling of racial incidents, lay visitors, equal
opportunities, police training and, in recent times,
domestic violence. The influence of consultative groups 
was best illustrated by quoting from the first paragraph 
of the 1991 "Home Office Guide on Police and Community 
Consultation". The paragraph heading was "Tackling Crime 
In Your Community" and showed the status which the Home 
Office gave to domestic violence alongside other crimes:
"What can be done about burglaries, 
vandalism, street robbery and crime 
in your area ? Or the complex social 
problems of racial harassment, 
domestic violence, child abuse and 
drug and alcohol abuse ?"
The next part of the guide described the reason for 
setting up consultative groups:
"They have been set up all over the
country so that people can get
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together with the police to discuss 
problems of mutual concern. The 
meetings are open to everyone, and 
are held regularly in Town Halls, 
school halls, public libraries, club 
rooms and so on. By going and taking 
part, asking questions and voicing 
your opinions, you can help to 
influence the way your area is 
policed".
To examine the depth of such influence I decided to look 
at the Lambeth Community/Police Consultative Group. It 
met monthly and inter alia covered the policing area of 
Streatham Division. I took a sample of minutes between 
March 1988 and November 1990. I found that domestic 
violence was featured in twelve out of twenty four 
meetings, so in one out of two meetings the subject was 
raised. Every three months the consultative group 
considered the statistics from the four police stations in 
Lambeth. As an example, the following table showed the 
figures for the first five months of 1989 taken from the 
minutes, reference CP81/89:
LEVELS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIME REPORTS 
AND ARRESTS ON POLICE DIVISIONS IN LAMBETH
Year 1989 BRIXTON STREATHAM
Crime Arrest Crime Arrest
January 73 6 34 5
February 34 8 49 16
March 62 12 45 16
April 50 11 37 22
May 79 10 29 15
TOTAL 298 47 164 74
Arrests 
expressed 
as % of 
total 
crimes
16% 45%
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The arrest figures expressed as a percentage of total 
crime illustrated the impact of the Streatham domestic 
violence project when compared with another division in 
the borough.
At another public meeting in May 1989, the consultative 
group discussed the "Lambeth Domestic Violence Group", a 
multi-agency borough based group initiated by the police. 
The group agreed to fund a poster for the group and 
provided basic administration costs for such matters as 
photostating etc.
These examples highlighted the importance which the 
community placed on domestic violence. This, I would
suggest, reminded police of the importance of the subject 
and kept the issue in fairly high profile as a public 
concern. It therefore continued to focus police attention 
on their performance.
THE EFFECT OF MORE WOMEN POLICE OFFICERS
An influence on the traditional police patriarchal 
attitudes was the impact of the increased numbers of women 
police officers who had joined the police service in 
recent years and the drop in numbers who had been leaving. 
This was best illustrated by the numbers in the
Metropolitan Police. In 1980 the figure was 2,074 when 
the total strength was 23,691 (8.7%) and in 1990 it was
3,500 when the total strength was 28,364 (12.5%) and the
wastage was only 133. Although few had reached the very 
top positions, some had made considerable impact on policy 
for dealing with women victim issues. An illustration of 
their influence was the work of Commander Thelma WAGSTAFF.
Commander Thelma WAGSTAFF was the driving force in the 
1980*s behind the Metropolitan Police change in its
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approach to the investigation of rape. The result was 
better training for women officers in interviewing skills, 
taking statements from victims and their investigating 
techniques. More important was the opening of "Rape 
Suites". These rooms were set up with special facilities, 
usually situated away from the police station. Victims 
were interviewed and examined at these locations. The aim 
was to reduce the trauma which faced a woman when she 
reported such crimes by making their interview 
surroundings more friendly and less hostile than a police 
station.
In an examination of the policy approach to domestic 
violence in London, it is relevant to note that the first 
domestic violence office was set up at Tottenham Police 
Station under the supervision and guidance of Sergeant 
Colette PAUL. She was, co-incidentally, completing an 
external part time study course at the University of Kent 
under the supervision of Jan PAHL ! The success of the 
office resulted in similar units which were set up at 
different divisional stations throughout London. In 1991 
over 75% of divisional stations had a domestic violence 
unit. The Tottenham unit was given full support by the 
Community Relations Policy Department at New Scotland Yard 
and was seen as an important integral step in the way 
forward for police handling of these cases. Indeed in 
1990, "to increase the number of domestic violence 
officers" formed part of the Commissioner's main strategy 
statement. The officer who was entrusted with supervising 
and monitoring the new policy and the development of 
domestic violence offices was another woman officer. 
Inspector (now Chief Inspector) Jane STITCHBURY. The 
cumulative work and effort shown by these women officers 
was recognised in the acknowledgement section of the new 
1990 Metropolitan Police Domestic Violence best practice 
guidelines. Acknowledgement was made to six people, three
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were male officers, whilst the others were Jane 
STITCHBURY, Colette PAUL, and Susan EDWARDS. Hardly a 
conspiracy but a very good example of women officers and 
academics who worked together and influenced the way 
forward for the policing of this type of crime.
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF VICTIM SUPPORT
In recent years those in the judicial process began to 
develop a more sensitive approach towards the victims of 
crime. A number of influences have ensured that victim 
support remained uppermost in police strategies.
The first was the work of the National Association of 
Victim Support Schemes which existed in most parts of the 
country. This body was set up to give on-going support to 
victims of crime. Each police division had regular 
liaison meetings with local co-ordinators and volunteers 
to ensure that good support services were given to 
victims. Victim Support Schemes, however, had not been 
able to give full support to all victims of domestic 
violence. This was due, in the main, to limited 
resources, lack of volunteers and a recognition of the 
need for specialist training in this area. However, this 
had been recognised by the N.V.S.S. At the 1991 Annual 
General Meeting it was announced that a working group had 
been formed to review the services already available to 
some victims of domestic violence and to consider the 
establishment of a central referral point from which all 
services could be co-ordinated. The membership of this 
working group included representatives from the police, 
women's aid, probation, medical and social work agencies. 
It was hoped this assisted in keeping the issue in high 
profile.
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The second matter which focussed police attention on the 
victim came from the Home Office Circular 7/89. The 
circular launched " the witness in court leaflet" which 
gave practical information, reassurance, help and advice 
to victims and witnesses attending court. The leaflet was 
intended to be sent out, by police forces, with court 
warning notices to prosecution witnesses. Therefore, if 
an offender was charged, all domestic violence victims 
were to receive a copy of the leaflet from police. This 
indirectly acted as a reminder to the police of the 
importance of giving support to victims.
The third issue which helped to keep the victim to the 
forefront of the support services came from the Victim's 
Charter which was launched by the Government in 1990. The 
charter, for the first time, set out their rights and 
expectations to the victims of crime. It covered such 
issues as reporting crimes, victim support and criminal 
proceedings and drew upon an informal contract between 
professional agencies and victims.
Victim Support had also set up some special projects in 
seven Crown Court centres. At each court centre there was 
a court based co-ordinator and with selected volunteers, 
who were trained to give practical and emotional support 
to victims of crime and other vulnerable witnesses, 
assisted in giving help and advice to witnesses attending 
court.
It is relevant to this thesis to mention that included in 
the contents of the Victim's Charter was information about 
police cautioning and the charter made particular 
reference to the fact that before a decision was made to 
caution, either by the C.P.S. or the police, the interests 
of the victim was to be taken into consideration.
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THE GROWTH OF FEMINISM
As the feminist movement in America was drawing attention to 
the plight of victims of domestic violence, so too were 
feminist groups in this country. SMITH (1989) alluded to 
the fact that both the British and American suffragette 
movements included domestic violence within their concerns, 
however, it was not until the 1970's that public interest 
was re-kindled and began to focus on the subject.
In 1971 the first women's refuge was founded by Erin PIZZEY. 
PIZZEY attracted much media attention by showing the 
difficulty she was encountering, especially from local 
authorities, whilst trying to provide help and accommodation 
for such victims. PIZZEY wrote a book, "Scream Quietly Or 
The Neighbours Will Hear", which gave an account of the 
physical and social miseries of women at her refuge who had 
fled from their violent partners. She was a controversial 
feminist and in her later book, "Prone to Violence" she 
suggested that victims of domestic violence were addicted to 
the violence in their relationships and could not help going 
back to it. HORLEY (1985) stated PIZZEY became alienated 
from many of her feminist colleagues whose aim was to 
combine the refuge movement and the women's movement and so 
establish a national feminist organisation which could 
become a formidable pressure group. She stated that in 
North America the various groups communicated and formed 
conditions and were united in lobbying fund raising and 
education. HORLEY said the splitting up of the refuge 
movement had stopped its growth and therefore limited its 
influence on opinion formers. EDWARDS (1989) found that the 
scars had not healed even some years afterwards. Three 
divisions of the refuge movement thus developed in this 
country. There was the National Women's Aid Federation, 
which attached great importance to the politics of women 
abuse and preferred not to work with men or non-feminists, 
the Independent Refuge Movement which adopted broader views 
and a group, spearheaded by Erin PIZZEY, who maintained that 
some women and families were physically and emotionally 
addicted to violence and that refuges should have employed
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male workers to show that not all men were abusers. By 1985 
Erin PIZZEY had left this country, leaving the Independent 
Refuges and the National Women's Aid Federation to work in 
parallel. DOBASH (1981), wrote that several fundamental 
changes had occurred as a direct result of the diverse 
activities of these groups. He concluded:
"Both material and symbolic benefits 
have been gained from the setting up of 
refuges, educating the public, pressing 
for legislation and attempting to get 
legal, medical and social agencies to 
take up their full responsibilities for 
dealing with violence."
The feminists groups drew attention to the inadequacies of 
the criminal law which offered, as they saw it, no redress 
in criminal law for the victims of domestic violence. SMITH 
(1989), also thought that the combination of the women's 
movement was influential in the Government setting up in 
1974 the Commons Select Committee on Violence in Marriage. 
The Committee aimed "to consider the extent, nature and 
causes of the problems of families where there is violence." 
The Select Committee was followed by three important pieces 
of legislation which gave powers to the courts to help 
protect victims. The policing of these acts invariably fell 
on the shoulders of the Police Service. The Government 
continued its interest and set up a standing body which 
inter alia was concerned with violence against women (The 
Women's National Commission). At the end of 1986 the 
Government issued a circular, number 69/1986, addressed to 
all Chief Constables of England and Wales and stated that 
the over-riding concern in dealing with domestic violence 
was to ensure the safety of victims and further reduce the 
risk of violence. The result was that many chief officers 
issued their own policies in line with the spirit of the 
Home Office guidelines.
At the time of writing this report the current ministerial 
group on women's issues was working on the preparation of 
material for use in schools so that the prevention of
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domestic violence was to be included in personal and social
education. John PATTON, Minister of State at the Home
Office, said of this policy:
"Young people must be taught that
violence is not the answer to personal
problems".
As well as ministerial and feminist groups, since the 1960's 
individual women had been conducting research and writing 
about women victims of domestic violence. One of the areas 
which had drawn their attention was the Police response 
towards dealing with domestic incidents. The following 
three examples illustrate this type of contribution to the 
overall debate.
Between 1976 and 1980, Jan PAHL, from the University of 
Kent, conducted research at a women's refuge. She 
interviewed forty-two women during their stay at the refuge 
and re-interviewed them again some time after they had left. 
She found that Police were perceived by these victims as 
being the least helpful of agencies to which women turned 
for help before going to the refuge. Married women who were 
assaulted by their husbands were less likely than other 
victims of assault to receive effective help from the 
Police. She found that there was a conflict for Police when 
they handled these incidents as to whether they should be 
law enforcers or peace keepers. Her research illustrated 
widespread disparity between the way that wife assault was 
perceived by the Police and by women who were assaulted. The 
former did not see it as real Police work whilst the latter 
wanted it treated as a crime in the same way as other 
assaults.
Susan EDWARDS from the Polytechnic of Central London, 
researched the response of the Metropolitan Police before 
and after their change of policy in 1987. She examined the 
performance of two divisions and produced a number of 
important findings. She found there was a considerable 
divide between Police policy and practice, the use of Police 
discretion led to the under-enforcement of the law even
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after the new policy was taken into effect and decisions 
made by Police Officers on whether to arrest depended not on 
their powers under the law, but on the moral presumptions of 
officers. Her researchers discovered poor reporting, arrest 
and recording practices whilst dealing with these crimes.
Jalna HANMER and Sheila SAUNDERS, from the University of 
Bradford, in 1987 completed a two year study of "Women, 
Violence and Crime Prevention", in which they analysed 
statistics, interviewed Police Officers and victims of 
domestic violence. Their report to the West Yorkshire 
Metropolitan County Council included forty-four
recommendations of which twelve applied to the local Police. 
In particular they recommended that specialist units of 
women officers should take the responsibility for responding 
to violence against women. Police Officers should ensure 
that the decision to enforce the criminal law should not be 
left with women victims. Police should monitor all assaults 
on women and the proportion of Women Police Officers in the 
West Yorkshire Police Service should be increased
substantially. After the submission of the report, the 
Chief Constable of West Yorkshire issued a policy statement 
which showed his commitment to dealing with domestic
violence in a most positive way. In his introduction to 
this policy he wrote:
"It has long been my belief that my 
policing priorities for West Yorkshire 
must, of necessity, reflect the 
priorities and fears of the public that 
we serve. Their priorities must be ours 
and the Force must be responsive to 
them. In recent months I have been
increasingly impressed by the growing 
body of informed public opinion which 
has expressed real concern about the 
incidence of domestic violence and the 
need to ensure the proper protection of 
victims from physical attacks which take 
place in the home."
Interestingly, after he issued the policy statement, he 
rationalised the various ad hoc procedures and units under 
his command. In their place, he established eight units to 
deal with domestic violence which included spousal assault
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and child abuse. The units were staffed, in the main, by 
women officers! The response by the West Yorkshire Police
Service is discussed in more depth in a later section.
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WOMENS* NATIONAL CŒiMISSION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
As I breifly mentioned in the last section, the Womens'
National Commission set up its Working Group on 'Violence 
Against Women' in July 1984 under the Chairmanship of Mrs 
Ann HARRIS CBE., then President of the National 
Federation of Womens' Institute. The group focused on 
women victims of violence only and inter alia made
recommendations on police training and procedures for 
domestic violence. Some of the recommendations
included:-
a. Senior officers should be concerned to ensure that, 
where Force instructions require this, officers should 
undertake arrest of persons perpetrating violence in 
the home, and should not use their own discretion.
b. Incidents where violence has been committed should 
invariably be made the subject of a Crime Report.
c. Officers who have taken a violent man into custody 
should try to ensure that they or their colleagues, 
inform the battered person what subsequently happened, 
including the time of release.
d. All officers should be issued with details of 
appropriate local support organisations for battered 
wives, and other useful details.
The Working Group asked all Chief Constables for
information about domestic violence measures they had
taken or had planned. With reference to training. Chief
146
Constables were asked if any new training courses had 
been introduced and were requested to supply any 
background papers if there were any available. They were 
also asked specific questions about their response to 
rape victims. These included any steps taken which were 
similar to the Metropolitan Police press statement on new 
policy for dealing with rape victims ie., emphasis on 
needs of victim, training of women police to take initial 
statements in rape cases. Detective Inspectors in charge 
of investigation, opening of Victim Examination Suites.
These requests from an Advisory Committee to Her 
Majesty’s Government, no doubt ’focused’ the minds of 
Chief Constables to this issue. Out of the 44 replies, 
26 either made no comment on measures connected with 
domestic violence or made a general statement indicating 
satisfaction with existing policies; a few very firmly 
indicated there was no need for action.
Their findings were considered by the Home Secretary and 
the Home Office responded to this Cabinet Office report 
with Circular 69/86 in 1986 (HANMER et al 1989).
This stirred many Forces into issuing new policies. As 
an example, the Metropolitan Police created a Working 
Party on Domestic Violence in 1986. HANMER et al 1989 
described it as a ’flurry’ of interest in London. This 
Working Party then produced recommendations, many of 
which became policy. EDWARDS 1989, who was a member of 
the Working Party, stated these reflected the 
recommendation of the Womens’ National Commission Report. 
Interestingly, BOÜRLET (1990) wrote that, as a result of
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a questionnaire he had forwarded to Chief Constables, 
found in 1985 20% of Forces had a specific advisory
policy or Force order whilst in 1989 the figure had risen 
to 78% but noted that some had not yet moved towards the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Womens* 
National Commission. He thought that the Commission’s 
Report highlighted one of the processes by which the 
attention of Chief Officers could be drawn in the hope 
that new policies and initiatives will result.
Whilst the Commission was considering its response, a new 
approach by the Police for dealing with victims of ’rape* 
was emerging in the USA. It drew attention of the Police 
and public to the plight of women victims and how they 
were being poorly treated by the authorities.
Such changes went some way to changing Police attitudes 
and I will next consider what some commentators said 
about this shifting Police policy, practice and attitude.
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POLICE ATTITUDE TO RAPE VICTIMS
Public attention to violence against women, was also focused 
by the issues which surrounded official responses to 
rape. These included the police investigation and 
attitude to the offence.
LEDOUX and HAZELWOOD 1987 stated:-
"Because the public’s perception of Police 
beliefs and attitudes concerning various crimes 
(in the context of rape) can affect its 
willingness to report crime, to assist in 
identification, to convict an offender and to 
support new legislation, law enforcement should 
study its own beliefs and attitudes - and reform, 
modify or use them as indicated."
LEDOUX and HAZELWOOD highlighted the traditional views of 
Police attitudes towards victims of rape. These fell 
into two categories; anecdotal and empirical. In the 
first. Police attitudes were viewed as hostile, callous, 
indifferent, stereotypic, insensitive and officers did 
not view rape as a ’real crime’. They thought empirical 
evidence suggested a more balanced view, ie.. Police 
beliefs were influenced by other agencies to the Criminal 
Justice System which tended to put the blame for rape on 
many victims. There was evidence that Police training 
helped officers to understand the rape victim but did 
little to change the negative beliefs about blaming the 
victim in rape.
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I will return to their research after considering the 
work of Ian BLAIR, who as a police officer completed some 
research on the American Police approach.
BLAIR 1985 examined the practices in 4 Police departments 
in the United States. He found that in the USA Police 
investigators had the opportunity to form part of a whole 
network of agencies designed to support and protect the 
victim. The experience of the American Police was that 
the most effective development in the investigation of 
rape was for detectives to treat victims in accordance 
with the knowledge of the particular effects of rape upon 
the victim ie., rape trauma syndrome. He urged Police in 
this country to adopt a similar approach as well as 
developing liaison with non police agencies.
He observed that the Police procedures in relation to the 
investigation of rape underwent fundamental development. 
He felt this was a result of a marked increase in the 
incidence of rape which coincided with important changes 
in American politics and society. This included the mass 
expansion, in both energy and influence, of the womens' 
movement. BLAIR thought in the early 1970's Police in 
America faced an intense challenge as to the 
effectiveness of policing methods and their structures 
for dealing with rape. The result was considerable 
energy and finance was put into examination of the 
traditional Police approach. He considered that 
experimentation had shown that whilst very little could 
be done to measure the detection rate, for attacks on
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unknown assailants, the new methods employed by rape 
investigators deceased the trauma suffered by victims and 
appeared to improve the quality of evidence.
His view was, in some way, borne out by the work done by 
LEDOUX and HAZELWOOD 1987 who found a better change in 
attitude of officers was emerging in Police Forces. They 
forwarded a questionnaire to 3,000 participant police 
officers from different parts of the country. The 
response rate was 72% and they wrote that it was the 
largest national survey on Police attitudes towards rape. 
Their results showed a significant shift from 
traditionally held Police views. They found, inter 
alia:-
(a) Officers were not typically insensitive to the plight 
of rape victims.
(b) The officers were, however, suspicious of some victims 
who met a certain criteria which included previous or 
willing sex with assailant or where victims provoke 
rape through their appearance.
(c) Officers now viewed rape as a serious crime which 
deserved punishment.
(d) Interestingly, officers thought that prosecutors, 
victims and potential jurors were not properly 
prepared to play their assigned roles at a jury trial.
(e) An encouraging aspect was that most rape investigators 
had received rape victim training.
They thought that since most training had occurred within 
a relatively short time of the questionnaire that
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training might have explained the difference between the 
historical Police attitudes about rape and the attitudes 
expressed in their study.
BLAIR 1985 compared the external and mounting pressures 
in America to similar patterns which he felt were 
emerging in this country. However, in the early 1980's 
he found very little inter-agency co-operation for 
supporting victims. BLAIR pointed to the three issues 
which fuelled the public interests. First, in 1982 
public controversy was aroused over a case where a rape
victim, who had hitched a lift, was the subject of
judicial comment for contributory negligence. Second, in 
1983 the Chambers’ and Millar's report, 'Investigating 
Sexual Assault' suggested fundamental short comings in 
Police procedures and attitudes to this crime. Third was 
the case of Director of Public Prosecutions -v- MORGAN 
and others 1975 Cf.App. Ref 136 in which the House of
Lords had to make a judgement on appeal whether in rape, 
the defendant can properly be convicted notwithstanding 
that, he, in fact, believed that the woman consented, if 
such a belief was not based on reasonable grounds. Their 
Lordships, by a majority of 3 to 1, decided that he could 
not, and the appeals were allowed. It was after this 
case that the definition of rape was changed by
Parliament. The significance of the case to this thesis 
was that it brought the position of the rape victim into 
public focus, and, helped to continue the debate about 
domestic violence.
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The poor Police approach was also subject of much comment 
in the Womens' National Commission Report in 1986. They 
pointed out that similar to what Chambers and Millar had 
found the Police often initially adopted this stance to 
test the authenticity of the woman's story and if proved, 
the police officer usually became more supportive of the 
victim.
MAIDMENT 1977, had opined a similar view and suggested 
that the perceived insensitive approach was due to the 
officers trying to do their job thoroughly in a situation 
where embarrassing and personal questions had to be 
asked. He quoted the dilemma facing police officers was 
spelled out in Matthew HALE's 'A History of the Pleas of 
the Crown*, "Rape is an accusation easily to be made and 
hard to be proved."
The Womens' National Commission heard evidence from the 
West Midlands Rape Crisis Centre that valuable contacts 
were made with senior officers but that attitudes of 
officers at some local stations were un-enlightened. 
MAIDMENT 1977 thought that many officers, male and 
female, were cold and sometimes callous in their handling 
of victims. Some were voyeuristic in their approach. 
Such attitudes were graphically displayed in the Graif's 
TV documentary film on a rape investigation in the Thames 
Valley Police Area. Part of the video showed police 
officers questioning a rape victim in a very 
unsympathetic insensitive and aggressive manner.
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The programme received much media attention and BOÜRLET 
1990 thought that this led many Chief Constables to 
review their policies and adopt the recommendation of the 
Womens* National Commission. These included
recommendations to improve police training, the taking of 
initial statements by specially trained officers, that 
interviewing officers should be aware of the Rape Trauma 
Syndrome, for the option to make available to victims to 
be examined by women police surgeons and that an officer 
be designated to advise and liaison with the complainant 
and referral to other organisations.
Perhaps the most significant result of these analyses of 
the Police approach to the investigation of rape resulted 
in a number of important changes in Police procedure with 
an emphasis on a better service and understanding of the 
position of women victims. As an example, the 
Metropolitan Police formed a working party into rape 
investigation and training.
The Metropolitan Police Press Release 1985 stated the 
emphasis was on the needs of the victim and new measures 
designed to make the victim as comfortable as possible. 
These included training of women officers to take initial 
statements. Detective Inspectors were to take charge of 
investigations, some of these senior investigating 
officers attended courses which included Rape Trauma 
Syndrome, Victim Examination Suites were opened where 
victims were taken to be medically examined, private 
arrangements were made at hospital to conduct follow up 
victim examination and selected victim support volunteers 
were given specialist training in handling rape victims.
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The approach adopted by the Metropolitan Police was 
mirrored throughout the country. Therefore change of the 
Police approach to rape, during the eighties went some 
way to improve, and highlight, the position of women 
victims in cases of domestic violence.
All these developments, in my opinion, went some way in 
persuading the Police to change their policy and practice 
towards victims of this type of crime. There was not a 
co-ordinated pressure lobby but rather an ad hoc series 
of public statements from different groups at different 
times with the common theme to improve the service given 
to the victim.
The Police examined their role and considered their 
options. It was within the Metropolitan Police Service 
policy framework that I considered developing "the adult 
caution". In the next section I will describe the 
consultation process, which took place, as well as 
outlining the procedure which emanated from this process.
Ok
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C H A P T E R  2
The Streatham Policy
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BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STREATHAM PROJECT
The embryo idea for this project emerged in about 1986
whilst I was studying part time for a Law Degree. The
section which covered family law included domestic 
violence and the Police response to such conflict. I was 
exposed for the first time in my twenty year Police 
career, to some of the academic research findings, 
particularly those from North America. Most of the 
research findings have been discussed in the previous 
section in my literary review. The result was that it 
caused me to question my established, and I would have to 
admit somewhat entrenched, views and attitudes to Police 
involvement in these cases. I was persuaded that the best 
course would be for the Police to view spousal assault 
from a victim's perspective. I realised that the 
traditional Police approach could be improved by a radical 
change in both policy and practice.
I thought the starting point was to create a positive 
approach in policy which encouraged police officers to 
intervene and arrest at the earliest stage in any 
allegation of domestic assault, I felt the best
opportunity Police had of influencing an offender's
behaviour was to arrest the suspect when first called to 
any assault even where minor injury had been inflicted. 
This was done in the belief about deterrence, not with any 
empirical evidence, that such apprehension may well have 
acted as a salutary lesson to some offenders and stop the 
repeated violence. Many researchers had discovered that 
domestic violence escalated in severity over a period of 
time. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to me that an 
offender's behaviour was best influenced in the early 
stages of this process of escalation.
A similar approach had been adopted by Police in the area 
of juvenile crime since 1968 in the Metropolitan Police
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area, I had worked previously in a community office and 
was very familiar with the care, sensitivity and 
understanding undertaken by the police when they dealt 
with such cases and wondered if a similar procedure could 
be developed in domestic violence cases. It is therefore 
pertinent to describe briefly the police system as it 
applied to a juvenile who was arrested for a crime.
Invariably the juvenile was taken to the nearest police 
station and processed under police and legal rules. The 
circumstances of the arrest was investigated by the 
custody officer who had to be satisfied that there was 
sufficient evidence to support any charge or summons 
should the case eventually appear before a juvenile court. 
In most cases fingerprints were taken and the juvenile 
released into the care of the parents or guardian who were 
asked to return to the station with the offender at a 
later date. Meanwhile, the case papers were prepared and 
submitted to the Detective Chief Inspector for the purpose 
of a double check and assurance that there was, indeed, 
enough evidence to prosecute. The case papers were then 
referred to a "Juvenile Bureau", which was a police office 
specially set up to make further enquiries into the 
personal background of the offenders. A Juvenile Bureau 
officer was assigned to the case and made enquiries about 
the offender with other agencies involved with the 
juvenile, e.g. education, welfare and social services. 
The Juvenile Bureau officer visited and interviewed the 
juvenile and parents at home and thereafter completed a 
fairly comprehensive, yet confidential, report on their 
findings which were then submitted with appropriate 
recommendations to a Chief Inspector. This senior officer 
examined the evidence, considered the background of the 
juvenile and decided the most appropriate course of action 
to process the case, i.e. no further action, caution, 
summons or charge. The decision hinged on the particular
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facts of the case and the background circumstances of the 
juvenile. Every effort was made to avoid bringing the 
juvenile before a court of law.
The main aim was to stop juveniles re-offending. In most 
cases it was found that a caution appeared to be as much a 
deterrent as a court appearance especially for a first and 
second offence. The caution was not a criminal record and 
provided an incentive to the juvenile in that if he or she 
did not re-offend before reaching the age of seventeen, 
the police record of the incident was destroyed when the 
juvenile reached that age.
I thought the framework of that procedure could be applied 
to first time offenders of domestic violence, but only 
where the injury was minor. Therefore, the sections of 
the juvenile procedure which I felt could be used were as 
follows:
a) Police officers to exercise their power of arrest for 
crime and to take the prisoner to the police station.
b) Process the prisoner at the police station under the 
current regulations for dealing with criminal 
offenders, e.g. take fingerprints and photographs.
c) If the offence was not of a serious nature and it was 
the first time the person had been arrested, bail the 
prisoner for consideration of alternative outcome, 
i.e. caution.
d) During bail period enquiries were made into the 
background of the offence and the offender by 
specialist unit.
• 159
e) The offender was seen by a senior police officer on
return to the police station.
f) Police records were destroyed after a set period of
time.
It was my intention not to make any comparison between the 
types of offences and offenders but suggested that the 
procedure might be applied to some domestic violence 
offenders. That said, I took the view that there were 
certain similarities between some juvenile crime and some 
domestic violence, i.e. the offences often highlighted 
some problems which had their roots within an emotional, 
family or relationship context.
The next step was to develop this idea by seeking the 
advice and views of others involved in dealing with the 
effects of this type of crime. I therefore arranged to 
meet a number of other people with different experiences 
in the field of domestic violence. The first meeting was 
with a group of people who reflected broadly the opinions 
of academic researchers, women's refuge, feminists, policy 
department at Scotland Yard and operational police 
officers. After a lengthy and constructive meeting the 
following points emerged;
1) Any special procedure for handling domestic violence 
cases should be expanded and the definition of 
"household members" should include victims who had 
any type of relationship with the offender, e.g. 
boyfriend/girlfriend. It was felt that the
Metropolitan Police definition, which limited the 
meaning of domestic dispute as "any quarrel including 
violence between family or household members", was 
too restrictive and appeared to be unfair to people 
who had a relationship outside this narrow
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definition. The group pointed out that much domestic 
violence was between partners who had temporarily 
broken up their relationship.
2) There should be a strong policy of arrest and that
police officers should be encouraged to deal with
these assaults in exactly the same way as they would 
have done with other crimes. The feminist view was 
that all offenders ought then to be charged without 
seeking the views of the victim.
3) There should be better police recording and
monitoring practice of these crimes. Far too many
crimes never reached official statistics and police 
should be discouraged from "cuffing" allegations of 
crime which were recorded in the crime book merely 
because the victim later made a withdrawal statement. 
There were many reasons why a victim wished to 
withdraw from a prosecution, however, the fact 
remained that a crime had taken place and in the view 
of the group, should have been recorded in the Home 
Office statistics.
4) In relation to this specific procedure, minor injury 
needed to be carefully defined to avoid the danger of 
officers expanding the scheme to include more serious 
assaults. It was regarded as vital that this project 
only covered minor injuries and that all other 
assaults should be vigorously pursued through to 
prosecution.
5) The group agreed that victims of domestic assault 
were "vulnerable" and that police should use their 
power of arrest under Section 25 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act to protect these vulnerable 
persons.
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6) Every effort should be made by police management to 
bridge the gap between policy and practice in these 
cases.
7) Extra training of officers was seen as essential. 
Other agencies should have been consulted in the 
development of this procedure e.g. social services.
The second meeting took place with representatives of the 
local Borough Council, Community Affairs Department and 
Police Monitoring Committee. I had hoped to involve the
Social Services Department in providing some extra 
support, especially long term, for victims and their 
families who had been the subject of, or witnessed some, 
abuse. Unfortunately, the meeting concluded with the
council representative stating that they would only give
limited assistance and objected to the idea of releasing
background information on individuals or families which 
were held on confidential social services records. It 
was, however, agreed that in cases of domestic violence 
where the offender lived in a household where there were 
children, a written report would be forwarded by the 
police to the Director of Social Services of the area
where the household was situated. It was agreed that in 
most cases where families had children who were on the "at 
risk" register, the social services would probably call a 
case conference to discuss any implications of the 
domestic violence. Where the children were known to the 
social services, but not on the "at risk" register, the 
department would consider communicating with the victim to 
assess if the children were in need of any supervision.
I was disappointed at the apparent lack of co-operation by 
the social services department. However, I had to be 
realistic and accepted that their resources were limited. 
I also accepted that the idea of visits by social workers
162
to check up on children could have caused a dilemma for 
victims of domestic violence in that it might have caused 
victims not to report assaults in order to keep the social 
services away from the family. This, of course, could 
undermine one of the intentions of my new policy which was 
to encourage, not discourage, victims to report assaults.
The final two meetings were concerned with the legal 
implications of my policy. The first was with the local 
Crown Prosecutor who agreed with the system in general and 
advised that two months would be the appropriate period of 
time for deferment of a decision to prosecute or caution. 
He felt that it would be wrong in law to start any 
prosecution after that period. This agreement was 
important because some offenders would have to be 
prosecuted when they returned to the station at the end of 
the two month deferment period, e.g. if the victim wished 
the case to go to court or if he re-offended or did not 
admit the offence. Another meeting took place with the 
representatives of the Metropolitan Police Solicitors 
Department. The police solicitor examined the procedure 
from a legal point of view and gave a written opinion 
which is referred to in the next section. His opinion was 
that the policy was within the law but he expressed a 
personal preference for instant cautions at the police 
station at the time of arrest rather than the issue 
deferred for a decision.
Whilst I did not agree with him, I felt that my proposal 
of deferring the decision to prosecute for two months was 
important in as much as it allowed breathing space for 
both parties and it gave the police time to reflect on the 
best course of action. He opined that the instant caution 
would be the least costly, that justice would be seen to 
be done quickly and there would be an instant record of 
the offenders caution in the central index which would
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have been available to other police officers if the 
offender re-offended. I thought his opinion was very 
persuasive. However, on balance, I preferred the deferred 
decision idea. In my recommendations at the end of this 
thesis I do mention that it would be very useful for 
further research to be completed to compare and assess the 
value of an instant caution with the deferred decision 
procedure.
With this broad structure in mind, I then consulted 
further with police officers who were to operate the 
policy. There was an underlying reluctance by some 
officers to co-operate mainly because of the heavy 
workload. Nonetheless, the majority thought it was a
positive step which gave them direction.
It was fortunate I had the full support of the police
station management team. I have already acknowledged the 
support and encouragement given to me by Roger STREET. It 
was most important to have the support of "the management 
team". This was especially so in a hierarchical 
organisation such as the police. It was not possible to 
get a policy through, or if approved to get it to work, 
without the help of all the supervisors. I was also very 
appreciative of the encouragement I was given by the 
Detective Chief Inspector who was head of the station 
C.I.D. He was in total agreement with what I was trying
to do, so I felt confident that the C.I.D., who had to
complete much of the crime investigation, would give their 
support to the idea.
To sum up this section, the original idea was my own but 
it was developed with the help, guidance and co-operation 
of other professionals. In the next section I will 
describe each part of the policy in detail.
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THE STREATHAM POLICY
As I have already described it was out of a change in 
police attitude towards domestic violence, in policy and 
legal practice, that the Streatham scheme was conceived. 
The process was an amalgamation of academic research 
findings. Home Office Circular 14/85 later replaced by 
59/90 (see Appendix 1), and Metropolitan Police policy 
(1987 Force Order). The new procedure was developed after 
consultation with various agencies concerned with this 
issue.
The aim of the policy influenced police discretion at each 
stage of the process, e.g. arrest, custody and caution, 
encouraged a positive approach by police officers and 
therefore provided a better service to victims. Each 
stage of the policy was as follows:
ARREST STAGE
Officers, when satisfied that there was sufficient 
evidence to prove that an assault had taken place, were 
encouraged by supervisors and the new policy, to use their 
legal powers and exercise their discretion to arrest. 
Arrest was seen to provide the best service to victims and 
to act as the best deterrent. Officers were reminded of 
the legal definition of assault as established by the 
courts :
"An assault was any action in which 
'A' intentionally or recklessly 
causes to apprehend immediate and 
personal violence" (Fagen v 
Metropolitan Police IQB 439 1968, 3 
ALL ER at 455).
The purpose of reminding officers of this definition was 
to support my idea that an assault was a crime
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irrespective of the degree of injury. So, in my policy, 
I went on to further elucidate exactly what constituted a 
legal assault.
An assault, occasioning actual bodily harm, was any act 
in which *A* intentionally or recklessly inflicted 
unlawful personal violence on (B. ROLFE 1952 36
Criminal Appeal Report). Personal violence included any 
hurt or injury which resulted in any injury to the 
victim's state of mind for the time being (Regina v 
Miller QBD 1954 282). Officers were advised to use their 
powers provided for in the general arrest condition found 
in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, Section 25 (3) 
(e). This authorised a constable to arrest if he/she had 
reasonable grounds for believing that arrest was 
necessary to protect a child or other "vulnerable person" 
from the relevant person. The policy emphasised that 
domestic violence victims were "vulnerable persons" and 
that arrest was necessary to protect such persons from 
offenders. The purpose was to persuade officers to 
exercise their legal powers to arrest even in cases of 
minor injury.
In cases where evidence was insufficient to prove an 
assault, officers were asked to consider exercising their 
powers of arrest under common law for breach of the 
peace. These powers were defined in the case of 
McCONNELLl v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester 1990 1 
ALL ER 423:
"At common law a breach of the peace 
can occur on private premises even if 
the only persons likely to be 
affected by the breach of the peace 
are inside the premises and no member 
of the public outside the premises is 
affected".
Accordingly, where a police officer genuinely suspected,
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on reasonable grounds, that a breach of the peace was 
likely to occur inside private premises, the officer was 
entitled to exercise his common law power to arrest for 
breach of the peace without warrant.
Officers were also reminded of the importance of being 
caring and compassionate to the victim of a domestic 
assault. These victims would invariably be in a state 
of shock and should always be spoken to separately from 
the suspect. Officers were advised to give the victim a 
locally sponsored advisory leaflet (see Appendix 2) 
which had been produced by Streatham Police. The 
intention of this leaflet was to standardise the 
information that was given to victims.
The policy extended the Metropolitan Police definition 
of domestic dispute. The official policy had defined a 
domestic dispute as any "quarrel including violence 
between family or household members". Divisional policy 
developed this definition to include those who had "some 
type of personal relationship e.g. boyfriend/girlfriend, 
or ex co-habitees". This action afforded other 
vulnerable victims the same service from police and 
avoided any perceived discrimination.
The guidelines endeavoured to influence, and persuade, 
officers to deal with domestic disputes from a legal, 
and not a moral, perspective. This pragmatic approach 
intended to change some of the negative attitudes which 
had been shown previously by many officers.
CUSTODY STAGE
Offenders were processed and supervised by police 
sergeants who acted in their capacity of custody 
officer in exactly the same way as towards other
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prisoners, i.e. under the provisions contained in the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Codes of 
Practice. In addition, each case was supervised by the 
duty inspector. This provided a second check and aimed 
to ensure that it was only cases that fell within the 
guidelines were deferred for two months. Custody 
sergeants decided if the case fell within the criteria 
for a deferred decision procedure. If not, sergeants
had to charge all cases if they thought there was a
realistic chance of conviction.
The criteria for deferring a decision fell within the 
Home Office guidelines for cautioning:
a) The injury had to be of a "minor nature". 
The decision, as to what constituted a minor 
injury, was left to the common sense and 
judgement of the custody officer. In making 
his decision, the custody officer consulted
with the C.I.D. officer appointed to 
supervise the case. The guidance given was
that such an injury would be confined to
soreness, redness, slight bruising, nervous 
or hysterical tension.
b) The standard of evidence had to be the same 
as required by the code for Crown 
Prosecutors, e.g. the test for prosecution 
must be whether there was a realistic 
prospect of a conviction.
c) The offender had to admit the offence and 
agreed to the deferment procedure.
d) The victim agreed to the caution and had to 
• be informed that such a caution could deprive
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him or her of a ready means of redress 
through a court compensation order.
A deferred decision to prosecute was not to be used if 
the following conditions applied:
a) Where the victim wished to have the offender 
charged and there was sufficient evidence to 
prosecute.
or
b) Where there was sufficient concern for the 
safety of the victim. If there was a 
possibility that the release of the offender 
would result in a re-occurrence of the 
original situation then I suggested, the 
proper course for the police was to detain 
the offender, for appearance at court, either 
by way of charge or bind over application.
or
c) Where the offender had a previous conviction, 
or caution, for assaulting the victim.
Fingerprints and photographs were taken from the 
offender who was treated like other prisoners and 
detained in a police cell until release. This was 
intended to have the dramatic effect on the offender 
who, it was hoped would have, realised that he was being 
treated as a criminal. The symbolic impact of this part 
of the process was intended to bring home to the suspect 
that his actions were officially being recorded. 
Custody officers, when satisfied that the basic criteria 
for deferment had been met, informed the victim of the
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impending release of the offender and bailed the 
offender to re-appear at the police station on a 
Thursday evening two months later.
After the scheme had been operating for about 18 months, 
a "self help group" for men was started by some local 
professional people. The offender was given an 
invitation letter, which was sealed in an envelope 
marked "personal", before leaving the station. This 
aspect of the policy is discussed in more detail in a 
later chapter.
TWO MONTH DEFERMENT PERIOD
The two month deferment period of time was my idea, 
chosen because I felt that it gave everybody breathing 
space. As mentioned earlier it was the maximum time 
which the C.P.S. thought was legally possible in these 
circumstances.
During this period, the investigating officer completed 
any further enquiries with regard to the allegation of 
crime, e.g. extra witness statements, and prepared case 
papers as if the case was being presented before the 
court. The C.I.D. officer liaised with the domestic 
violence officer who supported and advised to the victim 
during this period. The domestic violence officer 
ascertained if there had been any re-offending against 
the victim, and checked with the National Identification 
Bureau records for any previous convictions of the 
offender.
The domestic violence officer ensured that a report was 
forwarded to the social services department of the local 
authority, if there had been any children involved with
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the offender, A previous agreement, already discussed, 
had been made with the social services department that 
they would make further enquiries and arrange a case 
conference if they considered it appropriate, e.g. the 
children involved may be on the "at risk" register and 
considered to be in need of further supervision.
The domestic violence officer was also in a position to 
refer the victim, or indeed the offender, to other 
agencies, e.g. Relate, Alcoholics Anonymous or local 
self help groups.
If the person arrested re-offended during this deferment 
period, the intention of the police was to charge him 
with the original and the new offence.
Provided there was no repeat crime(s) the Community 
Liaison Inspector, after speaking to the C.I.D. officer 
and domestic violence officer, acquainted himself with 
the evidence contained in the case papers and 
antecedents of the offender before administrating the 
caution at the police station on the return date.
CAUTION STAGE
The inspector, in uniform, conducted the caution, 
usually in a formal setting at the police station. The 
offender would be advised where to seek further help if 
this course was desired. Local and central records were 
noted immediately after the caution.
The experience at Streatham was that the most effective 
method was the Community Inspector gave the caution to 
the offender. The main advantage of using the same 
person was that it ensured a minimum standard of 
caution and a consistency in approach.
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CLEARING UP ALLEGATIONS OF CRIME
After the project had been operating for several months, 
local policy directions were issued on how crimes should 
be cleared up. Guidance was taken from the national 
rules for clearing up crime as laid down by the Home 
Office and gave police the opportunity to "clear up" the 
crime.
A crime was cleared up if (i) "the guilt of the accused 
was clear but the victim refused or was permanently 
unable to give evidence", or (ii) "the accused admitted 
the offence but it was decided that no useful purpose 
would be served by proceeding with the charge", or (iii) 
the accused "was cautioned by police". These rules were 
vigorously applied at Streatham and consequently most 
crimes, which involved domestic assault, were cleared up 
before submission of the crime statistics to the Home 
Office,
CLASSIFICATION OF ASSAULTS (NO CRIMING)
In the latter stages of the research the policy of the 
division was altered so that most crimes were classified 
according to the statement (verbal or written) made at 
the time by the victim or another witness. Allegations 
were only classified as "no crime" if the crime was 
transferred to another division, or where there was 
substantial indication that the allegation was actually 
false, i.e. where the victim admitted that the statement 
made to police was completely untrue. All such 
retractions were carefully examined in the knowledge 
that victims may have denied the assault as a result of 
pressure from the offender.
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Withdrawal of support for a prosecution, by the victim, 
would not in itself be sufficient for a "no crime" 
classification.
See Appendix 3 for flow chart of the procedure.
This section dealt with the actual procedure I adopted, 
in the next part I will discuss the law as it related to 
the process.

ITT
THTg l aw as it related TO THE STREATHAM PROCEDURE
General developments in the criminal law set the 
parameters of the police legal powers which were to be 
found in the Streatham procedure. Before the policy was 
finally formulated I met with the local Crown Prosecutor 
and a representative of the Metropolitan Police Solicitors 
Department to discuss the legality of the proposed system. 
The Solicitors Department provided me with a written legal 
opinion on some aspects of the procedure.
This section is thus devoted to a brief consideration of 
that part of the law which gave legal authority to the 
scheme. I had felt that it was vital to have a legal 
opinion as I had thought that the "cynics" at the police 
station would not accept my interpretation of the law. I 
was right, because, as can be seen later, some custody 
sergeants did not fully accept even the legal opinion ! 
Nevertheless, the legal opinion added to the scheme's 
general acceptance at the station. I will now mention 
some of the specific issues which were subject of legal 
advice by the lawyers. Where appropriate the legal 
opinion of the Metropolitan Police Solicitor is quoted.
THE POLICE POWER OF ARREST
Section 25 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
contained the general arrest condition of police. One 
condition provided by Section 25 (3) (e) stated:
"That a constable has reasonable 
grounds for believing that arrest is 
necessary to protect a child or other 
vulnerable person (my emphasis) from 
the relevant person".
In the Streatham policy all the victims of domestic 
assaults were regarded as "vulnerable persons". This
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section gave police constables power to arrest offenders 
for the purpose of protecting the vulnerable person. 
Initially some officers were uncertain as to how long and 
under what circumstances a person could be regarded as 
"vulnerable". Some officers took the view that once the 
immediate danger from the offender had passed there was no 
longer the legal power of arrest. I disagreed with this 
and my policy specified that any victim of domestic 
violence would be vulnerable up until the time the 
offender was arrested. I suggested the role of the police 
was to use their power of arrest and, in doing so, offer 
the best protection for the victim.
Legal Opinion
"It is legally correct to view just 
about all victims of domestic assault 
as "vulnerable persons" as provided 
by Section 25 (3) (e) of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
However there may be the very unusual 
case where the victim may not be such 
a vulnerable person and it could be 
envisaged that such circumstances 
could arise where the female victim 
was, for instance, say a professional 
lady wrestler or the alleged offender 
was wheelchair bound."
This latter example was rather far fetched but was 
included to remind officers that they had discretion under 
the law and each case was to be judged on its merits.
THE POWER OF THE POLICE TO DETAIN 
THE OFFENDER FOR A COOLING OFF PERIOD
The main issue which arose here concerned the powers of 
the police to detain a person merely for a "cooling off" 
period in custody at the police station prior to being
released. This was not an integral part of the procedure,
but, caused some debate between the police custody
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officers, especially in the initial period after the 
scheme was launched.
Legal Opinion
It is advised very definitely that a 
cooling off period of a number of 
hours, for no other reason than a 
cooling off, is not lawful and does 
not accord with the provisions of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act.
The duties and obligations of a 
custody officer in respect of 
detention at a police station are 
exhaustive - see Section 34 (1). At 
the risk of over-simplification: such 
a person may be detained at a police 
station before charge only for such a 
period as is necessary to obtain 
sufficient evidence to charge that 
person with the offence for which he 
has been arrested - see Section 37 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
and the Codes of Practice - see Code 
C, paragraph 1 (i) which provides
that all persons in custody must be 
dealt with expeditiously and released 
as soon as the need for detention has 
ceased to apply."
Another interesting legal point, which was also discussed 
by the officers who were going to operate the policy, was 
the correctness in law if an officer who was called to the 
scene of a minor domestic assault, did not exercise his 
power of arrest under Section 25 (3) (e) but decided to 
arrest the assailant under the common law provisions of 
preventing a further breach of the peace. It was held in 
McConnell v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester 
Police 1990 1 ALL ER 423 that a breach of the peace could 
have occurred on private premises even if the only persons 
likely to be affected by the breach of the peace were 
inside the premises and no member of the public outside 
the premises was involved. BEVAN and LIDSTONE (1984) 
pointed out that the general limit on police detention, 
which was contained at Section 34 of the Police and
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Criminal Evidence Act, only applied if the person was 
arrested for an offence and not for the person arrested 
"under other powers of arrest” (e.g. common law).
It thus seemed to follow that the police, if they 
exercised their power of arrest under common law, were not 
bound by the restrictions of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act. Therefore they could keep a person in 
detention for a suitable "cooling off" period until the 
danger from the person's violence had abated. This period
of detention could have been for several hours after the
offence, even overnight, before the assailant was 
released. If the possibility of a further breach of the 
peace did not abate, the person could have been detained 
in custody and taken before a Magistrates Court to show 
why he should have not to be bound over to keep the peace 
in future.
This method of dealing with an offender in a case of 
domestic assault appeared practical, but did not receive 
the support from the Solicitors Department.
Legal Opinion
Police should exercise their wide
powers under statute and not resort 
to common law where there was
reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that a statutory offence had taken 
place.
Some police forces promoted a policy for dealing with 
minor domestic cases by arrest for breach of the peace. 
Their argument was that a bind over at court was a 
suitable sanction on an offender. The circumstances 
described probably warranted interpretation from a court 
and although I disagreed with the emphatic opinion from 
the solicitor, I did not encourage the use of common law 
as a method of dealing with these cases. It was my belief
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that the strict legal definition of assault gave the 
police adequate powers of arrest to deal with even the 
most minor of cases. I also believed that a caution had a 
more lasting impact on an offender because the police 
record was kept for three years whilst a bind over was 
usually only for a period of up to twelve months.
DEFERRED DECISION TO PROSECUTE
The two month deferment period for consideration to 
prosecute/caution/no further action was agreed by the 
local Crown Prosecution Office. Some custody officers had 
considerable difficulty in accepting the legality of this 
part. Their argument centred around the principle that 
once the initial police investigation was completed the 
offender had to be taken before a court. Again this was a 
matter of legal interpretation which was a matter for the 
courts, but, I asserted that there was power to bail 
exactly the same way as the police service dealt with 
juvenile crime.
Legal Opinion
A deferment period of two months is 
probably lawful since consideration 
may need to be taken as to whether, 
in the circumstances, charge or 
caution are appropriate and the 
provision of police bail to await 
such a decision would probably fall 
within Section 35 (5) (b) of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
which states that a person shall be 
released without bail unless it 
appears to the custody officer, that 
proceedings may be taken against him 
in respect of any such matter and if 
it so appears, he shall be released 
on bail".
Most custody officers accepted this legal opinion but a 
legal difficulty arose if the offender failed to appear at
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the station in answer to this bail. Under the law the 
police had no power of arrest in these circumstances 
unless there was new evidence justifying a further arrest 
(Section 42 (2) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984). 
The options available to the police were to take no 
further action, or locate the person and administer the 
caution at the place where he was found e.g. home address, 
or send a written warning (not an official adult caution), 
or summons if the intention was to prosecute the suspect.
Experience at Streatham showed that the offenders who 
failed to appear at the station invariably had moved 
address. This made the service of a summons, or a issue 
of a caution, difficult. In any case the intention in 
most cases was to caution and the legal process did not 
validate the person being summoned to appear at the 
station to receive a caution. Overall the Metropolitan 
Police Solicitor favoured the police use of an instant 
caution at the time the person was brought to the station 
rather than deferring the matter.
Nevertheless, I personally believed that the two month 
"waiting period" added a significant dimension to the 
adult caution, so I continued with my policy. That said, 
I have suggested in my recommendations, that further 
research should be conducted using the instant caution 
procedure and then comparing the results with the deferred 
decision to prosecute or caution.
Most police officers, once they became fully aware of the 
legal opinion, accepted the legality of the different 
parts of the scheme.
As I have already mentioned it was not difficult to 
formulate new policy, however an effective manager's major 
task was to ensure that the procedure was being accepted
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and adopted in practice. A most important part of this 
work was to objectively monitor and evaluate the working 
of the scheme. Doctor Susan EDWARDS gave me valuable 
advice and guidance in this area. I will deal with this 
aspect in the next section.
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THE RESEARCH EVALUATION
The implementation and impact of my policy was evaluated 
with the help of three researchers from the University of 
Buckingham. From the outset of the scheme I considered it 
was important to draw on the independent expertise of 
Doctor Susan EDWARDS, who had been working in this field 
for several years. I believed that the use of independent 
researchers/interviewers was most likely to achieve a 
higher level of objectivity to the analysis. I also 
believed that working with an established academic brought 
greater influence, post project, when endeavouring to 
persuade other police managers to adopt a policy.
My aim in this section is to discuss the problems in 
evaluation, interviewing victims, how implementation and 
effectiveness were measured and the methodology that was 
adopted.
THE PROBLEMS OF EVALUATION
The success of the policy depended, in part, on the impact 
of the arrest, deferred decision and caution on the 
subsequent behaviour of men who assaulted 
spouses/girlfriends. The effectiveness of this policy, in 
reducing subsequent battering, was not easily measured 
since evidence of subsequent behaviour needed to be 
assessed over a period of time. It also depended, inter 
alia on couples remaining together as well as on the 
proclivity of the victim to report any subsequent assault 
either to the police or to the interviewer. The success 
was determined by a number of variables.
First, I set out to examine how far the policy was 
implemented by police officers at the various levels of 
operation. This included a consideration of the extent to
182
which officers arrested in minor cases and how far they 
recorded such crimes. This was empirically evaluated 
through a very thorough examination of all police records 
by one of the researchers.
Second, I set out to examine the impact of the policy on 
officers, offenders and victims. The researchers 
interviewed a number of police officers and a sample of 
offenders and victims.
MEASURING IMPLEMENTATION
The measurement depended on the difference, if any, that 
had taken place between the pre and post policy period. 
This part of the study was evaluated through a number of 
different methods. First a short questionnaire was 
devised and completed by a sample of police officers who 
were operating the policy. Second a number of interviews 
were conducted with a sample of officers at each level of 
the organisation. These were conducted by the researchers 
and included a sample of arresting officers, custody 
officers, C.I.D. officers, domestic violence officers, 
inspectors and senior management. Third was a calculation 
of the arrest rate expressed as a proportion of the total 
domestic crime, and comparing this profile to a sample 
period in earlier years (pre-policy) and with the 
performance of another division which did not have a 
similar policy. Fourth, a quantitive examination was made 
of the proportion of domestic violence cases that resulted 
in a deferred decision, expressed as a proportion of all 
incidents from which charges were laid.
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MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS
The effectiveness of any new proposal was usually 
considered proved by a marked reduction in the behaviour 
under consideration. In this project a reduction in the 
violent conduct of the offender was desired so the re­
offending rate of suspects was measured during and after 
the monitoring period. An examination was also made of 
police records to find out the re-offending rate of other 
offenders who had been charged with domestic violence. 
The difficulty with this type of measure was discussed at 
Chapter 1 and therefore a reduction in violence was not 
taken as the only measure of success or of effectiveness.
Firstly, effectiveness had to be reflected in an improved 
police response and service. Secondly, it had to be 
proved by an increased use by the police officers of their 
powers of arrest. Thirdly, it had to be shown that there 
was a continued police commitment to prosecute offenders 
who had not been cautioned. Finally, and most
importantly, there had to be an increased public, 
especially victims, satisfaction with the police response.
I suggested that studies in the field of family violence 
have relied too heavily, and often erroneously, on the 
diminished or increased frequency of repeat violence as a 
measure of the success (or the failure) of the police 
arrest policy. As I previously discussed, SHERMAN and 
BERK (1984) found that where there had been an arrest, the 
offender was less likely, compared to other police 
methods, to re-offend during the follow up period. They 
concluded arrested men were less likely to re-offend and 
it was arrest which had the deterrent impact on their 
subsequent behaviour. This conclusion remained open to 
empirical question and scrutiny. If there were cases 
where arrests were executed and there were fewer calls to
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the police for subsequent assistance, can it reasonably be 
inferred that the violence in these relationships had 
ceased, or on the contrary had, in fact, the violence 
continued and women were too afraid to contact the police? 
It was well known that women were traditionally reluctant 
to report these crimes to the police. This was not just 
reflected in the low level of reported crime figures, but 
more importantly it was one of the conclusions reached by 
the crime survey interviewers of the British Crime Survey
1988.
It therefore followed that it was scientifically unsound 
to rely solely on the increase or decrease in repeat calls 
to police for assistance as a measure of success or 
failure. This study, then, treated and regarded the 
matter of measuring implementation differently.
Firstly the deferred decision policy had to be examined 
within the overall frame of policing policy on domestic 
violence. One indication of the success of the 
implementation of the policy was the calculation of the 
arrest rate as a proportion of all reported incidents. It 
was expected to increase and certainly not fall. An 
additional measure was the prosecution rate, expressed as 
a proportion of all recorded incidents, since the success 
of the deferred decision policy depended also on ensuring 
that the deferred caution was not used as an alternative 
to prosecution, (a matter feared by critics of the policy) 
but rather the alternative to no action being taken in 
minor cases. It was expected that the prosecution rate 
would increase and certainly not fall. These
measurements, of course, were relevant only in the short 
term. In theory, if this arrest procedure was very 
successful, and acted as a deterrent, then eventually 
reported crime would have dropped as would the prosecution 
rates. Whether or not the deferred caution was used as an
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alternative to prosecution or as an alternative to no 
action was best assessed by comparing the arrest and 
prosecution profile of Streatham Division with another 
division in the Metropolitan Police area that had no 
specific policy on domestic violence and lacked a domestic 
violence unit. For this purpose the other division, which 
was referred to as division 'A', was chosen for two 
reasons. First the population and police size were very 
similar and second, the other division had been researched 
in earlier studies by EDWARDS (1986) (1989).
Secondly, the policy had to be measured in the context of 
how far the implementation of the policy accorded with the 
strict guidelines and criteria. This measurement centred 
on how relief officers used their discretion in exercising 
their power of arrest and how custody officers exercised 
their discretion and power to defer the decision for a 
caution.
Thirdly, policy had to be examined according to its 
implementation. This required the need to interview a 
number of officers. Consideration was given to working 
alongside officers and observing how they actually 
performed their duties. Unfortunately, a limited research 
budget made this proposal unrealistic so it was not 
undertaken. Another difficulty in observing officers was 
the problem of adopting the correct approach, e.g. a 
researcher could have attached him or herself to one 
officer on a tour of duty and never have received a call 
to a domestic assault. On the other hand, the researcher 
could have stayed at the station and waited for a suitable 
call. The officer who dealt with the incident would then 
have returned to the station before going on to the scene 
of the incident. This would have caused delay and 
therefore would have given a second rate service to the 
victim.
1?6
Fourthly the policy had to be assessed through interviews 
with offenders as to the execution of the arrest, 
detection and the prospect of a deferred decision to 
caution and its broad impact on subsequent behaviour.
Lastly, the policy had to be assessed through interviews 
with victims as to the assistance rendered to them by the 
police throughout this time. It was intended that efforts 
were to be made to distinguish the effects of arrest, 
detention of the offender in custody whilst necessary 
enquiries were being made, the effect of the pending 
decision to charge/caution on the interim behaviour of the 
suspect and the effect of the deferred decision. For 
example, it was necessary to have considered whether the 
same, or similar, effect on offenders might have been 
achieved by arrest and detention alone.
METHODOLOGY
Quantitive and qualitative research methods were used by 
the researchers.
Police records were examined for the period of six months 
at Streatham Police Station from May 1989 to December
1989. The aim was to examine in close details the several 
profiles on incidents, reported crimes, recorded crimes, 
no crimes, arrests, deferred decisions and cases reported 
for prosecution.
Two months, September and October, were chosen for 
comparison with two control samples. The first control 
sample was the same period during the previous year at 
Streatham Police Station and the second control sample was 
selected for the same period at another police division. 
The aim was to make a comparison between the total crimes 
reported, arrests expressed as a percentage of total
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records, the number of crimes that were reported yet were 
"cuffed" expressed as a percentage of total crimes 
recorded and an analysis of the charging rate also 
expressed as a percentage of total records.
My own domestic violence officers examined pre and post 
policy police records on injury on duty files, sickness 
records, occurrence and incident report books and 
ascertained the number of officers injured as a result of 
dealing with domestic violence.
Interviews were conducted by researchers with offenders, 
victims and police officers. Forty-seven offenders who 
had been arrested, detained and subject to the deferred 
decision policy were interviewed with a view to assessing 
the impact of the procedure on subsequent behaviour. A 
checklist was devised for the interviewer (see Appendix 8) 
whereby all offenders were questioned on matters relating 
to the effect of the arrest, the taking of fingerprints 
and photographs, the detention and deferred decision 
periods and the caution.
Interviews were conducted with twenty-three victims, whose 
aggressors had been subject to the deferred decision 
process. Victims were questioned with a view to 
considering their levels of satisfaction with the police 
response and to gather information on subsequent behaviour 
of offenders during the two month deferment period. Again 
a checklist of questions can be found at Appendix 8. 
Thirty police officers from each level of the 
organisation, and who had experience in the implementation 
of the policy, were interviewed to assess their attitude 
and response to the new policy. An interview checklist is 
to be found at Appendix 9.
PROBLEMS WITH INTERVIEWING
Other research has found that a number of sensitive 
problems were posed by interviewing victims. For 
instance, the British Crime Survey (1983) was nationally 
unsuccessful in fostering disclosure of domestic violence 
and rape in the course of sampling interviews. HOUGH and 
MAYHEW (1985) explained that the very low reportage of 
domestic violence might have been because the offender was 
in the house during the course of the interview, thereby, 
inhibiting full disclosure by the victim. HAMMER and 
SAUNDERS (1984) argued for the use of specially trained 
female interviewers.
At the beginning of the project several of these problems 
were anticipated and resolved in the following way.
1) All female victims were interviewed by an independent 
female interviewer and three victims were questioned 
by Doctor Susan EDWARDS.
2) The location of the interview was a cause for some
concern. It was finally decided that victims should 
be interviewed in their own home if they chose. In 
some cases the offer, to complete the interview at 
this location, may well have contributed to the non­
response rate.
3) The privacy of the victim was also an important
concern and here the non-response rate may well have
been affected by those women who simply did not wish 
any further invasion of their privacy. A small fee, 
of £5, was made available to victims as a recognition 
of their time. It was not meant in any way to
reflect the true value of their time and co­
operation, but was a gesture. In this respect many
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of the North American studies, which involved similar 
victim surveys, involved a fee to victims.
There was also some concern about a suitable time and 
place for interviewing offenders. After much deliberation 
it was decided, that the most practical and cost effective 
way was, to conduct the interviews at the police station 
immediately after the caution. Having adopted this 
strategy I accepted that this location may have had some 
influence on the answers given by the interviewees and 
might have put doubt upon the credibility and independence 
of the male interviewer.

190
C H A P T E R  4
The Quantitative Research Findings

191
THE QUANTITIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS
This section is divided into five parts. The first 
describes the approach which had been taken taken in the 
analysis of statistical information, the second highlights 
the main findings, the third discusses the comparative 
results from the control samples, the fourth illustrates 
the general prosecution practice and the last examines the 
extent of "cuffing crimes".
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The aim of this study was to measure the impact of the 
Streatham domestic violence policy by (i) considering the 
total records over the eight month period, (ii) comparing 
the arrest and recorded crime figures with those of an 
earlier period at Streatham, and (iii) comparing those 
trends with another division that had no specific policy, 
nor a dedicated domestic violence office.
The method employed was to examine police records for an 
eight month period between May 1989 and December 1989. In 
addition data were collected for September/October 1988 at 
Streatham, and September/October 1989 at another division, 
to achieve a basis of comparison through the use of two 
control samples.
Data were collected from the following sources - incident 
report books, beat crime books, major crime books, 
screened in books, screened out books, domestic violence 
office files, arrest index books, custody records, bail 
book, court index book, court records and the station 
induction book.
To allow for an accurate and a systematic analysis of 
police records all the data was imputed into an Apricot
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computer which was on loan from the Metropolitan Police 
Department of Computer Services. That department also 
provided valuable advice to me and trained the researcher 
who had the responsibility for imputing and analysing the 
statistics. As a result of the advice and guidance the 
"card box" file system was employed. It was necessary to 
construct our own fields of information and a coding 
system appropriate to the research needs - see Appendix 6.
MAIN FINDINGS
The "progress" of reported domestic violence incidents, 
and their case mortality, from the public reporting by 
victims and bystanders through to police arrest, 
cautioning, charging and case disposal practices are 
illustrated at Appendix 7 and was examined as follows. A 
total of 446 domestic related crimes were recorded by the 
Streatham police during the period of data collection. 
Major crimes, which generally speaking involved more 
serious injury or intent, totalled 81 (18%). The total 
number of beat crimes, which were usually those involving 
less serious injury, totalled 365 (82%). There was a
general increase in reported incidents over the eight 
month period - see Table 1. In the lowest month there
were 48 reports and the highest 65. Although the general
trend was upwards there were monthly fluctuations up and 
down. Perhaps the period was too short to illustrate a
trend of increased reporting by members of the public.
However, an analysis over a much longer period showed a 
significant increase in the number of domestic incidents 
which were reported to police at the Streatham police 
division. In 1988 the figure stood at just over 300 
whilst in 1990 the figure rose to over 600. I accepted 
that there could well be a number of reasons for this, 
e.g. increased media attention to the crime, however, it 
was encouraging to have speculated that the new policy
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might have re-assured victims to come forward and report 
these crimes although the victim interviews did not fully support this
A total of 204 suspects were arrested during this period 
producing an arrest rate of 46% (expressed as a proportion 
of total crime cases) - see Appendix 7. Therefore in 54% 
of cases an arrest, at the time the research was 
completed, had not been made by the police. There were 
various reasons for this and included (a) where the case 
was "no crimed" because the victim refused to substantiate 
the original allegation and (b) the assailant did not live 
at the venue of the crime and had disappeared, but was 
circulated on the police computer as "wanted by police". 
Such a person remained on the wanted files for a 
considerable time.
Of those arrested, 105 (52%) were charged, 66 (32%) were 
deferred for two months under the local policy, 9 (5%) 
were bailed for further enquiries to be made, in 20 cases 
(10%) the outcome was recorded as "no further action" and 
in the remaining 4 cases (2%) two offenders were arrested 
elsewhere and two were offenders, who had been arrested in 
Streatham but had committed offences elsewhere and, were 
transferred to another station to be dealt with. These 
figures are shown at Table 1. The figures illustrate a 
gradual increase in the number of offenders arrested, the 
number who were charged and the number processed by way of 
a deferred decision.
A closer examination of the incidents initially recorded 
in the crime book which were finally classified as "no 
crime" revealed the number of be 149 (representing 33% of 
total crimes reported). Thirty-three of these were major 
crimes and 116 were beat crimes. Table two provides a 
breakdown of the reasons for classifying these records as 
"no crime". The police recorded several reasons for
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classifying cases in this way. Thirteen per cent of the 
crimes occurred on another division and were thus 
transferred to another station for the investigation to 
continue. Many of those crimes may well have received a 
crime classification at the transferred station. In the 
majority of cases (56%) the victim was unwilling to 
proceed further with the case. This was a very 
significant figure as it represented the difficulty which 
faced the police in processing these cases. In each case 
there was probably some reason why the case was not 
considered for the deferred decision procedure e.g. the 
injury was not minor, the offender did not admit the 
offence or the offender had a previous conviction for 
assaulting his partner. This figure may well have been
greater because it did not include those cases in which 
the victim noted withdrawal after the research period. 
The real concern I had about this high number of cases was 
that in most of the incidents an assault actually 
happened, yet, for whatever reason the victim was 
unwilling to proceed so the offender had absolutely no 
sanction imposed on him. As experience and research has 
shown, these offenders may well continue with their 
violent behaviour which will escalate in frequency and 
severity and the woman victims will be even more at risk. 
An analysis of the reasons why these victims did not wish 
to proceed was beyond this research, but, I do believe 
that one of the roles of police was to create a climate 
which encouraged victims to continue with a prosecution. 
I saw the Streatham scheme as providing an important first 
step in that direction.
In 24% of the cases the police considered that there was 
insufficient evidence to substantiate an allegation and 
the police concluded that there was not a reasonable 
prospect of a conviction so the case was not brought
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before a court. The remaining 7% of cases were reported 
in the crime book and classified as "record only".
Out of a total of 204 arrests, 66 (32%) of the cases fell 
within the criteria required for the Streatham scheme. 
These cases were deferred for a two month period and the 
offender released on bail. After this period, 44 (67%) 
adult cautions were administered, 4 (6%) offenders were 
charged, in 7 (11%) cases no further action was taken and 
in the remaining 11 (17%) of cases the offender failed to 
turn up to answer to his bail - see Figure 2. In this 
latter category the police officers in the domestic 
violence office continued to make enquiries in an 
endeavour to trace the offender and make alternative 
arrangements to administer the caution. The 4 offenders 
who were charged had committed further violence during the 
deferment period so the police considered it was 
inappropriate to administer an adult caution.
A police charge was preferred in 105 cases, representing 
52% of the total arrests. These suspects represented 23% 
of all the allegations of crime. Seventy-nine (76%) 
suspects were remanded in custody pending a court 
appearance in accordance with the provisions contained in 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Twenty-six (24%) 
offenders were bailed to appear before the court. These 
figures represented a vigorous prosecution policy as well 
as a commitment to protect the victim by detaining the 
majority of offenders in custody.
CONTROL SAMPLES
In order to evaluate the Streatham police performance, as 
a result of implementing the policy, it was considered 
necessary to compare the results with an alternative 
method of dealing with this type of crime. This was
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achieved by comparing the total reported crimes, arrest, 
charging and "no criming" rates with two control samples. 
A two month sample, within the research period in 1988/89 
was compared with (a) the same period in 1988, on the same 
division, and (b) the same period in 1989 with another 
division which did not have a specific local policy nor 
any designated officers to take on special responsibility 
for domestic violence. September and October were 
selected for the two month comparison period. The key
findings, which are illustrated at figures 3, 4 and 5 and 
Tables 11 and 12 were as follows:
Comparison between 1989 and 1990
Total reported crime - more crimes were reported.
In 1989 there were 107 allegations of crime which was an 
increase of 37 (53%) on 1988. Major (or more serious)
crime reporting increased from 10 to 21 (110%) whilst beat 
(or less serious) crimes increased from 60 to 86 (43%) - 
see Figure 3. Accepting that there could have been more 
crime to report, this was very encouraging and tended to 
suggest that either more people/victims had increased 
their confidence in the police and were thus reporting 
more crime or, that officers were reporting more from the 
scenes of domestic violence.
Arrests from reported crime - more arrests were made. 
Arrests increased from 21 (30% of total records) in 1988 
to 56 (52% of total records) in 1989. There was a
striking increase in arrests for major crime from 1 (10%
of total reported crime) to 11 (50% of total reported
major crimes). There was also an increase in arrests for 
beat crimes from 20 (33% of total beat crimes) to 45 (52% 
of total beat crimes) - see Figure 4. This was a very 
important finding as it provided proof that officers were
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paying heed to the "arrest” message contained in the 
policy.
No criming - fewer crimes were classified as "no crimes". 
The number of "no crime" classifications declined from 47 
(67% of all crimes recorded) in 1988, to 32 (30% of all 
crimes recorded) in 1989. In 1988, 25 victims were
unwilling to attend court and pursue the prosecution. 
This was the reason given for "no criming" on the crime 
record. This figure represented 53% of the total of "no 
crimes" whilst in 1989 the number was 22 representing 68% 
of the total of "no crimes" - see Figure 5. It is 
relevant to note that the "no criming" policy at the 
Streatham division was not introduced until the latter end 
of the 1989 research period, therefore its impact was of 
limited effect. However,' to estimate the true value of 
this "no criming" part of the policy, crime figures for 
Streatham Division were analysed for September/October
1990. These showed that "no criming" had been reduced to 
2% !
Charging rate - more offenders were charged in 1989.
Of those arrested at Streatham in 1988, 13 offenders (18% 
total records) were charged with criminal offences and 
brought before the local Magistrates Court. In 1989 of 
those arrested 29 (27% of total records) were charged and 
brought before the court. The positive action of 
arresting more people was reflected in the increased 
number of offenders who were charged in the research 
period.
These comparative findings illustrated the positive effect 
of the new policy when compared to the previous year. The 
findings suggested that the implementation of the policy 
resulted in significant increases in reporting, arresting
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and charging of domestic crimes whilst fewer allegations 
were "no crimed".
COMPARISON WITH ANOTHER DIVISION
Comparison was made with the performance of another 
division (called Division *A*) for September/October 1989. 
The other division was similar in population mix and size 
(92,000 compared to 80,000), area (4% compared to 3% 
square miles), police manpower (272 compared to 265), 
civilian support staff (40 compared to 50) and the annual 
financial budgets.
One of the researchers attended the other division and 
examined the same police records as they had done in the 
Streatham survey. The key findings were as follows:
Total crimes - more crimes involving domestic violence 
were reported on Division *A'.
Division *A* had 23 (21%) more crimes recorded in the two 
months period (130 allegations of crime compared to 107). 
Division *A* recorded 18 major crimes (14% of total 
crimes) whilst Streatham recorded 21 (20% of total
crimes). Division * A* recorded 112 beat crimes (86% of 
total crimes) whilst Streatham recorded 86 beat crime (80% 
of total crime) - see Figure 3.
Arrests - significantly more arrests were made at 
Streatham.
Division 'A* arrested 16 (12% of total records) offenders, 
whilst Streatham arrested 56% (52% of total records). In 
major crimes Division *A* arrested 6 (33% of total major 
crime records) whilst Streatham arrested 11 (50% of total 
major crime records). There was also a considerable 
difference in arrest rates for beat crimes. Division * A* 
arrested 10 (9% of total beat crimes) whilst Streatham
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arrested 45 (52% of total beat crimes) - see Figure 4. 
This difference was particularly relevant because the 
Streatham policy addressed police procedure in dealing 
with minor injury cases which in the main would be put in 
the category of "beat crimes". I believe, the Streatham 
policy was a major contributory factor in the difference 
in arrest rates between the two divisions.
No criming - Streatham had fewer "no crimes".
There were 60 (46% of total crimes recorded) crimes
classified as "no crimes" at Division 'A* , whilst at 
Streatham the number was 32 (30% of total crimes
recorded). At Division 'A* 31 (50% of total records of 
"no crime") victims stated that they were unwilling to 
attend court and pursue a prosecution whilst at Streatham 
the figure was 22 (68% of the total of "no crimes") - see 
Figure 5. These latter figures emphasised the difficulty 
in pursuing a case to prosecution as at both divisions, 
the majority of victims, stated they were unwilling to 
support a court appearance.
Charging rate - more offenders were charged at Streatham. 
Of those arrested, 29 (27% of total records) offenders
were charged at Streatham whilst at Division ’A ’ only 12 
(9% of total records) offenders were charged. This 
comparison showed that the positive approach adopted by 
the Streatham officers was also reflected in a much higher 
percentage of offenders being charged and brought before a 
court.
These four sets of comparative figures indicated a more 
effective police performance at Streatham than Division 
'A'. Although Division 'A' had more crimes reported, 
Streatham significantly arrested and charged more 
offenders and less allegations of crime were "cuffed"
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PROSECUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In evaluating the impact of the police deferred decision 
to caution, this had also to be examined in the wider 
context of the police response to the prosecution of other 
offenders. This was examined over an eight month period. 
It is argued that the success of the deferred decision 
policy depended also on a police commitment, and continued 
dedication, to charge in the more serious cases and to 
ensure that, in accordance with the set policy criteria, 
the deferred decision was only used in cases of very minor 
assault.
One hundred and five suspects (24% of the total recorded 
crimes), were charged during this period. Seventy-nine 
suspects (75%) were kept in custody whilst the remaining 
26 (25%) were bailed to appear at court. The list at 
Table 8 gives details of the charges which included 5 
cases of threats to kill and four cases of grievous bodily 
harm.
Prosecution outcomes were derived from police result 
records. These outcomes continued to show that, as 
indicated earlier, cases were discontinued by the C.P.S., 
withdrawn by victims, and when prosecuted few offenders 
received custodial sentences, more typically being dealt 
with by way of a fine under £100. Details of specific 
outcomes are contained at Table 8.
"NO CRIMES"
Part of the effectiveness of the policy was measured by 
the declining use of "no crime" as a method of writing off 
cases. The use of "no crime" as a final crime outcome 
continued to be used throughout the months of the study. 
Following the commencement of the policy evaluation, I
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continually made efforts to reduce the "no crime"
practice. Notwithstanding the efforts of my senior 
management team, the "no crime" classification continued 
to be used and in some cases this caused particular 
concern and illustrated the divide between policy and 
practice even at a location where the subject was regarded 
as high profile. In the early stages of the policy I
issued verbal instructions not to use "no crime" as an
outcome to the investigation of the crime reports for 
domestic violence. However, I had depended on the admin 
support services at the police station to carry out my
instructions. Unfortunately, the staff in the support 
office (called the crime desk) changed every six weeks and 
the verbal instruction was not always complied with, 
despite the office being supervised by two sergeants. As 
I have already mentioned, towards the latter end of the 
research period, I issued a written station policy which 
was intended to reduce "no criming" to a minimum. 
Afterwards I closely monitored the situation, and found 
that the "no criming" rate on the division was reduced to 
only 2%,
Details of the 149 crime reports which were classified as 
"no crime" are contained at Table 9. The table 
illustrates that many quite serious allegations of crime 
were being cuffed and so never reached the Home Office for 
inclusion in the tables of official crime statistics. 
Physical injury was a strong feature in many of these 
cases. The use of the "no crime" was the result not of a 
lack of commitment by police to the victim but perhaps the 
police practice of writing off crimes because the victim 
made a withdrawal statement. Also, in the past there was 
an incentive to police officers to cuff crimes. It 
centred on, in my opinion a misguided belief, that a rise 
in crime figures reflected police ineffectiveness. This 
was a point that was articulated by CHATTERTON (1983) and
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which I have already made reference to In my Literature 
Review. A real concern I had was the serious types of 
crimes which were being committed, reported to police and 
yet never recorded in official statistics. It was for 
this reason that I introduced a policy which virtually 
eliminated the practice of "no criming".
Having discussed some of the statistical analysis 
surrounding the positive action at Streatham, the next 
section will concentrate on the specific results from the 
deferred decision procedure.

203
C H A P T E R  5
The Deferred Decision Procedure
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DEFERRED DECISION PROCEDURE
The aim of this section was to concentrate on the effects 
of the deferred decision procedure by an examination of 
the details of the crimes, characteristics of the victims 
and suspects, the re-offending rates of suspects, 
interviews with offenders, suspects and the police 
officers and a consideration of the response to a written 
questionnaire completed by a number of police officers on 
the Streatham Division.
DETAILS OF CRIMES
Between May and December 1989 the police arrested 66 
offenders who had committed assaults, resulting in "minor" 
injuries against victims and the circumstances fitted the 
set criteria for deferring the decision to prosecute or 
caution. Two cases were recorded in the major (serious) 
crime book, 62 in the beat (less serious) crime book and 
two cases were found in the custody records without a 
corresponding crime book entry. The intention of the 
policy was not to deal with cases which had been entered 
in the major crime book. This might suggest there was a 
small percentage (3%) of cases which had slipped through 
"the net". This net widening was a concern which some 
feminists had expressed when I was formulating the policy. 
This occurred despite the two supervisory checks which I 
had built into the system, i.e. the first in the custody 
suite by the duty inspector and thereafter by the 
community inspector when he supervised the case papers and 
executed the caution.
The two cases which failed to reach the crime books were a 
result of administrative errors. It happens that 
sometimes officers will charge, or deal with, a suspect at 
the station in the custody office and omit to complete a
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crime sheet therefore fail to record the crime in the 
crime book. A monitoring system has now been set up to 
avoid this type of mistake.
A monthly breakdown of the number of deferred decision is 
contained at Figure 8. Accepting the odd monthly
fluctuation there was a general increase in the number of 
deferred decisions from 5 in May to 9 in December. 
Analysis of the figures over a much longer period 
revealed that the numbers contained in this sample were 
fairly typical for Streatham Division. Details of the 
allegations and classifications of the 66 crimes is 
contained at Table 3. The majority of offences were 
classified as "actual bodily harm" which meant that most 
of the offences resulted in some bodily injury to the 
victim. A more detailed breakdown of the exact injuries 
is contained at Table 4. Most of the injuries resulted in 
either reddening to the skin, bruising, minor abrasions 
and scratches.
CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTIM AND SUSPECTS
A detailed analysis was made of the background of the 
suspects and victims for the 66 deferred decision cases 
according to gender, age, residence, relationship, colour 
and previous convictions.
Sixty-six victims were female and 65 of the suspects male. 
There was only one female suspect. This suspect was 
involved in an incident between a mother and a daughter, 
where the outcome was "no further action". The reason 
given for no further action was the mother's history of 
mental illness and alcoholism. The breakdown of gender is 
illustrated at Figure 6.
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The following table illustrates the breakdown of ages of 
victims and suspects. The highest proportion of victims 
and suspects were in the age group 20 - 39.
Ages Victims Offenders
0-19 4 0
20-29 32 34
30-39 12 13
40-49 2 11
50-59 6 5
60—69 2 1
Unknown 8 2
66 66
Forty-eight victims and suspects lived together whilst 18 
lived apart - see Figure 7.
The relationship between the suspect and victim were as 
follows - 22 (33%) were husband and wife, 18 (27%) were 
boyfriend and girlfriend, 17 (25%) were common-law husband 
and wife, 5 (8%) were ex-boyfriend and girlfriend and 4 
(7%) had other relationships. This latter category 
included one ex-husband and wife, one ex-common-law 
husband and wife, one mother and daughter and one between 
"friends".
An analysis of the skin colour of both the of victims 
and suspects showed that 44 (66%) were between people of 
the same colour, 17 (26%) were between people of mixed
colour. In 5 (8%) cases either the victim or the
suspect's colour code was missing from the police records.
A total of 37 (56%) of suspects, had been previously
arrested by the police and convicted. Twenty-three (52%)
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of the suspects who were given an adult caution had a 
previous criminal record. Four suspects were charged and 
2 had a previous criminal record. Seven cases resulted in 
no further action being taken against the suspect and of 
these 4 (57%) had a previous criminal record. Finally in 
11 cases, where the suspects failed to answer their bail 
at the police station, 8 (73%) of this group had a
previous criminal record.
As I have mentioned previously, in the 11 cases where the 
suspect failed to attend to answer his bail, the procedure 
entailed the case being given back to the domestic 
violence office to supervise. In most cases they were 
able to contact the offender and make the necessary 
arrangements for him to attend the station to receive the 
caution. An analysis of the station records over a longer 
period of time showed that the domestic violence officers 
were successful, in most cases, in persuading those 
suspects to attend the station.
RE-OFFENDING RATES OF SUSPECTS
As part of the overall evaluation police records were 
monitored to ascertain the reported re-offending rates 
through monitoring subsequent arrests. Bearing in mind, 
and accepting, the criticisms which were made about the 
short research period in the SHERMAN and BERK Minneapolis 
Study, I thought it was necessary to examine the re­
offending rates over a longer period of time. This 
inevitably produced a much larger sample size and probably 
gave a more accurate reflection of the impact of the 
policy. Police records were analysed between February 
1989 and November 1990 - a period of 21 months. I would 
remind the reader that the figures should not be treated 
in isolation when evaluating this scheme but, should be 
considered along with all the other measures such as
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victim and offender interviews, particularly in assessing 
any deterrent impact.
These data were collected from records which had been kept 
in the domestic violence office. These records contained 
details of allegations of crimes made to police officers 
and direct complaints from the victims.
The total number of domestic violence deferred decision 
cases from February 1989 to November 1990 was 135 - see 
Table 5. The total number of cautions, which were 
administered, was 89 (66%) and the total number of
offenders who were charged, on their return to the police 
station, was 9 (7%). The total number of offenders where 
it was decided to take no further action, on their return 
to the police station, was 15 (11%) and 24 offenders (18%) 
failed to answer their bail.
Of the 135 offenders who were bailed, 9 (7%) were reported 
to police having re-offended during the bail period. In 
addition, 11 (8%) offenders were reported to police having 
committed further offences after being cautioned. As can 
be seen from Table 5, the re-offending rate measured over 
a 20 month period, was very similar to the 8 month 
research period. It may thus be concluded statistically, 
albeit over a limited period of time, that a significant 
number of offenders (86%) did not come to police attention 
having re-offended. A small percentage of offenders (7%) 
committed crimes within a short period of time after 
arrest and another small percentage (7%) continued to 
commit crimes after being cautioned.
The question I had to ask myself was whether this was a 
satisfactory performance or not. The most obvious way 
would be to look at another control sample, however, I was 
not aware of any other police station in the country that
209
had a policy which advocated cautioning for this type of 
offence. I therefore examimed the other method of 
processing offenders i.e. prosecution, I analysed the re­
offending rates of those suspects who were charged and 
brought before the court. A person would normally be 
charged if the offence was considered by the custody 
officer to be more serious than a "minor injury" offence 
or if the person had been previously cautioned or charged 
with an assault on the victim. A charge might also be 
preferred if it was a "minor injury" case in which the 
victim wished the matter to go before a court or the 
offender did not admit the offence. Generally speaking 
the cases that went before the court were of a more 
serious nature therefore one could not attach too much 
weight to a direct comparison between the two methods of 
disposing of cases. Accepting this, I was trying to find 
a very rough benchmark from which to judge the performance 
of the cautionary system, albeit I was speculating.
At the Streatham police station in 1989, 103 assailants 
from 638 incidents were charged and up until January 1991, 
23 (22%) had re-offended. In 1990 130 assailants from 581 
incidents were charged and 18 (14%), had re-offended again 
in that year. One would have expected this figure to be 
lower because the research was completed in January 1991 
and some offenders, in the sample, had only just been 
charged in December. Although more detailed research was 
needed to examine the data, the statistics tended to 
suggest that charging offenders was no more of a deterrent 
than cautioning. The difficulty facing any reader of this 
research is to decide whether these re-offending rates 
indicated a success or not. In an ideal world, of course, 
there should be no re-offending ! I also had to accept a 
major flaw in making this type of comparison was it 
depended on the subsequent crimes being reported. I would 
contend that there was no magical optimum re-offending
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level to which I could consequently refer so I did not 
draw conclusions which were too specific. I thought it 
was reasonable for me to say this. After being arrested 
and cautioned a significant proportion of offenders have 
not re-offended at the time of writing this report.
Up until the new Streatham policy was adopted, most of 
these offenders who were cautioned would not have been 
arrested by police. Therefore, no sanction would have 
been made upon them. They would probably have continued 
to commit these crimes. I would argue that part of the 
impact of this policy has probably been to go some way to 
breaking the cycle of violence and influencing some of 
this group to change their behaviour.
Finally, again I would remind the reader that these 
results must be taken in conjunction with what the victims 
and offenders have said about the policy. It is this part 
of my research which I will now go on to describe.
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THE RESULT OF VICTIM INTERVIEWS
A total of 23 victims were interviewed, representing 35% 
of the total deferred decision sample (66). Whilst 
suspects were interviewed at the police station 
immediately after the outcome of the deferred decision, 
victims were contacted at a much later stage and were 
interviewed, by an independent female researcher, at a 
venue of the victim's choice. The outcomes of these 23 
cases were as follows - 20 cases resulted in an adult 
caution, in 2 cases no further action was taken and in 1 
case the offender was charged. Information from the 
"charge” and the "no further action" interviews can be 
seen under these specific headings.
All the victims who were interviewed were women. The 
final interview sample was formulated after a lengthy time 
consuming process which often involved having to make 
several attempts to make contact with the victims. The 
response rate, although no higher, was quite favourable 
when compared to other victim studies.
The methodology which was employed was that all the 
victims were offered a choice of interview venue. These 
included a local tenants association meeting place, a 
domestic violence office at Streatham Police Station or, 
alternatively, the person doing the interview offered to 
visit the victim in her own home. If none of these venues 
was thought to be satisfactory the victim was asked to 
suggest an alternative. All the victims were asked a 
detailed set of questions to ensure uniformity (see 
Appendix 8). In addition, the interviewees were asked if 
they wanted to give any further information which they 
considered to be relevant to the circumstances surrounding 
the violence. The domestic violence police officers 
informed the victims beforehand regarding possible contact
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from the researcher. This initial police contact was 
followed up by the researcher telephoning, sending a 
letter or making a home visit. It was stressed to the 
victims that the research was confidential and 
independent, aimed to assess the victim's reactions to the 
deferred decision procedure, victim satisfaction with 
police response and the effectiveness of the police 
intervention.
In formulating this approach strategy I was very aware 
that contacting the victim could cause problems if the 
victim and offender were still living together. In 
addition to the safety and privacy of the victim, I was 
also mindful of the personal safety of the researcher when 
visiting some of these homes, some of which were located 
in "high crime" areas. The domestic violence officers 
indicated these potentially sensitive cases, and in some 
instances, advised contacting the victims at their place 
of work so that the offender had no knowledge of the 
interview. I was also aware that some of these visits 
could be dangerous, for both the researcher and the 
victim, and in those cases a domestic violence officer was 
located nearby for the duration of the interview. As a 
precaution, each time the researcher went out to 
interview, a note of the address which was being visited 
was left at the police station. However, all the 
interviews were conducted without any danger or problem. 
There was only one offender who was actually verbally 
abusive and in that case it was decided not to speak to 
the victim (see below for further details). The interview 
sample was drawn without having to make contact with any 
victims who it was perceived were living with potential 
difficult offenders. The decision was taken not to pursue 
these difficult cases unless it was absolutely necessary. 
The reason for this was to avoid creating any unnecessary 
problems and stress for the victims. The experience of
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the researcher was that communication was made easier 
where the victim had a telephone, although it was still 
often necessary to telephone several times before a 
contact was made. It was found that most victims were 
very willing to be interviewed, and as previously 
mentioned, the victims decided the time and place of the 
interview.
Fifteen women (65%) were interviewed in their own homes. 
One interview was conducted with the suspect present. 
Five (22%) victims were interviewed at the police station 
but only one of them chose this option. The other four 
were present with the suspect when he returned to answer 
his bail. This in itself was highly significant, as 
victims were not asked to return with the offenders for a 
final decision. One women was interviewed in a cafe 
because she did not want to return to the Streatham area
as she had left her previous home to avoid contact with
the offender. At the time of the interview she had been 
homeless for 2 weeks and was just about to move into a new 
flat. Only one victim who was contacted by telephone 
refused to be interviewed. However, she did agree to give 
a brief telephone interview. The final victim was
interviewed at a relative's flat where she was staying on 
a temporary basis. She had left the marital home four 
months previously apparently, because of her husband's 
extreme violence and alcoholism.
It was accepted right at the very beginning of this
research that contacting domestic violence victims and 
conducting interviews was going to be exceedingly 
difficult. Although studies I have read from America have 
not actually discussed these difficulties, in depth, I 
will now discuss some of the problems which were 
encountered at Streatham.
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Two victims who agreed to be interviewed, and chose the 
police station, did not appear. One victim was later 
contacted by the researcher visiting the home, leaving a 
letter for the victim with the offender and then following 
it up with a telephone call. The woman, who said she was 
depressed, no longer wished to be interviewed. The other 
victim did not respond, despite the fact the messages were 
left on her answerable and a letter was sent to her home 
address.
One victim, who agreed to be interviewed at home, was 
actually ill when the researcher arrived and therefore the 
interview could not take place. Again it proved 
impossible to re-establish contact with this victim. In 
another two cases neither victim appeared at the agreed 
venue at interview time and despite the researcher waiting 
for over an hour, neither victim appeared at the agreed 
location. In both of these cases the women had forgotten 
about the appointment and another date was subsequently 
arranged and the interviews conducted.
Victims who did not have a telephone were contacted by 
letter. Enclosed with the letter was a reply paid 
envelope and a form requesting the victim to indicate 
whether she wished to be interviewed and, if so, to give a 
suitable date and time. No replies were received from 
this method of contact so the researcher then visited each 
home with with aim of arranging a future interview date 
and time. If there was no one at home another letter, 
explaining the reason for the visit, was left at the 
venue. Only one woman contacted the researcher using this 
method. If no contact was made after the second letter 
these cases were not pursued further.
At one house, the offender answered the door. He was very 
rude and abusive to the researcher and stated that the
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woman victim was not at home and in any case apparently 
did not wish to be interviewed. Despite further 
enquiries, by the officers working in the domestic 
violence office, no further contact was made with this 
victim.
In conclusion, contacting the women and conducting the
interviews was a very time consuming process, often with
limited success, however persistent the interviewer might 
have been. This affected the total number of the final
interview sample as it was considered not practical, or 
ethical, to pursue the victims who were difficult to 
contact. To maintain independence, it was decided, the 
researcher would not seek police help in making contact 
with the victims.
The procedure for recording what was said in the
interviews with victims was that the interviewees were 
taped and afterwards the interviewer typed the answers to 
a list of questions which had been previously agreed at 
the beginning of the research. This was a style which the 
interviewer felt most comfortable with and was found to be 
effective by her. An example of a typical typed interview 
can be found at Appendix 10. At the end of the interviews 
the researcher prepared a draft synopsis of her findings. 
It was from these sources that the following results and 
conclusions were made by me.
Previous violence
Seventeen victims (74%) said that this most recent violent 
episode was not the first incident. However, the number 
of previous incidents, and levels of violence, varied.
One respondent said that the violence started on the day 
they married and had continued on a regular basis ever
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since, but she had never reported the facts to police 
because of fear. Her injuries apparently included the 
left eye swollen, severe bruising, scratches to the left 
side of the neck, bruises on the upper left arm, scratches 
and a graze to the elbow. This was the first time she had 
reported him to the police. She detailed in interview 
that he had a record of past violence which included an 
attack on his step-father with a knife and a previous 
threat to beat up his nephews.
One victim said that there had been no previous violence 
but the question was probably misunderstood because the 
victim was Turkish and did not speak very good English. 
When interviewed, through an interpreter, her response was 
checked against her first statement to the police and was 
found to be incorrect. On the contrary, this victim had 
been subject to violence on several previous occasions.
Previous contact with the police
Seven respondents (30%) said that they had previous 
contact with the police for a domestic incident. The 
following are some of the comments made to the 
interviewer.
"When I've phoned the police before, 
they have just come up here - they 
said what they had to say, and I said 
what I had to say, and they just left 
it at that ! He promised he wouldn't 
do anything else, but when the police 
had left it was a different story".
"I haven't phoned the police often.
I've been too frightened because of 
what he might do. It has been going 
on for a long time now and I just got 
fed up with it. The police seemed to 
do nothing before if there was no 
physical injury that they could see, 
or any argument going on whilst they 
were there, in which case the police
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seemed to be satisfied and just went 
away again and that was it. I've had 
bruises and scratches but not on my 
face and so the marks really didn't 
show at the time (the victim was dark 
skinned). The bruises sometimes came 
up a lot more the next day. 1 think 
what stops a lot of people going to 
the police is that they think they're 
not going to get any help".
Eleven respondents (48%) said that this was their first 
police contact.
Who contacted the police
Eleven (48%) victims contacted the police themselves. 
Three victims asked family members to make contact with 
the police, three neighbours phoned the police on their 
own initiative, one suspect phoned because he wanted his 
wife arrested, one current boyfriend because the victim 
had been abducted by her ex-boyfriend and had been 
assaulted. In a further case police were at the scene and 
witnessed the incident themselves.
Why this time
Respondents were asked whether there was anything 
particular about this incident which resulted in them
contacting police. There was a range of answers to the 
question. Twelve (52%) victims said that they wanted the
situation to stop either because they were frightened, had
been injured or did not know what else to do. The
following answers were typical responses.
"1 thought he was going to kill me so 
1 didn't have any choice, 1 was 
frightened".
"1 told him 1 was going to phone the 
police and he went on and on. 1
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don't think he believed me and he 
thought I would do what I usually do 
- not say anything about it, but he 
was quite surprised when they came".
"I was coming to the decision that 
I'd had enough, I phoned the police 
because I wanted him to know that I 
was serious I hoped they would talk 
to him"•
One victim who had been assaulted before said that she 
would not normally have phoned the police but she was 
worried about the effect on her grandchildren who were at 
that present time staying with her. One further victim 
said that she'd seen a television programme about the 
police changes in domestic violence and so decided to 
telephone and seek help.
Police response time
The average response time, estimated by victims, was 
between 10 and 13 minutes and some victims said that this 
seemed a long while at the time. In one case the response 
time was 2% hours and, by the time the police had arrived, 
the suspect had left. In this case the offender was not 
arrested until several weeks later when he returned from 
holiday. The police had explained to the victim that the 
delay was a result of a wrong address being recorded at 
the time the victim made the report.
Police officers at the scene
All the victims reported that no less than 2 officers 
arrived, in some cases several police vehicles arrived on 
the scene of the crime. One of the main reasons for this 
was the local police operated a system which, in part, 
relied on police vehicles which were manned most of the 
time by two officers. Since it was these response
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vehicles which answered most calls it was not surprising 
that victims perceived at least two officers attending 
each call. Police women were in the minority who attended 
the scenes of violence. This concerned only one victim 
who stated that she would have preferred to have been 
dealt with by a woman officer. The majority of victims 
were satisfied with the initial police response to their 
call for assistance.
Did the victim think it was right to arrest
Fifteen victims (75%) said it was right to arrest, even 
though two of the victims were also taken to the police 
station with the suspect. Four (17%) victims said that it 
was not right to arrest. They said that they only wanted 
the police to talk to the offender. Interestingly, two of 
these four victims returned to the station with the 
suspect at the end of the deferred decision procedure. 
Some of the responses are indicated below.
"No, but I was so upset I didn't know 
what to think".
"It was all right them helping me and 
stopping it. When they said they 
were going to take him away, I was 
hysterical at the thought of my other 
half being detained in a police 
cell".
"When they arrived I explained to the 
officers what had happened. I didn't 
really want them to come into my 
house as I thought phoning them was 
enough. The officers said they just 
wanted to come in and have a quiet 
word with him and they would go. 
They in fact came into the house and 
interviewed him and to my surprise 
they said they were going to arrest 
him. I was then very angry and
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reminded the policeman that he said 
he would only have a quiet word. One 
of the officers was young and
arrogant".
Relationship of the suspect with the victim after arrest
During the post arrest period two suspects returned to 
their home unexpectedly. Others made little contact with 
the victim. These situations are now considered here.
The force and divisional policy clearly stated that 
victims had to be informed of the impending release of 
offenders. In two cases, where victims resided with 
offenders, particular difficulty was experienced on the 
release of the offender as the victim was not expecting 
his return. Sadly, it was another example of the 
difference between policy and practice. It is relevant to 
note the feelings of the victim in these cases.
"I was very surprised to hear a key 
in the door at 6am that morning. As 
you can imagine I was very 
frightened. I looked outside and 
there was a car so I assumed that the 
police had brought him to get some of 
his things, I couldn’t believe it 
when he came into the house and said 
that he had been released after a 
telling off. What were the police 
thinking of ? They know nothing 
about him, he could easily have come 
back and really beaten me up this 
time. The police didn’t even phone 
to let me know what they had done. I 
was on my own in the flat with two 
young children to protect. I didn’t 
expect this after the initial 
positive response".
"When they took him away he was gone 
for a few hours. He didn’t have his 
keys with him and the next thing I 
knew he was banging on the door to be
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let in, but I didn't open the door. 
They didn't let me know he would be 
coming back. I was really upset, and 
if he had still been mad he could 
have kicked the door down and then I 
would have been really hurt. He went 
away that night and didn't come back 
for about two weeks, when we made it 
up”.
Fortunately, in neither case did the offender assault the 
victim, however, these examples showed the importance of 
the police informing the victim about the release of the 
offender and was shown to be of enormous value to the 
victim.
Understanding of the new policy
Three victims were unclear about the new police policy. 
Several women said that they were given three options to 
chose from, i.e. charging, no further action or caution. 
Whilst some women had seen the television programmes about 
the changes in domestic violence policy and so knew that 
something was different, they had little understanding of 
the new approach to domestic violence and no real 
understanding of the deferred decision policy nor the use 
of the adult caution.
Return for the caution
Although the victims were not specifically requested to 
return to the station with the suspect for the purpose of 
the caution, several decided to do so. Five (21%) victims 
accompanied the suspect on his return date to answer his 
bail. One victim explained that she returned because the 
domestic violence officers had been trying to contact her 
and four other women returned because they were concerned 
about the outcome of the deferral upon the assailant.
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Contact by the Domestic Violence Office
Eighteen victims (78%) were contacted by the domestic 
violence office after the incident took place. One victim 
came to the station, at the time of the caution, in 
response to the letters and messages and one victim made 
contact with the office after a second incident took 
place. The level of contact varied, but almost all of the 
victims said that they found this contact helpful and 
supportive. The following comments were typical of those 
that were made to the interviewer.
"It was nice to know there was 
someone I could phone if there was 
any more trouble".
"She explained to me what was going 
to happen and gave me options".
The effect of the policy on their relationship
All respondents were asked whether the prospect of a 
formal caution, or prosecution if the re-offending 
occurred, affected their relationship. Seven (30%) 
victims said that their relationship had actually 
improved. An example of this type of response is as 
follows :
"Yes I think it has been better, 
during the two months he was very 
good, I think it frightened him in 
that it was considered a crime and 
also because he was kept in custody. 
He's been drunk since but not as bad 
as he has never raised his hand to me 
since".
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In a further 7 (30%) cases relationships had ended as a 
result. Only 2 (8%) said things seemed the same and 1 
respondent said that things had worsened. She said:
"It has made it much worse, he 
doesn't take it out on the children, 
but maybe his feelings towards me 
have changed. He didn't think our 
relationship could continue because 
of what had happened, neither did 1, 
it came out of the blue. It was the 
involvement with the police that was 
the problem, that he was arrested and 
would have a record for a few years.
He's still upset about that. It was 
the first time that anything had 
happened".
Would you have gone to court and given evidence if the 
police had decided to prosecute
Notwithstanding the following comments made by victims, it 
was certainly the case that had the victims expressed 
their wish, at the time of the arrest, the offender would 
have been charged.
Twelve (52%) victims said they would not go to court and 
give evidence to support a prosecution. The majority said 
that they just wanted the violence to end and hoped that 
the arrest and caution would be sufficient. All felt 
quite strongly about this point. Interestingly, one of 
the twelve, at a later date, charged the offender after
their was a repetition of the violence. One victim was
undecided and did not know what she would have done had 
the case gone to court. Only 6 (26%) victims said they 
would go to court and surprisingly, at the time of the
interview (subsequent to the caution being given) 13% 
stated that they would have preferred, with hindsight,
that the offender had been charged. The following was
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part of a statement made by one of the respondents in this 
latter category.
"Yes, that's what I wanted them to 
do. It would have meant more to him. 
I wouldn't have had to pay the £20 to 
have my phone number changed to stop 
him ringing me. I had to get legal 
aid to get an induction to stop him, 
his friends and his family coming 
round. I had to leave my work and 
work somewhere else to stop them from 
harassing me. I've had to change and 
he hasn't had to do anything. Its a 
big game to them, but if he had been 
pulled up in court and had received 
something for it, even if it was only 
a bind over for a year, then it would 
have meant something and it would 
have given me some more security. My 
life has completely changed, his 
hasn't”.
Would the victim call the police again
Seventeen (74%) victims said they would call the police 
again. Two said they would not. One victim was very 
definite about this and angry that her husband had been 
arrested, yet the same victim phoned the police again for 
advice during the deferral period. A further three 
respondents were undecided.
Could the police have been more helpful
Most respondents were satisfied with the police response 
and assistance. Two victims strongly expressed the view 
that they would have liked to have had been informed when 
the suspect was released. One victim would have preferred 
better treatment at a police station. Her comments were 
as follows:
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"They shouldn't have left me in that 
room, I was in pain, not just 
physically but mentally and I didn't 
just want to be left hanging about. 
I just wanted to get home. I was 
examined by the doctor, it was about 
twenty minutes before he came, he put 
some cream on my face and gave me two 
aspirins. I then had to go back into 
this box room and make a statement. 
I was in real pain, my dress was half 
ripped and I had no shoes on. It was 
very degrading. They left me alone 
in there a lot, there was nothing to 
look at, its just one square room. 
The big room where my ex-boyfriend 
was kept was better. It was bigger 
and there was other people around".
The room referred to was probably one of the two interview 
rooms where all the victim statements were taken at 
Streatham Police Station. The rooms are sparsely 
furnished and there are no windows. As will be seen in 
the next section, the researcher who interviewed the male 
offenders also found the rooms "unwelcoming".
I would suggest that these victim interviews tended to 
support the policy adopted by me at Streatham. To round 
off this section I will highlight those parts which 
provide evidence for that opinion.
Seventy-four per cent of victims stated that they had been 
assaulted previously. This did not entirely support 
JAFFE's findings but it did mean that in the majority of 
cases to which police were called the victim had been 
previously assaulted. My argument was that the police 
officers should not, therefore, look for who was morally 
to blame (as CHATTERTON found) for the incident but deal 
with it legally and exercise their power of arrest because 
in 74% of the cases the offender had struck out at the 
victim on previous occasions.
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In fact, 75% thought it was right to arrest the assailant 
and this was the victim's view some while after the event. 
Most interviews had taken place within six months of the 
crime.
Seventy-five per cent of the victims had confidence in the 
scheme and stated they would telephone the Police again. 
This was most significant. Whilst one can debate the 
deterrent value of this policy, there was a loud and clear 
message from most of the victims stating that arrest was a 
service they wanted from the Police. Most of the victims 
seemed to support the role of the domestic violence office 
and the help that was given to them by the dedicated 
domestic violence officers. Seventy-eight per cent of the 
victims admitted receiving some form of contact from this 
office. Interestingly 50% of victims would not have gone 
to court to support a prosecution. If the Police had 
charged the offenders in these cases, the Crown 
Prosecution Service would not have continued with the case 
because of the legal difficulty in getting witnesses to 
give evidence. A witness can be compelled to attend court 
under Section 80 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 but cannot be compelled to give evidence. The result 
would be that nothing would have happened to the 
assailant. This policy provided a sanction, citable for 
three years against the offender and might have been the 
first, and vital, step to preventing further violence.
Domestic violence is not an easy matter for the Police, or 
any agency, to deal with as it often involved complex 
social and personal issues between two people. This fact 
was borne out by the 21% of victims who attended the 
Police Station, two months after the assault, with the 
offender. This indicated a caring and compassionate 
emotion which would have probably been quite different 
from the feelings expressed by them at the time of the 
offender's arrest! Thirty per cent of the victims stated 
that the caution process actually improved their
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relationship so it left me asking the question what was 
the point of pursuing these type of cases through a court? 
My view was that it added strength to the use of the 
caution.
Similar supporting evidence was found in the offender 
interviews which I will discuss in the next section.
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THE OFFENDERS - DETAILS AND RESPONSES
This part of the report analysed the responses of the 
assailants who had been cautioned. The interviews took 
place at Streatham Police Station on Thursday evenings 
between 7 and 10pm over a ten month period between July 
1989 and May 1990. The respondents, 47 in total, were 
interviewed by an independent male researcher who was
attached to the University of Buckingham. The assailants 
were interviewed immediately after being cautioned. After 
the caution was completed, the cautioning officer informed 
the assailant of the research that was being completed and 
was then invited him to assist by way of interview. 
Perhaps it is not surprising but none refused ! Ninety- 
eight per cent of the assailants admitted their actions 
and accepted the caution.
The figure of 47 was arrived at from the suspects who 
turned up for the caution. There was some Thursday
evenings when no interviews took place because the
interviewer was not available. Those who re-offended in
the two month period were not interviewed because they 
would have been charged and taken to court. Those who 
failed to turn up for a caution were also not interviewed. 
It is open to debate but I doubt if these limitations 
affected the results of the interviews. The aim after 
all, of the interviews, was to seek the views of offenders 
who had been through the whole system from arrest to 
caution.
The interview technique
Initially, the interviews were held in an "interview room" 
adjacent to the station office and custody suite. The 
interviewer found the room unwelcoming and was often busy 
and occasionally "chaotic". The interviewer opined that
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the area and room were not conducive to good 
communications by way of an informal "chat". As a result 
of this rather difficult start I changed the venue for the 
caution and the interview. I utilised two offices in the 
senior management suite. The interviewer found that the 
change of location assisted in having a more relaxed and 
informal interview with the assailants.
Another problem arose from the policy of only
administrating the cautions on Thursday evenings. Whilst
the domestic office had made repeated requests to the 
custody sergeants to "stagger" the times of the bail
return, unfortunately, this was not always done. As a
result on some Thursday evenings there was up to six men 
arriving at the same time to be cautioned. As a result, 
on some occasions, the interviews were conducted in the 
knowledge that a post caution queue of men were forming 
and the participants would be anxious to leave. In 
hindsight, the interview procedure could have been more 
effective had the organisation of the timetable been more 
structured and more time allocated to each interview. 
This would have enabled more confidence to be built up 
between the interviewer and interviewees and no doubt 
would have helped to develop a better discussion.
One issue which was beyond any forward planning was the 
language difficulties of seven of the respondents. The 
interviewer, found on occasions, that the replies were 
difficult to understand and hence posed problems of 
validity. In addition, six offenders also arrived 
apparently the worse for drink, smelling strongly of 
alcohol and at times stared morosely. Therefore, in 28% 
of the cases, there was difficulty for the interviewer in 
trying to carry out a coherent and meaningful interview.
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There was an interview schedule drawn up for the 
interviewer and this is shown at Appendix 8. However, the 
combination of the interviewers style and his experience 
after the first few interviews resulted in the interviews 
taking place in an informal and unstructured way, 
questions were not asked in a chronological order but 
rather whenever the subject seemed relevant. The approach 
to the interviews was that the interviewer was given 
background knowledge of the offence and the offenders, 
from the police case papers, prior to the interview. From 
this the interviewer was able to ascertain whether the 
interviewee was lying or reluctant to tell the truth.
The interviews varied in length from the shortest at three 
minutes, where communication was virtually impossible, to 
the longest at approximately 45 minutes. The interviewer 
found that whilst a few assailants were reluctant to talk, 
most were only too willing to assist, setting their 
behaviour in the wider context of their life story. I 
would have to admit that the validity of the assailants 
responses, especially in the light of the fact they were 
interviewed immediately after a caution, could be doubted 
by some critics. I would argue that the interviews were 
only part of the evidence to prove or disprove the success 
of this scheme and should be viewed in the context of the 
findings of the other qualitative and quantitive research.
An example of a typical interview is to be found at 
Appendix 11.
The offenders - facts and figures
In total, 47 men were cautioned and later interviewed for 
the study. Their racial and national identity were 
classified as follows:
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Race Code Number % Of Respondents
ICI (White Skinned 24 (52%)
European type)
IC2 (Dark skinned 2 ( 4%)
European type)
IC3 (Negroid type) 17 (36%)
IC4 (Indian or Pakistani) 1 ( 2%)
IC6 (Arabic/Egyptian type) 3 ( 6%)
Regarding age, offenders varied. from the youngest at 20 to
the oldest in his mid fifties. It is to be noted that 81%
of the offenders were aged 38 and below. In my opinion
this would mean that, unless the cycle of violence was
broken, 81% of offenders would have more than 20 years in
which to continue to assault their partners. 1 base this
on the fact that there were few assailants above the age
of 58. 1 would contend that in order to prevent years of
wife battering it was vital that the cycle of violence was
broken at the earliest stage.
Age Number % Of Respondents
20 - 23 6 13%
24 - 28 16 34%
29 - 33 7 15%
34 - 38 9 19%
39 - 43 3 6%
44 - 48 3 6%
49 - 53 2 4%
54 - 58 1 2%
The structure of the relationship with the victim was
equally varied.
Number % Of Respondents
Married 16 13%
*Common Law 10 21%
Co-habiting 17 36%
Boyfriend/Girlfriend 1 2%
Ex-boyfriend 3 6%
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*Based on the length of co-habiting. Less than three 
years was classified as co-habiting.
The length of the relationships showed a frequency for 
assaults in relatively "new” partnerships:
Less than two years 
3 years - 5 years 
6 years - 10 years 
11 years - 15 years 
16 years - 20 years 
*Not known
Number % Of Respondents
10 21%
9 19%
7 15%
5 11%
1 2%
17 36%
*This rather high figure was attributable in part to a 
reluctance to remember how long they had known the victim 
and on other occasions a problem of precision in that, for 
example, the relationship in some cases was in the second 
or third stage with years of separation between or, in a 
few cases, was renewed after years of absence forced by 
migration.
Of the 47 assailants arrested, approximately 50% admitted 
that they had previous convictions, although these were 
not always for offences of violence. Out of the 24
assailants, 9 admitted that they had had several custodial 
sentences but only three (6%) were for violent offences 
and out of the 47 only 3 had previous convictions for 
domestic violence.
Offenders were represented in a 
occupations :
wide spectrum of
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Skilled Manual 
Semi-skilled Manual 
Unskilled/decorator 
White Collar 
Service industries 
Self-employed 
Student (full time) 
Professional
Number % Of Respondents
3 6%
2 4%
11 23%
2 4%
6 13%
10 21%
3 6%
5 11%
Details of the incidents
Forty-three (91%) of the assaults took place in the home. 
Of the other four, three occurred in the street and one at 
a place of work. The incidents were variously brought to 
the attention of police as follows:
Telephone call from victim 
Telephone call from neighbour/
witness 
Telephone call from family
witness
Victim called in person to
station 
Victim flags down passing
police car
Number % Of Respondents
23 49%
15 32%
3 6%
5 11%
1 2%
Incidents occurred predominantly in the evening/night, but 
close to a quarter occurred in the morning or afternoon:
Morning 
Afternoon 
Early Evening 
Late Night 
Early Hours 
Not Known
1 2 - 5
6 - 9
9 - 1 2
Number % Of Respondents
3 6%
8 17%
12 25%
17 36%
5 11%
2 4%
The offender's accounts and their perceived reasons for 
their arguments and subsequent assault provoked the 
following replies. None was particularly surprising:
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Number % Of Respondents
Affair/jealousy 6 13%
Drink by either victim/offender 14 30%
Hysteria/depression/medication 7 15%
Housing conditions 3 6%
Unemployment/money worries 7 15%
Personality change/In-Laws 3 6%
Level of communication/ 7 15%
constant arguments
The ensuing argument and assault produced the following 
injuries which were described in the police files:
Number % Of Respondents
Soreness/bruising/swelling 20 42%
Reddening/grazing 12 25%
Slight bleeding/cuts/scratches 7 15%
Fright/distress/hysteria/shock 5 11%
No injuries 3 6%
Of the 47 victims, 2 required hospital treatment, one 
required stitches to a wound.
As a result of these incidents men were arrested and a 
crime report entry completed for the following offences:
Number % Of Respondents
Sec. 47 6 13%
A.B.H. 33 70%
Common Assault 7 15%
Sec. 25 1 2%
In 28 (59%) of the cases children were present at the time 
the assault took place.
In 12 (25%) cases the assailants admitted the police had 
been called to the address on a previous occasion to deal 
with a domestic dispute.
The interviewer found it difficult to assess the precise 
nature and frequency of previous assaults/arguments. 
Thirty-two (68%) offenders admitted they had committed
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assaults against the victim on a previous occasion. 
Another illustration of the considerable under reporting 
of this crime was found in a comparison with the number of 
assailants who had a criminal record for such an offence. 
Only 3 (6%) had a criminal conviction for such an offence!
Details of detention and release
With the exception of five persons, 42 (89%) assailants 
were arrested at the scene of the crime. These five 
suspects stated that they had attended the police station 
"voluntarily" after being requested to do so either by 
letter or telephone by one of the domestic violence 
officers. Almost all the other respondents remembered the 
speed of the police response; for the majority it was less 
than 10 minutes, for a few it was around 15 minutes and 
only one thought it took around half an hour but he 
admitted being drunk at the time. These times could only 
be estimates as the interviews took place at least two 
months after the crime took place.
The number of police officers who attended the incident 
varied considerably in that in 14 cases the offender was 
met by two officers, in 7 instances three officers were in 
attendance, in 8 cases four officers arrived at the scene, 
in 8 cases six officers attended and finally the last 2 
cases the assailants seemed to recall that eight officers 
attended ! Of the remaining three arrests, two of these 
incidents were stumbled across by the police and details 
of one arrest were not known. Only one altercation 
required a forced entry from the police, but five men 
arrested necessitated restraint in the form of 
handcuffing.
The actual arrest certainly shocked many, and for those 
who had never had the police at their door, the arrest was
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an acute embarrassment. The following was one response:
"I was in the back of the car, I 
thought everybody was looking at me 
and asking what's going on".
For others the seriousness of their violent acts was 
realised upon arrest:
"It was a mystery to me at first. I 
never thought I'd done enough to 
warrant it" (his wife had received 
bruising and a reddening to the face 
in a household with a long history of 
domestic violence).
"Arrest made me realise her fright, 
realised that fear is more dangerous 
than assault".
Arrest brought for others a realisation of the 
deterioration of their relationship:
"By the time the marriage has got 
into the hands of the police its the 
end of it".
"See, you make a home and when she 
phones the police its no longer your 
home.... they were right to do it 
but.... for me to be dragged out of 
my own home in front of my own kids 
was a bit revolting".
However, even the significance of arrest and detention 
could not permeate a self justifying belief for some that 
their actions were not "wrong":
"When arrested I was worried. I 
thought there was something wrong 
with me - there isn't".
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Forty-one (82%) persons detained were placed in a cell. 
Five of the remaining six who were not placed in a cell 
were those who had called to the station as requested and 
were then interviewed immediately, the other was 
interviewed then released.
The length of detention varied considerably albeit the 
figures should be approached with slight caution as the 
responses were dependent on the self report and
recollection of the interviewees. In addition many of 
whom admitted being quite drunk when arrested.
For those arrested, the subsequent detention in a cell 
followed by the process of being photographed and
fingerprinted, proved a stunning experience. Only one 
person detained claimed that such a procedure had no 
effect on him. For the rest, regardless of whether they 
had at any time been in police custody (which meant 24 of 
the 47), and those 9 who had served prison sentences,
arrest and detention was the last thing they expected. 
The following responses were typical:
"I didn't feel too good about that.
I felt like a criminal".
"It was like them telling me to eat, 
drink, go for a shit, then go to 
bed.... its like being back in 
prison. In fact being locked up was 
rather like a refresher course".
"It was horrible. I had flu and I 
coughed all night and the food they 
brought me was horrible. I can't 
believe they put people in there, it 
was freezing cold and there was shit 
over the blanket.... in fact you'd 
think I was a bleedin' bank robber".
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"I never thought I'd see the Inside 
of a cell, it was terrible”.
For some, conditions were hardly ideal, for others the 
detention time allowed them to reflect on the situation 
which had resulted on them being there:
"Its a sad thought, you sit there and 
think, the two of us we love each 
other and it comes down to me getting 
locked up for four hours”.
”1 cried.... 1 didn't think it would 
end up like this”.
Thirty-nine (83%) of the suspects were photographed and 
fingerprinted. The absence of this procedure for the 
remaining eight cases was probably due to the fact that 
five of them were "voluntary” callers and, in the three 
final cases, resulted from a possible oversight by the 
police or the loss of memory by those who were being 
interviewed. Just as was the case with being placed in a 
cell, the identity procedure shocked many who thought that 
such things were meant only for criminals, i.e. not them !
Eighty-nine per cent of those interviewed stated that they 
understood the deferred decision procedure. Five (11%) 
claimed that the full detailed implications had not been 
fully explained to them. How much of this was due to 
their own ignorance or their state whilst under arrest was 
not known. In general, the vast majority understood what 
they were entering into when they were released from the 
police station.
On release 35 (74%) went home, 2 found that their partners 
had left them. Only one, however, was instructed by the 
police not to return to the scene of the arrest.
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apparently being threatened that if he did so he would be 
arrested again. Only 7 went to other addresses after
being released.
The effect; happy ever after ?
For some the assault and arrest proved very significant
because their partner left them. This occurred in 8 cases
although 2 were already separated at the time of the 
incident. For the remainder the preceding weeks and 
months had produced various results which included an 
openness to talk over the problems, a silence which lasted 
for days and a refusal to mention the incident, 
disappointment from one victim whom the assailant 
considered had wanted him charged and a tension over who 
was at fault.
The question about who was to blame was one which many 
could not answer and provided a dilemma, perhaps a 
reluctance to acknowledge their guilt. Those who could
reply said the following:
Both of us
Her
Me
Police
'Him* (in the case of 
affairs)
Relatives 
Unable to say
Number
12
11
3
1
1
2
17
% Of Respondents
25%
23%
6%
2%
2%
4%
36%
The assailants stated that their partners, for the most 
part, were satisfied with both the arrest and the deferred 
decision procedure. After all their consent was required 
for a caution to proceed. Only two of the men thought 
that the deferred decision procedure would, two months 
later, start arguments all over again. Some, perhaps 
making idle boasts, spoke of the regret their spouses had
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in calling the police initially, one claimed that whilst 
he was being cautioned:
"She's at home right now crying. She 
thinks I'm going to prison".
In contrast, another spoke of his wife being annoyed that 
he was not going to prison. As a result she had taken out 
an injuction against him.
It could be argued that the crucial test of the whole 
policy was whether it had altered the behaviour of the 
offender. The interview process relied on the presumed 
honesty of the subject's replies supported, where 
possible, by the information gained subsequently by both 
the officers who worked in the domestic violence office 
and from the interviews of the women victims. 
Statistically, the question whether arrest and caution 
altered behaviour brought the following replies:
Outcome after arrest/caution Number % Of Respondents
Stay together "happy and 14 13%
sorted"
Stay together "trying to get 3 6%
along"
Incident not spoken about 2 4%
Partners want the other out 2 4%
Filing for divorce 4 9%
Split-up 1 2%
Made woman too powerful 8 17%
Made man alter behaviour 13 28%
One couple had cancelled their intended marriage whilst 
two had made appointments with marriage guidance 
counsellors. Two families, one of whom had their children 
on the "at risk" register of the local social services, 
were later visited by a social worker.
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The caution - the points for and against
The caution was understood by all excepting 11%. In three 
of these cases the difficulty may well have been 
attributed to alcohol, one to a language problem and one 
to total pig-headedness and an inability to listen to the 
interviewer.
Whether it was a "good idea" produced a very mixed 
response, 3 (6%) were indifferent, 12 (25%) considered it 
simply a "bad thing" due to the length of time and power 
it gave to the woman, the rest, 69%, thought the caution 
was "okay" and a good thing, although a few of this group 
held reservations about the length of time the caution 
would be on record and again, the power that it gave to 
the women.
Finally, perhaps the most important part of the whole 
pilot scheme and study was the attitude of the offenders. 
The replies that were given to the interviewer, although 
very varied, could be analysed in terms of complaints 
which were classified in terms of (i) dissatisfaction,
(ii) unfairness, and on the opposite side of the coin
(iii) a positive thing which encouraged attitude changes 
in both men and partners, and the issue of spousal 
violence on a wider spectrum. It was, of course, very 
difficult to measure accurately the attitude of those 
being interviewed, because as I said earlier it depended 
on the honesty of the offenders who may well have been 
influenced, to some extent, by being interviewed at the 
police station immediately after the adult caution. 
However, accepting these limitations, the following is a 
selection of the responses which were given and went some 
way to helping me assess the attitude of the offenders.
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"If it's going to stop violence, 
fine, but if it's going to ruin 
people's lives, giving women the 
chance to shout, and the guy spends a 
day in prison then they'll have to 
look carefully that the woman's not 
at fault".
"They didn't take my word. It's me 
who's got to prove it against myself. 
They just supported the woman".
"The loyalty side of things affects 
me. You have a row over a silly 
thing and you're 'nicked'. That will 
always give the woman the stronger 
hand; it won't help domestics".
The frequency of such responses showed a significant fear 
in the minds of the men who were interviewed. However, 
none gave any evidence that the victims had responded in 
that way in the previous two months. Although beyond the 
scope of this research, it would be most interesting to 
speak to these interviewees at a much later date, to find 
out if those fears were founded.
A positive thing
For various reasons many considered the scheme to be a 
good thing. Arrest and detention had made them alter 
their behaviour in that discussions and arguments were 
more reasonable, or at least did not escalate into 
violence :
"1 still shout and scream but 1 think 
more about what can happen to me when 
I've done nothing physical".
"1 didn't want to get that carried 
away and it's given me a good kick up 
the backside".
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Dissatisfaction
"I was not given adequate time to 
explain my side and, having never 
before been arrested, you should have 
a chance to repudiate things and not 
be left alone to be charged (meant 
cautioned). Its completely against 
democracy and freedom".
"I wouldn't have minded going to 
court because I'd have pleaded not 
guilty and won".
One combined a complaint of the length of the two month 
deferred decision procedure. This was his perception of 
the insignificance of his act:
"I think that a record for three 
years for something so minor is a bit 
long. How long would they caution a 
real criminal".
"If its for three years it might as 
well be thirty".
Unfairness
What many thought unfair was how the policy favoured the 
woman, both at the scene of the incident and at any future 
date :
"I've learned to keep my cool but I 
reckon its made her worse, she knows 
how much I hate getting locked up.
She can play on it, and say things 
knowing I can't do anything. It's 
given her more power".
"She knows she can have a row, run 
down here, and I get banged up for 6 
hours or maybe longer".
"It's like a trap. When we have an 
argument she can phone the police and 
tell them I'm beating her and they'll 
believe her".
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"We've talked about it, we haven't 
resolved the issue but we have re­
structured our ways of discussion".
"It's definitely changed me. I give 
way in an argument".
"It's a deterrent. During the bail 
period I found myself in a situation 
where, if it wasn't for that I would 
have repeated it. You then think 
twice, take a deep breath and walk 
out of the door".
For another, the shock of arrest in front of his family
produced a change of social habits:
"I've packed in drinking. Haven't 
been to the pub since".
Yet others would do anything to avoid a police cell, a
court room or an envisaged prison sentence.
"It's better than going to court. It 
stops it before it starts"
"I'll suffer being beaten and 
humiliated by her rather than be 
thrown into jail".
For some, it was feared that in spite of any policy or 
evaluation their behaviour will, somehow, never either be 
rational or reasonable, such was one respondent:
"I'm one of those people who don't 
give a damn what happens to me, the 
only person I respect is God, 
everyone else comes after. If 
tomorrow she hits me I'll hit her 
again and face the consequences 
after".
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Others though were perceptive. They saw the enormity of 
the issue:
"If people can be helped before it 
comes to court then it must be good.
But what you're fighting against is 
human nature and environment and just 
about everything else that 
constitutes life. The main reason is 
called the Battle of the Sexes".
In concluding this section on interviews with offenders 1 
think a number of important issues came out of these 
interviews. Let me highlight those 1 considered to be the 
most important.
The research on offenders showed that 50% had been 
convicted previously for some type of offence so had 
experience of being dealt with at the police station. 
They were from a wide spectrum of occupations and racial 
backgrounds, most were under 40, living with the victim 
and 65% of their relationships were under 10 years old. 
Most of the assaults occurred in the evening over 
jealousy, drink or money worries and often children were 
present.
Sixty-eight per cent admitted previously assaulting the 
victim. These results were similar to what the victims 
themselves had said and gave support for JAFFE's research 
which stated that a victim can be assaulted up to 36 times 
before she calls the police.
The arrest shocked many as did the experience (which 
applied to 80% of offenders) of being placed in a cell and 
having their fingerprints and photographs taken.
Nearly 70% thought the caution was a good thing but a 
small number considered it gave the woman too much power.
245
Nearly 90% understood the procedure and stated it had 
altered their behaviour.
Interestingly, 74% said they went home after they were 
released from the police station and 30% stated that the 
knock on effect of the arrest and caution procedure was 
that their relationship was happy and sorted out. I would 
have to add a caveat to this that many of these offenders 
had a rosy view of their relationship and only 6% of those 
interviewed were prepared to blame themselves for the 
violence.
It was not easy to deduce from the offender interviews 
alone whether the procedure had a lasting impact or 
influence on their behaviour. One can perhaps be cynical 
about the responses given to the interviewer, 
nevertheless, the replies are only part of the overall 
assessment and therefore should be given due weight. The 
whole aim of the research was to investigate the evidence 
available to support or modify my local police procedure. 
Up to this part of the thesis I have considered arrest, 
charge and re-offending rates and sought the views of 
offenders and victims. I would contend that most of the 
findings are positive and favour the scheme.
However, it was also important to consider the views of 
the operators of the policy. It was my belief that if the 
policy was to secure a long term place in the general 
police procedures then it had to be accepted by those who 
were tasked with actually reporting and investigating 
these crimes. Therefore, the next stage was to assess the 
reaction of the police officers and this was tackled by 
way of interview, completion of a questionnaire and an 
assessment of the effect of the policy on their personal 
safety.
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THE POLICE OFFICER'S PERSPECTIVE
One of the key factors to effective police policy is the 
successful translation of that policy into policing 
practice. In the past police management has been 
criticised for being remote and removed from the ground 
floor. It is police managers who draft and issue policy 
yet it is the working police officer who puts the policy
into practice. Changing the response of the police
officers could only be achieved by altering the policy, 
monitoring its implementation in practice and evaluating 
the results. It is therefore important that the policy
makers, the trainers and the operational officers work 
together. To what extent changes in police practice 
reflect the changes in the police attitude to the problem 
is, however, a matter for speculation. Research seems to 
indicate that over a period of time, a change of policy 
with adequate and effective training and monitoring of performance 
can have an impact-on the performance, (URSEL 1990, SHERMAN 1992).
In this process effective communication of the policy
matters was vital to winning the support of the working 
police officer and was central to, amongst others. Sir 
Peter IMBERT's Plus Programme, the essence of which was to 
have a police force which worked together to improve the 
quality of service. In the context of the Streatham 
policy, this service was towards the victims of domestic 
violence.
Domestic violence policy and policing have historically 
been subject to the general policy translation problems 
and these have already been discussed by EDWARDS (1989) 
and BOURLET (1990).
The aims and objectives of this part of the research was 
to discover, inter alia:
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i. The police officer's views on domestic violence in 
general.
ii. Whether the Streatham policy was understood by the 
police officers.
iii. Whether, and how the policy was communicated to
the officers.
iv. Whether the policy was being implemented by the
officers in practice.
V. Whether the policy facilitated or hindered the
police in their role, 
vi. How effective the policy was considered to be by
the operational officers.
Of the 272 serving police officers at Streatham Division, 
a small sample of officers was selected for in depth
interviews. Systematic random sampling of officers was 
used to achieve this end, provided that the officers 
satisfied a selection criteria of four months service on 
the division prior to April 1989 when the policy was 
implemented. It was considered necessary for the officers 
to have some appreciation of the way in which such 
incidents were handled prior to the start of the police 
initiative. Fifty-three police officers were interviewed 
by Dr. Susan EDWARDS and the researcher Gary ARMSTRONG. 
All ranks and specialisms were represented including the 
community liaison inspector, domestic violence support 
officers, detective inspectors, relief inspectors, 
sergeants and police constables.
For the same reasons of objectivity it was felt essential 
that I took no part in this process. This was 
particularly relevant because of the hierarchical 
organisation of the police. The intention of the 
interviews was to find out what the officers personally 
thought of this scheme and not provide answers which the
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"senior management" wanted to hear ! As far as possible 
the comments contained in this section could not be
attributable to any one individual. However, this was 
obviously difficult in some cases because, for instance, 
there was only one community inspector. Interviews varied 
in length form 40 minutes to 1 hour 20 minutes. Before 
the start of the interviews I agreed, with the
interviewers, a master interview schedule which was 
adapted and modified to suit the particular circumstances 
of the officer who was being interviewed. Therefore 
sergeants were asked questions relating to both arrest and 
custody issues, reliefs were asked questions about arrest 
issues, whilst inspectors and senior management were 
questioned about all of these aspects. The master
schedule is illustrated at Appendix 9.
The interviewers prepared a draft synopsis of their 
interview findings and it was from this that I prepared 
the conclusions. This section is divided into five parts 
i.e. the inspector, the domestic violence officer, 
sergeants, relief officers and C.I.D. officers. Each part 
contains details of what the interviewees said to the 
interviewers.
The Inspector
Eighty percent of the cautions were conducted by one
inspector. This was a deliberate policy by me in an 
effort to ensure that the cautions were of a similar 
nature and standard. The other 20% of cautions were 
conducted by myself. As a Divisional Community Liaison 
Inspector he was both directly responsible for the 
domestic violence office and was very experienced in 
cautioning, albeit mainly juveniles.
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He informed the Interviewer that he considered he was 
chosen to do the cautions because of his involvement with 
the domestic violence office and "it needed someone fairly 
dedicated to the issue". In addition, he had seen the
policy develop at first hand, having worked in the same
office as the domestic violence office and being one of 
the parties, whom I had consulted at the formulation stage 
of the policy. The inspector stated that there was no set 
procedure or directive as to what constituted a caution, 
so he took a pragmatic approach that depended on a number 
of factors. Whilst firm in stressing to the suspects that 
the police organisation was seeking a change in the 
behaviour of the assailant and that violence would not be 
tolerated, the primary endeavour of the early part of the 
caution was to illicit an admission of guilt from the
accused. This provided a double check on the crucial part 
of the procedure, i.e. that the offender had admitted
committing the assault. The inspector's interpretation of 
the deferred decision period was:
"In part to see if they are capable 
of taking on board the initial event.
The caution is to show there is 
another check to the issue. I use 
the analogy of the endorsement on a 
driving licence, it is like saying 
you have got three points this time, 
the next time its disqualification".
The nature of the caution was decided after the inspector 
ascertained the current perceptions of the offender about 
his arrest:
"If they have taken on board what 
they have done I don't see any reason 
for going over the top. If they have 
not grasped the issue I will spend a 
considerable amount of time 
explaining what will happen if they 
continue in the same way".
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The actual procedure for formal adult caution (always on 
Thursday evenings between 7pm and 9pm) lasted between 3 
and 40 minutes. Some cautions were conducted in a chatty, 
convivial manner, others were more stern. The inspector's 
approach was often dependent on the information about the 
incident which was contained in the domestic violence file 
under the heading "Local Information". The file was given 
to the inspector shortly before the caution took place. 
Generally speaking the only other source of background 
information open to the inspector was if he had been the 
operational duty officer, at the station, on the day of 
the arrest or happened to have been in the custody office 
when the suspect was brought to the station.
After conducting over 30 such cautions the inspector 
believed that many of the men had seen the "error of their 
ways" and did understand the procedure. Further, he 
considered the policy advantageous for both the victim and 
the offender. For the former, because the policy was 
relieving the victim of the inevitable pressures from both 
a court appearance, friends and family of the suspect. 
For the offender, the effect of the arrest, time detained 
in a cell and being dealt with in a firm manner between 2 
- 10 hours in a custody suite, surprised them and probably 
had as much of a deterrent effect as a court case:
"It has made them think twice, they 
cannot say to us anymore but I only 
hit the wife".
The other advantages which the inspector saw were the 
good community relations it gave the police and the time 
that it saved the Crown Prosecution Service and the 
courts.
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The Domestic Violence Office
The domestic violence office consisted of two experienced 
women police officers (with a police service of 1\ years 
and 12 years respectively) who worked in their own office 
and where they could be contacted directly by phone. 
They worked from Monday to Friday on a two shift system 
covering the hours of 9am to 8pm. Initially, in August 
1988, one officer was appointed to the office dealing 
with community relations but had the specific 
responsibility of both domestic violence and child 
protection. She said that the idea of a separate 
domestic violence office arose in December 1988 and began 
as an experiment the following April. In August of that 
year the Streatham scheme was piloted, and the following 
month another woman officer was appointed on a three 
month attachment. However, the workload of the office 
doubled and ten months later the temporary attachment was 
still there. The office duties were divided between work 
at the police station and home visits. Tasks in the
former will be analysed first.
The office had an important training role in the 
introduction of the policy. This took the form of giving 
talks to groups of officers when they came on duty 
(called parades) and longer and more detailed
presentations on relief training days. Subsequently,
they became a consistent reference point to the officers
of various ranks, both uniform and plain clothes, who 
variously needed information or else the clarification of 
police procedures. Interestingly sometimes they had 
longer individual discussions with some officers who, 
seeing the subject as topical in policing policy,
realised the issue could arise at selection boards for 
promotion or specialist posts.
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Initially both the officers perceived hostility from 
their colleagues; on one level this was attributed to a 
cynicism arising from the traditional attitudes to the 
problem e.g. "it*s not worth bothering with, it's grief". 
They stated that operational officers viewed the dealing 
with domestic violence as grief because in so many of the 
disputes the officers themselves ended up getting the 
blame for everything in that they were blamed if they 
took no action, they sometimes were blamed by the victim 
for arresting the offender and, of course, they were 
blamed by the offender if he was arrested. On another it 
was the lighthearted comments made about their job, 
"always in plain clothes driving around in cars". Whilst 
the formal discussions helped to inform the officers of 
the policy, one of the officers thought the main way of 
"winning hearts" was through the office making themselves 
available in the canteen for a "chat" whereby they could 
promote the scheme informally and advise with regard to 
its implementation.
Whilst dealing with their colleagues was one aspect of 
their work, their main function was to attend to the 
victim of the domestic violence. Each morning saw up to 
four new cases of violence (Mondays produced sometimes 
double that number). Their job was then to collate the 
necessary crime sheets from the crime desk and try and 
establish contact with the victim. This latter duty was 
mainly done by telephone. However, if the woman was 
considered to be "high risk" a home visit would be 
undertaken immediately. At other times the office would, 
in their words, "hold back" to allow the arresting 
officer to make investigations first. In the meantime 
they could establish over the telephone from the victim 
exactly what had happened, explain the deferred decision 
procedure and inform the victim of any bail conditions 
which had been set by a court on the offender's release.
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The officers would also discuss any arrangements that 
were necessary to meet the victim either at home or at 
the police station. From this the officer could take the 
issue up with the detective officers in charge of the 
case and suggest whether charging or the deferred 
decision and caution was more appropriate. When a 
caution was the outcome of the deferred procedure, one of 
the functions of the office was in the words of one of 
the officers to "facilitate the procedure" on the 
suspect's return to the station. This task extended from 
ensuring that the necessary papers of the caution file 
were in order during the week which preceded the caution 
and being present, on the caution evening, to help with 
the smooth running of the procedure. Whilst this usually 
included escorting the men from the station reception 
area to the office where the caution was to take place, 
the unexpected occasionally arose when for instance the 
children or the assailant's partner accompanied the 
offender. This invariably meant that the children and/or 
partner had to be entertained during the time of the 
caution. This extra contact with partners afforded the 
domestic violence officers another opportunity to talk 
over both the cautioning procedure, the current state of 
the relationship and to check if there had been any 
further violence.
The officers thought an essential aspect of the 
cautionary process was the informal discussion between 
them and the cautioning officer shortly before the 
caution was to be administered. This gave the domestic 
violence officer the opportunity to convey any 
additional, up to date, information on the incident. 
These extra details were usually contained on a form 
which was attached to the caution file. This form 
usually contained information on the offender, the 
history of the couple and an opinion on the likelihood of
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a re-occurrence. It was their opinion that these 
informal exchanges, based on the officer's acquired 
knowledge and perceptions, helped convey to the 
cautioning officer the seriousness or otherwise of the 
case. The significance of this informal briefing was 
that the domestic violence officers thought they could 
influence the approach which the inspector was going to 
adopt in the caution interview. Put simply they could 
ask the inspector not to go too easy on the person and 
even suggest that a severe talking to was warranted ! "A 
bad offender or one with previous history, needs a severe 
word". It was also possible for the offender to be 
charged when he returned to the station. This often 
rested on what the domestic violence officer had found 
out during the two month period e.g. if the suspect had 
re-offended or the victim wished the matter to go before 
a court.
This type of information was not easily elucidated on the 
telephone and that was why the officers favoured doing 
home visits. These were usually arranged in the absence 
of the male offender, although the officers stated that 
this was not always possible. At times, the man would be 
present and, whilst this inhibited some women, others 
talked relatively openly even in these circumstances. 
Despite the man's presence, and this caused the domestic 
violence officers some annoyance at times, some home 
visits were, as one officer explained, done deliberately 
when the man was at home "to show a continuing police 
interest". The officers stated that whilst they suffered 
occasional impoliteness, neither of them had ever been 
assaulted when making such a visit.
The visits were conducted in plain clothes and on average 
took about half an hour. Any home visits which were 
considered to be "risky" because of the possible presence
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of a violent man, had to be treated slightly differently. 
A back-up police officer in a police vehicle would 
accompany the officers to the address or an appropriate 
message was left with the station communications room 
that the visit was taking place. The visits were 
intended to establish the history and frequency of 
violence, where the woman saw the relationship going, to 
explain the local Streatham policy, give advice and 
contact points for housing, social services, victim 
support and to give details of where to contact 
"sympathetic" solicitors. The officers also confirmed 
the victim's continuing consent to have the offender 
cautioned.
An additional service provided by the officers was to 
phone the victim after the caution had been administered 
to ensure that "matters were okay". Afterwards many 
victims returned their phone calls to express their 
appreciation.
Whilst acknowledging that many of the women victims they 
saw were in families with problems variously of low 
income, unemployment, and poor housing, the officers were 
often faced with middle class women victims. It was the 
officer's experience that many women from this group
often would phone, or even walk into the office and 
discuss matters but often without leaving a name. 
Invariably, once they became aware of their options and 
the law they would leave, rarely to return.
One year after the implementation of the scheme, the
domestic violence office noticed amongst their colleagues 
"not a revolutionary, but a definite change in attitude 
especially amongst the youngsters". In part they thought
this may have been due to a tactic that the office
employed. They were aware that most domestic incidents
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were dealt with by fairly inexperienced officers so the 
office made the point of giving these officers "feedback" 
on their arrest.
"We can pat him on the back and tell 
them they've done a good job. I 
thank them. Unfortunately in a 
police force, officers very rarely 
get feedback about arrests and 
incidents which they've reported".
Whilst making progress to an extent, the officers 
recognised that at times the entrenched attitudes of some 
of their male colleagues was a matter still to be 
overcome.
"The problem is they don't see the 
victim, hear her, or see the house.
Men too often think what would push 
them to assault, they never get over 
the problem of 'what would I have 
done'. They don't always think its a 
diabolical crime".
Despite this the officers thought that the cautioning 
policy was a success:
"The victims like it, it gives them a 
chance to recognise that it has 
happened and we're involved without 
them having to go to court. Our 
court system doesn't favour victims".
However, they stressed that the caution should only be 
administered strictly in cases of minor assault where a 
re-occurrence was most unlikely and where attending court 
would not help the situation. Their main worry was if 
cautioning offenders should become the norm instead of 
prosecution or that the narrow definition for the caution 
could be expanded to act as an alternative to charging. 
This was a fear that had been expressed by some feminists 
when I was seeking advice on formulating my policy.
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Both officers were cautious about the extent of their role 
and the future of the policy. The office, they stressed, 
needed to be maintained with a minimum of two officers who 
could monitor cases over a longer period of time. One of 
their criticisms was that the procedure meanwhile needed 
tightening in the area of supervision particularly "up to
detective sergeant and detective inspector”. They
considered that a lot of allegations of crime contained in 
crime sheets "gather cobwebs in the screening process" 
with the result that the office had frequently to "chase 
them up". Also, they thought that the success of the
scheme was bound up with the views of the particular
senior officers who were in charge at that time. They 
feared that a change of senior personnel could mean a
change of policy emphasis.
I think this was a real fear and one of the criticisms of 
a local policy. It is relevant to note that at the time 
of completing the final draft of this thesis, this
cautioning procedure became area wide policy. This meant 
that eight divisions in South London had adopted the 
cautioning practice. The area policy included a system of 
monitoring and evaluation with monthly statistical returns 
to ensure that performance was related to policy. The 
effect of this is that when I eventually relinquish 
command of Streatham Division the policy and practice will 
continue.
Finally, the officers stated that the way they go about 
their job brought them certain worries, not only in 
content but, as it were, in style. They expanded on the 
former by saying that after a caution unless there was 
another offence they could only assume that everything was
all right with the victim so their concern was the long
term support that was available to victims of this type of 
crime. On a personal basis they were not certain of
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always doing or saying the right thing to victims. The
officers had the feeling of being alone in dealing with an
issue which was commonly referred to as a problem of
society. At the same time both realised the police had an
immediate role until some greater, wider solution was 
forthcoming, as one explained:
"If a woman is frightened enough to 
leave the home and come to a police 
station or phone us, there's a reason 
for it and a role for us".
Since the date of the interviews, a closer liaison has 
developed with victim support and the women's refuge, 
however, if the victim had not received support from 
these other agencies then, practically speaking, the 
police may well have been the only "professional body" to 
help the victim. In a later section I have given my own 
views on the growth of domestic violence offices, as a 
means of providing a service and support to victims, and 
point out the inherent dangers for the police service of 
such increased specialisation.
Sergeants - in the role of custody officer
The custody officer, who was invariably a sergeant, was 
in charge of the custody area of a police station. He 
dealt with and supervised the reception of prisoners and 
had responsibility for the processing of those arrested 
under the provision contained in the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. Streatham Police Station had a 
recently refurbished custody area which was too small for 
the volume of prisoners. The result was that sometimes 
the custody area was closed down and the prisoners had to 
be transferred to other police stations. Often the 
custody officer role was performed by two sergeants. In 
my opinion a custody officer exerted considerable
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influence on the discretion of police officers on whether 
or not to arrest people for what was perceived in the 
police culture as "minor crimes". Younger officers would 
be reluctant to bring in prisoners if they received a 
negative response from the supervising sergeant in the 
custody suite. It was therefore, imperative, that the 
custody officers accepted the concepts and the practice 
of my new local policy.
The interviewers found that most custody officers 
supported the arrest form of the deferred decision 
policy. Arrests were executed in accordance with a 
variety of powers which included common law assault, 
common law breach of the peace and section 25 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Many custody
officers however, opposed the "bailed to return" part of 
the policy, claiming that their over-riding concern was 
with the legality of this procedure. Many expressed 
their concern by feeling torn between the requirements of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, on the one hand, 
and the Divisional Instruction on the other. Some
custody officers went further, maintaining that the 
policy was usurping the power of the courts.
I consider this fear was quite a natural reaction from 
some of the sergeants. At the time the interviews took 
place the policy was really still in its infancy, many 
sergeants disliked change and were somewhat rigid in 
their application of the law. To be fair to many of them
my policy relied on an interpretation of the powers of
police contained in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. 
My view was confirmed by legal opinion. However, it was 
only an opinion and was open to interpretation by the 
courts. I have to add that since these interviews most 
of the ambiguity was cleared up by further training and 
at the time of writing this final draft, most, but still
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not all, sergeants accepted the validity of the local 
procedure.
By contrast, many custody officers had no difficulty with 
the legality of the instant caution and would have 
preferred implementing this option rather than the 
process of deferring the decision and bailing the suspect 
to return to the station two months later. As I 
discussed earlier, I think the instant cautions may well 
be a viable alternative to deferring the decision. It 
was my personal choice to stay with the local policy.
This section is divided up into a number of parts that 
considered the sergeant's views on different aspects of 
the policy i.e. general response to domestic violence, 
attitude to the arrest policy, individual discretion, 
custody, the process of decision making and finally 
deferred decisions.
General response to domestic violence
Of the 12 sergeants (40% of the total number of uniform 
sergeants interviewed), all experienced considerable 
difficulty in dealing with domestic violence incidents, 
reflecting the same problems as those found by EDWARDS
(1986) and BOURLET (1990). Of all the calls for police 
assistance, domestic violence was considered by them to 
be the most unpredictable. This element of uncertainty 
was expressed by all officers, typical of a response was
"you don't know what it is". That said, the interviewers
considered that the verbalised responses given by the 
sergeants to domestic incidents had certainly changed 
very significantly from those views that had been 
articulated to the interviewers in earlier studies in 
London and in Kent (EDWARDS 1986). The interviewers
considered that from the nature of the responses, the
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officers appeared to have a heightened awareness and 
genuinely appeared to be more sympathetic to such calls, 
and more eager to get on and do a good job. A small 
proportion of officers, however, described the old well 
worn stereotypes. Some officers said "it's aggravation", 
"it's grief", "99% rubbish", "it's not what police work 
should be but we've got to sort them out", "domestics are 
problematic". Moreover, one or two officers continued to 
express their feeling that the police were intervening in 
a private domain and interfering and influencing the 
course of a marriage, e.g. "you're interfering in a 
person's personal marital life", "by our actions you're 
ruining a marriage". Officers still felt ambivalent 
about their precise role in "domestics". Only one 
officer indicated at the outset that he would arrest.
It was precisely these negative, ambivalent views that 
the policy was meant to address. I would not have 
expected officers to change their approach overnight, but 
I would have looked for a change over a period of time 
and for most of these officers to re-consider their 
stance in view of the success of this scheme. This group 
of sergeants would have had at least 6 years, and many 
over 10 years, police experience so that the negative 
police culture views would well be established in them 
and not easily broken.
The police response was affected, to some extent, by who 
had made the call for assistance. Some sergeants opined 
that where women, as victims, had called the police the 
assumptions was that the situation was not too serious. 
One sergeant expressed the view as, "if she phoned she's 
not being slapped". Perceptions of seriousness changed 
when, for example, as one officer expressed it, "if the 
line goes dead or screams are heard or a serious 
disturbance and assault are taking place", then the
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police were particularly alerted and prepared to view the 
call more seriously.
All officers insisted on entering the house, believing 
that even if the woman said all was well it was of vital 
importance for a police officer to check out the safety 
of the woman and children. Experience had shown one 
officer the wisdom of such thoroughness, "in one case I 
was trying to get in and he was standing there with a 
carving knife behind his back".
Once at the scene, officers were eager quickly to gain 
control of the situation. Interviews by police officers 
were usually conducted with both parties together rather 
than separately. This was despite the Metropolitan 
Police Order of 1987 which advised separate interviews. 
A combination of practicality and economics dictated this 
course of action. Sometimes this was because only one 
officer was in attendance but, the main reason given was 
that it was thought necessary, for evidential reasons, 
that an allegation of assault should be made in the 
presence of the aggressor. At some point however, most 
officers spoke with the victim separately in another room 
or even in the police car. The sergeants stated that the 
attendance time spent at the domestic violence calls 
varied enormously from between 10 minutes to several 
hours, more typically the time taken was about 30 
minutes. Officers who attended domestic disputes 
invariably asked the woman what had happened, what she 
wanted to do and whether it had happened before. Alcohol 
was seen as a contributory factor in most of the cases.
In some cases where the victim had left the scene, police 
tried to find out where she had gone and, under these 
circumstances, would be extremely concerned for her 
safety.
263
In cases where the offender had left the scene before the 
police arrived, then officers asked the victim where the 
offender might have gone to and dependent upon the 
seriousness of the allegation/injuries complained of, the 
officers would make every endeavour to arrest the 
offender. The over-riding concern was that the offender 
might return and assault the victim again.
Attitude to the positive arrest policy
All officers said that they would arrest in cases of 
common assault upwards although the meaning of what 
behaviour constituted common assault varied considerably. 
This was defined most comfortably and certainly by minor 
acts of physical assault including slapping and punching. 
Assaults of a lesser nature, including allegations 
without any physical evidence and more minor incidents of 
slapping, formerly dealt with by officers doing nothing 
and leaving the scene, caused greater difficulty. In all 
allegations most officers required some evidence of 
assault i.e. a bruise, slight redenning, finger marks on 
the face etc.
Furthermore, the sergeants were reluctant to arrest in 
cases of minor allegations and minor incidents of 
physical assault when the crimes were not supported by 
any other aggravating factors. Allegations of slapping 
for example, in the absence of a warring atmosphere, 
distress, indication of damage to the property and a 
tearful victim and/or children etc., would be less likely 
to result in the officer exercising his power of arrest. 
This was so even though the divisional policy indicated 
that officers should seriously consider the arrest 
option. As one officer expressed it, "if it is calm and 
there is no assault, then there is nothing to be gained 
from arresting".
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A very small number of officers said that they would 
arrest, even where allegations were not corroborated by 
physical evidence, but where there was a warring 
atmosphere and/or the victim was obviously upset, fearful 
etc. Sergeants also made comment that where all, or a 
combination, of these factors was present, even in the 
absence of an allegation of common assault, they may well 
have decided to arrest a suspect in order to prevent an 
escalation, criminal damage or assault using their common 
law powers of arrest for breach of the peace. This was 
in accordance with the local policy.
The interviewers found that the officer's personal 
attitudes towards the police role still continued to 
weigh heavily on the approach of the arresting officer 
not withstanding the existence of evidence or an 
allegation of physical assault. But some moral factors 
including the sanctity of marriage, the state of the 
home, the kind of woman the victim was, the perception of 
provocation etc., were far less frequently referred to, 
in justification or explanation of non-action, as 
compared to earlier studies (EDWARDS 1989). The response 
of this officer was therefore untypical, although it 
indicated that prejudices still persisted and influenced 
the police decision to arrest:
"We had one Irish fellow living with 
a black girl, she's got a baby by 
someone else, and now she's expecting 
his baby. She wanted to go out at 
night clubbing. He objected. The 
house was a tip, I wiped my feet as I 
walked out, that's how bad it was.
It's quite obvious she doesn't want 
to know. He whacked her and we 
didn't arrest. She was making his 
life hell. There was nothing to be 
gained by arresting him".
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Overall a mixed response characterised officer's reactions 
to the arrest part of the policy. Officers said that the 
arrest was effective, as a deterrent, only to those who 
had no previous contact with the police. One officer 
said:
"The reaction of people who had been 
nicked before and have police to 
their door regular, is not a big 
deal. The person with no previous, 
and educated, reacts with laughter. 
One man couldn't believe that he had 
been nicked. He was looking for
Jeremy Beadle, saying, 
up'".
it's a wind
Some officers expressed concern that the policy was 
infringing upon their discretion to arrest. A typical 
response was encapsulated by one officer:
"We are taking away the power of 
discretion from younger officers (it 
won't work with the older ones).
They get there and are more alert to 
violence in the home. But straight
away they are looking for arrest and 
that's a bad thing".
Notwithstanding these several reservations, officers 
overwhelmingly supported the purpose of the policy. One 
officer explained:
"The big stick. It defuses the 
situation immediately and is a clear 
indication that the offender's 
behaviour is unacceptable. It gives 
credence to the wife, she thinks 
something is being done. She has a 
few hours relief and it reverses the 
roles. She now has power over him 
and not vice versa".
There was one common thread which was to be found running 
through all the responses from the sergeants and that was
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that they required physical assault to have taken place 
before exercising their power of arrest.
Policy and individual discretion
Some officers had difficulty with reconciling the demands 
of the policy with the desire to exercise their own 
discretion. Whilst the precise level of violence required 
by officers to effect and arrest was a bruise, some 
conceded that the policy implied that a shove was of 
itself sufficient. This caused officers some concern. 
There was some resistance as one officer said, "I wouldn't 
want to bring him in for that". However, this difficulty 
was lessened where, for instance, other additional 
aggravating circumstances were featured i.e. if the woman 
was in a state of fear or shock or terror. Only one 
mentioned the divisional policy in this instance. Only 
one officer said he always arrested.
Not all officers stated they would use their powers of 
arrest under Section 25, in fact, 50% said they did not. 
Those who did, saw that the purpose of this section lay in 
protecting children and the mentally ill. Some officers 
stated that they would use Section 25 in a domestic 
violence context, where, for example, the victim had not 
been assaulted but was "mentally frightened or in fear" or 
where children were present and in some distress.
By contrast some officers saw there to be no use of 
Section 25 as such situations, as described above, were 
already covered by the powers of arrest under common law 
covering the response to a breach of the peace. One 
officer responded "I wouldn't use it without the presence 
of a kid.... otherwise there's breach of the peace or 
actual bodily harm". I touched on this subject in my 
section on the law as it concerned the Streatham Policy.
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The advice given by the Metropolitan Police Solicitors 
Department was that officers should use statutory powers 
if an offence had been committed and not resort to common 
law powers for breach of the peace. This was a matter I 
addressed at training sessions which were organised after 
these interviews were conducted.
Some concern was expressed by sergeants over the way the 
policy was enforced by senior officers. Some cited 
instances, in the early part of the policy, when one 
senior officer read a crime sheet three days after the 
incident, then ordered the officer to arrest the offender 
based on the "vulnerable person" part of Section 25. The 
constable, who was instructed to carry out the arrest, was 
a young probationer who had only been at the police 
station for four weeks and he was not even at the scene of 
the crime when it was reported to the police. The 
sergeant opined that this was not a lawful order, "you 
cannot ultimately order a man to arrest, it shows the 
policy was all up in the air". I do not know the 
circumstances of this specific incident but it may well 
have related to a strategy which was adopted at the very 
beginning of this policy. It was this; in order to 
develop the confidence of the young probationer 
constables, they were allocated some of the crimes 
involving minor injury where, for a number of reasons 
(usually the suspect was not at the scene when police 
originally dealt with the violence) the assailant had not 
been arrested. The intention was to create a positive 
approach to domestic violence. I believed this strategy 
worked in practice. I based this judgement on their 
reaction and performance. However, what this did 
illustrate, was the power of anecdotal evidence to shape 
officer's attitudes and perceptions.
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Another officer expressed a similar opinion and measure of 
worry:
"Often the victim wants the violence 
to stop but doesn't want the offender 
arrested. But now we arrest and this 
presents a dilemma for the young 
officer who is quite cautious. If 
you get an allegation and swift the 
guy away, this appears to be the only 
way you can avoid criticism of senior 
officers.
I think if the policy had requested officers to discard 
their discretion the opinion of this sergeant would be 
absolutely legitimate. However, the policy still allowed 
officers to use their discretion. This was a point that 
was emphasised in the training sessions. But this opinion 
was a good example of how important it was for the maker 
of new policy to ensure that its meaning and spirit was 
properly interpreted by those that had to operate it.
Attitude to custody
Sergeants, in their role as custody officers, all agreed 
on the procedures for accepting an arrested person into 
custody. Officers stated that the normal practice was 
that they asked arresting officers for the evidence, found 
out why the suspect was arrested and processed the 
prisoner under the requirements of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act. This included obtaining evidence by 
questioning, informing the suspect of his rights, 
searching the arrested person and asking him to sign the 
custody record.
Some officers were critical that arrests were made that 
they believed were not actually warranted. All officers 
said that, in general, the options open to the police were 
to charge, defer the decision, instant caution and no
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further action. But once, an arrested person for domestic 
violence was brought to the station custody officers were 
presented with what they saw as a "fait accompli". They 
felt that they had no option but to proceed by way of 
charging or deferring, since the other option of no 
further action was not (given the new policy) politically 
open to them.
On the matter of charging one sergeant said:
"I make a decision to charge after 
collecting all the evidence, which 
includes interview with the suspect, 
with the victim and obtaining a 
doctors report".
Officers said that they may well have made up their mind 
in the initial stages but their main imperative was to
"get the best evidence".
In most cases where a decision to charge had been taken,
sergeants agreed that they would not grant an offender
bail. The main reason given was to prevent further 
offences, "I don't bail in a domestic, I can't put the 
conditions a court can". The officer was alluding to the 
fact that unlike a court of law a custody officer cannot 
bail a person from a police station and impose any legal 
and binding conditions. Another officer replied:
"The only one is where he would go home 
where the victim is, and unless you can 
bail him to go somewhere else he might 
stay in custody until the morning. It's 
not the way to go about things, but it 
tends to go that way. Every policeman
defends his own back before anything
else".
Whether or not protecting of the victim was the truly 
paramount consideration of whether the officer was
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"defending his own back" from criticism was never made 
exactly clear to the interviewers. However, the practice 
of remanding charged men in custody demonstrated a 
considerable change in the procedure since the earlier 
work in 1984 and 1988 (EDWARDS 1989) and I believe that it 
showed a much more positive approach by police 
particularly from the point of view of giving a better 
service to the victims of crime. Decisions, by custody 
officers, were made in consultation and discussion with 
the officer in the case or, if the case was particularly 
complex, the duty inspector would be involved, and in very 
violent cases C.I.D. involvement would follow. As one 
sergeant said:
"It's only with the griefy ones that 
I'll have a chat with him. And if 
it's that bad I'll N.F.A. (no further
action) it. But you can be called
upon to explain yourself as to why
you did not comply with the station
policy. If I thought that was likely 
to happen I would consult".
This was an interesting reaction from a sergeant. Again, 
as an implementation strategy, in the early days of the 
policy, I asked sergeants to report to me the reasons why 
they had made certain decisions which seemed to me to be 
in conflict with the purpose of the divisional policy. I 
found this practice very worthwhile because it gave me the 
opportunity of discussing further with them the reasons 
for the policy.
Officers expressed discomfort about the implication in the 
policy regarding the detention of the person and the
policy directive that offenders should be bailed to return
after two months. Officers thought the detention of
offenders was warranted under the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act only to preserve evidence, or obtain evidence
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by further enquiries, and pointed out that bailing 
offenders to return to the station, could be done only if 
further enquiries were still to be made. They considered 
that in most of these cases further enquiries were not 
actually being made in connection with an offence but into 
the background. Since the man had not been charged, most 
officers felt uneasy about the legality of what they were 
actually being required to do. Again, this was an issue 
which was discussed at length in subsequent training 
sessions.
Deferred decision
Overall there was only limited support for the two month 
deferment policy. One particular officer was vehemently 
opposed, whilst other officers expressed difficulty with 
what they perceived to be the legality of the policy. 
Some officers, on the other hand, felt that they might "do 
their legs in" and be "left carrying the can", and on the 
other, that they would get "squibs in their tray" and be 
"called to answer to senior management" if they did not 
comply with the requirements of the policy. One officer 
queried:
"It all depends on interpretation.
It's delicate, possibly going against 
P.A.C.E. But you won't get a test 
case because no solicitor will say 
why didn't you charge my client. The 
only thing might be after two months 
they decide to charge. In five years 
the superintendent could be retired 
in the Seychelles when I am on a 
charge of unlawful detention in the 
High Court. They will never say 
(senior management) that police were 
making social enquiries, but they use 
that as a breathing space, everybody 
accepts it as a convenient method of 
keeping them in".
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Two other officers noted:
"P.A.C.E. stated you shouldn't bail 
to return for a caution. We are not 
making further enquiries. If you 
have the evidence to charge you 
should. All cautions should be done 
at the time".
"One day we will get a bloke with a 
few friends in the right places and 
he will sue the job to high hell".
Custody officers also expressed some disquiet with the 
perceived pressures to arrest placed on reporting 
officers.
"P.C's on the relief, in general, 
feel that they are under pressure to 
arrest even if it doesn't seem to 
come up to standard. They find it 
difficult to justify why they didn't 
make an arrest".
Sergeants were also particularly concerned about the 
management of suspects on their return to the station at 
the end of two months. One sergeant described the 
situation as:
"When suspects return they should be 
re-arrested, there should be new 
evidence but we don't do it. You
should book him in".
This argument centred around the procedure of custody 
officers completing a full custody record when a suspect
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returned to the station in answer to his bail. In a 
normal case the offender would be accompanied to the 
custody suite, detained, a custody record made out and 
then he would be informed of the result of the further 
enquiries by police.
In the deferred decision cases where the offender was to 
be charged on his return to the police station this 
procedure applied and a custody record was made out in the 
normal way. However, if the person was to be cautioned 
the arrangement was that he was met at the front enquiry 
counter by a member of the domestic violence team, 
informed that he was to be cautioned and agreed to the 
arrangement that it was done in the chief superintendent's 
office. A record of the caution was made by the 
cautioning officer and a signature was given by the 
offender on a police form. I felt it was bureaucratic to 
make out an additional record by way of a custody sheet in 
these circumstances. Initially, some sergeants took issue 
with me on that policy, however, after I had explained to 
all the sergeants, at the three monthly sergeant's 
meeting, my reasons for my policy, and that I had written 
the policy down, the procedure was accepted by the 
majority.
In conclusion, sergeants working as custody officers, 
supported the general aims of the local policy but 
expressed reservations regarding the legality of specific 
aspects. A minority still retained negative attitudes to 
the police dealing with domestic violence.
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The response of the relief officer
Relief officers were asked questions specifically related 
to their response to the arrest part of the policy as this 
involved them directly. The arrest component of the 
policy did not meet with their unanimous support. 
Officers were clearly divided, and like custody officers, 
many felt that their discretion has been removed. 
Officers found particular difficulty, and were reluctant 
to exercise their power of arrest, in those cases at the 
lower end of the scale least clearly defined i.e. cases 
involving mental shock, common assault or reddening of the 
skin. Officers who had no difficulty with the policy felt 
that they were dealing with domestic violence more 
effectively, efficiently and professionally. But there 
was no doubt that even some of these officers dispensed 
with any such dilemma by simply not arresting in some 
minor cases thereby effectively retaining the right to 
exercise their discretion.
Perceptions held by arresting officers regarding the 
matter of domestic violence were, again, similar to those 
of custody officers. The following responses illustrate 
the range of view:
"Grief, oh no, not a domestic".
"You know it is not going to go 
anywhere".
"Oh no, not another domestic".
"It's grief. Usually tempers are 
heated. It is a complicated story 
and it's deep rooted".
"They tie you down and there is never 
a satisfactory ending".
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"You are imposing on the family".
Like custody officers, when called to a domestic, 
arresting officers responded more quickly when they had 
additional or specific information. For example where a 
female was screaming or where a call was abandoned, where 
there was mention of weapons or of a disturbance in the 
background then the response was quicker.
Officers saw their first role at "domestics" as:
"A splitting and calming action".
Whilst officers stated that they tried to interview the 
victim and suspects separately, as per Metropolitan Police 
policy, there was also an evidential need for the 
allegation to be made in the assailant's presence:
"Women tend to be victims so you are 
sympathetic with them, but whilst you 
try to do that you can't show too 
much bias until you find out what has 
been going on".
"My modus operandi is to stay between 
the two and keep them away from the 
kitchen where there are possible 
weapons".
Again decisions to arrest were mediated by the degree of 
injury and presence of aggravating factors:
"If it is clear cut and she has a cut 
to her face and he says 'she deserved 
it', then you arrest".
"Look at the body language, get both 
stories, look for the reaction when 
the other one is talking. So if she 
is saying that she has had enough and 
insults his manhood, he gets 
aggravated and jumps straight in.
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Now you are constantly trying to keep 
to the questions concerned with the 
immediate problem otherwise you are 
opening old wounds".
Notwithstanding the emphasis on arrest, the interviewers 
found that the contrition of the offender appeared to be 
one of the more significantly salient factors influencing 
the police officers decision not to arrest:
"Where it is a minor assault, 
reddening or a slap, this would only 
happen where there would not be a 
repetition and where they are 
apologising".
However, officers still blamed victims for their part in 
the incident and this, also influenced decisions not to 
arrest. As one officer said:
"On one occasion I did not arrest 
because the victim and the offender 
had had a good fight. She had no 
signs on her. He had bite and 
scratch marks down his arm. They had 
been married for 30 years, they 
apologised for calling us, and I left 
them".
"I spoke to the eldest child who was 
of a responsible age, she 
acknowledged that it had not happened 
before. I thought there was no 
mileage in arresting and humiliating 
one of the parents. It was reported 
for a further visit and all was 
well".
Notwithstanding the policy, and the factors cited above, 
the prosecutability of the cases still influenced some of 
the officers in the decisions they took at the onset. As 
one of the officers remarked:
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"We went out on relief with a message 
to arrest. But nobody had an idea 
about what was going on".
I found this comment fascinating because I had attended 
each relief training day to explain the policy and the 
reason for its implementation on the division. I did 
exactly the same thing with the C.I.D., inspectors and 
sergeant's meetings. There was an important lesson 
here for all policy makers. The division comprised of 
nearly 300 personnel and it was obvious that some 
officers had not heard my lecture. With hindsight I 
should have made sure that I had spoken to everybody 
and arranged for additional presentations to be given 
to those who had missed my sessions. Alternatively I 
could have made a training video recording which could 
have been shown to all officers. As a direct result of 
these findings, immediate further training sessions 
were conducted at the police station.
The officers stated that the relationship between the 
management and the ground floor was seen as being of 
the utmost importance:
"You can't do enough for a good 
guvnor".
Fifty per cent of the officers interviewed supported the 
policy and these responses gave an indication of the range 
of attitudes that were articulated to the interviewers:
"Officers don't like the policy but 
if you don't follow it you get squibs 
in your tray".
"I have got my own discretion, it's 
down to me".
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"To a certain extent the court 
influences what I do".
For some of the officers the role of the court was not
over-riding although the wishes of the victim in the
matter were supreme:
"Not bothered whether the court is an 
outcome, if it's minor and she
refused to assist, I would not arrest 
if the victim did not want me to".
Whilst most of the officers understood the policy many 
felt it could have been better communicated. Some
officers understood the policy in this way:
"If you go, someone's got to be 
arrested".
"Common assault doesn't exist because 
she is vulnerable and it is arrest 
under Section 25".
"Basically we recognise a lot of 
difficulties in getting witnesses. 
In many cases there is technically 
'no crime' because there is no 
allegation. Now we have a policy 
which says we must arrest in the vast 
majority of cases".
Officers explained that the policy was communicated by the 
sergeant and the inspector, officers were also referred to 
a memorandum, after the implementation talks were given by 
officers from the domestic violence office. Most 
expressed the opinion that senior management should have 
presented the policy personally to the relief parades:
"No-one gave us a chat, no-one sat 
down and talked to us".
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"Makes you deal with it without 
discretion. There's no humming and
barring, you arrest, because you get 
criticised if you don't".
"You have to write a 728 (police 
report form) as to why you didn't 
arrest. It is easier to arrest and 
let the domestic violence team get on 
with it".
Where officers were asked whether it saved police time, 
the response was very mixed. Some said that it involved 
less time at the scene whilst others recognised that it 
involved more paperwork at the police station.
As to whether the effect of the arrest was salutatory on 
the offender and of itself had a deterrent impact, 
responses again were very mixed. As one officer 
expressed :
"It does for people who are bothered 
but many people in this area are not, 
its a place where, to many, an arrest 
is water off a duck's back".
A small minority of the officers expressed the worry that 
it may have deterred women from reporting:
"The bloke doesn't like it and the 
women don't like it seeing a bloke 
forced out of the house".
The officer's reactions to the arrest rung of the policy 
was mixed. Whilst officers favoured the new positive 
police profile, they were uncertain about whether arrest 
was the solution:
"I don't agree with the policy here.
Of course if it was breaching the 
peace then I would arrest for that.
If it was A.B.H. then I would arrest
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for that too. Only in matters of 
common assault, am I wary, each 
situation should be treated on its 
own merits. Dragging the husband out 
of the house is not what they (women) 
want".
"Our policy is to arrest, that is way 
off".
For some officers arrest was not always necessary:
"Now you nick for injuries. Even if 
it was a push or even if she doesn't 
want to (doesn't agree) - it's not 
always necessary".
"The policy here is, if you don't
arrest you get criticised. You feel 
you have to arrest at the scene.
You're under pressure. I am never
happy with domestics. There's always 
more going on than we are told
about".
There was, then, a division between those who religiously 
applied the policy, not because of a belief in arrest, but 
a concern with discipline:
"A.B.H., a cut, bruising, every 
situation is different there is the 
official line but I don't see it".
There were, however, certain problems with policy at the 
lower end where the evidence of physical assault was not 
clear. Clearly other circumstances played a reduced role 
in implementing the policy. Officers were unhappy about 
arresting for arguments and for shock and fear. This was 
a similar response to the custody officers. However, 
where a person was vulnerable, nearly half of the 
arresting officers said that they would arrest, although 
most felt that the Section 25 power of arrest was to be
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used mostly in connection with protecting children and the 
mentally ill:
"She did not have any injuries. But 
she was very fearful of him. He was 
a dominant man and I thought she was 
vulnerable and I brought him in".
Some officers commented that they would exercise their 
power of arrest in the same way as a breach of the peace. 
As a general rule officers tended to prefer arresting 
offenders to prevent a further breach of the peace.
In conclusion the evidence gleaned by the interviewers 
suggested that relief officers at Streatham found 
difficulty, in the first few months of the policy, in 
arresting assailants if they abided strictly to divisional 
policy. They felt that it interfered with their 
discretion given to them under the law. However, it is to 
be noted that their attitude to domestic violence had 
changed since the introduction of the policy. At the time 
of writing up this report policy recommending arrest had 
been introduced "throughout London" for domestic violence 
(Best Practice Guidelines 1990).
The policy was never aimed at encouraging a universal 
mandatory arrest for these crimes. Indeed, a great 
strength of the policing of this country is the individual 
discretion a constable has under the law. I think it was 
right that when officers dealt with some domestics, 
especially if the case concerned a very minor injury, it 
was sufficient to leave it to his or her discretion This 
meant that on some occasions no arrest was made by the 
police. I think an important message in this policy was 
that constables were made aware of the positive effect 
that arrest and caution can have on the victims and the 
offenders. The impression that I was left with, from the
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interviews, was that many officers were expressing 
opinions which were based on their own experiences, 
policing or otherwise. It was interesting to note that 
none of them passed views or drew any conclusion from the 
academic research findings which they had been exposed to 
during the initial training sessions. The result was that 
in the next series of talks, which followed on from these 
interviews on the division, greater emphasis was placed on 
the previous academic research, but more importantly, on 
the findings of this study e.g. 75% of victims expressed 
satisfaction with the arrest procedure, 75% had been 
assaulted on a previous occasion before calling police.
I must add that having just finished the 1991 series of 
relief training sessions, I was very encouraged by the 
very positive attitudes being shown to the policy among 
officers. I was confident that it was not just my 
subjective view, as the increased percentage of arrest 
figures also confirmed, or supported, my opinion that the 
officers believed in the arrest policy and were putting it 
into practice. However, that was 2% years after I 
introduced the policy and highlighted that 'negative 
culture* views were not changed quickly.
Criminal Investigation Department officers
The Criminal Investigation Department were a group of 
officers who were in charge of all criminal investigations 
at the police station. In a busy division, such as 
Streatham, the workloads were high as was the staff turn- 
round. This policy imposed on them more investigative 
work so I saw their co-operation and support as being an 
essential "cog" if the system was to work in practice. I 
was fortunate in having two successive chief inspectors, 
in charge of that department, as well as two detective 
inspectors who gave me full support from the inception of
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the policy. However, not all officers under their command 
were easily persuaded that our new policy was the way 
forward for these crimes !
A small sample of C.I.D. officers were interviewed from an 
interview schedule which focussed on matters relating to 
the deferred decision policy as well as matters which were 
pertinent to the prosecuting of domestic violence cases. 
In all, 5 officers (16% of the total C.I.D. manpower) were 
interviewed by Susan EDWARDS and Gary ARMSTRONG.
C.I.D. officers at Streatham were familiar with the issues 
and had practical experience of the difficulties which 
have been raised already in this section.
All supported the enhanced profile brought to domestic 
violence through the new policy and its focus on arrest 
and prosecution. With one exception officers supported 
the deferred decision policy, largely because they felt 
frustrated that so few cases went to court and had a 
successful outcome. As mentioned elsewhere in this 
report, practical police work has been faced with the 
dilemma of what to do with cases which were withdrawn by 
the victim or else discontinued by the Crown Prosecution 
Service. The deferred decision, with this arrest 
function, presented an opportunity for the officers to do 
much more for the victim and provided them with some 
control over the outcome. There was, however, one officer 
who was not supportive of the policy and was of the view 
that the way to proceed with such cases was to prosecute:
"Domestic violence is often half our 
workload. Only on this division we 
push it. The victim gets a raw deal.
If someone's assaulted on the street 
then we charge, why should a woman 
victim of domestic violence wait 
thirty days. At the end of the day 
this lets her down. We should charge
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and not defer the decision".
One over-riding feature which emerged during the 
interviews with the C.I.D. officers, as indeed with all 
the other officers, was the very significant change 
witnessed by the interviewers, in the way in which 
domestic violence was being openly discussed. Officers 
regarded these cases seriously and negative stereotypes 
about individuals, families, social classes and racial 
groups were far less evident than in earlier, similar 
interviews with the Metropolitan and Kent Police officers 
(EDWARDS 1986). The attitudinal responses of officers 
indicated to the interviewers that there had been a real 
change in the officer's own perceptions of the importance 
of domestic violence in the overall profile of police 
work. This attitude was perhaps encapsulated by one of 
the officers who stated:
"Domestic violence, at the end of the 
day, is an assault; you must 
investigate it".
Whilst accepting this sample is small, I wondered if this 
positive response was a result of two very long training 
sessions I had with the C.I.D. office right at the very 
beginning of the policy. Most C.I.D. officers heard me 
speak about the policy and the reason for its adoption on 
the division. As I have said the policy was also very 
strongly supported from the beginning by the supervising 
C.I.D. officers.
The arrest component of the policy was widely accepted. 
The officers reflected the enhanced service given to the 
victims and this positive approach was also supported in a 
rigorous prosecution climate where over half of those 
arrested were charged. This figure constituted a quarter 
of all cases which were classified as a crime. These
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figures must also be set in the context of earlier studies 
which showed that only 16% of crime cases resulted in 
charges and only 26% of crime cases resulted in arrest 
(EDWARDS 1988). It is argued that the enhanced 
prosecution profile showed that the deferred decision 
policy was not being used as an alternative to 
prosecution. This was vital to the success of the policy 
and contradicted those opinions of criticism which feared 
that such a policy would divert cases away from 
prosecution. The consequence of the deferred decision 
policy was that it involved detectives at the point where 
the arrested person was brought into the custody area. 
The C.I.D. officer had responsibility for the taking of 
statements, collecting of evidence, general investigation 
of the case and presentation of the evidence to the 
custody sergeant for a decision as to outcome. The 
interviewers concluded that the procedure was broadly 
welcomed as another option to the officers when dealing 
with these cases:
"It gives the couple the opportunity 
to sort things out. It provides 
essential breathing space".
"The deferred decision procedure is a 
good thing, it's a cooling off
period, and it is already being 
expanded to other areas".
The officers did express some concern over the decision to 
bring the victim to the station at the same time as the 
suspect. This was not part of the divisional policy but 
was practice which was adopted by some officers in an 
effort to ensure that the police officers obtained a 
statement from the victim at the time of the offence. 
Some felt uneasy about this because it gave the wrong 
impression that police officers were virtually arresting 
the victim.
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I could understand this fear however, I did not stop the 
practice which had the advantage, as some officers saw it, 
of obtaining a statement there and then. Some officers 
felt that a delay in taking a statement afforded the 
victim the opportunity of having second thoughts about the 
matter and this often resulted in the victim refusing to 
make a statement.
The major concern for all the C.I.D. officers was the 
victim who "fades away". Here the problem of the 
reluctant or fearful victim was seen as the case of the 
victim who simply gets lost in the system:
"If we lose her.... we lose the job".
"This work needs a lot of commitment. 
It is difficult to keep hold of the 
victim".
"Victim reluctance is normal, there 
is always a fear he will be put away. 
I tell them the truth, that it's up 
to the C.P.S.".
One officer explained that the reason why some victims 
dropped their case was largely because of the delay factor 
which gave the culprit time to "work on" (persuade) the 
victim to not pursue the case through to prosecution.
The C.I.D. officers in the main thought that the process 
of deferring a decision to prosecute would only influence 
those men who had not previously been through the criminal 
justice system:
"But if people had been before the 
courts, to prison, or involved with 
the police, then the effect would be 
so much reduced".
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One officer likened the process to the verbal admonishment 
of a child:
"It comes as a shock to the nice guy, 
but to others, it's not Damocles".
Another officer felt that the impact of the deferment was 
extremely variable and depended upon the background and 
circumstances of the offender at the time of the alleged 
violence :
"Most of the people that we deal with 
are the pathetic type, drunks. I've 
never had a professional man to deal 
with. On certain offenders the 
policy can have an impact, on others 
it has no impact at all".
All officers said that the arrest approach was a good 
policy especially if it stopped the wife being beaten up. 
The general feeling was that the domestic violence unit 
was crucial to the implementation of the policy, to 
heightening the profile of the subject and also from the 
point of view of giving good service to the victim. The 
caution was viewed by some officers, as a "negotiating 
tool". One officer used the expression, "offenders play 
ball". It was presumed that the interviewee was referring 
to a practice which had been developed by some officers. 
This could best be described as a discussion with the 
offender to the effect that if the suspect admitted the 
offence an adult caution could be very seriously 
considered if the case was one involving minor injury.
There could be inherent dangers in allowing this "plea 
bargaining" type of approach and this was one of the 
reasons for imposing a supervisory check, by an inspector, 
into the system both at the custody and caution stage.
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One officer had reservations about deferring the caution:
**I would like it dealt with there and 
then".
The officer was referring to the option of giving the 
offender an adult caution at the police station soon after 
arrest. One C.I.D. officer spoke of the frustration and 
the delay time that it took to hear these cases at court 
and also the practice of the Crown Prosecution Service to 
go ahead with a prosecution on a lesser charge and to 
which the offender would plead guilty. The officer 
thought that the reasons for this lay in the remoteness of 
the Crown Prosecution Service decision makers:
"The C.P.S. are detached, they 
haven't seen the victim so they are 
less committed. They often want to 
get a hearing cheaper and quicker.
At Crown Court you are talking about 
a six to nine month wait for a 
hearing, and during that time he 
could re-offend or the victim could 
lose interest and you could lose it.
So there are some hidden benefits in 
reducing it (from a Section 47 
assault to a Section 39 assault) and 
getting it over with and a conviction 
in a Magistrates Court".
Another criticism which was voiced by a number of 
officers was the fact that the new policy was considered 
to involve a lot of paperwork. This in turn required 
more resources and as one detective said:
"It's like trying to get a five star 
service out of three star resources".
The emerging positive response by the C.I.D. officers was 
most encouraging as it was some of this group which had
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held some very cynical views at the very beginning of the 
policy.
Having assessed the verbal responses from the officers who 
were interviewed the next section will look at what the 
officers wrote in a questionnaire which was given out to 
all police personnel at the station.
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RESPONSE TO THE WRITTEN QUESTIONNAIRE
All the officers were asked to complete a one page 
questionnaire. The Department of Management Services of 
the Metropolitan Police was approached for this specific 
purpose. The D.M.S. was asked to provide assistance in 
connection with the survey of the officers. Since the 
local officers were being required to effect a major 
change in the traditional response to domestic violence 
incidents, I considered it important to have data which 
could be used to assess both the behavioural and 
attitudinal elements that such change had on the officers.
Doctor Susan EDWARDS, Inspector Don BROADBERY (my 
community inspector), Alistair McBEATH (D.M.S. 
representative) and myself met and discussed the subject 
area which we wanted to analyse and from that a suitably 
worded questionnaire was devised for distribution to the 
officers who were implementing the new policy. To 
safeguard confidentiality, the questionnaires were 
distributed locally to all officers, however, completed 
forms were returned direct to the Department of Management 
Services Branch where the data was inputted into a 
computer. To retain objectivity the completed
questionnaires were analysed by D.M.S. and a report of 
their findings was submitted to me at Streatham. It was 
from these findings that the conclusions contained in this 
section were drawn up by myself.
In the questionnaire, shown at Appendix 4, the questions 
were grouped around several major issues. The first three 
questions dealt with the officer's understanding of the 
new domestic violence policy and how well it had been 
explained to them. Other questions dealt with the 
possible attitude change or the conflict associated with 
the new policy. A couple of questions centred on the
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potential obstacles through the effective implementation 
of the policy. The remaining questions dealt with the 
perceptions of domestic violence in a forcewide context. 
The findings and conclusions from the questionnaire were 
intended to be considered alongside the findings from the 
in depth interviews discussed in the previous section.
I will now discuss some of the findings of the computer 
analysis.
A total of 200 questionnaires were sent out to the 
Streatham officers below the rank of chief inspector. The 
118 returns represented a response rate of 59%. Appendix 
5 shows the respondent profile with respect of the 
following variables; age, sex, marital status, rank, 
length of service and job description.
The data describing the Streatham officer's degree of 
understanding of the new policy are shown in Figure 11. 
The pattern shown was encouraging. Over half had a 
significant degree of understanding of the policy 
(complete understanding 14% and considerable understanding 
39%). Only 6% claimed to have "no understanding" while 
the remainder, and the largest single group (41%), were 
those with "some understanding" of the policy. The degree 
of understanding interacted similarly with the age and 
length of service of the respondents. Thus, it was the 
younger, less experienced officers, who were more likely 
to fall within the "no understanding" and "some 
understanding" groups. The older and more experienced 
officers were less likely to give either of these two 
responses. Such an interaction suggested that 1 should 
have considered ways to increase the effectiveness in 
communicating the new domestic violence policy to the 
younger and less experienced officers, some of whom had 
joined the division after the policy was started. Thus
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they did not receive some of the initial training 
sessions. This has since been addressed by the divisional 
training unit who now discuss the local policy with all 
new recruits. The great majority of respondents (81%) 
claimed that they fully understood the reason for the 
introduction of the new policy; while a negative response 
of 19% indicated there was room for improvement. The data
concerning how well Streatham senior management team were
thought to have explained the policy to their officers was 
not so encouraging and re-affirmed what was being spoken 
about in the interviews. Concerning how well the policy 
had been put across to them, Figure 11 shows that the
majority of officers (58%) held a negative opinion. This 
percentage came from the 15% who fell into the "not at all 
well" group and the 43% from the "not well" group. The 
aim of this question was to assess the impact of the
training sessions. This disappointing result seems to be 
at conflict with the findings in the last paragraph where 
81% stated that they fully understood the reasons for the 
introduction of the policy. This might have indicated 
that the sessions were successful. Nevertheless, this was 
quite a salutary lesson for me and highlights the
importance of effective communication to the 
implementation of any policy. The senior management team 
had thought the policy had been well presented. I had 
spoken at many officer training days and this was
emphasised by training lectures, on the early turn
reliefs, at 7am on consecutive Fridays by the officers of
the domestic violence office. As a result of this
criticism a better system of communication was tried in 
the later series of presentations e.g. use of flow charts, 
diagrams and flip charts.
The findings from the question implicated forcewide
perceptions on domestic violence were quite encouraging
when viewed as a measure of the potential receptivity to
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the Streatham initiative. Ninety-three per cent of 
respondents considered that not enough attention had been 
directed in the past at the area of domestic violence. 
This figure should be assessed against the information 
shown in Figure 11 which details the respondent's views on 
the forcewide status of the area of domestic violence. It 
can be seen that 45% considered that domestic violence had 
a very low, or low status within the police service. 
Taking the results of these two questions together it 
would appear then, that the officers would be likely to be 
receptive to future initiatives which placed domestic 
violence higher in the scale of policing priorities. I 
would suggest that the Streatham initiative could have a 
major impact: exactly two-thirds (66%) of the respondents 
considered that the new domestic violence policy 
represented a more effective method of dealing with this 
type of crime.
Concerning attitude change, two-thirds (66%) claimed that 
the new domestic violence policy had not altered their 
attitudes in the subject; one-third (33%) did report some 
change. In this latter group, the majority referred their 
attitude change to a new belief in having a positive way 
of dealing with domestic violence and one that was backed 
by senior management. One respondent described it as
"A belief in a positive way of dealing 
with a previously no win situation".
There was a solid grouping of officers who reported that 
they had an increased sympathy for alleged victims and 
also a better awareness of the negative consequences of 
such behaviour. Also on a positive note was the 
significant number of officers who claimed that they had a
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considerably heightened awareness of the scale of domestic 
violence as a major problem in society.
There was little evidence which suggested that officers 
had experienced any difficulty in resolving their own 
views, on domestic violence, with the new divisional 
policy. Only 3.5% reported having "considerable
difficulty" in this respect; the figure for those in the 
"quite some difficulty" group was only 9.6%. For the 
remainder, 29.6% reported "a little difficulty" with a 
final 57.4% reporting "no difficulty". The figures 
suggested that any potential personal attitude conflict 
was clearly not an obstacle to the successful 
implementation of the policy.
Decisions made by officers regarding what constituted a 
case of "minor" assault had obvious ramifications for the 
successful implementation of the policy. The great 
majority of officers (86%) claimed to have no difficulty 
in this respect. Of those officers who did claim to have 
difficulty (14%) few took the opportunity to make any 
comment on how this influenced their implementation of the 
scheme. A couple of officers reported that they were more 
likely to be influenced by the attitude of the suspect. 
One officer claimed a conflict in definition for "minor" 
assault between the Metropolitan Police and the Crown 
Prosecution solicitors. One substantial and rich source 
of information about officer's views came from the replies 
to the question which asked them what they thought was the 
least effective part of the policy. A total of 66 
officers (56%) took the opportunity to express an opinion 
and some of their replies suggested that there were one or 
two areas of confusion and needed to be resolved. These 
views are classified into major issues, where several 
officers expressed the same concerns, and minor issues 
which amount to unsupported individual opinions.
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Major issues
It was clear that a substantial number of officers were 
either unsure or unhappy about arresting domestic violence 
suspects merely on the basis of a violent behaviour 
classification. This concern was seen to emanate from the 
new policy and was typified by the following comments:
"Arrests for common assault are
unjustified".
"The policy promotes unlawful arrests 
and contradicts the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act".
"Should one arrest for A.B.H. ? It is 
difficult to get convictions".
These views represented a conflict on the legal 
procedural content of the policy and no doubt reflected on 
the deficiency in the early months of the new procedure.
One concern, raised by a total of 12 officers, was the 
fact that the new policy was not seen to increase the 
chances of successful prosecution. There was frustration, 
and an expectancy, that many alleged victims would still 
withdraw allegations. The question was raised several 
times as to whether it was wise to arrest an offender when 
the victim might well offer no support. Withdrawal of 
allegations was seen, by several officers, to promote what 
was perceived to be a lack of co-operation by the Crown 
Prosecution Service in prosecuting cases of domestic 
violence. The views above perhaps reflected an excessive 
pre-occupation with prosecution of offenders but I would 
suggest that lowered offending rates should probably be 
the more realistic goal for the police service.
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A group of 9 officers felt the new policy curtailed their 
freedom and professionalism when dealing with these 
crimes. The policy was described as being inflexible and 
the perceived need to arrest in all cases was seen to 
remove the officer's discretionary powers. The final 
identified body of shared opinion raised the valid point 
that the policy may inadvertently serve to promote further 
offending once the bail period had expired. There was 
concern that the offender would simply return home and re­
offend after the bail period. The questions raised here 
represented the laudable concern on behalf of the 
participating officers. However, it would have to be a 
matter of further empirical research to find out whether 
or not their fears were justified.
Minor issues
Several additional concerns were raised by officers; these 
are listed below by representative statements:
a. The policy provides no long term help for victims 
(1)
b. There is lack of co-operation with the Crown 
Prosecution Service (1)
c. The procedure of extended bail breaches the law (1)
d. Arresting every offender is impracticable (1)
e. The police are now acting as judge and jury (2)
f. The policy requires too much manpower to service 
(2)
g. The caution is insufficient. The police should 
charge first time (2)
h. The C.I.D. are dealing with paperwork and prisoners 
(2)
i. There is a lack of co-operation from neighbouring 
stations in as much as they are not operating the
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same policy (2) 
j. The cooling off period of two months is too long
(3)
At the end of the questionnaire, the space which was 
provided for further comment, proved quite a popular 
option with the respondents; in fact 43 officers made such 
contributions. The range of comment was quite broad and 
often echoed and the major and minor issues which I have 
just described. However, there was a group of 14 officers 
who expressed almost identical comment concerning the 
legality of the policy. It was felt that the criteria for 
the arrest contravened the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act. This confirmed what the officers were saying when
they were interviewed. Concern was expressed that the 
policy could be challenged in a court and that the officer 
involved may face disciplinary action. The other issues 
raised in this final section of the questionnaire are as 
follows :
a. The policy may promote unfounded allegations (1)
b. Bail may promote repetition of the offence (1)
c. Arrest may, in some cases, exacerbate the situation 
(1)
d. There is a need for more press coverage so as to 
encourage more of these victims to report the 
crimes to police (1)
e. There was a need for more women's refuges and 
counselling facilities (2)
f. There should be dedicated domestic violence 
officers/teams (3)
g. More training was required about the new policy (3)
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I felt the most important points to emerge from the 
questionnaire were:
(a) The importance of monitoring the effect of 
training. The perception of the management team 
was quite different from that of the operational 
officers, the majority of whom understood the 
policy, and reasons for its introduction, but 
thought it could have been put across in a better 
way.
(b) Although many previous researchers had found a 
negative attitude in officers there was in fact a 
positive outlook by those officers who were 
involved at Streatham Police Station. The majority 
(93%) of the officers thought that in the past 
insufficient attention had been paid to domestic 
violence.
(c) Sixty-six per cent of the officers thought that the 
new policy was a more effective way of dealing with 
domestic violence and there was little evidence 
that the policy conflicted seriously with their 
personal attitudes.
Overall these results were very encouraging and I would 
argue that they represented the change which can be 
achieved by a policy maker giving positive direction. 
True, mistakes were probably made in the early stages with 
regard to the training and the education about the policy 
but, I felt confident that, generally speaking, the policy 
had been well received by the operators and had the 
potential to be expanded beyond the bounds of the 
Streatham Police Station.
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Interestingly the possibility of more police officers 
being injured as a direct results of enforcing the policy 
was not raised in any of the interviews or in the 
questionnaire results. However, this issue arose some 
while after the interviews had finished. It is this issue 
that I will deal with in the next section.
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C H A P T E R  6
Assaults on Police

301
ASSAULTS ON POLICE
In the Literature Review it was demonstrated that a common 
fear among police officers was the perceived high level of 
violence directed at them when dealing with domestic 
disputes. This was a contributory factor in increasing 
the police officer's negative attitudes when responding to 
such incidents. The perception amongst officers at 
Streatham was no different. At one of the relief training 
days, after the scheme had been operating for about a 
year, some officers expressed the view that the early 
intervention and arrest policy had resulted in a greater 
number of officers being injured by offenders who had 
become aggressive towards the officers when they realised 
they were being arrested. There was no statistical 
information available to endorse or refute this 
assumption. Their fear was based on rumour and anecdote, 
not fact. It was therefore important to research the 
facts quickly because this type of rumour could well have 
fuelled antagonism against the policy.
To prove or disprove the perception I decided to measure 
the assault rate of officers whilst dealing with domestic 
violence for the year immediately following the 
implementation of the policy and make comparison with the 
number of assaults in the preceding year. The figures 
were not easily retrievable because, although injuries on 
duty were recorded locally, the circumstances leading up 
to the injury were not always shown on the records. 
Therefore, the injury on duty forms were checked against 
crime books, incident report books, occurrence books and 
the records kept in the domestic violence and community 
unit offices. The analysis revealed that in 1988, from 
294 reported domestic dispute incidents, four police 
officers were injured in four incidents. That is in 1988, 
1 in 74 police calls to deal with a domestic dispute
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resulted in an officer being injured - see Table 6 for 
further details.
In 1989 the reported incidents doubled to 636. Twelve 
officers were injured in six separate incidents. That is 
in 1989, 1 in 106 incidents resulted in a police officer 
being injured - see Table 7 for further details.
However, a closer examination of these incidents revealed 
that, although there were more officers injured from twice 
the number of incidents, none was hurt as a result of 
enforcing the new policy.
It can be concluded that there was no evidence to suggest 
there was any increased danger to officers when employing 
the strategy of early intervention and arrest. The reason 
for this may be that, as my research findings indicated, 
the minimum number of officers who attended domestic 
assaults was 2, which may have acted as a deterrent to any 
would be offender. It perhaps also indicated that the 
handling of these situations was diplomatic, sensitive and 
helpful as voiced in the victim and offender interviews.
In addition it was noted that all assaults on the police 
happened at night, at the scene of the dispute and that 
officers were invariably in uniform.
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PUBLICITY ABOUT THE PROJECT
A number of articles about the "deferred decision" 
procedure appeared in some of the national newspapers and 
magazines. A cross-section of these is to be found at 
Appendix 12. Most commentators who described the project, 
were supportive of the efforts which had been made by the 
police to improve their response to this issue, with the 
exception of HORLEY who represented the views of some 
feminists and had reservations about the use of the adult 
caution in the domestic violence field. Her view, was 
that all offenders should have been charged by the police, 
prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service and convicted 
by a criminal court.
I have also featured Streatham's "famous" caution case 
against Jeff HARRIS for assaulting his fiancee Dawn 
GRIFFITHS. It made the headlines in many of the national 
newspapers. The reason for this was that just previously 
their baby had been snatched from St. Thomas' Hospital but 
found safe and well 16 days later. The kidnap case 
featured in the national media for all the time that the 
child was missing.
A number of the features, which highlighted the 
significance of the local procedure, are worth 
illustrating from the case. Their relationship was beyond 
"the household" but still attracted the special procedure 
because I had expanded the definition of the word 
"domestic".
The injury was minor and the result of a flare up between 
the couple. Despite this he was arrested, kept in a cell 
and interviewed by a C.I.D. officer. This was not the 
first time she had been assaulted by him.
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The next day the couple were back living together 
apparently as friends. She denied that she ever had been 
assaulted. If, in the absence of this policy, he has been 
arrested and charged on the basis of her statement at the 
time then no doubt the case would have been withdrawn at 
court so no sanction would have been put on HARRIS.
My scheme resulted in HARRIS being given an adult caution. 
If he re-offended the caution could have been cited in 
court for up to three years by way of the antecedent 
history if he was found guilty. At the time of writing 
this report he has not been reported as having re-offended 
so the caution may well have had the desired effect of 
stopping him continuing on the cycle of violence.
Dawn GRIFFITHS was given help and advice by the domestic 
violence office and was made more aware of the potentially 
dangerous situation she found herself in with her 
boyfriend.
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A CASE STUDY OF THE DEFERRED DECISION PROCEDURE
This section illustrates a fairly typical example of a 
domestic violence case which was processed by way of the 
new divisional policy. The case was taken at random from 
the deferred decision cases. Both the man and the woman 
were subsequently interviewed by the members of the 
research team.
Background of offender and victim
A couple, aged 28 and 25, lived together as co-habitees. 
They owned their own house which was being paid for by 
monthly mortgage repayments. The couple had two children. 
She was a manageress and he was a salesman. He had a 
number of previous convictions which included theft, 
deception and robbery. There had been no reported cases 
of assault against the victim by the offender. He had 
served a custodial sentence in borstal and in prison.
Circumstances of the assault
Whilst the couple were out shopping with their children, 
an argument developed between them in a supermarket and he 
stormed off taking the car keys with him. A short while 
later he saw her walking with the children along the 
street. He stopped the car, got out and approached her on 
foot. The argument continued and he struck her on the 
cheek. The assault was classified by the police as 
"actual bodily harm".
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Injuries
She was examined at the police station by a doctor who 
pronounced she had a bruise on her left cheek and right 
elbow.
The custody record
At the police station the custody officer recorded that 
injuries were minor, the man admitted the offence, his co­
habitee did not want him charged and agreed the matter 
should be deferred. A full witness statement was taken 
from her and he was interviewed by a C.I.D. officer. He 
stated that he slapped her around the face with the back 
of his hand. He denied any previous violence against her 
although he agreed that the police had been called to the 
address somewhile previously but had taken no action. He 
concluded the interview by stating "I'm just a bit upset 
about the whole thing now. It easily could have been 
sorted out without all these problems. If this is the way 
she wants to sort it out, let her sort it out".
Deferment period
During the two month deferment period, a letter was sent 
on the day following the offence from the domestic 
violence office. The domestic violence officer made five 
attempts to contact her however, she did not return any of 
the calls. There have been no more reported cases of 
further violence.
Caution date
On the caution date the suspect and the victim both 
appeared at the police station. She was spoken to by the 
domestic violence officer, prior to him appearing before
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the uniform inspector. She told the officer that she was 
happy for him to be cautioned and that there had not been 
any further violence since the date of the offence. 
However she did mention that she had been previously 
assaulted by him and as a safeguard the domestic violence 
officer made sure she had the domestic violence office 
telephone number. After admitting the offence he was 
cautioned by the inspector.
Interviews
Both of them were interviewed and the researcher's reports 
are to be found in Appendix 9 and 10.
She said she had called the police before but they had 
taken no action when they arrived. She stated she had 
been frightened to call the police in the past but, she 
found the police had taken her seriously on this occasion. 
At the time she wanted the suspect arrested because "he 
will continue to think he can do whatever he wants to do". 
She thought he was shocked and angry at being arrested. 
She believed mistakenly he had not been arrested before. 
She found it useful to be given the telephone number of 
the domestic violence office and opined his behaviour had 
changed as a result of the deferred decision procedure. 
She said she would have gone to court at the time of the 
offence but probably not afterwards since they had 
remained co-habiting. She told the interviewer she would 
call the police again and calling the police showed him 
she was serious about dealing with the assault and it had 
made him more understanding and reasonable. She thought 
the arrest had a much greater effect on the offender than 
the caution. She felt it helped that the police decided 
on the course of action so she could not be blamed.
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At interview he admitted that he had been violent before 
with the victim and that police had been called twice in 
the past. Since he had been arrested by the police 
previously he did not find the arrest any "big deal". He 
60% blamed himself for the arrest and he thought that the 
arrest had affected him in that it made him think more 
about his actions. Generally he thought it a good thing:
"I mean, who wants to see their mum 
with lumps and cracked bones or even 
dropping down dead. I don't want to 
look on and know that I caused it or 
contributed to it".
Af terwards
Since then there has been one reported dispute between 
them in the fifteen months since the offence. The 
circumstances of that incident was they had attended a 
Christmas company function when they started to argue and 
she stormed out. She caught a mini-cab and went straight 
to the Streatham Police Station and reported the matter. 
There was no allegation or evidence of any criminal 
offence. She was contacted again fifteen months after the 
assault, she stated there had not been any further 
violence but she still feared being assaulted by him. 
Apparently after the caution the couple continued to 
argue, however, she stated that the difference was that 
they could talk "sensibly" about their relationship, which 
was nearing an end. He was looking for alternative 
accommodation and she treated him as a flat mate and he 
"comes and goes" as he pleased. She expressed great 
appreciation at being contacted again by the domestic 
violence office.
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In my next section I will consider the developing role 
that these domestic violence offices have had throughout 
London.
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFICES
As part of an overall strategy of providing a better and 
more consistent service for the victims of domestic 
violence, the police in London have developed a system of 
domestic violence offices, manned by police officers and 
situated at most police station. The aim of this section 
is to consider the emerging role of these domestic 
violence offices by examining briefly the functions of my 
office at Streatham.
At the beginning of my project I decided to create a 
specialised post of one officer to give greater support to 
the victims of domestic violence and to ensure that my 
policy was accepted, understood and practiced by the 
operational officers. I felt the investment of this 
resource was very worthwhile until the policy was well 
established. I did not envisage the office becoming a 
permanent fixture so I deliberately avoided labelling it 
as a "unit". My reason for this was straightforward. It 
was my experience of the police culture that when a 
specialist "unit" was set up to deal with a difficult 
policing issue the officers identified that the particular 
problem was no longer their*s but belonged to the unit. 
The subject became "marginalised" so that operational 
officers would not give the same emphasis to it. I will 
explain this further. The main aim of my project was to 
persuade officers to arrest suspects for domestic 
violence. In other words, the police role lay with 
officers who were called to the scene of the assault to 
act and deal with the incident as a crime and therefore 
arrest the suspect. I was fearful that if a "unit** was 
formed, officers would be discouraged from taking this 
action because they saw that responsibility lying fairly 
and squarely on the shoulders of the unit. This would 
particularly be the case with incidents involving minor
314
injury. It was exactly this type of assault that I was 
anxious to see the police role change to the practice of 
early intervention and arrest and so break the cycle of 
violence.
At the time I formed this office there was only one other 
in London, at Tottenham, where some very good pioneering 
work had been done. In 1991 there was over 50 such units. 
This meant that over 70% the police stations in London had 
one of these units. However, there was some large areas 
of London where there was no domestic violence units. I 
would argue that this indicated a lack of consistency in 
the approach by the police, no doubt due in part to the 
lack of commitment by some of the local senior managers. 
The Commissioner, in his 1989 annual report, wrote about 
standardising police station approaches to domestic 
violence. However, it was not made compulsory so local 
managers developed their own response along different 
lines and viewed the policing priorities in different 
ways. For example, Streatham was bounded by five 
divisions, each with its own individual approach. This 
led to tremendous frustrations especially for the victims. 
An anecdote will illustrate the position. Early in 1991 
a woman alleged to an off duty Streatham sergeant that she 
had been badly beaten up by her common-law husband at her 
home address which was on a neighbouring police station 
area. He had also apparently threatened to kill her. The 
sergeant, who wished to give the best possible service to 
the victim, referred her to the Streatham domestic 
violence office. The victim was examined by a doctor, a 
full statement was taken from her and the crime case 
papers were forwarded to the neighbouring station. The 
victim was given a promise that her common-law husband 
would eventually be arrested. The case papers were taken 
over by hand and the C.I.D. of the neighbouring station 
continued the investigation into the crime. Two weeks
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later the woman saw the sergeant again and stated, 
contrary to her husband being arrested, the C.I.D. 
officers attended her home address and after listening to 
both sides of the story blamed her for staying out all 
night with a girlfriend. The officers blamed her for the 
ensuing argument when the husband turned round and beat 
her up. The officers apparently said she had got what she 
had deserved ! She was by now very upset, confused and 
frightened about any further assault.
This was an example of two neighbouring police stations 
operating in completely different ways yet each had 
operated the same central policy which had been issued 
from Scotland Yard. Even with the development of the 
domestic violence offices there were still many varying 
approaches, e.g. another neighbouring station of Streatham 
employed a C.I.D. officer attached to the domestic 
violence office for the purpose of arresting offenders and 
preparing case papers. Some "units" worked within the 
framework of arresting and charging all offenders whilst 
others worked with little else other than the central 
policy which had been issued by the Metropolitan Police in 
1987.
Such a diverse number of approaches made a mockery of the 
statistical information produced each year by the 
Metropolitan Police. I will explain this further. In the 
1991 annual report of the Metropolitan Police, it stated:
"There was a rise of 10% in reported 
incidents in 1990, compared with 1989. 
The number of arrests per hundred 
offences in 1990 was 68 for offences 
of domestic violence compared to 46 
per hundred for other types of 
violence against the person offences".
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From these statistics it appeared the Metropolitan Police 
had a seemingly impressive arrest figure especially when 
it was compared against the arrest for other types of 
violence. These figures were collated from individual 
police stations and relied on the proper submission of 
crime reports. However there was no standard policy for 
the completion of crime reports and these figures were 
completely distorted. This is simply illustrated by 
comparing two hypothetical stations each with different 
policies. At each station 500 victims reported 500 crimes 
in a year. Station *A* had no policy on the recording of 
crime whilst Station *B* had a policy, similar to 
Streatham, of eliminating the "no criming" element which I 
have already discussed in the Literature Review. The 
result would be as follows:
Station *A*
500 allegations of crime made - 150 offenders arrested. 
However, 60% of crimes were "no crimed".
Therefore 300 crimes were "no crimed" and did not reach 
official statistics.
Therefore only 200 crimes were classified or submitted to 
the central statistical department.
Arrest rate equals total arrests divided by total 
classified crimes multiplied by 100.
This equals 150
7ÜÜ X 100 - 75%
Station *B*
500 allegations of crime made - 150 offenders arrested 
0% of crimes were "no crimed".
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Therefore 500 crimes were classified or submitted to the 
statistical department.
Arrest rate equals 150
3ÜÏÏ X 100 - 30%
It was my experience, from the Streatham figures, that an 
arrest ratio of 75% for offences of domestic violence was 
very difficult to achieve. This figure had been arrived 
at through an inconsistent approach to the domestic 
violence statistics.
Having highlighted the effect of these inconsistencies I 
will now look at the developing role of the units and I 
will do this by considering the work that had been done in 
the Streatham Unit. As already mentioned, between 1988 
and 1989, as a result of the local policy, the number of 
cases reported to the unit doubled from 300 to 600 and 
remained at that figure during 1990. Because of this 
extra workload I increased the office staff form one to 
two. Both were women police officers but there was no 
special reason for this, the position was advertised and 
the persons selected were selected as being the best for 
the job. In fact, out of over 50 units across London, 16 
employed male officers.
The functions which the officers carry out had expanded in 
the first two years of their operation. Their development 
was probably very typical of other units. In my 
experience when specialist units are set up they find 
additional functions which are seen as being necessary to 
improve their efficiency and effectiveness. No wanting to 
be too cynical, but rather practical, the next stage of 
such specialisation is that "units" try to make themselves 
indispensable! I am not suggesting that this was 
necessarily the case with domestic violence units but the 
natural development of my office made me suggest that the
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police ought to carefully analyse their expansion. The
five main functions of the office were as follows:
Supporting victims
One of their main roles was to make contact with the 
victims immediately after the crime and ensuring that 
he/she had been given the local domestic advice booklet. 
This contact could be as short as a telephone chat or as 
lengthy as a home visit or even a visit to the police 
station for an interview by the domestic violence team. 
Subjects covered in such contacts were often quite wide 
ranging but the strength of the local unit was that it 
gained experience of other local organisations and 
agencies to whom the person could be referred. These 
other local organisations included sympathetic and
experienced solicitors dealing with domestic disputes, 
local housing officers, social services departments, the
organisation Relate, Victim Support, Alcoholics Anonymous 
and local self help groups for both men and women. 
Although it was never intended domestic violence officers 
often went beyond just supporting ,the victims, into the 
difficult area of advising and counselling them, 
especially on their personal relationships. This was not 
something they were trained to do and often had to rely on 
their own experience.
In many cases help and advice was given to women victims 
with the criminal prosecution system. This could be as 
simple as explaining court procedures, linking up with the 
C.I.D. officer in charge of the case or, as often happens, 
actually attending court with the victim. Attending court 
could be a daunting and frightening experience especially 
for the victims of a domestic assault who can find 
themselves in the witness box facing the offender who is a 
co-habitee or husband. Experience showed that it could be
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of great help to have such support especially in the court 
room. There was some difficulties in doing this 
especially when it raised the expectation level of the 
victim. In one case a domestic violence officer was 
sitting in the part of the court which the public did not 
have access to, and the victim was about to give evidence. 
The defence barrister suddenly stood up and addressed the 
judge. He objected to the presence of the domestic 
violence officer whom he claimed was having an unfair 
influence on the witness/victim. After a "voir dire", the 
judge decided that the officer should leave the court area 
whilst the victim gave her evidence. The result was 
devastating to the victim. She collapsed when she 
suddenly realised that she was on her own in the witness 
box and unfortunately the case was lost, I very much 
doubt if the defence would have objected if it was 
someone, other than a police officer, i,e, victim support 
volunteer, I therefore asked the question if this type of 
service was really widening the role of the domestic 
violence officer or was this really a role for another 
agency ? Currently there is an experiment, in seven Crown 
Courts, where victim support volunteers are employed to 
help and assist witnesses.
Another important aspect of the officer's work was the 
formation of a local women's self help group for domestic 
violence. The domestic violence officers were the 
catalyst and the scheme was well received and popular with 
victims. However, the group needed servicing and 
resources. At the time of writing this report the 
leadership and administration emanated from the domestic 
violence office.
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Training
Secondly, training in all the aspects of the police 
handling of domestic violence was seen as a very necessary 
role. As was stated by the officers in their response to 
the written questionnaire, it was vitally important to 
educate and communicate with the officers on the changes 
of policy. Various approaches were adopted by the 
domestic violence office. These included being available 
for the "one to one chats" with officers, visiting the 
police station canteen for informal discussions and the 
domestic violence officers also fully involved themselves 
in all the station training days.
In the police service personnel were rarely posted to a 
police station for more than 3 to 5 years so there was a 
considerable change in staff. As part of an induction 
course to the police station all new officers went a visit 
to the domestic violence office where they were informed 
of the procedure that was adopted. I saw training as 
probably their most important role to ensure the policy 
was understood and adopted by all officers.
The location of the office was very important if it was to 
be effective and it was for this reason that it was 
situated in a position on the ground floor of the 
divisional station. It was close to the police canteen 
and was readily accessible to all the operational 
officers. The fact that the office was in a prominent 
position I thought emphasised the importance which senior 
management attached to the subject.
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Cautioning
Thirdly, the domestic violence officer's work also
developed in the role of cautioning. Originally their 
work was confined to making home address and background 
enquiries on the victim/offender and organising the 
regular caution evenings. Experience showed that some 
domestic violence offenders did not appear on the return 
date to answer their bail. The domestic violence officers 
in these cases made further enquiries about the
whereabouts of the suspects who failed to appear. As can 
be seen from Table 5 approximately 18% fell into this 
category. In the first few months of the scheme the
police took no further action on these suspects, mainly 
for two reasons. Firstly the offender had usually moved 
address and there was no power of arrest and secondly it 
was not thought cost effective to pursue those cases 
because it was believed that the initial arrest probably 
acted as a sufficient deterrent. The domestic violence 
officers changed that practice so that most of the men who 
did not appear were found and given new dates for the 
caution. The result was that most attended to receive
their caution.
Liaison with the other agencies
Much of the domestic violence officer's work was spent in 
liaison with the other agencies which were involved with 
domestic violence. This took the form of attending 
meetings, giving presentations to outside bodies and even 
receiving outside groups who visited the police station. 
Such meetings proved invaluable from the point of view of 
liaison, cross-flow of ideas and sharing experiences with 
other people in the same field. This has resulted in the 
domestic violence office being able to give a more
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informed service, advice, guidance and help to the 
victims.
Adminis tration
Generally speaking successful specialist groups expand 
their service and take on more work. This often has the 
knock-on effect of increasing their administration. The 
Streatham domestic violence office was no different. 
Detailed records were kept on every contact with the 
victim and the police response which was completed on each 
case. It was vital that police actions were properly 
recorded, accounted and the information was available 
afterwards. I well remember the "Tyra HENRY'* public 
enquiry in the 1980*s at Lambeth Town Hall. This 
concerned a case of domestic violence by the parents of a 
young child who subsequently died. The Juvenile Bureau 
police record of the liaison with the family was very 
thorough and well documented especially in the contact 
with the other agencies. As a result the police were in a 
position to rebut the spurious allegations made by the 
barristers acting on behalf of the other agencies. I 
could well imagine a similar situation could arise with a 
domestic violence incident, e.g. the recent murder at the 
Stoke Newington Police Station where the police apparently 
allowed a man and a woman to confer in private in a 
domestic violence office. In the absence of the police 
and the social worker the man attacked the woman with the 
result that she died. I therefore viewed detailed record 
keeping as imperative to the success of the domestic 
violence office.
The officers also kept an up to date "sensitive addresses" 
index which contained locations where previous domestic 
violence incidents had occurred. This index was available 
to operational officers so that they could be forewarned
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and given the basic background information on any 
potential violence with regard to the premises and/or the 
people before attending the scene of a call for police 
assistance.
These areas of work which I have described illustrated 
that the role of the domestic violence office expanded. 
At Streatham I deliberately allowed the unit to develop in 
the hope that it encouraged other agencies in this field 
and because it provided a better service for the victims 
in the short term. In the long term I anticipated that 
such development would help me to identify its true role 
in the policing philosophy of the station. One issue 
which particularly troubled me was that the police had 
taken the lead in giving the full support to the victims 
in this field. The police were intent in improving the 
service given to the victims of this and other crimes, 
but, I feared this could be counter-productive. I
believed that as long as the police maintained this high
profile there was a danger that the other agencies may 
well allow the police to continue to do this and avoid 
having to commit their own resources.
At the beginning of this thesis I wrote about the
development of the "co-ordinated approach" and "crisis 
intervention" schemes which operated in America. The 
police were only one of many agencies which were helping 
victims. I believed that the only way forward, and to 
provide the best available service to victims, was for the 
government and the local authorities to commit real 
resources to this area by creating similar local co­
ordinated schemes. The police role would then be to refer 
the victims to other professional bodies after having 
given them the support at the scene of, and immediately 
after, the crime.
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After writing this report it was my aim to assess the 
developments within my office and to rationalise the role 
of the police. I have reservations on three major issues:
(a) The role of the police should be limited to the 
arrest; the support of the victim at the time of 
the crime and then referral of both victims and 
offenders onto the other agencies for counselling 
and longer term support.
(b) The police urgently need to evaluate the growth of 
these domestic violence units and decide centrally 
the parameters and their common purpose.
(c) It may be better, once a common arrest policy is 
achieved in practice throughout London, that 
domestic violence units should be phased out and 
their present function taken over by better 
qualified personnel from the other agencies, e.g. 
government funded, locally based victim support 
schemes.
Moving on from domestic violence "units", another area 
which support can be given to victims is to help offenders 
understand more about why they commit violent acts and 
what can be done to stop it. One option is to create a 
•self help group* for men. It is this aspect of my scheme 
that I will describe in the next section.
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THE SELF HELP GROUP FOR MEN
A controversial area when considering society's response 
to domestic violence is the provision of self help groups 
which aim to help violent men who assault their 
wives/women friends. Some programmes report a success 
rate, e.g. the Bolton Scheme in this country boasts a 
success rate of 60%, however, it is difficult mainly 
because of the poor reporting rate of such crimes, to 
predict the long term success of some of these schemes.
After the Streatham cautioning project had been started I 
considered the other strategies which could be undertaken 
to reinforce the impact that the arrest and the caution 
process was having and also what could be done to heighten 
the awareness of offenders to the problem. I decided to 
encourage the formation of a voluntary self help group for 
men. Before embarking on such a local diversion scheme 1 
assessed some of the experiences of some of the self help 
groups for me in the U.S.A. and the research which had 
been carried out there. Before describing our work in 
this area, I will give a brief over-view of some of these 
findings.
I found the research conducted by Albert ROBERTS most 
interesting as it set out to analyse the approach of a 
number of different groups. He examined 84 separate 
projects which were involved in helping batterers. From 
his findings he identified the following "needs" for any 
programme which set out to divert batterers away from 
violence:
1. The need to learn about rational and irrational 
beliefs.
2. The need to learn amger control techniques.
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3. The need to develop good communication skills.
4. The need to learn stress management skills.
5. The need to participate in support groups 
utilising shared experiences and peer support to 
help overcome violent behaviour.
The aim of most of the programme was to strive to help men 
gain self control over their own behaviour. ROBERTS found 
that 33% of the groups used a combined counselling 
approach, including individual, group and when considered 
appropriate couples counselling. He found another 33% 
only used group counselling as a preferred option. 
Twenty-five percent used only individuals or couples. The 
remainder tried formal education programmes with offenders 
by exploring the causes and possible solutions for 
battering after which men were encouraged to join one of 
the counselling options already described. Another 
researcher, Ann GANLEY a psychologist, ran the first 
residential treatment programme and it identified the 
following techniques as being necessary in an effective 
treatment programme for men;
(a) A clear treatment goal had to be agreed between 
the offender and the counsellor. This gave both 
parties a plan for the change and a system was 
then arranged to measure the progress.
(b) The client had to accept the responsibility for 
his own behaviour.
(c) The use of confrontation as a means of showing the 
client the reality of violent behaviour (she had 
found that many men minimised or denied their 
abusive behaviour).
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(d) Psych-educational approaches which accepted the 
concept that battering was a learnt behaviour and 
that the behaviour could be changed through an 
educational programme. The emphasis on the 
education was manifested by the use of various 
teaching aids such as blackboards, videos, role 
playing and also by the use of specific 
terminology to create an educational atmosphere. 
Meetings for example were called "classes" and the 
participants were given "homework".
(e) She found that men progressed quicker working in 
groups and after 6 years experience in this type 
of work concluded that the advantages of working 
in groups were that there was an opportunity to 
decrease his isolation and dependency on his 
partner, opportunity to enhance his inter-personal 
skills and also the opportunity to learn from peer 
role models as well as to serve as a positive role 
model for others.
GANLEY recommended that each therapy type group should 
comprise of 8 to 10 clients with two leaders.
I have chosen one of the diversion programmes to describe 
how they worked in practice. The programme I chose was 
the abusive men exploring new directions (AMEND) which was 
started in Denver in 1978 the programme was divided into 
four phases:
(a) Phase one consisted of the initial meeting and
discussion with the client. This usually afforded 
the man the opportunity of venting his feelings of 
frustration and anger. It also allowed the 
interviewer to ascertain if the problem could 
easily be identified so that the person could be
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dealt with by perhaps another agency i.e. alcohol 
may be the main problem in which case the person 
needed specialist treatment as opposed to just 
attending the self-help group.
(b) Phase two where a person was given details of a 
structured educational programme which lasted for 
4 - 6  weeks and covered areas such as the cycle of 
violence, anger control, communication, self 
image, male image and the understanding of the 
role of women.
(c) Phase three which normally came after the 
educational programme above. The men joined a 
support group which dealt with the problems and 
this phase could be long term and was therefore 
open ended.
(d) Phase four was when the man felt that he had 
completed his own change of behaviour and could 
thus go back into his environment without having 
to attend the support sessions.
AMEND found the biggest problem was the high fall out rate 
of men attending the sessions. They found that 75% of 
clients left after one or two sessions. The main reason 
for this was that once a wife or partner returned home the 
motivation for attending the group apparently disappeared 
and the person dropped out of attending the session. 
AMEND had the policy of not accepting court mandated 
clients as they believed that men should attend sessions 
only because they themselves wanted to change and not be 
seen to be attending because of a court order. Other 
facilities which AMEND offered included a community 
outreach programme, a re-group where partners joined in 
and a 24 hour hotline operated in conjunction with another
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agency. AMEND therefore offered men a wide variety of 
educational programmes.
In the 1980*8 self help groups also developed in this 
country. One of the schemes, which received much 
publicity, was the "Bolton Move** in Greater Manchester. 
Greater Manchester had a women*s aid refuge for a 
considerable time. The two groups joined forces and 
worked together in the hope of finding ways to work out 
programmes for couples who had previously had an 
intractable domestic strife. The men*s group was started 
by an ex-batterer who boasted of having 40 - 50 men
actually attending regular group meetings. The strategy 
adopted by this group was similar to AMEND in that a 
batterer had to go through a number of sessions with the 
helpers. These sessions included getting the offender to 
admit the violence, re-enacting the violence using another 
member of the group, the offenders took the position of 
the victim and finally an examination of the roots of 
anger and what it involved.
The "Bolton Move**, and other such schemes in this country, 
have had a mixed reception from women who have been 
involved in helping victims. As an example HORLEY writing 
in the Independent on 11th February 1989, was critical of 
these groups in as much as she felt the emphasis should be 
placed on arresting offenders and not counselling them. 
She saw a danger in over-enthusiasm for these groups when 
they had not proved themselves to be worthwhile in the 
long term. She thought any help for men was a luxury 
which society could not afford especially when set 
alongside the difficulty which women*s refuges had in 
raising finance. SMITH (1989) was also sceptical of the 
worth of these projects. She thought the real test was if 
the schemes actually changed behaviour in preventing a re­
occurrence of domestic violence and not whether or not
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participants completed the programme having proved their 
self-esteem or were less depressive or whatever measure 
was used to evaluate the success or otherwise. She 
pointed out the danger of such schemes which might help 
abusers to express their violence in other, socially more 
acceptable ways, e.g. psychological and verbal hurt and 
increased economic hardship.
SMITH was not entirely critical because, as she pointed 
out, sufficient long term evaluation needed to be 
undertaken to support or refute the work completed by 
DUTTON in 1987. DUTTON found that over a 2% year period a 
greater decrease of recidivism was experienced by a group 
who had treatment which was appended to the arrest, e.g. 
40% of those who did not partake in a treatment programme 
were re-arrested but only 4% of those treated were re­
arrested.
Perhaps the most objective view came from Gaye GARRARD who 
worked in a women's refuge which helped the Bolton Move in 
their joint initiative in Greater Manchester. She thought 
that she and her colleagues could only offer temporary 
respite and catered for women in the refuge but could not 
bring any lasting change to the men. She believed that 
working alongside the Bolton Move was the first real 
chance of ending the cycle of violence in men.
I contrasted the efforts made by these voluntary self help 
groups with the opinion of the DOBASHS who worked for the 
Institute for the Study of Violence at the University of 
Stirling. They believed that men would not attend these 
groups voluntarily and felt the only way forward was to 
create re-education programmes which were conditional to 
sentences imposed by the criminal justice system. It was 
their opinion that if men failed to attend these 
programmes they should be returned to the court. They
332
thought, like the AMEND programme, that violent behaviour 
was something that men can unlearn.
Whilst I accepted these different views I was keen to try 
and help offenders to recognise their behaviour patterns 
and, perhaps, through a small self help begin to encourage 
a change. I did not have any access to additional 
resources, or indeed experts, who were academically 
qualified to run a professional therapy group similar to 
the Men's Centre in North London, but I was fortunate in 
having the help of Campbell Paget who was the local police 
divisional chaplain. He had much experience in life, 
having served in the Army and was very knowledgeable about 
the local area since he was attached to a local church. 
He was an excellent communicator, had great strength and a 
compassionate approach to people's problems. He also had 
a consuming interest in the project, having been present 
at my initial meeting with the "experts" and was anxious 
to help.
He was willing to run a self help group using some of his 
congregation. We had several meetings to discuss the 
process and agreed that neither the police nor the church 
should be seen to have any influence on the group, that a 
suitable mutual meeting place had to be found in the 
community and that it had to be available on a regular 
evening basis for at least once a week. Our difficulty 
was in deciding which was the most effective way of 
enducing men to attend the group. There seemed to be two 
main options. The first was to make it conditional to the 
deferred caution process so an agreement would be made 
with the offender at the police station, after the arrest 
process, and before the person was released on bail. He 
could, for example, have been asked to sign a form 
undertaking to attend the group in the intervening two 
months. Although this idea would not be backed by any
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law, there could be a moral inducement for the offender to 
attend i.e. attendance could be regarded as a suitable 
recommendation for him to receive a caution. It was 
generally felt that men would attend in these 
circumstances but perhaps for the wrong reasons, i.e. to 
get a caution as opposed to wanting to genuinely improve 
their behaviour. The second option was to make it totally 
voluntary for the offender and not to be connected with, 
or influential upon, the caution. This latter process was 
favoured as it was felt that offenders who were also 
volunteers would be easier to work with and so would 
potentially be more productive in a group environment.
A local community hall was arranged and five volunteers 
agreed to help. An invitation letter was carefully 
drafted and produced on plain paper with a map showing the 
recipients the location of the hall. I issued policy 
which stated that a copy of the letter, signed by Campbell 
Paget, had to be given to each offender at the police 
station and the custody records was marked up accordingly. 
This was re-enforced by the domestic violence office staff 
who sent out an additional copy to the offender within a 
few days of his release. The letter was given to each 
arrested offender whether he was charged, bailed under the 
caution scheme or even if no further police action was 
taken.
The process was experimental and initially unstructured. 
It was intended to be developed dependant on the response 
of the offenders who attended the self help group. It was 
hoped that volunteers and offenders would be able to talk 
through their experiences and explore the remedies and 
options for combatting future violence. The question 
might have arisen that some offenders, who had been 
charged, might have wanted the fact that they had attended 
the group mentioned to the court, by way of antecedent
334
background. This was thought to be a good thing and was
to be encouraged although it would be dependant on the
views and reactions of the offender. The attendance of 
the offender at the self help group was to be
confidential; and that fact was not intended to be
released to the court, or the police domestic violence 
office, unless the person specifically wanted this done.
The broad aim therefore was to try out the scheme, conduct 
periodic reviews of its progress and tailor the procedure 
to make it more effective.
In the first week only one person appeared at the hall. 
He was not an offender who had been processed through the 
Streatham scheme, but had been referred to the group by a 
neighbouring police station. The volunteers were somewhat 
disappointed at this response. They thought they had seen 
some potential clients walking near the meeting place and 
it was perceived that the map which had been given to the 
offenders had not clearly identified the location of the 
hall. The map was thus changed so that there was no doubt 
about its whereabouts.
The support group volunteers met on Tuesday evenings for 
six weeks. However, no further offenders attended and the 
group was, therefore, stopped. I endeavoured to find out 
the reasons for its failure because the fault did not lie 
with the co-ordinator or the volunteers as they had 
attended each Tuesday evening. I carried out a small 
research project which included speaking to eight 
offenders, four of whom had been charged with offences and 
four who had been cautioned, the co-ordinator of the 
project, the domestic violence officer, with the purpose 
of finding out their perceptions and feelings about the 
failure of the scheme.
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Inspector BROADBERY, the community liaison officer, who 
conducted most of the cautions thought that the suspects 
always rationalised their guilt away by blaming everybody 
and everything but themselves. This fact was also found 
in the interview with offenders as only 6% blamed 
themselves for the violence. Of all the people he had 
cautioned, only one person, to his knowledge had sought 
counselling. That offender was a young, intelligent, 
articulate man who had recognised he had a problem. 
Inspector BROADBERY was asked if he thought it should be 
made a condition of the caution, but, he strongly 
disagreed with this suggestion because he felt that an 
element of coercion would only result in the offenders 
paying lip service to the group. He thought that the 
offenders considered that the caution was a short, sharp 
treatment and once cautioned many wanted to put the matter 
behind them, this would also be part of the process of the 
men not wanting to recognise that there was a problem.
The two domestic violence officers confirmed that each 
offender in the six week period was sent an additional 
copy of the letter. This acted as a reminder and a follow 
up after the arrest had taken place. The officers also 
disagreed with making thL attendance at the self help 
group a condition of the caution. They felt that unless 
they were volunteers, offenders would disrupt the group. 
They also thought that an important promoting point of any 
self help group was the fact that the co-ordinator had 
professional qualifications. They had an interesting 
insight into the apathy displayed by some of the offenders 
when they themselves formed a successful self help group 
for women victims. Some of the women enquired if their 
husbands/boyfriends could also attend and asked the 
officers to phone and invite some of the offenders. The 
officers made several phone calls but all of those that 
they spoke to refused to attend. The officers provided
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some answers as to why they thought the men would not 
volunteer to attend. In their opinion if men sought help 
from outside the household they would probably feel that 
they had lost a sense of power or control over their own 
and their partner's lives. To have any chance of success, 
the officers considered that the group had to be totally 
void of any connection with the police and that it ought 
to have been based in a more central location. Robert 
HART was also spoken to. He ran a local "Everyman Centre" 
whose aim was a self help run the scheme, as he put it, 
"a service by men, for men who wanted to stop being 
violent". Their services were advertised, and contact 
with clients was made initially by telephone with the 
theme "for a confidential chat or appointment call us". 
The bulk of people who called or attended the centre came 
from agencies other than the police. He recognised the 
difficulty that any group might have if they were seen to 
be connected in any way whatsoever with the police. He 
considered that offenders would see it as punishment if 
they had been cautioned and also had to go to the group. 
Offenders would view it as a reminder of constant 
punishment.
Campbell Paget when interviewed stated that he was 
enthusiastic about setting up the group because as he saw 
it male offenders had nowhere to go for help. He said the 
initial aims of the group were (a) to overcome the 
problems of seeking help, (b) provide a forum for men to 
start to talk with other men and to start to recognise and 
discuss the problem and (c) it was hoped that once a man 
realised the implications of his behaviour that it may 
have been appropriate to refer the person onto another 
agency for professional help or counselling. He had 
visited the "Bolton" self help group and gave five reasons 
as to why men probably did not attend our local scheme. 
He felt that there were men that did not want to go, did
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not think they had a problem, and certainly did not 
recognise that they had a problem, could not be bothered, 
it was perceived as being connected with the police and 
they did not view the group as being of any use to them.
The one person who did attend, in fact attended most of 
the sessions in a very positive way. He was given good 
support and at the end was talking freely about his 
domestic problems. He was also receiving help from his 
doctor and was enthusiastic about the assistance he had 
received from the group. Campbell, with hindsight, felt 
the scheme needed a helpline which was manned 24 hours a 
day by volunteers and run in a similar way to the 
Samaritans. He also thought that the unit should have 
been advertised outside the police, e.g. with social 
services or in the press and so attract other men rather 
than just trying to appeal to offenders who had been dealt 
with by the police.
Finally, the eight offenders, four who had been cautioned 
and four who had been charged, were interviewed by me on 
the telephone. They were asked if they had received the 
letter and seven replied in the affirmative but one was 
not sure. Only four of them apparently received a letter 
at the police station. This indicated that some of the 
custody sergeants had apparently not given out the letter 
according to the instructions contained in my divisional 
policy. The four sergeants were interviewed and the 
following reasons were given by them for not carrying out 
the policy. One sergeant had just joined the division and 
was unaware of the procedure, one worked in the custody 
office regularly but did not know the divisional policy 
whilst the other two, according to the appropriate custody 
records, had in fact given out the letters.
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The offenders were asked if they had read the letter and 
understood the contents. All stated that they remembered 
reading the letter, understanding the contents and vaguely 
recalled where the meetings took place.
Three offenders perceived the self help group was 
connected with the police whilst the others had not 
apparently thought about that and were not aware it could 
have been so connected.
The replies were various as to the reasons why they had 
not attended any of the meetings. One person said he was 
already receiving help from another agency. The other 
agency apparently was Relate and said that as a result he 
he did not think it was necessary for him to attend the 
Streatham self help group. Interestingly, the other six 
all said they did not attend the group because they no 
longer considered they had a problem. They stated the 
dispute with their partners had been sorted out and there 
was not need, as they saw it, to seek any further help. 
One suspect said he did not go because he felt that it was 
not a professional agency so he did not think any more 
about it. One person said it was the first time he had 
assaulted his wife and he had spoken to her about it. He 
felt ashamed of what he had done and did not want to 
discuss it outside the family environment.
Of the four people who had been cautioned under the 
deferred decision scheme, three admitted they had 
committed previous violence against their partner. One 
person said it was the first time he had committed such an 
assault. All four stated they had committed no further 
violence since being cautioned.
Accepting the restrictions which were naturally imposed by 
a police officer interviewing an interviewee on the
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telephone, it appeared the self help group, to which 
offenders were referred, stood little chance of success. 
Perhaps the biggest hurdle to overcome in organising any 
such scheme for men is to persuade the offender that he 
has a problem. Second would then be to persuade the 
offender to seek help to stop the repeat violence. My 
research has shown that only 6% of offenders acknowledged 
that they were to blame for their violence. Invariably 
they blamed something else, e.g. drink, unemployment or 
somebody else, e.g. their partner.
This part of the Streatham experiment failed. It relied 
on the offender's volunteering to seek assistance and that 
concept appeared to have little chance of success. It 
seemed that police run treatment programmes stand out 
contradictory messages to offenders. On the one hand it 
may appear to be a place where an offender can seek help, 
however, on the other hand, it can be viewed as on-going 
police supervision and punishment. I was therefore left 
to conclude that society can either let these voluntary 
groups, e.g. the Bolton Move, flourish outside any 
connection with the police or the judiciary, or, as DOBASH 
and others have suggested, devise a court mandated scheme 
where by it would become compulsory, or conditional, to a 
person to attend such a self help group. No doubt such 
schemes would be organised by people who were 
professionally qualified in counselling and helping 
offenders to recognise and make good their problems. I 
believe that the police role would be to support such self 
help groups by making appropriate referrals. As an 
example, in the light of this experience, the Streatham 
policy was limited to informing offenders of the local 
advertising campaign run by the Brixton "Everyman Centre".
Having now discussed the various aspects of the Streatham 
project, my final chapter before making a summary and
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recommendations, is to mention briefly the response and 
results of another police force outside London. This 
other force also believed the police role was to arrest 
offenders who committed this type of crime.
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C H A P T E R  11
Another Police Approach to 
Domestic Violence
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ANOTHER POLICE APPROACH TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
I feel a most difficult hurdle of any police policy maker 
is to ensure that his or her policy is actually put into 
practice by the operator. In the police force the
operator is usually the constable on the beat. However, 
as already discussed, several major obstacles have to be 
overcome before the police culture will accept and
practice any policy change. Some of these obstacles are
worth repeating. They include negative attitude of the 
officer, a natural resistance to change, acceptance of the 
policy by the police culture and, probably most important 
of all, the existence of police discretion which is given 
to constables under our law. In this thesis the Streatham 
policy has been examined against the performance of
another period and another division within London. The
purpose of this section is to consider the effect of a 
different approach by another police force.
I chose West Yorkshire, mainly because this was the county 
where HANMER and SAUNDERS did their research in 1987. I 
was curious to look closely at the local force reaction to
the research findings, to examine subsequent force
procedures and any measurement of the results of police 
performance, particularly when compared to the results of 
the Streatham scheme.
Research Findings
The researchers questioned officers of all ranks in the
eight sub-divisions of the West Yorkshire Constabulary. 
The officers were asked for their views in relation to the 
policing and inter alia to violence against women in the 
home.
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Officers believed that more incidents were being reported 
because more women felt they were receiving more sensitive 
treatment from the police. Some officers thought that the 
actual amount and severity of violence against women was 
on the increase. Most officers said they had received 
little official training and felt they were being 
training, and thus gaining experience, by actually doing 
the job. Most officers appeared to regard marital 
violence, or a dispute between men and women who had a 
close personal relationship, as an argument that "has gone 
over the top". Most officers told the interviewers if the 
law was to be involved then it was almost certainly seen 
as a civil rather than a criminal offence. The majority 
of officers felt the onus was on the woman to deal with 
the situation by leaving her husband and finding 
accommodation elsewhere or alternatively using her common 
sense to avoid a repetition or to do something for 
herself. A typical response was "the action was their*s". 
Many officers felt the police were being required to 
intervene in situations that were outside the realm of 
policing and more in the sphere of social work. In fact, 
some appeared to resent the social work component of 
policing and officers in urban areas in particular wanted 
to be free of this obligation as soon as possible. One 
detective constable summed up a frequently expressed view:
**It is better not to arrest as there 
would be eight hours of paperwork, and 
too much of a policeman's job is spent 
on paperwork !
After interviewing members and officers of the County 
Council, the police, the victims and the offenders, HANMER 
and SAUNDERS in their report made eighteen recommendations 
about the future role of police in dealing with domestic 
violence cases. The following is a summary of some of
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their recommendations. The police should take violence 
against women more seriously, regardless of the 
relationship between the man and the woman. Emphasis 
needs to be placed on better training of the police at all 
levels about violence against women. Specialist units of 
women officers should take responsibility for responding 
to violence against women. Such units should be named so 
that agency personnel can develop a more appropriate 
liaison. Police officers should ensure that the decision 
to enforce the criminal law was not left with women 
victims. Every incident of alleged violence against women 
should be investigated in a standard way wherever it 
occurs. The police should monitor all assaults on police. 
Violent crime against women should become a major priority 
for policing and the allocation of resources.
The Police Response
Up until 1989 there had been no force policy specifically 
aimed at dealing with domestic violence. Following the 
recommendations made by Lord Justice Butler-Sloss, the 
Home Office Circular 52/88 and the D.H.S.S. document 
"Working Together", local force procedures were reviewed 
in order to establish effective working practices which 
were in line with the recommendations contained in both 
documents. Ad hoc units had been established across the 
force area to deal with the growing numbers of child abuse 
cases reported to the police. Those units were 
supplemented by three specialist women police departments 
what were initially set up to receive rape victims. The 
chief constable felt it was an appropriate time 
rationalise his force's approach to child abuse.
He did this by re-structuring and formally establishing 
specialist units across the force. The chief constable 
felt that child abuse, rape and domestic violence were
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issues that were the concern and responsibility of all 
members of his force. He thought there was common links 
between child abuse and domestic violence and they 
invariably required some form of inter-agency approach. 
He thought there was a need for specially selected 
officers, with the necessary aptitude and skills and with 
a balanced outlook, to specialise in these areas. Another 
important credential for his staff was that they had to be 
able to work closely with other agencies to the benefit of 
the victim. He believed there was a need for a consistent 
approach by his force and its dealings with other agencies 
so as to be in keeping with the government recommendations 
and the spirit of "working together".
The force rationalised the various ad hoc procedures. 
Units that had been established to deal with child abuse 
were re-structured into eight domestic violence and child 
abuse units across the force. Each territorial division 
was provided with the necessary facilities to accommodate 
such a unit. The unit's incorporated experienced members 
of the three existing women's units and officers who had 
been specially selected by way of force procedures. A 
force co-ordinator was appointed to provide a central 
reference point and to represent force policy to the 
various agencies and outside bodies. A computerised 
domestic violence index was developed to enable officers 
who attended the scene of domestic violence to be aware of 
the relevant background information and to be alerted to 
the possibility of violence against the officers. Forty- 
five officers were selected to form these new eight units 
and they attended a two week residential course at the 
force training school. They continued to receive on the 
job local training with inputs from other agencies. The 
chief constable issued a policy statement which included 
the following paragraph:
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"Domestic violence is a criminal 
offence and it is important that the 
police action is clearly defined, in 
particular I am concerned that all 
officers should act to enforce the law 
when an assault takes place within the 
domestic environment in exactly the 
same way that they would act in a 
cases of attack by a stranger or in 
respect of any assault outside the 
home".
It is relevant to note that in the foreword to the force 
policy document, whilst referring to domestic violence, in 
1991 the chief constable stated:
"In all proven cases of violence there 
shall be a presumption in favour of 
arrest, charge and prosecution. The 
use of formal caution as an 
alternative to prosecution should be 
regarded as an option only in 
exceptional circumstances and only 
then in those less serious cases in 
which there are significant mitigating 
factors".
The chief constable stated the police response to such 
offences had two principal aims. The first was the 
protection of victims in order to ensure that they, and 
the children, were not left at a continuing risk. And 
second, that vigorous investigation to secure evidence, 
and where such evidence permitted, to arrest and charge 
the offender. He particularly highlighted the extensive 
powers which enabled police to arrest and take action in 
these cases of domestic violence. He ordered that 
supervisory officers would take an active interest in the 
investigation of all domestic violence cases and sub- 
divisional detective chief inspectors were given the 
specific task of monitoring the quality of all 
investigations and the presentation of subsequent court
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files. He also built in a check to ensure officers were 
treating domestic violence as crimes and he commanded the 
heads of stations to examine their station communication 
logs to ensure that this was done.
Put simply, the force policy changed to arresting and 
charging offenders. Supervisory officers were instructed 
to make sure this was done. The approach was similar to 
Streatham, except it discouraged the use of a caution as a 
means of processing offenders. Therefore offenders who 
had committed crimes, whether major or minor, were treated 
in the same way - charge. This was the police role which 
many feminists argued was best practice.
Results
In order to achieve quality information on the allegations 
of domestic violence a force survey was conducted in 1990 
on all the incidents which fell within the category of 
domestic violence. The force had defined domestic 
violence in broad terms similar to the Streatham 
definition. It involved;
"Any incident involving an assault, 
disturbance or potential breach of the 
peace between parties who could 
generally be described as married or 
having a family relationship and 
included co-habitees or lovers 
(relationship included separated or 
divorced)**.
In order to collect the information a special form was 
designed to correlate with a computer programme which had 
been specially prepared for the survey. The form, which 
was to be completed by each officer attending a domestic 
violence scene, was intended to provide a snapshot of the
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circumstances surrounding the allegation of crime. The 
period of analysis was three months - June, July and 
August 1990. Once completed, the form was passed to the 
community affairs inspector for the station area and then 
forwarded to the force co-ordinator for domestic violence 
and child abuse. In addition all instances of domestic 
violence were inputted onto the domestic violence index at 
each police station. On the reverse side of the form 
there was an opportunity for officers to report on how 
they had dealt with the incident both at the scene and 
immediately afterwards. The police action was to sub­
divide into three key areas, (a) advice to victims, (b) 
arrest - report and (c) custody.
In the three month period West Yorkshire officers attended 
2,700 incidents of violence falling within the set 
criteria. This represented 29.3% of all the crimes of 
violence reported in that period. The sample size was 
much bigger than Streatham but was over a shorter period.
The most vulnerable periods of the day when incidents of 
domestic violence were likely to occur had a similar 
pattern to those in the Streatham analysis. Twenty-nine 
per cent of all incidents reported to police allegedly 
occurred between 11pm and 2am. Nearly half of all the 
calls received (46.5%) occurred between the period 9pm to 
3am. However, incidents of domestic violence were 
reported every hour in the 24 hour period !
Of the total calls attended throughout the period of the 
survey, officers reported that in 48% of occasions alcohol 
had already been consumed by the assailant. In the 
Streatham survey 30% of offenders stated that drink was a 
perceived reason for the initial argument which led to the 
assault.
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The survey showed that in 85% of cases the victim was 
female. Like Streatham there were few cases of men being 
beaten by women.
Forty per cent of the women victims were aged between 20 
and 30 years. In 36% of the cases the assailant was the 
husband of the victim, in 25% of cases the offender was a 
male co-habitee and in 15% of the cases the assailant was 
identified as the boyfriend of the victim. In Streatham 
the figures were very similar, 48% of women victims were 
aged 20 to 30 years, 33% the offender was the husband and 
25% the offender was a co-habitee.
The police action was closely scrutinised and it was found 
that where a police officer decided not to arrest 53% of 
victims were referred to a solicitor, 9.5% of cases the 
victim was referred to the social services, but rather 
disappointingly, only 3.5% of the cases were victims 
advised to go and seek the advice of the women's aid or 
the specialist police support that was available at the 
force domestic violence and child abuse units.
Throughout the three month survey 772 persons were 
reported for offences. This represented 32% of the sample 
size. Four hundred and sixty-nine suspects were actually 
arrested and this represented 17% of the total incidents. 
By way of comparison in the Streatham analysis it was 
found that in 1988 there was a 30% arrest rate which rose 
to 52% in 1990. However, at another division in London, 
the arrest rate was only 12%. I feel these figures are 
extremely significant in as much as it showed that however 
well intentioned the policy of the force was it did not 
manifest itself in the arrest rates for domestic violence 
by constables. This was, after all, one of the primary 
aims of the chief constable, i.e. to arrest and charge 
offenders. So despite the built in checks by the
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supervising officers it appeared that the constables were 
not abiding by the force instructions. This fact was
further highlighted in the conclusion to the report which 
stated:
"From the information provided by the 
officers it is clear that effective
early intervention in line with force 
policy and the subject of much comment 
in the HANMER study, is not being 
provided in every case and there is
room for improvement".
Of those arrested only 188 were charged and detained
whilst 108 were admitted to bail.
The analysis of the West Yorkshire approach continued by 
the force and whilst figures were not available the 
officer in charge of the research felt that there was a 
gradual improvement in the arrest rates during the 
following year.
In conclusion, the Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire 
Police Force issued an impressive, positive arrest policy 
which was slow to reflect in any increased arrest figures. 
I think the Streatham Police Station arrest rate was 
higher and more successful for three reasons. First the 
Streatham officers were informed of the reasons, and the 
previous academic research findings, for promoting an 
arrest policy. Second a vigorous on-going training policy 
was adopted at Streatham particularly after research had 
shown there was a need for an improvement in this area. 
The third reason was that officers at Streatham were given 
a positive procedure, with an end product, for dealing 
with minor injury assault cases e.g. caution, whilst such 
a process was discouraged in West Yorkshire.
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That said, I must be mindful of the different type and 
size of sample. The true level of success will be in the 
years which follow the change of policy and it may well be 
that the West Yorkshire Police Service will achieve a much 
higher arrest rate in due course. The final part of my 
work is to look back and make some conclusions and 
recommendations from the research which I have undertaken. 
I will cover these in the next two sections.
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SOME RESERVATIONS
Before drawing conclusions from this research, it is 
relevant to consider some of the reservations I had about 
the findings. Some of these I have already mentioned, in 
the main text, but I felt it was pertinent to highlight
them at this stage and so add balance and objectivity to
some of the more positive results.
a . Victim Interviews
I would have preferred the sample size of victims, 
who were part of the deferred cautions system, to 
have been larger. The victims who were interviewed 
were those whom we were able to contact. They were 
in a group who were apparently willing to co-operate 
with the interviewer. Sixty-five per cent of the 
original sixty-six victims however, did not respond 
to the considerable efforts made by the researcher to 
interview them. Whilst it may be pure speculation to
guess the reasons for this 'non co-operation' some of
these victims may have put a more 'negative' view on 
Police action.
Some critics may feel that it might have been more 
productive to have pursued these cases with more 
vigour rather than respecting their privacy and 
possibly causing them unnecessary stress by more 
visits to their home addresses. With hindsight, I 
would have to be sympathetic with that view, but, 
time and cost also prevented that course of action.
b . Offenders' Interviews
The fact that the interviews were conducted at the 
Police Station, immediately after the caution, may 
have had some influence on how they answered the 
questions about the effectiveness of the procedure.
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Some may have given the interviewer the answers they 
thought was wanted so they could leave as soon as 
possible. As an example, 70% said that a caution 
was a good thing and 90% stated they understood the 
procedure, so one could believe that the procedure 
had worked. Yet, in 17% of cases, men said it made 
the woman too powerful and only 2% said they were to 
'blame' for the incidents. This indicated, perhaps, 
an underlying fear that some of the male offenders 
had not really taken responsibility for their 
actions, and the policy and practice had a limited 
impact on them. The difficulty facing me, was the 
limit on the amount of researchers' time. Many 
offenders did not live with the partner or had moved 
out and it was felt that it was more cost effective 
to conduct the interviews at the Station, than spend 
time trying to track them down.
c . Officers' Interviews and Questionnaires
Most of the interviews, and answers to the 
questionnaires, were positive about the policy, 
however, it must be borne in mind that the officers 
worked on my Division, it was my policy and I had 
driven it from the beginning. The Police Service is 
a rank orientated body and it may be this had some 
influence on what the offers were saying. I wondered 
if they were giving the answers I wanted to know 
rather than what they actually felt. I tried to make 
the questionnaire independent and anonymous, however, 
I suspect some of the officers may have viewed this 
with suspicion!
d. A more accurate and comprehensive assessment might 
have resulted if I had taken a longer time between 
the caution and the interview date. As I have 
mentioned, in the literature review, research shows 
that some men act out a 'cycle of violence' and 6
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months is probably too short a time to judge any 
lasting impact of my policy.
e. SHERMAN 1992 described how the Minneapolis
replication studies showed that arrest can have 
different result for different areas and on different 
•folks'. My research was confined to only one part 
of a London Borough. It would have been interesting 
to compare results of the same type of Police 
practice in another area with a different social, 
economic and race mix; the results may have been 
different.
So bearing in mind those reservations, I will now draw
together the conclusions which I felt resulted from the 
research.
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CONCLUSIONS
One of the most neglected areas in the policing and 
prosecution of domestic violence incidents was the police 
handling of the allegations of criminal minor assaults. 
It was considered that the operational police response to 
domestic violence in this country needed to take account 
of the research findings in this field. This study sought 
to develop some of those findings into practice thereby 
improving the protection of the victim in these cases. It 
promoted an early intervention and arrest approach and 
provided the opportunity of a formal sanction for the 
offender in the form of a deferred caution.
In the past the police, in the absence of substantial 
evidence of physical violence with which to arrest, charge 
and prosecute the offender, had done little to help the 
victim. This situation proved most unsatisfactory for the 
victims and also led to frustration, manifesting in 
negative attitudes, by the police officers. The deferred 
caution process was regarded as an alternative, not to 
prosecution, but to the widespread police practice of 
doing nothing in cases of minor assault. Under this 
policy officers were advised to arrest in most cases of 
minor assault as laid down by a set criteria. Thereafter 
custody officers were required to charge or defer the 
decision to prosecute or caution. It is contended that 
the policy, and the consequent police practice, has made a 
major contribution to the consistent protection of 
domestic violence victims, improved the profile of this 
crime amongst serving police officers and significantly 
improved police recording practice.
A caution can be administered either after arrest at the 
police station or deferred for two months for further 
enquiries to be conducted into the case. The
357
effectiveness of the former has not been measured in this 
research. It can be concluded, for the following reasons, 
the use of adult cautions proved to have a valuable place 
in dealing positively with domestic violence cases which 
involve a minor injury. However, it must be emphasised 
that any effective Police response must also include a 
vigorous prosecution policy for all other cases.
My research which was conducted on re-offending rates 
tended to suggest that charging an offender was no more of 
a deterrent than cautioning.
Most victims expressed satisfaction with the procedure and 
felt their safety was a major consideration. Seventy-four 
per cent of the victims of minor assault stated they had 
been assaulted previously by the offender, 75% of the 
victims thought it was right to arrest the offender and 
74% commented that they would call the Police again, yet 
52% reiterated that they would not give evidence at court 
had the Police charged the assailant.
The offenders found the experience of arrest, and the 
threat of subsequent prosecution or caution, a salutary 
experience, so much so, that 28% said the process actually 
made them alter their behaviour. A significant number 
(85%) did not come to the attention of the Police again 
during the monitoring period and 68% of them thought the 
caution was a good idea.
However, the real impact of the process was limited. Many 
offenders would not accept they had a problem and did not 
attend the 'self help' group. Only 6% of offenders blamed 
themselves for the assault and 72% stated it did not alter 
their behaviour. Seventeen per cent thought the process 
made women too powerful. Generally the results showed 
that the policy had different effects on different 
offenders. It deterred some but not others, however, my 
main argument for advocating this policy was not based on
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any deterrent theory, but that it provided a better and 
more consistent Police response to victims.
The new procedure gained widespread acceptance by most of 
the police officers and there was little evidence that the 
policy conflicted seriously with the officers' personal 
attitudes. In fact, most officers thought the status of 
domestic violence deserved to be higher and that there was 
no apparent obstacle preventing both the rationale and the 
procedure being widely accepted throughout the Police 
Force.
The policy reflected the increased confidence shown by the 
public in the reporting of these crimes. The Police 
reports of domestic violence doubled after the first year 
of the project.
When compared to a previous period, and another Police 
area, the crime figures at Streatham mirrored the positive 
approach shown by the Police by significant increases in 
the number of arrests (52% of cases compared to 30% and 
18% respectively) in charges, 27% of records compared to 
18.5% and 9% respectively whilst there were reductions in 
'no criming' practices (30% which was later reduced to 2% 
compared to 67% and 46% respectively).
Statistical analysis showed that, when Police adopted an 
early intervention and arrest strategy, there was, despite 
some police officer's perception, not any increased danger 
of being injured in the execution of this Police duty.
The role of the domestic violence units has expanded 
beyond supporting victims. The domestic violence officers 
have become involved in training, arresting suspects, 
liaison with other agencies and an increasing amount of 
administrative work. This thesis has pointed to some of 
the problems which can ensue from marginalising such work.
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Self help groups for men were probably more successful 
when they were seen to be totally independent from the 
Police. Their best change oc success would emanate from 
either a court mandated scheme or a totally independent 
body with professionally qualified staff.
The procedure, which provided policy to influence 
practice, was no more costly in resources than any other 
process and this research, I would suggest, illustrated 
real benefits for the victim, the offender and the Police.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. COMMON APPROACH
All police forces should adopt a common approach to 
these crimes.
2. DEFINITION
The definition of "domestic violence" and thus 
consequent procedure should be extended to include 
people who have had a relationship outside marriage.
3. ARREST
The Strategy of early intervention and arrest for all 
cases of domestic violence should be adopted 
nationally. This would help to create a consistent 
approach, provide positive direction to officers and 
give the best service for the victims.
4. CAUTIONING
The deferred decision procedure, although successful 
at Streatham, should be regarded as one of several 
options open to the police in dealing with this 
crime. When deferred decisions cannot be
implemented, adult cautions, within the set criteria 
of this project, should become policy in all forces.
5. FIRM PROSECUTION POLICY
The police of the deferred decision to caution, or 
immediate adult caution., should be set alongside firm
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prosecution measures in all but the most minor of 
cases that can be included in the caution programme.
That the police, inform the Crown Prosecution Service 
at liaison meetings and at court user groups, their 
reasons for pursuing a vigorous arrest and charge 
policy requesting that the Crown Prosecution Service, 
where possible, follow these cases through to a 
prosecution.
6. RECORDING PRACTICE
(a) Crimes involving domestic violence should be
reported, recorded and classified according to the 
statement made by the victim or witnesses at the time 
the allegation was made to the police.
(b) The police policy and practice should ensure that
most of these crimes are recorded as "cleared up".
(c) There should be a Home Office crime classification
category, "assault - domestic" so that levels of 
reported crime can be monitored.
(d) A national index of "cautions" be kept at the
National Identification Bureau at New Scotland Yard.
7. MANAGING AND SUPERVISING CHANGE
Any change of policy will require the close attention 
to the methods of communicating adequately its 
justification. Operational officers will need 
reassuring about the problems of liability and 
accountability raised by any new strategy. The 
policy will require sustained managing so that
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practice does not revert back to the older
traditional ways.
The Bramshill Police Staff College ought to organise 
carousel courses to assist supervising officers to 
adopt and manage these changes.
8. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNITS
That their current role needs to be monitored and 
evaluated so that the parameters of their work can be 
set.
9. SELF HELP GROUPS
There is a role for these groups but are best left to 
agencies other than the police.
10. MULTI-AGENCY APPROACH
There is an urgent need for agencies, outside the 
police service, to work together to provide long term 
support, advice and guidance to the victims of 
domestic violence. Efforts to form multi-agency work 
groups should be encouraged.
11. FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research be undertaken to compare the impact 
of an instant caution, within the criteria set for 
this project, with the results from this scheme.
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APPENDIX 1
O u r reference: POL/85 1/19/1 
Your reference:
HOME OFFICE 
Queen Anne’s Gale, London, SW IH 9AT 
DirecHine: 01-2Ï2 5229 
Switchboard: 01-213 3000 
18 February 1985
The Chief Officer of Police
c.c. The Clerk to the Justices (with a copy for the Chairman of the Bench) 
The Clerk to the Magistrates' Courts Committee 
Inner London Magistrates 
Provincial Stipendiary Magistrates 
The Circuit Administrator 
The Court Administrator 
The Chief Clerk to the Crown Court 
Chief Probation Officers
The Clerk to the London Borough Councils (with a copy for the 
Director of Social Services)
The Chief Executive of the Metropolitan County Councils, Non- 
Metropolitan County Councils and Metropolitan District Councils 
(England and Wales) (with a copy for the Director of Social 
Services)
2 .
Dear Sir
HOME OFFICE CIRCULAR 14/1985 
THE CAUTIONING OF OFFENDERS 
General
As chief officers will be aware, the Royal Cormission on Criminal Procedure 
drew attention to disparities in cautioning rates amongst police forces.
Since the Royal Commission reported, many forces have revised their policies 
and instituted cautioning schemes. At the same time the Home Office and 
the Crime Committee of the Central Conference of Chief Constables have been 
considering how best to promote more effective and consistent cautioning 
practices on a national basis. This work has taken as its starting point 
that there is no rule in law that suspected offenders must be prosecuted.
It has long been recognised in the case of juveniles that there may be 
positive advantages for society as well as for the individual in using prose­
cution as a last resort. Cautioning provides an important alternative to 
prosecution in the case of juvenile offending; it also represents a possible 
course of action in the case of adults.
I now attach a copy of guidelines on cautioning. These guidelines are com­
mended by the Home Secretary to all chief officers. They were drawn up by 
a Working Group of chief officers and officials with the approval of the 
Crime Committee of Central Conference. They take account of comments 
received from many individuals and agencies operating in the criminal justice 
system when they were published in draft together with the report of the 
Working Group and research conducted by the Home Office Research and Planning 
Unit. Chief officers had a copy of these papers made available to them.
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3. The guidelines fall in two parts. Ihe first part, dealing with the
cautioning of juveniles, replaces Home Office Circular 70/1978; the second 
part, dealing with cautioning of adults, gives fresh guidance and amplifies 
the principles set out in the Attorney General's guidelines on criteria 
for prosecution (Home Office Circular 26/1983) in so far as the cautioning 
of offenders is concerned. The division of the guidelines into two parts 
arises from the recognition that in general there is in the case of juvenile 
offenders a much stronger presumption in favour of courses of action which 
fall short of prosecution unless the seriousness of the offence or other * 
exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.
Arrangements for decision making
The Home Secretary notes with approval that a number of schemes have been 
adopted in different parts of the country to ensure that decisions on the 
disposal of offenders are taken justly and effectively and in consultation 
with other interested agencies. These schemes, which are in the most part 
concerned with juvenile offenders, though some extend to certain categories 
of adults, range from multi-agency bureaux which consider all cases at the 
outset to early cautioning schemes where other agencies are involved only 
at a later stage.
5. The Home Secretary sees the issue of the present guidelines as a means to 
encourage the consistent application of policy in cautioning decisions, 
which will be a complementary process to the existence and growth of such 
special schemes. However, he wishes chief officers to be aware of his view 
that the issue of these guidelines should also provide the opportunity for 
a review of local arrangements, where this has not already been done, to 
ensure that liaison arrangements with social services departments, the 
probation service and where appopriate the Education Welfare Service, are 
such as to encourage the participation of those agencies in decision making. 
This may be particularly appropriate where there is doubt in the mind of the 
police as to vrfiether a caution is the right course in an individual case.
6. For example, where local arrangements are for the police generally to make 
immediate decisions to caution juveniles, the guidelines are intended to 
provide that in individual cases where an immediate decision cannot be made, 
there can be consultation before prosecution is determined. The guidelines 
do not of course prevent consultation in individual cases from taking place 
from the outset. A review of local consultation arrangements should also 
take in the question whether other agencies wish to be informed by the police 
after the issue of cautions in cases in which they have had no previous 
involvement.
Particular issues
7. The Home Secretary wishes to draw chief officers' attention to the follarii^  
particular further points.
(a) 'Net widening': the guidelines make clear the danger that
a formal caution may be used and the juvenile thus brought 
within the fringes of the criminal justice system when less 
formal action migjit have been more appropriate. Whilst in 
many cases it is recognised that whether or not a juvenile 
is dealt with formally will depend on the exercise of powers 
outside the police station (e.g. arrest), it should not 
follow that simply because a juvenile is brought to the 
police station formal action (e.g. a caution) is required, 
as against a decision to take less formal action, or no
2 .
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further action at all. This is an area which supervisory 
officers will need to monitor carefully.
(b) Schemes for cautioning drunkenness offenders: a number
of police forces have adopted such schemes. They may apply 
only to simple drunkenness offences or additionally to less 
serious cases of aggravated drunkenness; the normal course 
would be for the offender to be detained until he is sober and 
then to be cautioned and released. A feature of such schemes 
is that if an offender is arrested more than three times a 
month he would normally be prosecuted.
8. Chief officers will no doubt wish to ensure that the contents of these guide­
lines are promulgated to all those officers who will have day to day respon­
sibility for making decisions in individual cases, and that consideration is 
given to the training needs which these guidelines may bring about.
9. Chief officers will know of the introduction of legislation to create a Crown
Prosecution Service independent of the police. This service will have as its
primary function the conduct of all criminal cases in which the initial 
decision to proceed has been taken by the police, and the prosecutor having 
charge of a case will have discretion to drop or alter charges. These 
functions will be carried out under the superintendence of the Attorney 
General. The initial discretion on whether to institute criminal proceedings 
will, however, generally remain with the police. Thus there will continue
to be scope for the police to caution rather than prosecute offenders, and 
accordingly for guidelines such as those attached to the present circular, 
though their content will be open to discussion in the light of future 
experience and developments.
10. H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary will wish in the course of their inspection 
of forces to pay particular attention to cautioning policy and practice and 
may require from chief officers information about the effects of changes 
which are made.
11. These guidelines are intended to provide a general framework for cautioning 
in respect of criminal offences, but they are not intended to prejudice the 
existing system of written warnings in the case of traffic offences.
12. Any enquiries about this circular should be addressed to Mr. T.F. Oui ton 
(tel: 01-213 4028).
Yours faithfully.
z;
X
Alan Harding
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GUIDELINES ON CAUTIONING 
I JUVENILES
General
It is recognised both in theory and in practice that delay in the entry of 
a young person into the formal criminal justice system may help to prevent 
his entry into that system altogether. The Secretary of State commends to 
chief officers the policy that the prosecution of a juvenile is not a step 
to be taken without the fullest consideration of whether the public inter­
est (and the interests of the juvenile concerned) may be better served by 
a course of action which falls short of prosecution. Thus chief officers 
will wish to ensure that their arrangements for dealing with juveniles are 
such that prosecution does not occur unless it is absolutely necessary.
As a general principle in the case of first time juvenile offenders where 
the offence is not serious, it is unlikely that prosecution will be a 
justifiable course. Specifically it will not be right to prosecute a 
juvenile solely to secure access to the welfare powers of the courts.
2. A formal caution may represent one form of entry into the criminal jus­
tice system. It will for example be cited should the offender subsequently 
appear before a juvenile court. It is therefore important that the issue 
of a caution should be a formal procedure which takes full account of its 
consequences for the individual concerned and that it should take place only 
where strict criteria are fully met.
3. It is also important that a formal caution is not issued unless the 
circumstances of the case are sufficient to justify it. It should be consi­
dered whether it is more appropriate to deal with an offender without 
formal proceedings of any kind, for example by an informal word of advice
or warning.
Criteria for a caution
4. Before a caution is issued to a juvenile, the following criteria must 
be met in full.
(a) The evidence available must comply with the Attorney General's guide­
lines on criteria for prosecution
ie a conviction should be more likely than an acquittal before a court. 
Cautioning must not be used as a substitute for a weak prosecution 
case. If there is insufficient evidence to support a prosecution, 
it will not be right to use cautioning as an alternative.
(b) The juvenile must admit the offence
It is not sufficient that the juvenile should merely admit all or some 
of the facts which constitute the offence; he must recognise his 
guilt. If there is no admission in circumstances where otherwise a 
caution would have been issued, the proper course may be to take no 
further action.
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(c) The parents or guardian must consent to the caution being issued
In practice parental consent should not be sought until it has been 
decided that a caution is the correct course. The juvenile and his 
parents must have explained to them the procedure of cautioning and 
its significance: that a record will be kept, that the fact of a
previous caution may influence the police's decision whether or not 
to prosecute if the juvenile should offend again, and that the caution 
may be cited if the juvenile should subsequently be found guilty of an 
offence by a court.
The decision to caution
Immediate decisions
5. Assuming that the criteria for the issue of a caution can be met, the 
decision to caution will in the first instance turn on the nature of the 
offence and the offender's record.
6. It should be possible quickly to arrive at a decision to caution an 
offender if:
(a) The offence is not serious. In determining whether an offence is 
serious, consideration should be given to whether significant harm 
has been done to a person, substantial damage has been done, or pro­
perty of substantial value stolen: other factors may be the wilfulness 
with which harm or damage was done or the degree of suffering caused
to another individual ;
and
(b) the offender's record is not serious. Subject to the seriousness of 
the offence, first time offenders will normally be cautioned. A 
further caution is also likely to be appropriate for a second or 
subsequent offence where there has been a reasonable lapse of time 
since the incident which led to the earlier caution or conviction, 
or where the offence is trivial or different in chzuracter from the 
earlier offence, or where the earlier offence was trivial. A second 
or subsequent caution would be precluded only where the offence in 
question is so serious as to require prosecution.
7. It will normally be appropriate to come to an immediate decision not to 
caution if the offence is very serious, for example homicide, rape, arson 
endangering life, serious public disorder.
Further considerations
8. If it has not been possible to decide to caution an offender under the 
provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6, and unless a decision has been taken under 
paragraph 7 not to caution the offender, it will be necessary to give fur­
ther consideration to whether the offender can be cautioned, or whether in 
the circumstances prosecution would be the right course.
9. Whether or not other agencies have been involved in considering the 
individual case at an earlier stage, where an immediate decision cannot be 
made to caution and the decision whether cautioning, prosecution or some
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other course of action is right still hangs in the balance, there will
generally be advantage in the police seeking to secure the advice and
views of other interested agencies on the correct disposal.
10. Particular factors which may need to be taken into account in the more 
detailed consideration of an individual case, apart from the nature of the 
offence and the offender's record according to the policy described in 6(a) 
and 6(b) above, are:
(a) Interests of the aggrieved party
(i) It will generally be appropriate to seek the views of the aggrieved
party. Among factors which will need to be taken into account in
deciding whether to caution is that cautioning can deprive the victim 
of a ready means of redress through a compensation order. Although 
it is not desirable for the police to enter into any form of bar­
gaining between the offender and the aggrieved party, it may be 
appropriate to take into account whether the offender has made any 
repeuration for the damage done, or has indicated willingness to do 
so, together with any views expressed by the aggrieved party.
There may also be cases in which, although a caution may otherwise 
be administered, prosecution is required in order to protect the 
victim from further attention from the offender. The likelihood of 
the aggrieved party instituting private proceedings should also be 
borne in mind since it is desirable to avoid the situation where 
the police decide to caution and the aggrieved party wishes to 
institute private proceedings. The interests of the victim, although 
a most important factor which needs to be weighed in deciding whether 
the public interest points to prosecution or to a caution, cannot be 
paramount.
(ii) whatever the decision it will always be important to ensure that the 
victim is treated with courtesy and consideration.
(b) The offender's circumstances
It may be appropriate to take into consideration the offender's 
previous character and family circumstances in deciding whether a 
caution would be adequate or prosecution or some other action would 
be more appropriate.
(c) Groups of offenders
When juveniles commit offences in groups, it can be found that the 
records and circumstances of the individuals concerned vary. While 
it is necessary to be mindful of the need for consistency and equity 
in decisions to caution or prosecute, this should not prevent the 
consideration of each member of a group of offenders on an individual 
basis and a disposal related to the individual's particular involve­
ment in the offence and other circumstances.
Manner of issue of a caution
11. It will generally be appropriate for a caution to be administered in 
formal circumstances at a police station in the presence of the parents or 
guardian by a police officer in uniform. The officer should normally be of 
the rank of inspector or above. The parents or guardian should be asked to 
sign a form confirming their consent to the caution and that it was explained 
to them that the caution would be kept on record and might be cite I if the
387
juvenile should subsequently be found guilty of an offence by a court.
The form should also confirm the date of the caution, the offence for which 
it was administered and the fact that the juvenile has admitted the offence. 
The form should be countersigned by a police officer.
12. It is generally desirable that there should be little delay between the 
time of the offence and the administration of the caution. In cases where 
the decision to caution can be made quickly, it would be appropriate to ad­
minister the caution swiftly; in cases where more detailed consideration
is required (eg when other agencies are consulted) every effort should be 
made to come to a decision as quickly as possible, consistently with the 
need to reach the right decision.
Records
13. Chief officers will doubtless continue to ensure that local records are 
kept of the issue of cautions to juveniles, although there will generally be 
no need to keep records of cautions after the offender has reached the age 
of 17 or 3 years have elapsed since the last offence for which a caution 
was issued, whichever is the later. No doubt the arrangements which are 
made for recording cautions will enable such records to be made available
to the prosecuting authorities should the juvenile come to notice again.
Fingerprinting
14. At present there are no formal powers to take the fingerprints of a 
juvenile who has been cautioned, although the position will change with the 
implementation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, about which 
separate guidance will be issued in due course. Although fingerprints may
be taken with consent, there should generally be no need to seek consent
to take fingerprints for the purpose of identifying an offender. It will 
never be right to make consent to the taking of fingerprints a precondition 
to the issue of a caution; and it will generally be only necessary to seek 
consent to fingerprints otherv/ise where the police are satisfied that this 
is strictly necessary in the individual case for the prevention and detec­
tion of crime.
Citation
15. The practice of citing cautions should a juvenile subsequently appear 
before a juvenile court should continue. Cautions should be cited in a 
similar way and at the same time as the juvenile court is apprised by the
police of a juvenile's antecedent history. However, care must be taken to
present cautions separately so that the distinction between cautions and 
convictions is clear to the court and there is no confusion between the two. 
(For example, it is undesirable that cautions and convictions should appear 
on the same piece of paper, still less run on consecutively one from the 
other.) In order to avoid the unnecessary attendance of police officers
at court, it is hoped that courts will normally accept written notification 
of a previous caution unless the fact of a caution is challenged. The 
court will wish to know from the police only the date the caution was 
administered and the offence for which the juvenile was cautioned. It will 
not expect to receive any other information about the circumstances of the 
offence or of the juvenile at that stage.
Social Inquiry Reports
16. The citing of the fact of a police caution does not preclude it 
from being referred to in any social inquiry report prepared for the juven­
ile court, when it can be placed in the context of the juvenile's entire 
circumstances and conduct. Chief officers will have made arrangements 
that when a previous caution is to be cited by the police in a juvenile 
court, this information will be notified in advance either to the local 
authority social services department, or, where arrangements exist for 
the probation service to provide social inquiry reports, to that service.
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GUIDELINES ON CAUTIONING 
II ADULTS
General ; the decision to prosecute
The Attorney General’s guidelines on criteria for prosecution, issued to 
chief officers in February 1983, endorsed the principle that suspected, 
criminal offences should not automatically be the subject of prosecution.
In general, prosecution should only take place where there is sufficient 
evidence to support a prosecution and the public interest requires it.
Where there is sufficient evidence, but the public interest does not 
require prosecution, a formal caution may well be appropriate. But un­
like the case of juveniles, there is no general presumption that cautioning 
will be the normal course.
Particular categories of offender
2. The Attorney General’s guidelines suggest that membership of one of 
the following categories of offender may in itself indicate that a course 
other than prosecution is appropriate. Membership of one of these groups 
is of course no absolute protection against prosecution, which may be 
required on account of the seriousness of the offence or the.greater 
deterrent effect of prosecution, but it should point to sympathetic consi­
deration of the offender’s case.
(a) The elderly or infirm
The older or more infirm the offender, the less likelihood there 
should be of prosecution. In particular it would not generally be 
right to prosecute where the court is likely to pay such regard to 
old age or infirmity as to impose only a nominal penalty. Whether 
the offender is likely to be fit enough to stand trial should also 
be taken into account. While a person's age in itself might be some 
guide to whether prosecution would be in the public interest, it should 
not generally be necessary to adhere to rigid age barriers when 
considering prosecution.
(b) Young adults
A criminal conviction eeurly in adult life may have a significant 
effect on the prospects of the person concerned. It may therefore be 
appropriate to give particular consideration to a course other than 
prosecution in respect of comparatively youthful offenders, especially 
where there is no previous criminal record. This will apply most 
frequently in the young adult category (17-20 years) but the upper age 
limit need not be applied rigidly.
(c) Persons 'at risk*
A lesser disposal than prosecution may be appropriate where the 
offender is suffering some form of mental illness or impairment, 
especially where the strain of criminal proceedings would lead to a 
worsening of his condition. This similarly applies where the shock 
of prosecution might well prove fatal or the individual is suffering 
severe physical illness. Prosecution may also be inappropriate where 
the person concerned is showing signs of severe emotional distress.
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other adults
3. Although the use of cautioning may be particularly appropriate for the 
groups described above, the fact that a person does not fall into one of 
those categories need not preclude a caution. Particular factors which will 
weigh in the decision whether prosecution is justified in the public interest 
will be the seriousness of the offence and the offender's previous record 
and character.
4. The Attorney General's guidelines indicate that prosecution may not be 
appropriate where the circumstances of the offence (especially if the 
offence is triable on indictment) are not particularly serious and the 
probable penalty on conviction would only be a conditional or absolute dis­
charge ; end in sexual offences, when the girl or youth has been a willing 
party to the offence, account should be taken of his or her age, the relative 
age of the parties and whether or not there was any element of seduction or 
corruption. In addition, action other than prosecution may be considered 
for minor victimless offences or offences where only a small amount of 
property is involved.
5. The Attorney General's guidelines also indicate that prosecution may 
not be appropriate if the last offence was committed a considerable time 
before the probable date of hearing, unless an immediate custodial sentence 
of significant length is likely. If, however, the defendant has caused 
the delay or investigations have been complex or protracted, these factors 
should also be borne in mind.
6- The fact of a previous caution or conviction does not remove the 
possibility of a course of action other than prosecution in respect of a 
current offence, especially where the cffence in question is trivial cr of 
a different character to the earlier offence, or where the earlier offence 
was trivial, or where there has been a reasonable lapse of time since the 
previous decision.
The decision to caution
7. If, in the light of the factors outlined above, prosecution is deemed 
not to be required in the public interest, it will often be appropriate to 
take no further action and this course should always be given consideration. 
However, the nature of the offence and the other public interest factors 
indicated above may make it more desirable to issue a caution, bearing in 
mind the caution's deterrent effect and impact on the offender as a formal 
mark of society's disapproval.
Criteria for a caution
8. Before a caution is issued the following criteria must be met in full:
(a) The evidence available must comply with the Attorney General's 
guidelines on criteria for prosecution
ie a conviction should be more likely than an acquittal before a 
court. Cautioning must not be used as an alternative to a weak 
prosecution case. If there is insufficient evidence to support 
a prosecution, it will not be right to use cautioning as an 
alternative.
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(b) The offender must admit the offence
(c) The offender must agree to being cautioned
In practice consent to the caution should not be sought until 
it has been decided that cautioning is the correct course.
The significance of the caution must be explained: that a
record will be kept of the caution, that the fact of a previous 
caution may influence the police's decision whether or not to 
prosecute if the person should offend again, and that it may 
be cited if the person should subsequently be found guilty of 
an offence by a court.
9. Where a person does not make a clear admission of the offence (for 
example intent is denied) a caution will not be appropriate. It should 
not follow that prosecution will be the inevitable course ; in such cases 
it may right to take no further action. In some cases it may also be 
appropriate to consider whether appropriate medical or social help is 
needed.
The interests of the aggrieved party
10. It will generally be appropriate to seek the views of the aggrieved 
party. Among factors which will need to be taken into account in deciding 
whether to caution is that cautioning can deprive the victim of a ready 
means of redress through a compensation order. Although it is not desir­
able for the police to enter into any form of bargaining between the offender 
and the aggrieved party, it may be appropriate to take into account whether . 
the offender has made any reparation for damage done, or has indicated 
willingness to do so, together with any views expressed by the aggrieved 
party. There may also be cases in which, although a caution may otherwise
be administered, prosecution is required in order to protect the victim 
from further attention from the offender. The likelihood of the aggrieved 
party instituting private proceedings should also be borne in mind since 
it is desirable to avoid the situation where the police decide to caution 
and the aggrieved party wishes to institute private proceedings. The 
interests of the victim, although a most important factor which needs to 
be weighed in deciding whether the public interest points to prosecution 
or a caution, cannot, however, be paramount.
11. Whatever the decision, it will always be important to ensure that 
the victim is treated with courtesy and consideration.
Involvement of social services and other agencies
12. Chief officers may wish to consider, in conjunction with social serv­
ices departments and the probation service, what arrangements for consul­
tation are most appropriate to local circumstances in the case of adult 
offenders. They may wish to consider if consultation prior to a decision 
on the disposal of a case should be confined to particular categories of 
offender, for example the mentally ill or impaired, or to cases where 
there is reason to believe that the other agencies will have information 
which will directly affect the decision. It may be appropriate to notify 
relevant social services after a caution has been issued, for example, in 
the case of the elderly or those under stress.
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Manner of issue of a caution
13. It will Ije necessary to take account cf the individual circumstances 
of the offender in deciding how a caution is best administered, though in 
general this should be done in person by a police officer. In the case
of the. elderly, infirm and those suffering stress, particular consideration 
should be given to administering the caution in a relatively informal 
manner, perhaps at the person's home, and it may be appropriate for a 
friend or relative to be present when the offender is cautioned. With 
other offenders it may be appropriate for the caution to be administered 
in formal circumstances at a police station by a police officer in uni­
form. In this case the officer should normally be of the rank of 
inspector or above.
14. The offender should be asked to sign a form confirming his consent 
to the caution and that it was explained to him that the caution would be 
kept on record and might be cited if the person should subsequently be 
found guilty of an offence by a court. The form should also confirm the 
date of the caution, the offence for which it was administered and the fact 
that the person has admitted the offence and consented to the caution.
The form should be countersigned by a police officer.
Records and citation
15. Chief officers will wish to ensure that local records are kept of
the issue of cautions to adults, although they may wish to limit the length 
of time for which the records are kept in the case of offenders with no 
other police record to 3 years. No doubt the arrangements which are made 
for recording cautions will enable such records to be made available to 
the prosecuting authorities should the offender come to notice again during 
the time for which records are retained.
16. Previous cautions which were issued for offences committed by a 
person within the 3 years preceding the offence for which he has been pro­
secuted may be cited in court. Cautions should be cited in a similar
way and at the same time as the court is apprised of the offender's 
sintecedent history. However, care must be taken to present cautions 
separately so that the distinction between cautions and convictions is 
clear to the court and there is no confusion between the two. (For 
example, it is undesirable that cautions and convictions should appear 
on the same piece of paper, still less run on consecutively one from 
the other.)
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HOME OFFICE CIRCULAR 59/199 0 
THE CAUTIONING OF OFFENDERS
Introduction
1. This circular provides chief officers with guidance on the 
cautioning of offenders. Its purpose is to establish national 
standards for cautioning based on consistent general principles 
in which the courts and public may have full confidence, 
including the principle that cautioning is =^ uitable for age 
groups other than juveniles.
2. The terms of the circular have been agreed with the 
Association of Chief Police Officers and the Crown Prosecution 
Service. It replaces Home Office Circular 14/1985, which is 
hereby cancelled.
Background
3. Home Office Circular 14/1985 provided chief officers with 
guidance on the cautioning of juvenile and adult offenders. The 
guidance, which had the approval of the Crime Committee of 
Central Conference, was intended to promote more effective and
MSW-136.000 1
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nsistent cautioning practices in police forces. It embodied 
and amplified the principles set out in the Attorney General ' s 
guidelines on the criteria for prosecution. It commended inter­
agency involvement in the decision to caution or prosecute. And 
it warned against the dangers of net-widening by drawing 
offenders prematurely within the fringes of the criminal justice 
system.
4. The effects of Home Office Circular 14/1985 have been under 
review by the Association of Chief Police Officers and by the 
Home Office. Juvenile cautioning has been considered by the 
Association's Working Party on the Diversion of Young Offenders 
from the formal criminal justice system and the Home Office has 
commissioned research by Birmingham University into police 
cautioning practices in England and Wales. The Secretary of 
State is grateful to chief officers for their co-operation in 
that research, the main findings of which are summarised at Annex 
A. The guidance which follows has been drawn up in the light 
of those findings.
Government policy; the offender and the victim
5. Cautioning is recognised as an increasingly important way 
of keeping offenders out of the courts and in many circumstances 
reducing the risk that they will re-offend. There is now 
general agreement between the Home Secretary, the Association of 
Chief Police Officers and the Director of Public Prosecutions 
that cautioning policy should be based on a set of uniform 
principles, which can be applied across all age groups. The 
special considerations which apply additionally to the young, the 
elderly and infirm and other vulnerable groups will tend to mean 
that cautioning rates will remain higher for these groups than 
for others. But there is no reason why adults should be 
excluded from cautioning by reason only of their age.
6. The Victims Charter, published on 22 February 1990, 
emphasises that more attention should be given to the needs and 
views of the victims of crime. It must be recognised that
utioning an offender can deprive the victim of a ready means 
of obtaining a compensation order through the courts, but a 
prosecution should not be brought simply as a means of obtaining 
redress and the police should fully explain to the victim that 
the award of compensation is entirely a matter of discretion for 
the court. Although account will be taken of any views expressed 
by the victim, the general public interest, rather than the view 
of individual victims, must continue to prevail in the decision 
whether or not to caution or to institute criminal proceedings. 
So far as possible and appropriate, the victim should be kept 
advised about the outcome of the case and should have explained 
the significance of a caution if it is decided to administer one.
MSW-13 6.000
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National Standards
7. The national standards which are set out In Annex B to this 
circular create a framework of general principles and practice 
within which forces should operate. Within this framework, the 
decision whether to institute proceedings, to caution, to give 
an informal warning* or to take no action* at all against an 
alleged offender in a particular case remains a matter for 
individual chief officers. The decision may not always he an 
easy one. There is widespread agreement that the courts should 
only be used as a last resort, particularly for juveniles and 
young adults; and that diversion from the courts by means of 
cautioning or other forms of action may reduce the likelihood of 
re-offending. These factors would support a policy within which 
cautioning is used for a wide range of offences and offenders, 
with some offenders being cautioned more than once, provided the 
nature and circumstances of the most recent offence warrant it.
fi. On the other hand, chief officers should bear in mind the 
danger that inappropriate use of cautioning, especially repeat 
cautioning, might undermine the credibility of the police and 
ultimately of the law. Hor can the police protect victims' 
rights in the way the courts can. And there is also the 
possibility that delaying entry into the courts through a series 
of cautions may lead to a more severe response by the courts to 
a first criminal conviction than would otherwise have been the 
case.
9. Chief officers need to adopt a clear and consistent stance 
on these difficult and sometimes conflicting considerations. 
Wot all forces have conducted a review of cautioning policy, as 
Home Office Circular 14/1965 suggested. The Home Secretary is 
anxious that a review should be carried out in those forces where 
it has not taken place and recommends that chief officers in 
every force should, after discussion with the CPS and other 
relevant agencies including the Probation Service and the Social 
Services, produce a force policy statement on cautioning which 
will incorporate the new national standards and the means by 
which their application will be monitored.
Consultation with other aoencies in the cautioning decisions
10. Participation by other agencies in the decision-making 
process can do much to improve the quality and consistency of 
cautioning decisions. It is the view of the Secretary of State 
that chief officers may find it helpful to consult other agencies 
at two different levels.
11. At the policy level chief officers may find it helpful to 
discuss broad cautioning strategy and objectives, particularly 
in respect of young offenders, with local agencies including the 
Probation Service, the Social Services and the Crown Prosecution 
Service amongst others.
12. In the making of cautioning decisions, the Secretary of State 
endorses the recommendation by the Association of Chief Police
* See Annex C
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C ricers that chief offic^S should consider inviting juvenile 
liaison panels, which have already been established successfully 
hy a number of forces, to review any case where the police are 
in doubt whether or not to caution a juvenile, for instance where 
ho has been previously cautioned or convicted. Such panels will 
normally be based around police, probation service, education 
service and social services representatives and there may be 
scope for extending their role to cover young adult offenders.
13- In addition, the Crown Prosecution Service is always willing 
to give advice in difficult cases.
14. In straightforward cases prior consultation will be 
unnecessary and the decision to administer an "instant caution"* 
may be taken on the principle that primary consideration be given 
to the offence rather than the offender and his previous record. 
In the case of trivial first offences it may be more appropriate 
to deal with an offender by way of an informal warning. This 
would also serve to delay entry into the formal criminal justice 
; stem.
Support and assistance to those cautioned
15. The giving of a simple caution may be all that is required 
in most cases. However, the effectiveness of cautions is likely 
‘Lo be enhanced if they are backed up by arrangements for 
referring offenders who have particular difficulties related to 
the offence to other agencies or to voluntary organisations for 
support, guidance and/or involvement in the community. Such 
referrals should be on a voluntary basis but any agreement to be 
referred should not be made a condition of a caution. The type 
of support which could be provided will depend^ /updiT'^ what is 
available locally. The most useful type of support is likely to 
be help with accommodation and/or benefits; basic education; pre­
employment training; out of school and leisure time activities 
and help from alcohol or drugs projects.
Monitoring
16. The need for effective monitoring of each force's cautioning 
policy was highlighted by the Birmingham research. Chief 
Officers will wish to consider in conjunction with. HMIC where 
necessary, what sort of monitoring is necessary to measure and 
reinforce implementation of the force policy.
17. The importance of ensuring that every single cautioning 
decision is taken on the basis of fair and equal treatment - 
irrespective of ethnic origin - cannot be overstated. For this 
reason, ethnic monitoring of cautioning decisions may need to be 
considered. Chief officers should also consider whether the 
ethnic origin of cautioning decisions related to comparable 
offences should be monitored. The Commission for Racial Equality 
can provide useful advice in taking this forward (see, for 
example, their 1990 booklet "’Juvenile Cautioning and Ethnic 
Monitoring”)•
* See Annex C
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18. In both this circular and the attached National Standards, 
references to •juveniles' are to persons under 17 years of age.
19. Any inquiries about this circular should be addressed to 
John Woodcock, Hone Office, F2 Division, Boon 520, 50 Que'
Anne's Gate, London, SWIH SAT, telephone 071-273 3168,
Ann Scott (071-273 3890).
c L
KISS A M EDW'
P2 DIVISIO>'
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ANNEX A
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM RESEARCH INTO CAUTIONING 
The main conclusions to emerge from the research are:-
a. Juvenile cautioning rates, which were beginning to rise 
before the issue of the circular in 1985, have continued to 
rise since 1986. Cautioning rates for young adults and 
adults have also risen, but to a lesser extent (and from a 
much lower baseline). The result is a sharp fall-off in 
cautioning rates at about the age of 17, with 17 year olds
four times less likely to receive a caution than 16 year
olds. Although a lower cautioning rate for older offenders 
is to be expected there is no objective justification for 
the sharpness of the fall at 17.
b. There is uncertainty about the meaning of parts of
circular 14/1985, which has led to wide variations in the 
interpretation and use of *no further action' and informal 
warnings, and about the sort of offences for which they, 
and formal cautions, might be appropriate.
c. The circular appears to have had little success in 
promoting greater consistency. Large variations in 
cautioning rates between forces remain, and these cannot 
be explained solely by differences in local circumstances. 
Moreover, variations within forces were as great as 
variations between forces.
d. Information about cautioning was difficult to obtain 
because of the absence in many forces of adequate recording 
systems. The absence of such systems suggests that force 
policies may not be properly monitored. -
e. Although the use of multiple cautions is less than is 
often claimed, there is some concern about the 
effectiveness of repeated cautions, particularly where 
these are not backed up by any form of support or 
assistance for the offender.
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ANÎÎEX B
NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR CAÜTTOKIKG 
AIMS
1. The purpose of a formai caution is
- to deal quickly and simply with less serious offenders
- to divert them from the criminal courts
- to reduce the chances of their re-offending
Note lA These standards apply to all . criminal offences 
including traffic offences. They are not intended to 
prejudice the existing system of written warnings in the 
case of traffic offences.
Note IB A formal caution is not the only alternative to 
criminal proceedings. Nothing in the circular or standards 
is intended to inhibit the police practice of taking action 
short of a formal caution such as no further action or an 
oral warning in the street or at a police station.
Note 1C A caution is not a form of sentence. It may not 
be made conditional upon the satisfactory completion of a 
specific task such as reparation or the payment of 
compensation to the victim. Only the courts may impose 
such requirements.
DECISION TO CAUTION
2. A formal caution is a serious matter. It is recorded by the 
police; it may influence them in their decision whether or not 
to institute proceedings if the person should offend again; and 
it may be cited in any subsequent court proceedings. In order 
to safeguard the offender's interests, the following conditions 
must be met before a caution can be administered:-
- there must be evidence of the offender's guilt sufficient 
to give a realistic prospect of conviction
- the offender must admit the offence
- the offender (or, in the case of a juvenile, his parents 
or guardian) must understand the significance of a caution 
and give informed consent to being cautioned.
Note 2A Where the evidence does not meet the required 
standard, a caution cannot be administered.
Note 2B A caution will not be appropriate where a person 
does not make a clear and reliable admission of the offence 
(for instance, if intent is denied or there are doubts 
about his mental health or intellectual capacity). It does 
not follow, however, that in such circumstances prosecution 
will be inevitable. It may be appropriate to take no 
further action or, in some cases, to consider whether the
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person requires help from the health and/or social services 
or a relevant voluntary organisation.
Note 2C In the case of a juvenile under the age of 14 who 
commits an offence, it is necessary to establish that he 
knows that what he did was wrong and that where applicable, 
he had the necessary intent.
N o t e  2D In practice consent to the caution should not be 
sought until it has been decided that cautioning is the 
correct course. The significance of the caution must be 
explained: that is, that a record will be kept of the 
caution, that the fact of a previous caution may influence 
the decision whether or not to prosecute if the person 
should offend again, and that it may be cited if the person 
should subsequently be found guilty of an offence by a 
court. In the case of a juvenile this explanation must be 
given to the offender in the presence of his parents or 
guardian, or other appropriate adult. The special needs of 
other vulnerable groups should also be catered for, in 
accordance with the Code of Practice for the Detention, 
Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police Officers,
Note 2E If a person meets the first two criteria but 
refuses consent to a caution, prosecution need not be the 
only realistic option particularly if the offender’s 
understanding of a caution is in doubt or he is thought to 
be in need of help.
PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS
3. If the first two of the above requirements are met,
consideration should be given as to whether a caution is in the
public interest. Factors which should be taken into account 
here are:-
- the nature of the offence
- the likely penalty if the offender was convicted by a 
court
- the offender's age and state of health
- his previous criminal history
- his attitude towards the offence, including practical 
expressions of regret.
Note 3A The most serious offences, including those triable
only on indictment, will not be suitable for a caution,
regardless of the age or previous record of the offender. 
Nor will a caution be appropriate in cases where the victim 
has suffered significant harm or loss. (The meaning of 
'significant* may be relative to the circumstances of the 
victim.) Where there is any doubt, the case should be 
referred to the Crown Prosecutor for him to consider 
whether prosecution would be more suitable.
Note 3B A racial motivation for an offence is an
aggravating factor in determining the seriousness of an
MSW-136.000 8
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offence, although it does not mean that prosecution should 
automatically follow.
Note 3C The code for Crown Prosecutors, which provides 
guidance on the general principles to be applied to 
prosecution indicates that prosecution may not be 
appropriate where the circumstances of the offence 
(especially if’ the offence is triable on indictment) are 
not particularly serious and the probable result on 
conviction would be a conditional or absolute discharge. 
But the likelihood of a more substantive penalty upon 
conviction need not necessarily preclude a caution.
Note 3D It has long been accepted that there should be a 
presumption in favour of not prosecuting juveniles and 
certain special categories of offender, particularly the 
elderly or infirm and those where the offender is suffering 
from some sort of mental illness or impairment, or a severe 
physical illness. This presumption should now extend to 
other groups - young adults and adults alike - where the 
criteria for cautioning are met. Membership- of these 
groups does not, however, afford absolute protection 
against prosecution, which may be justified by the 
seriousness of the offence. And membership of other groups
- young adults or adults - need not lead automatically to 
a presumption in favour of prosecution.
Note 3E The offender's previous record (including any 
recent cautions) is an important factor, although not in 
itself decisive. A previous conviction or caution should 
not rule out a subsequent caution if other factors suggest 
it might be suitable - such as an appreciable lapse of time 
since the last offence, whether the most recent offence and 
previous offences are different in character and 
seriousness, and the effects of a previous caution on the 
pattern of offending.
Note 3T Two factors should be considered in relation to 
the offender's attitude towards his offence: the wilfulness 
with which it was committed and his subsequent attitude. 
A practical demonstration of regret such as apologising to 
the victim and/or offering to put matters right as far as 
he is able, should be features which may support the use of 
a caution.
Note 3G The experience and circumstances of offenders 
involved in group offences can vary greatly, as can their 
degree of involvement. Although consistency and eqviity are 
important considerations in the decision to charge or 
caution, each offender should be considered separately. 
Different disposals may be justified.
VIEWS OF THE VICTIM
4. Before a caution can be administered it is desirable that 
the victim should normally be contacted to establish:-
- his or her view about the offence
MSW-136.000 Ç
- the extent of any damage or loss
- the nature of any continuing threat from the offender
- whether the offender has made any form of reparation or 
paid compensation
The victim's consent to a caution, although desirable, is not 
essential.
Note 4A The nature and extent of the loss to the victim 
should be established, and their significance relative to 
his or her circumstances. The significance of a caution 
should be explained, if it is being, or likely to be, 
considered.
Note 4B .In some cases where cautioning might otherwise be 
appropriate, prosecution may be required in order to 
protect the victim from further attention from the 
offender.
Note 4C If the offender has made some form of reparation 
or paid compensation, and the victim is satisfied, it may 
no longer be necessary to prosecute in cases where the 
possibility of the court's awarding compensation would 
otherwise have been a major determining factor. Under no 
circumstances should police officers become involved in 
negotiating or awarding reparation or compensation.
ADMINISTRATION OF A CAUTION
5. A formal caution should be administered in person by a 
police officer and at a police station wherever practicable. A 
juvenile must always be cautioned in the presence of a parent, 
guardian or other appropriate adult, and members of other 
vulnerable groups treated in accordance with the principles set 
out in Code of Practice C.
Note 5A The officer administering the caution should be 
in uniform and normally of the rank of inspector or above.
In some cases, however, a Community Liaison Officer or 
Community Constable might be more appropriate or, in the 
inspector's absence,, the use of a sergeant might be 
justified. Chief Officers may therefore wish to consider 
nominating suitable "cautioning officers"
Note 5B Where the person is elderly, infirm or otherwise 
vulnerable, a caution may be administered less formally, 
perhaps at the offender's home and in the presence of a 
friend or relative or other appropriate adult.
RECORDING CAUTIONS
6. All formal cautions should be recorded and records kept as 
directed by the Secretary of State. The use of cautioning 
should also be monitored on a force-wide basis.
Note 6A Chief officers may also wish to keep records of 
informal action taken, and the reasons for it. But care
MSW-136.000 10
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should be taken not to record anything about an individual 
which implies that he is guilty of an offence when the 
evidence is in any doi±)t.
Kote €B Formal cautions should be cited in court if they 
are relevant to the offence under consideration. In 
presenting antecedents, care should be taken to distinguish 
between cautions and convictions, which should usually be 
listed on separate sheets of paper. Offences leading to 
some form of informal action may not be cited.
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AHNEX C
Definitions
1 A formal caution is a caution administered in accordance 
with the criteria set out in the national standards. It is 
formally recorded and may be cited in subsequent court 
proceedings.
2 An instant caution is the same, but it is administered 
very soon after the offence and without consultation with 
other agencies or with the CPS. It is therefore only suitable 
for straightforward cases.
3 An informal varnina/caution should only be given when the 
criteria for a formal caution are met but a formal caution is 
considered inappropriate. An informal warning/caution is not 
recorded and cannot be cited in court. It need not be 
administered in accordance with paragraph 5.
4 No further action should be taken when it is not thought 
appropriate even to administer an informal warning or caution. 
It may not be cited at subsequent court proceedings.

le  prosecution (you and the police) o r the d efen ce  (your 
>artner). In o rder to give time for the case  to b e  p re p a re d  
hey will rem and (postpone) the c ase  for a w eek  or two. 
)uring this time your partner will b e  on bail. Conditions of 
Mil will usually include not b e ing  allow ed to contact you 
ind he  may b e  req u ired  to stay at ano ther address. If he 
)reaks the conditions of his bail he can  b e  arrested .
WILL I HAVE TO CO TO COURT?
f/ your p artner adm its the offence, the Court will d e c id e  a 
sentence and you will not b e  requ ired  to appear. If your 
oartner p lead s not guilty then you will have to go to Court as 
Î w itness to give evidence. You won’t b e  alone. A friend can 
JO with you and the police officers in the case  will b e  there. 
Court staff will explain what is going on. R em em ber a  Court 
is just a p lace  w here  you explain what happened . You are  
not on trial.
WELL THE POLICE REFUSE TO 
HELP ACAIN IF 1 DON’T CHARCE?
T he police will always respond  to victims of violence no 
m atter how often they a re  c a lle d . . .  w hether the attack 
happens in the hom e or in the street, regard le ss  of w hether 
ch arg es a re  pursued.
WHERE CAN I CET ADVICE?
It may b e  that you have b een  living with a violent partner for 
som e time and have never reported  being attacked before. 
You may not want your partner prosecuted  but you may 
n eed  som eone to talk to who can explain w here you can get 
help
Your local police station has a dom estic violence officer 
who will listen to you and put you in touch with the many 
agencies who can give you positive help. The dom estic vio­
lence officer is a police officer and will provide support if 
you d ec id e  to prosecute  your partner but the decision to 
p rosecu te  rem ains yours.
IF VRCENT DIAL 999 
Your locad police 
elation is:
P io d 'i r c r t  w ith  th e  n id  of V oluntary  D onation. 
D e s ig n e d  b y  H inton a n d  T u nn ing ley  01 237 7273
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SHOULD I CALL THE POLICE?
An aMack In your o w n  homo is fust as serious as 
an attack In the street by a stranger.
NO-ONE HAS THE RIGHT TO HIT YOU.
Police se e  no différence in an attack on a woman by her 
partner and an attack on her by  a man she does not know. 
Do not b e  afraid to dial 999. If you can  get away from your 
attacker rem em ber a police station is a safe place 24 hours a 
day. Get help  as quickly as possible.
If  a neighbour has called  the police without your know ­
ledge do not send  the officers aw ay telling them  everything 
is alright w hen it isn't. They will want to speak  to you se p a ­
rately from your partner and  they will listen to what you 
have to say. Even if no arrest is m ade they will not leave you 
until they a re  su re  that there  will b e  no further violence. If 
you wish, they will organise transport for you to a place 
w here  you will b e  safe, like a friend's or a relative’s house, or 
woman's refuge. They will always ensure  that you get m edi­
cal treatm ent if you n eed  it.
T h e  police officers who call will always report such a visit 
and another officer will b e  contacting you as soon as possi­
b le after the incident to se e  if you requ ire  any further help 
or advice.
P o lice  may arrest your partner if they fear a further assault 
w hen they leave, or if they fear another disturbance.
P o lice  officers have instructions to arrest violent partners 
w here  there  is sufficient evidence. R em em ber if you have 
b een  assaulted you may b e  too shocked to m ake a decision. 
The officers will always lake your w ishes into account but 
the final decision to arrest is theirs.
Your partner will b e  a rrested  for what has happened  -  you 
a re  not responsib le for his actions.
WHAT HAPPENS AFTER AN ARREST?
Your partner will b e  taken to a police station and held there 
until a decision is m ade what to do next. Although there a re  
strict rules about how long som eone can b e  kept at a police 
station efforts will b e  m ade to tell you when he has b een  
released . He will not b e  re leased  if the police fear he will 
attack you again. At this stage he has only b een  arrested , he 
has not been  charged  with any offence.
Your personal account of what happen ed  is called a sta te­
m ent and  a police officer will help you w rite this. The officer 
will understand if you a re  not well enough to m ake a sta te­
m ent immediately.
WHAT IF I DON'T WANT TO CHARGE?
You will have som e time to think while your partner is at the 
police station. Use this time to get advice and  to think calmly 
about what you want done.
Even if you feel that the assault is not very serious, you 
should rem em b er that there  a re  likely to b e  further attacks 
which may result in w orse injuries. Your partner n eed  not 
be  charg ed  on the day  of the arrest, but may b e  asked  to 
return to the police station at a later date. This gives the 
police m ore time to gather the ev idence  and  you m ore time 
to se e k  advice and  com e to a decision.
J=rO
WILL THE POLICE ARREST?
P o lice  have the pow er to a n e s t  any person who has 
assaulted another.
It does not m atter w hether the assault takes place in your 
hom e or on the street, w hether that person is your husband
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
In o rd er to charge  your partner with assaulting you the 
police must have evidence. They will need  evidence of 
your injuries and your personal story of what happened. 
E vidence of your injuries can b e  got from your G.P. or the 
casualty doctor who treated  you. Police officers may ask if
WHAT HAPPENS IF THERE IS 
A CHARGE?
W hen a person  is ch arg ed  with an offence he must b e  takei 
before a Court so that the Court can hear the ev idence  an< 
d ec id e  if he is guilty or not guilty.
This will b e  done as soon as possible. The Court ma
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GUIDE FOR CUSTODY OFFICERS LS/LG 
DEFERMENT DECISIONS 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Deferred decision procedure
(a) Minor Injury
(b) Crown Prosecutor code 
sufficient evidence
Offender adm its offence
Victim ag rees to caution 
and  deferm ent
N O T
If victim  w an ts to  charge 
and  sufficient evidence
Concern for safety of 
victim.
W here offender has 
pre-cons or caution 
for assau lting  victim
o r
Inform
Victim
RELEASE
ARREST for Assault
COOUNG OFF" PERIOD 
P.O. 24 of 5.8.88
BAIL
for
fu rther
enquiries
into
offence
CHARGENFA for 
o ffence
Detain for 
appearance 
at Court 
e.g. bind 
over
Instan t 
caution 
GO 23/377 
procedure
CHECKS on P.N.C. 
and S .0 .5  for adult 
cautions - CO X 62676
If children 
involved F.78 
to  LA.
NAI Team  
CLO
BROUGHT TO STATION 
EVIDENCE TO CUSTODY OFFICER 
CASE supervised by Inspector
Bail for 
2 m onths, LS 
T hursday
evening - case papers,
finderprin ts etc. to
Com m unity
Liaison
Inspector
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Streatham Division ^
D om estic  Violence - Earlv Intervention and Arrest Policy
Age : ___________Sex:_________ Marital Status: Rank :_____
Length of Service : _________ Jo b  Description:--------------------------------------------------
1. What degree of understanding do you feel you have concerning the new divisional policy on Domestic Violence ?
V tick one box
No I— I Som e ,— , Considerable i—-» Complete .— .
Understanding |___ | Understanding |___ | Understanding |_J  Understanding |___ |
2. Do you fully understand the reason for the change in policy towards Domestic Violence ?
YEs Q  NO □
3. How well do you think that the new policy w as put across to you ? ^
Not at all I I Not 1 I Quite I I Very | I
well '— i well I— I well  ^ well I— I
4. Within the Force, what sort of status do you feel the area of Domestic Violence has ? V tick one box
Very low i— i Low j— i Moderate i— i High r~j
Status I I Status I I Status I I Status I I
5. Do you think that the new  divisional policy represents a more effective, long term method of dealing 
with dom estic violence ? i— i i— i
YES □  NO □
If NO, please exp la in ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Do you feel that the new  divisional policy has, in some way, changed your attitude towards Domestic
Y E S Q  NO n
If YES, in what w a y ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. In practical term s, what would you feel is the least effective part of the new policy on Domestic Violence ?
8. To what extent, if any, do you have difficulty in resolving your own views on Domestic Violence with 
the new  divisional policy ? V tick one box
No p n  A Little j— | Quite some I I Considerable F H
Difficulty L _J Difficulty I I Difficulty I—J Difficulty I— '
9. Dn you have difficulty in deciding what is a minor assault ? yES NO | |
If YES, how does this influence the way in which you attempt to carry out the new divisional Domestic 
Violence policy ?
10. Do you think that enough attention has been (directed, in the past, to  Domestic Violence ?
YES Q  NO Q
11. Any other com m ents : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Respondents * Profile
The following data describe respondents for the following variables : 
A g e , Sex, Marital Status, Rank, Length of Service and Job Description
AGE
Age B a n d (Yr s ) No
Length of Service 
Service Band(Yrs) No.
18 - 24 27 22.9 1 - 4 43 36.4
25 - 31 49 41.5 5 - 8 33 28.0
32 - 38 23 19.5 9 - 1 2 11 9.3
39 - 45 12 10.2 13 - 16 10 8.5
46 - 52 4 3.4 17 - 20 9 7.6
53 + 1 .8 21 + 7 5.9
Missing 2 1.7 Missing 5 4.2
Total 118 100 Total 118 100
Marital Status Sex
No . No . %
Married 64 54.2 Male 97 82. 2
Single 48 40.7 Female 19 16. 1
Missing 6 5.1 Missing 2 1. 7
Total 118 100 Total 118 100
Rank Job Description
Rank No . I Description No .
PC 64 54.2 Relief PC 65 55.1
WPG 17 14.4 Relief PS 11 9.3
DC 11 9.3 CID 19 16.1
PS 13 11.0 DIIU 2 1.7
WPS . 2 1.7 CLO 6 5.1
DS 1 .8 Others 3 2.5
D1 3 2.5 Mis sing 12 . 10.2
Insp 3 2.5
Missing 4 3.4 Total 118 100
Total 118 100
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APPENDIX 6
COMPUTER - FIELDS OF INFORMATION
1. Number and type of crime
2. Date and time offence took place 
and date and time reported
3. Victim: Name
4. Victim: Age
5. Victim: I.D. Code
6. Victim: Gender
7. Victim: Occupation
8. Suspect: Name
9. Suspect: Age
10. Suspect : I.D. Code
11. Suspect: Gender
12. Suspect: Occupation
13. Relationship Information
14. Residence Information: Living together or separately
15. Crime Allegation
16. Crime Classification
17. Details of Injuries
18. Details of Incident
19. Toxic Substance
20. Injunctions
21. Arrest
22. Arrest Outcome
23. Deferred Decision Outcome
24. Case Result
25. Police Officers Involved in Case
26. Domestic Violence Unit Involvement
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMPUTER CODES
A - CRIME NUMBER
C = Major B = Beat or IRB + Number i.e. C 1234
B - DATE & TIME
Date and time of offence and reported i.e. 14 Octo/0345 14 Oct/0930
C - VICTIM NAME
D - VICTIM AGE
E - VICTIM I.D. CODE
1 —  6
F - VICTIM GENDER
M = Male
F « Female
U = Unknown
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G - VICTIM OCCUPATION
U = Unemployed
H = Housewife
R * Retired
SC = School
ST = Student
M = Manual (cleaner, aux. nurse, shopvork)
SM = Skilled Manual (roofer, hairdresser, driver) 
SN = Skilled Non-Manual (croupier, site manager)
OC = Office/Clerical (typist, clerk telephonist)
PR = Professional (engineer, teacher)
BS = Business (owns company)
F = Forces'
U = Unknown
H - SUSPECT NAME
I - SUSPECT AGE
J - SUSPECT I.D. CODE
1 —  6
K - SUSPECT GENDER
M = Male
F = Female
U * Unknown
L - SUSPECT OCCUPATION
As above
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M - RELATIONSHIP
A = Husband/Wife
AX = Ex-Husband/Wife
B = Boyfriend/Girlfriend
BX = Ex-Boyfriend/Girlfriend
C » Common Law Husband/Wife
CX = Ex-Common Law Husband/Wife
F = Father
M Mother
S Son
D Daughter
B Brother
SI » Sister
St Step
0 » Other
F Foster
CM Grandmother
U Unknown
N - RESIDENCE
T = Together
S = Separate
U Unknown
0 - ALLEGATION
A Assault
AA Attempted Abduction
AB » Abduction
ABH » Actual Bodily Harm
AF Affray
AGBH = Attempted GBH
AIA = Attempted Indecent Assault
AM Attempted Murder
AP Abusive Mail through Post
ar » Attempted Arson
aiidm = Attempted Unwarranted Demands
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BOB = Breach of Bail
BOP = Breach of Peace
CA = •Common Assault
CD = Criminal Damage
DD = Domestic Dispute
FI = False Imprisonment
GBH = Grevious Bodily Harm
HAW = Held Against Will
I = Incest
lA = Indecent Assault
KID = Kidnapping
MUR = Murder
CPC = Obscene Phone Calls
POA = Public Order Act
RAP = Rape
RB = Robbery
SIR = Strangulation
TB = Threatening Behaviour
TCD = Threats of Criminal Damage
TH = Theft
TKI = Threats to Kidnap
TPC = Threatening Phone Calls
T2A = Threats to Assault
T2K = Threats to Kill
T2= = Threats to Other
T2V « Threats to Victim
US = Unlawful Sex
UW = Unlawful Wounding
UC = Unclassified
VI = Vehicle Interference
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P - CLASSIFICATION
NCI » Transferred
NC2 « Victim Unwilling to Proceed
NC3 = Insufficient Evidence
NC4 = Allegation Withdrawn
NC5 = Record Only
A = Assault
AA = Attempted Abduction
AB * Abduction
ABH = Actual Bodily Harm
AF = Affray
AM = Attempted Murder
BOP = Breach of Peace
CA - Common Assault
CAR = Common Assault - Record Only
CD = Criminal Damage
DD = Domestic Dispute
DDR * Domestic Dispute Record Only
GBH = Grevious Bodily Harm
IM = Incitement to Murder
KID * Kidnapping
MC « Malicious Communication
MUR = Murder
OPC = Obscene Phone Calls
POA * Public Order Act
RAP = Rape
SIR = Strangulation
TB = Threatening Behaviour
TH = Theft
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T2A = Threats to Assault
T2K = Threats to Kill
T20 = Threats to other
T2V = Threats to Victim
US = Unlawful Sex
UW = Unlawful Wounding
UC = Unclassified
Q - INJURIES
1 = Head
2 = Face
3 * Eyes
A = Nose
5 = Mouth
6 * Ears
7 * Body
8 «= Arms
9 = Legs
10 = Teeth
A = Bitten
B = Bleeding
C = Broken
D = Bruising/Blackened
E = Burnt
F = Cut
G = Fractured
H = Hair Loss
I = Lascertation/Graze/Scratch
L = Non-visible
M = Punched
N * Pushed/Pulled
0 = Reddening
P = Shock
Q = Slapped
R = Soreness
S = Stitches
T = Strangled
U = Swelling
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V = Kicked
W = Hurt/Grabbed Neck
X = Hair Pulled
Z = Stabbed
R - DETAILS 
A = Argument
CA *= Counter Allegations
CH = ChiId/Children
CR = Clothes Ripped
D = Divorcing/Divorced
DH *= Detained in Hospital
F = Fight
FE = Forced Entry
FS = Forced Sex
H » Hit
HI «= Hit with Implement
LC » Left Country
LH = Left Home
MI = Mental Illness
NA » Not Arrested
NR = New Relationship
OFD = Ongoing Family Dispute
P = Pregnant
PI = Past Injunctions
PR = Previous Relationship
PV = Previous Violence
S = Separating/Separated
SI *= Suspect Injured
SL * Sîuspect Left
SP = Sluspect Present
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T = Threats
TI = Threatened with Implement
TA = Taken Away
TH = Taken to Hospital
S - TOXIC SUBSTANCES
A = Alcohol
D = Drugs
0 = Other
U = Unknown
T - INJUNCTION
Y = Yes
U = Unknown
P = Previous
A = Power of Arrest
U - ARREST INFORMATION
Custody Number - Date & Time of Arrest - Details fo Custody Officer 
C 4862 T2610/0145 PS 54
V - ARREST OUTCOME
BRT = Bailed to Return
CHB = Charged and Bailed
CHR = Charged and Remanded
DD = Deferred Decision
IC = Instant Caution
NFA = No Further Action
T = Transferred
U = Unknown
W - DEFERRED DECISION 
AC = Adult Caution
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CH = Charged
FTA = Failed to Appear
NFA = No Further Action
U ■= Unknown
X - CASE RESULT
A = Absolute Discharge
AC = Adult Caution
BO = Bound Over to Keep the Peace
CD = Conditional Discharge
CO = Compensation Order
CS = Costs
DC = Discontinued
DD - Discharged
DM = Dismissed
DS = Deferred Sentence
F = Fined
G * Guilty
I «= Imprisonment
IS = Imprisonment Suspended
MR = Mental Health Order
NA = Non Appearance
NEO = No Evidence Offered
NG = Not Guilty
NP = Not Produced (from prison)
P = . Probation
RC = Reduced Charge
SS = Suspended Sentence
TC = Transferred to Crown Court
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WC = Withdrawn by CPS
WV = Withdrawn by Victim
WU = Withdrawn Unknown
Unknown
YOI = Young Offenders Institute
Z - DV UNIT INVOLVEMENT
A = Advice
AD = Administration
I = Interview
0 = Officers
L = Letter
P = Phone Call
R = Refuge
S . = Statement
V = Visit
Also length of time spent on case
tRECORD ONLYI 
93
20
(9.8% of arrests) 
(4.5% of crimes)
r
CASE ATTRITIOm
Domestic Violence Cases at Streatharj
May - Dec 1989|
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ARRESTSI
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(46% of crimes)
CHARGEDI
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(23.5% of crimes)
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appendix
8
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS - VICTIMS
THE INCIDENT
1. Can you give me the details of what happened to you ?
2. Has this type of thing ever happened before ?
3. Who contacted police, was it you, a friend or a neighbour ?
A. Have you or anyone else contacted the police before in
connection with this type of thing ?
5. Why were the police contacted this time.
INITIAL POLICE RESPONSE
5a. About how long was it before the police arrived ?
5b. How many officers were there ?
5c. Were you willing to let them in ?
5d. How did you feel when they arrived ?
5e. How did your partner feel ?
6. Did the police speak to you separately ?
6a. How did they deal with it ?
7. What information/advice were you offered by the patrol officers ?
8. Did they suggest you move to a safe place ?
9. Did you get the result you expected when the police were contacted ?
DEFERRED DECISION
10. Was your partner arrested ?
If yes - at what poirat was he arrested ?
what was his reaction when he was arrested ? 
for how long was he detained ?
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11. Did you think it was right to arrest him ?
12. Did you and your partner understand that it was a new police
policy which resulted in his being arrested and detained ?
13. Whilst he was held in custody did this give you some time
to decide what to do - make other arrangements, review 
relationship ?
13a. Was it good to have this breathing space ?
13b. What happened when he returned home ?
14. The police arranged for your partner to return to the station
at a later date - did you and your partner understand why ?
14a. Did the fact that he had to return to the police station
at a later date make any difference to the way he treated you ?
FOLLOW UP POLICE RESPONSE
15. Were you contacted by the domestic violence unit ?
16. How was this contact made - letter, phone, visit. 
How long after the arrest was this contact made ?
17. How helpful did you find this contact, could it have
been improved ?
17a. Do you wish you hadn't been contacted ?
18. Were you contacted again before your partner was due to return
for the final decision ?
18a. Did you contact the station again after the incident ?
THE OUTCOME OF USING DEFERRED DECISION
19. Has your calling the police affected your relationship. •
If yes - for the better or worse ?
20. If the police had decided to prosecute instead of cautioning
him would you have been prepared to give evidence in court ?
21. Is there anything the police could have done that would have
helped you more ?
22. Would you call the police again ?
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Interview Checklist - Offender 
Pilot
Preamble.
Hellow Mr ’X ’, you don't mind me calling you 'Y' do you ? I am a researcher
at The University of Buckingham, we are doing some research on the police.
They have this cautioning system here and we are looking at how it works and
asking people like yourself what they think about it.
1 only want to speak with you for about 30 minutes and it is all in confidence 
so 1 hope you will tell me exactly what you have felt about this system here.
1 am going to take some notes because 1 have a terrible memory so 1 hope you 
won't mind. Anything you say will not be repeated or seen by the police. 1 
promise you. And as 1 said before, this research is undertaken by the 
University of Buckingham and it is nothing to do with police.
1. You are called here for a decision to be made, can you tell me 
what the Inspector has decided in your case ?
2. What was the incident that brought you back here ? 
Probe
Can you tell me about it ?
3. IVhen the police came were you still at the home when they arrested
you ? What did they say ?
Probe
Were they rough ?
Were they polite ?
How did they explain it to you ?
What did you think ?
Were you angry, accepting ?
Probe find out whether he thought it was the victim's fault or 
whether he appreciated it was out of her hands.
Probe how were patrol officers, handcuffs etc.
A. What was it like coming into the station ?
What was the Inspector like when the cautioning scheme was explained ?
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5. Were you kept in custody ?
Tell me what happened. Probe
What was the charge officer/inspector like etc ?
6. How long were you kept in ?
7. What was it like, how did you feel ?
8. What happened when you got back home ?
Were you still with your partner ?
9. ' When you were told to come back on this date, how did you feel ?
What did you understand by a deferred decision ?
10. Have you ever been to a police station before ?
Gentle probe.
11. What did you think about the dd, was it something you worried about ?
12. Re-phrase - but something like did it alter your behaviour ?
13. Did it result in any arguments etc ?
14. What did your partner think of the dd ?
15. You have been NFA, Cautioned, pros.
Probably cautioned, what do you understand by the caution?
16. Do you think it will affect your future behaviour ?
17. In what way has this arrest and dd, and now caution, made you
look at your relationship ?
18. What measures hav eyou taken, i.e. marriage guidance ?
19. What do you think about this new police policy ?
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APPENDIX
9
RELIEFS/CUSTODY 
(revised schedule)
1. You are on patrol, a radio message is received and you are called to
a domestic what are the thoughts that immediately go through your head ?
2. When you hear the radio message to go to a domestic do you view it more
or less seriously if a neighbour has notified the police or if a wife has 
notified the police ?
Does this affect your response ?
3. Can you take me through it, you have found the address, you knock on
the door, what next ?
What exactly do you say when the door is opened ?
5. What do you do next ?
6. In a smal flat where do you do the interviews ?
7. How long do you take at the scene ?
8. What do you say to women ?
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10. If the victim has left the scene what do you do ?
11. If the offender has left the scene what do you do ?
1. Do you arrest the offender ? Why would you arrest ?
2. What influences your decision to arrest ?
3. What influences your decision not to arrest ?
U. When is arrest not appropriate ?
5. Have you ever arrested and had doubts about that decision later ?
6. What level of violence do you require before executing your P.O.A. ?
7. Have you ever arrested in accordance with PACE, s. 25 for the protection
of a vulnerable person ?
Can you tell me about the case ?
8. Would you have arrested if the woman had been (a) touches, (b) pushed,
(c) shoved ?
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9. What are the kinds of circumstances in a domestic situation which would
result in an arrest in order to protect a vulnerable person ?
10. Do you ask the woman at the scene if she is prepared to go to court ?
11. Woul you ever arrest a woman at the scene of a domestic ? When would 
arrest be appropriate ?
12. How far would the presence of children in a domestic would this affect 
your decision to arrest ?
13. Under what circumstances do you think a discussion with the offender is 
appropriate rather than removing the man by arresting him ? •
BACK AT THE STATION/CUSTODY
1. As custody sergeant when an arrested person is brought into the station
what is your role ?
2. What are the options open to you ?
3. What influences your decision to charge ?
What influences your decision to remand the charged person in custody ?
A. What influences your decision tco defer the decision ?
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5. Have you ever had any doubts about a deferred decision you have made ?
6. Do you arrive at your decision to charge/defer decision following
consultation with others ?
7. If you consult, how, with whom etc ?
8. At what stage of the offenders time at the station (detention) do you
make a decision to charge ?
9. Do you keep the arrested person in for some time before you make a decision
to charge ?
10. What is the average detention time ?
11. What is the criteria for the deferred decision ?
12. What do you think about the policy guidelines on bailing ?
THE ARREST/DEFERRED DECISION POLICY AT SD
1. What do you know about the Commissioner's policy on domestic violence ?
2. What do you understand by the Streatham policy on domestic violence ?
3. Do you think it was put over well to you ?
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4. How was the policy put over ?
5. Do you feel that you should have been consulted ?
6. Do you agree with the policy ?
7. What percetage of the officers agree with the policy ?
8. How important, is the relationship of officers to senior management in
getting policy accepted ?
9. Police response/operational response - How many officers attend domestics
these days ?
10. Is there any preference for male or female officers ?
11. Does it make your role clear/less ambigious ?
12. Do you welcome the guidance 7
13. Does it save police time ?
14. Do you feel you are dealing with domestics better ? In what way does 
it make the police more effective ?
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15. Do you think victims are more or less satisfied with your way of handling 
it ?
16. Has arresting men ever created further difficulties/exacerbated the 
situation ?
17. Does the arrest take the heat out of the situation ?
18. What useful purpose does arrest serve ?
19. Does arrest have a deterrent function ?
CUSTODY
1. What do you think about the old DV policy (lack of it) ?
2. Has the new policy made your work (charge, detention, deferred), less
ambigious in the case of domestic violence ?
3. Does it save police time ?
4. What are the positive aspects of the policy ?
5. Are there any negative aspects
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6. What is the legal mandate for the new policy (deferred decision, detention)
7/15 If you don't agree with the policy how wouldyou feel about it if the
arrest and DD bail aspect were tested and approved by a court of law ?
8/14 Do you think the police in the past gave enough attention to DV ?
9. Is there anything else you would like to add ?
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP
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APPENDIX 10
9th October 1989 - Victim Interview
The incident took place on Wednesday 2nd August at 5pm and was reported at 
the same time.
CAN YOU GIVE ME THE DETAILS OF WHAT HAPPENED
We were out shopping, my boyfriend and myself, we were in Safeways and 
everything seemed to be all right, we had both of the children with us.
He had taken the youngest child out of the trolley and she was running 
all over the place, so he got annoyed. I don't know why or for what reason 
but an argument started and he pushed the trolley over. 1 :iaid O.K. I'm 
going back to the car, everybody was looking at me and I didn't want to 
stay in there any longer, so he took the car keys from me. His mum only 
lives around the corner so I thought I would go there until he calms down.
He followed me out and I was walking down the High Road, he got out of the 
car and started fighting with me, involving other members of the public.
He punched me and I was sore. I went into the bus station to get help,
whilst I was in there he took the children to his mother's and then came
back.
WHO CONTACTED THE POLICE
There was a bus station quite nearby so I went in there and asked to phone.
I called the police myself, I was frightened to go back out in the street 
because I thought if he can do that then he might just carry on. The police 
came and we both went to the station. At the time I was feeling quite upset 
and I had had enough of him and I wanted something done about it.
HAS THIS TYPE OF THING EVER HAPPENED BEFORE
Tes, I've known him for about 10 years and over the years it has got worse, 
that's why I wanted something done about it. It started in the home, but 
then he didn’t care where he started, we have had small arguments, but that 
was the first fight in public. But they have been much worse.
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HAS CALLING THE POLICE MADE THE RELATIONSHIP BETTER OR WORSE
Both really, I think its a lot better if it works out and it has been so far,
but then again in little arguments he will go on about it so there is still
some bad feeling about it, but overall I think it is better, he is more 
reasonable. He thinks a lot more whereas before he just used to hit out.
Usually he is very sorry afterwards, and this time he knew I was serous about 
it and so he tends to give more. Whereas he used to just argue now he is a 
bit more understanding. Since he has been cautioned we still argue but its 
not as bad and there is no violence, now its mainly sarcasm rather than anything
else, and then a bit later he will speak, that breaks the silence, so its not
too bad now.
I think the only reason that is - is because he knows that if he does anything 
now he's got a three year bound over, and thats held over his head, and so 
I think that helps him to think whereas before he had no threat to him and so 
he could just go into a rage, nut now he has to think about what he is doing.
I think while I put up with it for so long he thought I didn't mind it and 
could go on living like it. You can’t really stand up to them physically 
but this way you have got the law backing you up.
Also a lot of women go to the police and they they will bundle you off to a 
women's refuge with the kids, whereas now th epolice are actually saying stay 
in your home and your husband or boyfriend will go somewhere else. That 
helps as well. I don't know how he will be after the 3 years but hopefully 
it will continue like this. He goes to work so he can't really afford to get 
into trouble anyway. He's an engineer and he has got a job so it would be a 
lit of embarrassment for him, and he would lose his job. I had him back 
because he said things would be better and he didn't want to leave his 
children. I didn't want the children to be without a father, so those are 
some of the reasons.
HOW MUCH DO YOU THINK IT WAS THE ARREST AND HOW MUCH THE CAUTION
I think 90% arrest and 10% caution, knowing that something can be done about 
it and losing his liberty for a little while would make anyone think. Also 
if it happens again it won't be my decision the police decide what to do and 
I think this helps me vecause he can't blame me. The police are taking the 
responsibility.
I think its brought things to light to him about men being aggresive and 
violent and what can be done and that I don't have to put up with it.
Perhaps if I had had this back up earlier it wouldn't have gone this far.
Because over the years he had been getting worse, getting more aggresive 
and more violent, but not to other people only to me. Even if somebody else 
upset him he would take it out on me.
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HOW DID HE FEEL ABOUT THE CAUTION
I think he felt like a naughty schoolboy, but its brought a lot of things to 
light and his behaviour has changed and for 3 years he has got to behave.
IF THE POLICE HAD DECIDED TO PROSECUTE WOULD YOU HAVE GONE TO COURT
At the time, yes, I would have. Because I was adamant that I wanted something 
done about it. At the time I wanted to end the relationship because I didn't 
want that for the rest of my life. My mother has been through the same thing 
and so it seemed like history repeating itself and I didn't want that. I was 
depressed and really feeling miserable about the whole thing so I would have 
done it, but as long as I didn't see him during that time and he stayed away.
If I had no contact with him during that time then I would have, but seeing 
him and then you get back together again, is different and more difficult.
But because it has been going on for such a long time, I got to the point 
where I thought, well I am me and I shouldn't have to suffer this.
COULD THE POLICE HAVE DONE ANYTHING THAT WOULD HAVE HELPED YOU MORE
I think they could have emphasised while they had him at the station about
staying away form the home, either for a week or two weeks. They did say to
stay at his mum's but they said then go back to sort things out. It seemed 
as though they left things wide open. After his dad had picked him up and I 
had gone back to my car that was it. So although they were helpful I still 
felt a little bit threatened that he could come back and start again. If there 
was an injunction that the police could do it would be better. Its just 
afterwards that you are most vulnerable because you don’t know how they are 
going to react they can either be frightened by the whole thing and calm down, 
or they could say how dare you and want revenge. Its the fear afterwards, 
or they don't want people to find out about what's been going on. I think 
immediate protection would be a good idea.
WOULD YOU CALL THE POLICE AGAIN
Yes, I would because since then it has been O.K. and I don't want to go back
to that and so if he started again I would. Then they would have to make him
stay away or arrest him and say you can't go back there or otherwise something 
is going to happen to you.
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WHAT WAS YOUR PARTNERS REACTION WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED
He vas quite shocked when I said arrest him, he was doubtful about it.
FOR HOW LONG WAS HE DETAINED
They kept us both there for about two or three hours, I sat mostly on my own • 
in the interview room. They kept coming backwards and forwards saying they 
had spoken to him and had told him about this two months thing. He admitted 
hitting me, he didn’t really have a choice.
LEAVING THE POLICE STATION
We didn’t leave together, his father came to collect him and he left, and then 
I went back down to where my car was parked in the High Road, I then went to 
pick up the kids at his mum's and then I came home, and he stayed at his mum’s. 
Because they said that was the best thing they could suggest. They said after 
that it was up to me to decide what I wanted to do, whether I wanted him back 
here or I wanted him to go womewhere else. His parents were not surprised 
because they had known about the arguments and fights before, what his mum 
usually says to me is to come down to her house and let him stay here so he can 
cool down for a little while. So usually I am running here there and everywhere 
or going down to his mum’s. She said she had given up talking to him because
he didn’t listen. They were quite upset, but as far as they saw it if it was
going to do some good then they were for it.
He was angry he didn’t like being arrested, obviously for ego reasons but on 
the other hand he said that in a way I was justified, because if it was him 
he wouldn’t like it either, before you couldn't reason with him, he wouldn’t 
say anything like that. He has never been arrested before and it was a big 
shock to him.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNIT CONTACT
When he went back to the station to be cautioned I went with him because she 
had been trying to contact me, but I hadn't been here. She did say to me if 
I had any more problems I could go along and talk to her. I didn’t see her 
during the two months, she said I was out or she couldn’t phone. I spoke to 
her that once and she gave me her number and said I could contact her if I 
wanted to talk about it. It was useful knowing that if something does happen 
I've got someone I can ring. Usually its my mum but she doesn't like getting
involved and my dad isn’t in this country and so its either his parents or
nobody, so it helps having someone else.
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PREVIOUS POLICE CONTACT
When I've phoned the police before they have just come up here and said 
what they had to say, I said what I had to say and they just left it at 
that. He promised he wouldn't do anything else, but when they had gone it 
was a different story. I haven't phoned them often. I've been too frightened, 
but it has been going on for a long time now and I was just fed up with it.
They did nothing before, I think now they are willing to do a lot more, before 
if there was no physical injury that they could see or any argument going on 
whilst they were there, then they were satisfied and just went away again, 
that was it. If they can't see any injuries on your face then they are not 
interested, I have had bruises and scratching and things but not on my face 
and so they don't really show at the time. The bruises sometimes come up a 
lot more by the next day, or I have had lumps and bumps in my head. I've 
always tried to cover my face, so that people don't know. If my face was hurt 
I wouldn't go out.
I think that is what stops a lot of people going to the police, you think when 
that happens - well that is it I'm not going to get any help.
POLICE RESPONSE
The police arrived in about 8-10 minutes, two cars and 4 policemen. They took 
us away in separate cars. Whether it was men or women didn't make any 
difference, it was if they were understanding. I think it is good for men to
see that men do this. They took me seriously and believed me. He was trying
to say it was just between us. They took us both to the station and asked what 
I wanted done about it, I said I wanted him arrested this time otherwise he 
will just continue to think he can do whatever he wants to do. So they spoke
to him and they spoke to me for quite a while, they wanted to know whose fault
it was, later they said that they had this new system that meant for a period
of two months he has to behave, and then he has to come back and get cautioned
and then they will decide what happens after that.
They told me about injunctions but said it would take a while to get it into 
action and then it would have to be me who would go down to the court and do 
it, and that puts you off a bit, because you have to go there and it would take
a while and it could still happen in the meantime.
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APPENDIX
Interview held on 5th October 1989 with 'X'. 'X* was arrested outside the
skating rink at A. 15pm on 2nd August 1989, he's aged 27. He'd had an argument 
with his co-habitee whilst out shopping which resulted in him slapping her in 
the face. He has a long criminal record including robbery, attempted theft,
ABH, criminal damage, handling stolen goods and has been in both borstal and 
prison, the last time was a year ago. The couple have two children and they 
live together, and htere has been violence in the relationship for the last 
two years. The injuries the woman received was a bruised cheek and bruised 
right elbow.
I go toff with just a caution and a warning not to get into any more problems 
over the next three years. I don't know if I will, there's a lot of things 
building up. Some things day in day out, you know kids don't stop. Well she 
works as well now, we both need to work, now its easy we've got money coming 
in. Well what happened was I slapped her in the face, we'd been shopping, she 
was pushing a trolly, I kicked that after an argument and she walked off. I 
followed her, one thing led to another and I hit her. She called the police, 
they nicked me in the street. Quite a few came, I think four, two at first 
and then another four. Two P.C's were in uniform. The uniform they wanted to 
have a dig at me, they tried to be rough, they were saying things to get me to 
retailiate. Coming up sort of trying to get me to do something physical. They 
were making the situation worse than it was. They were taking advantage of 
the situation. You see it makes things worse because you can't sort out your 
problems when others are involved. They're pouring water on you and you're 
already soaking wet. Not all policemen are out for the rough stuff but some 
take advantage. I can understand though, they're human. Well no its not the 
first time its happened, it happens quite a bit. It was usually a simple slap 
across the face, in the past its been the same thing, I was once eating something 
and she was getting at me and I tried to poke her in the arm and in fact it 
caused blood, I had to take her to hospital. They just said let it heal up.
She's called the police before, I think twice. They said either separate or 
stay apart for the night and told me what I could do about it myself. I'm a 
regular with the police. I've got all sorts on my record from the age of 17 
to 26 so when I was arrested this time it was no big deal. I was kept until 
it must have been about 11 o'clock, about 8 hours in all. The sergeant who 
spoke to me was reasonable, the interview was O.K. he could have made a better
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her, I don't blame her fully, I blame myself 60% and her 40%. It made matters 
said, its a sad thought as you sit and think two of us here love each other
and it comes down to me getting locked up in a cell for 8 hours. But she didn't
have any choice. I don't think she was wrong phoning the police. I prefer 
her to phone rather than me doing something wrong and not having her. Its 
nonesense to even think that I have got a right to hit her, no one has, no one's 
got a right to hit any woman. The effect. Well its had quite a lot. Before 
I used to flop my lid, it was just another way out of the situation, now I've 
got to try something else, I still shout and scream but I think more about what 
can happen to me and I've done nothing physical. To be honest I hadn't 
really thought about this whole thing until tonight when she reminded me I had 
to come here. Then it makes you think because we do get on well, we've been 
together for about 10 years, we met at school, and to be honest in there I've 
been thinking, what right have I got to act the way I do. I've actually looked
at it from her point of view. I never thought what she wanted, and I never
thought why should she stand there and take a beating in a shop from me. She 
did the right thing. I'm not like those blokes who hit their women for 
nothing. In effect then its a good thing, at first I thought what a bunch of 
cunts interferring in my relaitonship. Its like them telling me eath, drink, 
go for a shit, then go to bed. Its like being back in prison. In fact being 
locked up was rather like a refresher course, that 8 hours was the same as 
in the past it made me think. In fact I think this survey is good. I'm 
not scared of my name being used, if I can help you all the better. Its a 
good thing, I mean who wants to see their mum with lumps and cracked bones 
or even dropping ddovn dead. I don't want to look on and know that I caused 
it or contributed to it.
End of interview;
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Sex and violence 
behind closed doors
APPENDIX 12
Vill a positive arrest policy being pioneered in London be enough to stop a man beating his w^e? 
asks Robert Chessh\Te
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH. TUESDAY APRIL 9. 1991 15
A SPARROW ot a woman with tw ig -lik e  lim b s and  a pinched, sallow face sat in a 
bare room above a London police 
station and in a low, matter-of-fact 
voice recounted a catalogue of suf­
fering that suggested she had been 
th e  v ic tim  of a p ro fe s s io n a l  
torturer.
"M arie" had once been beaten so 
severely in the face that it was 
impossible to tell the colour of her 
skin beneath the livid bruising; 
twice her assailant had attempted 
to rape her, her rings had been 
ripped from her fingers; she bad 
been woken in the night and contin­
uously struck for six hours; ammo­
nia was thrown at her. burning her
Physical abuse did not satisfy her 
torm entor be would take dishes 
from the fridge, throw them to the 
floor and order her to clean up the 
mess; when “Marie” slept in at her 
mother's flat on her birthday, he 
arrived from an all-night drinking 
session and denounced her as a 
"lazy slut” ; when she tried to run 
away, a carving knife was held to 
her throat.
If h e r  a t ta c k e r  had  b een  a 
stranger, a police alert would have 
been issued  and local w om en 
advised to lock their doors and stay 
at home ^ e r  dark. He was. in fact.
her husband, and most of her suffer- _ 
ing took place behind the dosed 
doors of their council flat.
When "M arie " had finished her 
unhappy tale, her place on the 
orange vinyl armchair was taken by 
“ Mary". The purple scar across her 
black face is a permanent testament 
to what she went through; she bad 
escaped after thi? final attack —
Most of her suffering 
took place behind 
the closed doors 
of their council fla t
having endured 15 years of inter­
m ittent violence — by climbing 
through a window, shinning two 
storeys to the ground and fleeing 
barefoot. For weeks she dreamt she 
was trapped in a huge house: how­
ever far or fast she ran. she could
never reach the front door and 
safety. The husbands’ families had 
sided with their men. and tried to 
get the women to "sort the problem 
out" without recourse to the police. 
"W hat am I to do?” asked “ Mary” 
despairingly, "lie back and take it. 
and wait until he murders me?” At 
least once, each woman had felt she 
was about to be killed.
They were articulate; and neither 
struck me as the proverbial door­
mat. Yet both bad endured personal 
hell for years; both had repeatedly 
believed their husbands when the 
violence dissolved into contrition 
and the men swore they would 
never again lay a hand on them. .
Research has established that a 
woman suficrs an average of 35 
attacks by her partner before she 
goes to the police, a finding sus­
tained by this sad sample. Despite 
th is  Jo b -lik e  to le ra n c e . 1.000 
women a week report domestic vio­
lence to the Metropolitan Police.
For 20 years, since the foundation 
of the refuge movement for bat­
te red  wives, a grow ing p u b lic -  
understanding of the natu re of 
d o m es tic  v io lence has slow ly 
eroded the twin stereotypes — that 
abusers are all drunken louts who 
knock their wives about on Satur­
day nights, and that women — in 
this context, "sluts” — ask for it.
Surprisingly, nowhere has this 
revision of popular prejudice been 
more marked than in the ranks of 
the police. Most London divisions 
now have domestic violence units, 
and one has pioneered a positive 
arrest policy that would have left 
old-timers, who believed that avun­
cular advice was all that a “domes­
tic” required, shaking their beads 
in wonderment.
This month a report based on a 
year's research into the practice 
adopted in S treatham  in south 
London recommends to the Home 
Office that a tough, consistent 
approach to domestic violence is 
ad o p ted  by p o lice  fo rce s  
nationwide.
The heart of the policy is that
assailants shall be pursued and 
arrested as determinedly as if they 
were burglars; once caught, they 
should be prosecuted or — if the 
case meets certain criteria — given 
an official "caution". Police officers 
are no longer left free to make mor­
al judgm en ts, such as did she 
“deserve" it?
While the CID pursues the case 
against culprits, the domestic vio­
lence unit attends to victims. The 
women 1 met regarded the small 
Streatham office staffed by two 
WPcs as — in the words of one — a 
“ heme from home". If a woman is 
to summon the independence not to 
return to her abuser and the cour­
age to give evidence against him. 
she needs moral and practical 
support.
Thus far. thus acceptable to most 
who work with battered» women. 
But one aspect, at least, of the 
Streatham approach — use of the 
caution — is proving controversial 
with those who run refuges. Sandra 
Horley. director of Chiswick Family
Rescue and with 15 years experi­
ence of w orking w ith ab u sed  
women, believes that it is a weak 
response.
She points to statistics in Canada, 
where research shows that domes­
tic violence dropped a quarter when 
prosecution became the invariable 
consequence of arrest. She argues 
vehemently that introducing the
caution, even for a minority of 
offenders, “decriminalises" domes­
tic violence at the very time society 
is at last beginning to take it 
seriously.
The police response is that a 
“caution" is no mere salutary word 
of advice, but a formal sanction 
involving an admission of guilt. The 
offender is photographed and fin­
gerprinted; the caution rem ains 
“active" for three years and. in the 
event of a further attack, leads to a 
sliffer sentence.
, The  assau lt m ust be a f irs t 
offence, be “ minor” in nature — 
“reddening of skin", “ slight bruis­
ing” . according to one senior officer 
— and the victim must agree that a 
caution is acceptable.
According to Chief Superinten­
dent Ian Buchan, it is not an alter­
native to prosecution, but to doing 
nothing, which — in the light of the 
frequent unwillingness of victims to 
give evidence — was previously the 
all-too-common outcome.
■ The reality is that only half the 
serious cases that are prosecuted 
result in convictions. Where the 
woman is a reluctant witness, the 
Crown Prosecution Service will sel­
dom send a case for trial, and the 
wife batterer gets away with it.
Police and refuge staff complain 
that courts fail to reflect the seri­
ousness of domestic assaults in 
their sentences. It is rare, said one 
police officer, for anyone to be fined 
more than £100. "The courts." WPc 
Lynn Robinson of the Streatham 
domestic violence unit said sternly.
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One m urder in fo u r  
starts as dom estic  
iinlcnce against 
women: yet 
complaints to police o f  
assault in the home 
'ten seem a waste o f  
time. Does a pilot 
project a t Streatham , 
offering short sharp  
shock treatm ent to 
male offenders and  
follow-up intervention, 
signal new hope?
BY SARAH 
BAXTER
H av e a  s le e p  o n  it. y o u ’ll feel b e tte r  
in th e  m o rn in g .’ h a s  for y e a rs  been 
—  th e  t ra d itio n a l  d o -n o th in K  police re ­
s p o n s e  to  d o m e s tic  v iolence. But 
th is  V a le n tin e ’s  D a y  in  S trea th am . 
m en  w h o  h a d  thnu .tth t th a t a  few 
s la p s  in th e  face  w ere  a  p r iv a te  
m a tte r ,  m a y  h a v e  b een  d raR xed  to 
th e  po lice  s ta t io n ,  p h o to g ra p h e d , 
f in g e rp rin te d  a n d  lo ck ed  u p  over- 
n ijih t. it is a ll p a r t  o f  a  p ilo t p ro jec t, ru n  b y  th e  local police, to  
sh o ck  m en  o u t  o f  v io len t b e h a v io u r  p a tte rn s .  If su ccessfu l, it 
co u ld  be a d o p te d  th ro u g h o u t  th e  L o n d o n  a re a .
O n e  in fo u r m u rd e r s  a re  th e  re s u lt  o f  d o m e s tic  vio lence a n d  
s tu d ie s  sh o w  th a t  o n  a v e ra g e  w o m e n  h a v e  b een  a s sa u lte d  35 
tim e s  b e fo re  th e y  f in a lly  r e a c h  fo r th e  te le p h o n e  a n d  d ial 999. 
Y et. s a y s  S tre a th a m  W PC  M a g g ie  W ilso n . "W e w ere  litera lly  
t ra in e d  no t to  g e t in v o lv e d  in  th e se  c a se s . W e  w ere  told to  
s e p a ra te  p a r tn e rs  a n d  a d v is e  th em  to  s e e  a  so lic ito r  o r th e  
C itizen ’s  .A dvice B u re a u .’ S h e  c la im s  th a t  a t t i tu d e s  h av e  been  
tra n s fo rm e d  a t th e  s ta t io n . T h e r e  re a l ly  h a s  b een  a  b ig  
c h a n g e .’
T h e  p ro jec t w a s  in itia te d  las t .April b y  S u p e r in te n d e n t Ian 
B u ch an , w h o  s a y s  th a t  u n til  r e c -n tly .  h e  h a d  m u ch  th e  sam e  
a t t i tu d e  to w a rd s  " d o m e s tic s ” a s  a n y  p o lice  o fficer '. He a lte red  
h is a p p ro a c h  a f te r  u n d e r ta k in g  a  .M aster’s  d e g re e , w h ich  led 
h im  to  s tu d y  th e  s u b je c t  in  d e p th .
S u p e r in te n d e n t  B u c h a n  b e liev es  th a t  H o m e  O ffice  s ta tis tic s  
o n  d o m es tic  v io len ce  a re  h ig h ly  m is le a d in g . 'W h e n  a  w om an  
c o n ta c ts  u s . w e  a c c e p t  th a t  w h a t  sh e  s a y s  a t  th e  tim e  h a s  
h a p p e n ed , i r r e sp e c tiv e  o f  w h e th e r  s h e  w i th d ra w s  h e r s ta te ­
m en t la te r  on . If w e  a re  g o in g  to  o ffe r  v ic t im s  s u p p o rt ,  w e h av e  
to  b e liev e  w h a t  th e y  sa y . W e  u se d  to  " n o  c rim e  ” th o se  cases , 
b u t th e y ’re  n o w  rec o rd e d  so  th a t  w e  c a n  g e t a  reaso n ab le  
in d ic a tio n  o f  th e  level o f  a s s a u l ts .’ H e a ls o  b e lie v e s  in 'e a rly  
in te rv e n tio n  a n d  a r r e s t ’ —  e v e n  in  c a s e s  o f  v e rb a l h a ra s sm e n t 
o r  a b u s e  —  a n d  a r r e s t  r a te s  in  S t re a th a m  h a v e  ro ck e ted  60 per 
cen t.
B ut S u p e r in te n d e n t  B u c h a n ’s  p o lic y  is  n o t  u n iv e rsa lly  a d ­
m ired . .A lth o u g h  h e  c la im s . W e  re  k w k in g  a t  d o m e s tic  v io lence 
from  a c rim in a l, n o t a  m o ra l p o in t o f  v iew .’ n o t  a ll o ffen d e rs  a re  
c h a r.c td  w ith  a s s a u l t .  If th e  p o lice  c o n s id e r  th e  in c id en t 'm in o r ' 
a n d  th e  w o m a n  is re lu c ta n t  to  g iv e  e v id e n c e  a g a in s t  h e r p a r t ­
n e r. he  is lo ck ed  u p  for a  co o lin g  o f t' p e rio d  a n d  a  decision  on 
w h e th e r  to  c h a rg e  h im  is d e fe r re d  fo r tw o  m o n th s .  H e is bailed  
to  re tu rn  to  th e  s ta t io n  a t  th e  e n d  o f  th a t  p e rio d , w h en  he m ay  
o n ly  Ix- c a u tio n e d  —  lik e  a  ju \e n i le  —  fo r h is  b e h a v io u r. T h e  
H. .m e O ffice h a s  g ra n te d  th e  s ta t io n  £23.fXX) fo r th re e  re se a rch ­
e rs  to  m o n ito r  th e  p o lic y ’s  d e te r re n t  effec t.
S u p e r in te n d e n t  B u c h a n  m a in ta in s :  I t ’s  ta n ta m o u n t  to  a  c o n ­
v ic tio n . b iv a u s e  th e  cauti-an  c a n  b e  c ite d  in  c o u r t  fo r u p  to  th ree  
y e a rs  a n d  m a g is tr a te s  a n d  ju d g e s  c a n  ta k e  it in to  acco u n t 
w h e n  s e n te n c in g .’ D u r in g  th e  tw o -m o n th  p e rio d , a  do m estic  
v io len ce  tea m , ru n  b y  M a g g ie  W ilso n  a n d  .A nne M erch an t, ta lk  
to  th e  v ic tim s  a n d  o ffe r  th etii s u p p o rt .  T h e y  a ls o  ch eck  for a n y  
re c u rre n c e  o f  v io lence .
P ushing  and  slapping
A ty p ic a l m in o r ’ in c id en t .x c u r r e d  b i 'tw e e n  J o h n  B lake  (not h is  
rea l n am e) a n d  h is  w ife  tw o  m o n th s  a g o . H e  w a s  b ack  a t  the 
s ta t io n  last w eek  to  rece iv e  a  c a u tio n  fo r p u s h in g  a n d  s la p p in g  
h is  w ife, c a u s in g  h e r  to  fall o \ c r  fu rn i tu re .  S h e  d id  not w an t 
h im  c h a rg e d  w ith  a s s a u l t  a r .d  la te r  d e n ie d  th a t  th e  fall w as h is  
fau lt. J o h n  w a s  s till  s e e th in g  w ith  re s e n tm e n t  a b o u t k i n g  
d u m p e d  111 a  cell. 1 w a s  s tu c k  in a  sh it  h o le  th a t  1 w o u ld n  t even  
k e e p  m y  d o g s  in. T h e y  k e p t m e  all n ig h t  m  th is  freezing  cell 
w ith  p « ,h  p ^ 'h  a n d  lo id  a ll >w e r th e  w a lls . I' w a s  h u m ilia tin g .'
H is r e s p m s e  ra is e s  te a rs  a k m t  th e  e f ic v tiv e n e ss  of a
tion . a s  o p p o se d  to  a  s tr a ig h tf o rw a r d  policv  o f a r re s t  a n d  
ch a rg e . D eep d o w n , t h a t ’s  g o in g  to  be a n o th e r  th in g  I 've  b i t .  
tied  in  w h en  a n o th e r  ro w  b re w s  u p . ' h e  s a y s . If it h a p o e n e d  to 
so m eo n e  a  b it n a s ty .  1 re c k o n  th e  n e x t  tim e  thev  d id  s -v m e th in ^  
they  m ig h t m ak e  it w o r th  b e in g  n ick ed  for. Not m.e. I'm. just 
tr>-ing to  g iv e  y o u  a n  id ea  o f  w h a t  o thers; m ig h t th ink .
F o r th is  rea so n . S a n d ra  H o rley  o f  C h isw ick  F am ilv  Rescue 
a rg u e s  th a t th e  S tre a th a m  p ro g ra m m e  co u ld  be p i> itiv e lv  dan  
.gerous. It leav es  w o m en  a t  r is k  o f  fu rth e r  v io le n c e . 'W h a t  
h a p p e n s  in  th a t  tw o -m o n th  co o lin g -o ff  p c n o d ?  T h e se  w om en 
a re  p o ssib ly  g o in g  to  b e  m u rd e re d . .Arc th ev  go in g  to  be on a 
s tre tc h e r  n e x t timei*’
H orley  p i in t s  to  C a n a d ia n  s tu d ie s  sh o w in g  th a t sm ong  a t  
t K t  a n d  c h a rg e  p o lic ies  d e c re a s e  lev e ls  o f  violence a g a in st 
w om en , w h ile  p o lice  in te rv e n tio n  w ith o u t  c h a rg in g  can  lead to 
e sca la tin g  a s sa u l ts .  S h e  c la im s . "C au tion ing  is d o w n -g rad in g  
th e  s ta tu s  o f  th e  c rim e. I t 's  l ik e  sa y in g . "You be a g o id  boy." 
W h en  a re  w e  g o in g  to  c o m e  to  te rm s  w ith  the  fact th a t  w hat 
b e g in s  w ith  a  p u s h  a n d  a  s h o v e  c a n  en d  u p  in m urder?"
L’n d er th e  p rese n t B r i tish  leg a l sy s te m , how ever, ch arg es  
cou ld  n ev e r be  m a d e  to  s tic k  a g a in s t  s o m w n e  like John. So. 
w ith o u t a cau tio n , he  co u ld  h a v e  b e e n  re leased  scot-free. .And. 
in  a ll likelihood, h e  w o u ld  n e v e r  h a v e  been  a rre s te d  in th e  first 
p lace. T h e  S tre a th a m  po lice  b e lie v e  "som eth ing  is b e tte r  than  
nothing".
S u p e r in te n d en t B u c h a n  c la im s  th a t  p rev io u sly . 46 per cent 
o f  c a se s  w ere  d ro p p e d  b y  th e  C ro w n  P ro s e c jtio n  Serv ice, m ain  
ly  b ecau se  th e  vvom an w a s  u n w il lin g  to  giv e evidence. So far. 
o n ly  four o u t o f  11 m en  ta k e n  in to  custc<dy a t S tre a th am  ur.dt-r 
th e  pilot s ch em e  h a v e  re o ffe n d ed . "1 co u ld  sa y  " Isn 't  it m arvel 
lo u s” b u t a  m a n  c a n  q u i te  e a s i ly  a d ju s t  h is  b e h a v io u r for a 
sh o rt  period  o f  tim e .’ o b se rv  e s  B u c h a n . "It w ou ld  b e  na iv e  of me 
to  sa y  it’s  su ccess fu l. W h a t 1 a m  s a y in g  is th a t  it s  b e tte r  than  
n o th in g  —  a n d  th a t  is  w h a t  w a s  h a p p e n in g  before ’
N or d o  th e  S tre a th a m  p o lice  h e s ita te  to  c h a rg e  offenders 
D u rin g  o n e  rec e n t w e e k e n d , s ix  in c id e n ts  o f  a s sa u lt  vvcre re 
co rd ed , five  m en  w e re  c h a rg e d  a n d  o n lv  one m an  w a s  offered a 
tw o -m o n th  d e fe rred  d e c is io n '.  L a te r  th a t  w eek, it p roved  diffi 
c u lt  for th e  d o m es tic  v io len ce  u n i:  to  p e rsu a d e  their v ia im s  t :  
b r in g  ev id en ce  a g a in s t  th e m .
Too DEPRESSED
Ja ck ie  S te p h en s  (not h e r  rea l n a m e )  c a m e  to  th e  s ta tio n  las: 
Week to  b eg  .Anne M e rc h a n t a n d  M a g g ie  W ilson  to  
c h a rg e s . S h e  w a s  30. b u t  lo o k ed  lik e  a  L r lo r n  IS-year-old. b w  
w a s  a lso  e ig h t m o n th s  p re g n a n t  a n d . w h e n  a sk ed  ii sh e  "  
th e  b a b y . s h v A  h e r  h e a d  a n d  m u rm u re d . "I m  f v ,  dep ressed .
H er b o y frien d  h a d  s la p p e d  h e r  a n d  p oked  h e r in th e  eye. 
c a u s in g  h e r left ey e lid  to  sw e ll. S h e  h a d  ca lled  th e  P 'l 'c e  to 
h a v e  h im  rem o v ed  fro m  th e  h o u se , b u t w a s  d is tre s se d  m  fino 
h im  ch a rg e d  w ith  a s sa u l t .  If 1 h a d  b e e n  b leed in g  it w ould  have 
k v n  d iffe ren t.’ sh e  sa id . 1 d o n 't  th in k  i t 's  r ig h t th a t r.e w ^  
ch a rg ed . 1 sh o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  g iv e n  th e  cho ice. 1 d o n ’t \v ;n t  hi. 
g o in g  to  c o u rt. I d o n ’t th in k  it ’s  s e r io u s  e n o u g h .’ b h e  tu rr .ra  ■' 
th e  tw o  W rC s  a g g re s s iv e ly :  'W ill  y o u  d r . 'p  th e  c h a rg e s  '.he. 
S h e  then  a d d id  b e see c h in g ly . 'P le a s e  d ro p  th e  c h a rg es .
By th is  tim e  th e  p a p e rs  w e re  w ith  t'ne C row n P t j^ s iv u t^  
b iTvice. w h ich  a lo n e  c a n  d e c id e  w h e th e r  th e  ca se  wili pr'^vj- 
B ut Jack ie  co m p e lled  .A nne M e rc h a n t  to  ta k e  d o w n  a 
m en t, e m p h a s is in g  h e r  r e fu s a l  to  g iv e  e v id en ce  th e  c a rt 
a g a in s t  h e r  b o y frie n d  w ill p ro b a b ly  n e v e r  reach  co u rt.
R ita, a  w o rk e r  a t  a  s o u th  L o n d o n  reftig e . w o u ld  '
b t re a th a m ’s  ptilii-y e x te n d e d  to  o th e r  s ta t io n s . "It s a  lot e.e.i 
c u t th an  m o st, a n d  it g iv e s  w o m e n  tim e  to  fin d  a  p lace  " I ■
by  h tildir.g  m en  in th e  c e lls .’ s h e  r e m a rk s . .At her ref'J.ge is • 
Shaw  (not hiT  rea l n am e), a  5 3 -y ea r-o ld  w o m a n  w h o se  
h a s  been  c h a rg e d  w ith  .A ctual IV d iiy  H a n n  a f te r  he  lockec
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John, a maie 
offender. 7 was 
stuck in a shit-hole 
that I wouldn’t  even 
keep my dogs in. 
They kept me all 
night in this 
freezing cell with 
pooh-pooh and food 
all over the walls. It 
was humiliating.’
in her home over the weekend and assaulted her. "She's been 
marvellous." she says of Maggie. She took Gill to hospital, 
ferried her to the refuge and helped her move her possessions 
from her flat.
"1 m never going back.’ says Gill. 'It's a lovely feeling at the 
refuge. I can walk down the road and not look behind me. I'm 
not coming out until I've been rehoused. There's no way. I had 
to SI", in the dark. I couldn't put my TV on. because 1 couldn’t 
let him know 1 was in 1 had to sit with the window closed last 
•■•’mmer. even in the heatwave. If 1 go back. I'll end up in the 
dhousc'
Sandra Horley has no complaints about the Streatham 
tearr.'s dtd iation  and competence, irrespective of whether of­
fenders are charged. She believes the follow-up attention they 
pa\ ! ,  each ca.sr is first class, but insists. It's all right at 
S".rt. -'nam while it's a controlled experiment, but are other
rah ig a . Below: WPC Anne 
M erchent erffers M ippert on 
th e  phene.
people going to be as committed as Superintendent Buchan? I
I'm afraid that the net will widen and we'll end up with more iwe « &euth London 
cautions than charges. It will become a soft option for police 
forces.’
She accepts that too many cases get droppt^ by the Crown 
Prosecution Service, but says. This is where imagination has 
to come in. .^ e  the police gathering enough ev idence? .Neigh­
bours can witness assaults, children can witness assaults. It's 
not just a matter for the police, it's a matter of changing 
attitudes among the judiciary as well.'
.And it IS in court that the debate about whether or not to 
charge offenders becomes almost arcane. .Maggie Wilson says.
S> many women are afraid their man's going to be thrown iri 
jail and the key thrown away. It doesn t happen like that We 
wish it would sometimes.' So what do men get for domestic 
violence' Fines and bindovers.' she sighs
TIVKun i:
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Beating the 
wife beater
Domestic violence cases have not 
always been taken seriously by the 
police, but they are now. . . 
Duncan Campbell reports on the 
controversial experiment of special 
units and ‘deferred cautions’
ARLY in the new 
year the Home Office 
wiU take delivery of a 
.new report on domes- 
  f tic violence, the re­
sult of a controversial experi­
ment in south London aimed at 
tackling a problem that has 
been swept under official car­
pets for years.
In Streatham a man who now 
assaults or threatens his wife 
during a row will find himself 
arrested, taken to the local 
police station, held there for a 
number of hours and then 
given a "deferred caution" 
which requires him to return  
two months later to see an 
officer of the rank of Inspector 
or above. He will be finger­
printed and photographed.
If, in the course of the two 
months, he is violent or th reat­
ening again, the caution will be 
activated and he will be 
charged with assault. If the 
wife or girlfriend wants him 
charged in the first place, 
charged he will be.
The woman will also have the 
support of the Domestic Vio­
lence Unit, operated by two 
women police officers from a 
small office attached to the 
Streatham police station. They 
will go to court with her if she 
wants, point her in the direc­
tion of a women’s refuge if she 
needs it and. above all, take her 
complaints seriously. "In the 
old days, not much would be 
done," says Wl>C Lynn Robin­
son, who Joined the unit from 
the tactical support group and 
after 13 years in the force. “It 
would always be entered in the 
crime book as no crime’."
Promoting lids project o f“de- 
ferred cautlnn ”, Superinten­
dent Ian llui liini has been 
w orkup on a i , ,*o,-t for the 
'' '•"'•‘■i’ rcquirc- 
clfJl rV '* ""  **"'• with Dr
For some the shock and em­
barrassm ent is enough. For 
others the threat of prosecaüon 
and a criminal record appears 
to work: if they do not offend 
again in the next three years 
the caution is struck from the 
files, an added incentive to the 
men to behave, Buchan feels.
There are doubts, however, 
about the concept of domestic 
violence units, which Buchan 
acknowledges: “Whenever 
you create a specialist unit 
there is a danger that you m ar­
ginalise the problem — and 
that applies to any walk of life, 
not just the police."
He recognises that some male 
officers had traditionally taken 
the part of the man when called 
to a scene. (There are a very 
few occasions when the woman 
is the offender: the morning we 
met an officer had received a 
bravery commendation after 
being attacked by a woman 
with a  meat cleaver during a 
"domestic" dispute.)
There are now 42 such units 
in London. Eighteen months 
ago there were 14. They have
The Divisional Community 
Liaison Officer, Inspector Don 
Broadbery, says it is important 
that the deferred caution sys­
tem means that women are not 
obliged to go through court, 
which many are reluctant to 
do. “I sometimes liken it to an 
endorsement of a driving 
licence to the men, I warn them 
that this is the only chance 
they’re going to get,”
So far their survey shows 
that 86 per cent of those taken
grown at the greatest speed in 
the Metropolitan area, al­
though Northumbria and West 
Yorkshire have been operating 
sim ilar schemes.
For Lynn Robinson the 
change is dramatic: “In the old 
days you would go to the call, 
tell them to quieten down and 
that would be that. Husband/ 
wife rows were taboo: it was 
down to them." She says that 
dealing with so much violence 
o r threat of it is stressful: “You 
go home every day with a head­
ache”  For this reason officers 
are moved around regularly, 
both for their own well-being 
and to give others experience in 
a subject of which they all need 
to be aware.
WPC Debbie Lee. who has 
just joined the umt aficr being 
a beat officer, says that alcohol 
is often a factor on “domes­
tics". The officers are out of 
uniform, she says, “to put the
V. -I a ;  l . h c i :  L a s . " .  •
in for deferred cautions have not 
re-offended. Of those taken in, 
27 per cent of those involved 
were girlfriends and boy­
friends, 33 per cent husbands/ 
wives and 25 per cent common 
law husbands/wives.
Sandra Horley, director of 
Chiswick Family Rescue, wel- 
dpmes the domestic violence 
mats in principle, praising the 
"extremely hard work" and com­
mitment of the officers. But she 
says there are a number of draw­
backs: the units are staffed only 
in office hours, while most do­
mestic violence occurs at night; 
they are "often poorly re­
sourced, with limited office 
space, when the women may 
need a quiet environment”; and, 
although dedicated, the unit offi­
cers are not properly trained for 
such demanding work.
She believes the Canadian sys­
tem of having trained 24-hour 
social workers attached to the 
station would work better, sug­
gesting that some police officers 
not attached to the unit still find 
such cases unimportant
And she has "big, big reserva­
tions" on deferred cautions. 
“Cautioning does not defend or 
protect women from being mur­
dered by their partners," she 
says. "My main worry is that it 
perpetuates the idea that this is 
not a serious crime.”
She is also wary of measuring 
“ success" in terms of no further
assaults. “How do you measure 
a fist being waved in your face, 
intimidation whether verbal or 
psychological? ” She favours 
again the Canadian system, 
where arrest and prosecution 
are automatic and figures for 
such violence have dropped a 
dramatic 25 per cent: "K sends a 
very clear message to tlie com­
munity."
She feels the answer is the 
threo-pvor.' •'■'I ii -  t:o“ o'
cnforccmo;." p . . .....
education) and senices (lu-ip- 
Ir.ies, support workers, counsel­
ling programmes;.
Watclting the developments in 
the handling of domestic vio­
lence for Scotland Yard is In­
spector Duncan Wilson, a sociol 
ogy graduate from Aberdeen 
University, who joined the Met 
after completing his studies and 
resisting the temptation to "be­
come a permanent student". He 
is pleased with the way the units 
have developed and points to 
Brixton, where a detective has 
just been appointed to the team
as an indication that the units ’
are not being marginalised.
The majority of officers on the 
units are women, although a 
third now have male officers. 
The clear-up rate is 84 per cent 
many times higher than for 
crimes like theft or burglary, al­
though obviously the perpetra­
tors are not hard to identify.
The development of the units 
within the police — although a 
Home Office select committee 
had looked progressively at the 
subject as long ago as 1975 but 
did not act on it — goes back to 
Sir Kenneth Newman, Sir Peter 
Imbert’s predecessor as Commis­
sioner. He set up a working 
party which reported back in 
1986. He had seen research from 
Canada — ironically borrowing 
from the 1975 select committee’s 
findings — which indicated how 
such units could operate, A year 
later a new force order required 
the reporting of domestic vio­
lence as a serious crime for the 
first time.
“Society’s problem was that it 
refused to accept that there was 
a problem,” says Wilson.
Now that it has, the units 
could expand. Ian Buchan posits 
the idea of family service units 
on the Canadian model which 
have under one roof a law en­
forcer and social workers avail­
able on a 24-hour basis. He ac­
knowledges fhat police officers, 
often without comprehensive 
training, can only do so much. 
(Currently the members of tlie 
unit counsel each other, there is 
no official training programme 
or back-up.)
Duncan Wilson agrees: “A 
m^jor factor is attitude — an 
Englishman’s home is his castle 
and a woman is his goods and 
chattels. Alcohol, to use a fire 
brigade expression, may well be 
an accelerator but attitude is the 
problem”
Relationships with women’s 
refuges are remarkably good, he 
says, although there was suspi­
cion initially. "When you con­
sider that it’s a crime predomi­
nantly committed by men 
against women those suspicions 
were quite healthy, but I think 
we've n’C' rd o;i since thoi:."
There is, all paities acknowl­
edge, a long way to go. As Susan 
Fdwards puts it in her book 
, To icing ’Homistic’ Violence 
(Sage I^blications): “In both 
criminal and civil practice 
women are frequently seen to 
ftirfc't their rieht to protection
.. -.1 , ■; ii - (.1 (.-iuint'tions
aonut them , . .  Tue fact tliai 
violent nr.d sexual assault con 
t - rtiaai.i immune from 
legal condemnation or sanction 
and social disapproval, merely 
because a victim has at some 
time shared a degree of in to acy  
with the offender is absurd, per- 
' verse and obscene."
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Jail the 
wlfe-beaters
D ailY
5^.
19^1
A night in the cells 
could stop attacks 
at home, Baker told
WIFE-BEATERS should be jailed for at least a 
night to try to ensure they don’t do it again, says 
a new report. .
It claims that 86 per cent of husbands arrested for domestic 
violence do not re-offend and recommends that all offenders 
should face the short, sharp shock treatment, whether they are 
finally charged or not.
The report tells Home Secretary 
Kenneth Baker that it pays to get 
tough with violent husbands.
It calls for every offender. Including 
respectable middle-class professionals, 
to be arrested, taken to a local police 
station and given a  ‘deferred caution'.
If the man Is then violent or threat­
ening within the n ert two months, he 
will be charged with assault.
The report was written by Superin­
tendent Ian. Buchan and Dr Susan 
Edwards, of Buckingham University, 
after a  pilot scheme in Streatham, 
South London. ,
The authors believe tha t thousands 
of men are learning the hard way 
th a t police officers are no longer a 
soft touch when it comes to domestic 
violence.
Since Streatham  opened its domestic - 
violence un it with two women pobce
By ArmiONY DORAN 
Home Affairs Correspondent
officers two years ago, another 41 
units have sprung up in London. The 
capital alone deals with about 1,000 
calls a week from women attacked by 
their partners.
Similar projects have been operating 
in Northumbria and West Yorkshire. 
Mr Buchan said: The number of calls 
we had from women — and occasion­
ally victimised men — doubled in a 
m atter of weeks.
•On average, women had been as­
saulted 35 times before they called the ' 
police. We have been criticised for our 
‘deferred caution' but we believe it 
works ' However, police say that if the 
woman victim insists on immediate 
charges, they will be brought.
mThe 1980s saw many achievements and some set-backs in the area of domestic violence. One achieve­ment has been the establishment, by 
the Metropolitan Police, of 33 domestic 
\nolcnce units. This was a splendid initia­
tive which has encouraged many more 
abused women to come forward. Early in 
1988,1 visited the Tottenham unit which 
pioneered the first domestic violence 
project. Since then, I have been involved 
with some training in units and have 
formed a great respect for the dedication, 
energy and commitment displayed by the 
officers who run them.
W'here domestic violence units and 
refuges have good communications, and 
training has taken place, effeaive work is 
being done. The distribution of posters, 
cards and leaflets throughout Met police 
stations has improved relations with 
agencies and the community. Assaulted 
women are more confident knowing that 
there is a specialist officer who can be 
contacted if the need arises.
Some officers feel that, where there are 
clear aims and objectives and also senior 
management support, the unit approach 
results in more cases going before the 
courts. Feedback has also shown the 
extent to which abused women and chil­
dren have benefited from the attention 
and care provided by specialist officers.
Unfortunately, where units have been 
set up, they are not available 24 hours a 
day and are poorly resourced in terms of 
staff and facilities. This means lack of 
availability for women and agencies at 
times when this contact is most often 
needed.
Some unit officers may have a greater 
awareness of problems in dealing with 
domestic violence, while some of their 
colleagues still have the traditional police 
view of domestic violence — that avoi­
dance is the best policy. Without special­
ist training these officers will never gain a 
greater understanding of the need to treat 
these cases as serious crimes.
Women still complain that some police 
refuse to attend an incident if they know 
it is a ‘domestic’. The other day. a social 
worker told me that late one night, she 
heard the sound of blows and a woman 
screaming in the flat next door. Because 
she knew the woman was in need of 
protection, she rang the police. Two 
constables arrived, but by then there was 
silence in the next door flat. The officers 
said they would not knock on the door 
unless they heard screaming. They waited 
five minutes. The flat was still silent, so 
they went away.
As in this case, it is not alwaj-s special­
ised unit officers who respond to crisis 
calls. As well as running the units, 
specialist officers do the follow-up work 
generated by others. They also respond 
to the numerous random calls from 
women seeking support and adricc.
It is easy for non-specialist officers to 
fall into the trap of the squad syndrome’
A CAUTION
AGAINST
CAUTIONING
Sandra Horley, Director of Chismck Family 
Rescue calls for expansion of the Met s 
domestic violence units and challenges the 
validity of a pilot scheme to use cautions 
when men have inflicted only ‘minor’ injuries
where they do not bother to deal with 
cases of domestic violence because they 
have a unit at their station. Furthermore, 
some domestic violence units, have been 
teamed up with child protection units, a 
move which not only marginalises but 
confuses both issues.
Specialist officers often feel they lack 
support. Colleagues or senior officers 
may not be trained to understand prob­
lems of the abuse of women or be as 
committed to tackling it. Without 
appropriate back-up from senior manage­
ment, units can find they are working in 
isolation and not regarded seriously.
What can help these officers is funding, 
so that their units can be well staffed, well 
trained and properly resourced. It is also 
necessary for units to have a high profile 
within stations. Their status, their morale 
and their unit’s existence is dependent on 
the disposition of their chief superinten­
dent.
With unit officers struggling against 
almost overwhelming odds, can we really 
afford such initiatives as the pilot scheme 
recently set up in Streatham, south Lon­
don? TTiis involves the cautioning of men 
who have inflicted ‘minor’ injuries on 
their wives or co-habitees.
The process is as follows: the man is 
arrested, taken to the station, finger­
printed and kept in for a ‘cooling off 
period of from two to eight hours. Then, 
provided the man admits his offence, has 
no record of previous assaults on his 
partner and his partner does not wish to 
press charges, a decision to charge or 
caution him can be deferred for two
SAFE HAVEN: Feedback has shown 
how nwch women suffering from assault 
have bencfiticd from the care provided by 
specialist officers
months. During that time, the woman is 
visited to check that the violence is not 
being repeated, and the man’s record is 
checked.
After the two months are up, the man 
is interviewed by a senior officer and 
signs a form admitting his offence. This, 
technically, is the caution which can be 
cited in court for a period of up to three 
years.
It could be argued that, had Streatham 
not adopted its cautioning policy, fewer 
arrests would have been made; it could 
also be argued that the cautioning policy, 
by encouraging officers to arrest in cases 
of minor assault, is an important step 
towards changing police attitudes. 
Cautioning, however, does not defend or 
protect women from the possibility of
rOUCE W'TEW » MARCH. !**•
445
being murdered by their partners.
To give one example, police were 
called out to an incident where a man had 
been repeatedly assaulting his wife, plac­
ing a pillow over her face and remo\ing it 
only at the last possible moment. He then 
pulled her up from sitting to standing by 
her earlobes. This happened in front of 
the couple's child. The husband had a 
previous conviction for actual bodily 
harm against her. This man was merely 
cautioned.
His previous conviction was not disco­
vered until after he was bailed. Because 
of the lime it can take to get the 
information, does this not leave the 
woman seriously at risk? If a man does 
not have a criminal record, but has been 
cautioned in one area and moves to 
another can this information be re­
trieved? If a first cautioning is followed 
by a second and third, as is common 
practice with juveniles, will this not per­
petuate the attitude that domestic vio­
lence is not a serious crime?
The most important question concerns 
the criteria which govern a decision that 
an injury is either major or ‘minor’. Supt 
Ian Buchan, who established the caution­
ing project in Streatham, acknowledges 
that there are some grey areas particular­
ly with regard to intent. ‘There would be 
a danger in issuing a cautioning policy 
without defining what a minor assault is. 
You have to look at intent without just 
looking at physical results'.
Mr Buchan also emphasises the need to 
take into consideration the volatile na­
ture of the offender. But how is intent 
defined? If a man brandishes a knife in 
front of a woman’s face, is this a minor 
assault which merits cautioning or a 
major one which justifies a charge of 
attempted murder? Unless it is made 
clear that similar incidents are seen as 
major assaults, violent men remain one 
step away from committing murder.
jV
POLICE PIONEER: Supt Ian Buchan who staned the cautioning scheme in 
Streatham, South London
The Streatham cautioning policy is to 
be reviewed after a year. Currently it is 
being bailed as a success — out of 77 
cases, only four men have reoffended so 
far. However, during the ‘cooling-off 
period', one man inflicted grievous bodily 
harm on his partner with the result that 
she ended up in intensive care. Giving 
violent men a second chance puts women 
in danger. Can a policy which leaves a 
woman in danger of being murdered, be 
measured as a. success? Those who are 
experienced in working with battered 
women know that a two-month cooling 
off period will have little effect on men 
whose practice is the systematic, purpose­
ful and repealed beating of their part­
ners.
Men can also control their violence to 
the point where there may be a gap of 
years before the violence is repeated, or 
they may resort to other more sophisti­
cated means of intimidating their part­
ners. The only policy which has a known 
measure of success is that of arrest, 
charging and prosecution. It is this policy 
which makes a clear statement to violent 
men and all those involved — that this 
kind of behaviour is a crime against 
society.
If the policy of cautioning becomes 
nationwide, what repercussions will there 
be? First and foremost, it downgrades the 
offence and the status of all those con­
cerned, and it increasingly marginalises 
the issue of domestic violence. Officers 
will not see offences committed in this 
area as important and may cease to 
bother taking any action at all. The 
message this policy endorses is that a 
marriage certificate, or its equivalent in 
çjo» of cohabitation, denies women pro­
tection from a criminal offence.
Cautioning may be attractive because it 
avoids contact with the Crown Prosecu­
tion Service. It is enormously frustrating 
to police when all the hard work that goes 
into presenting a case seems wasted 
because the CPS is not prepared to take 
to court what they see as inherently weak 
cases. I also fear that the CPS will 
encourage the police to use cautioning by 
subtly exerting pressure which empha­
sises the likelihood of cases failing to
secure a successful prosecution.
This pressure makes it all too easy for 
demoralised officers to fall back on the 
autonomous activities involved in 
cautioning. It may raise morale to feel 
that offenders are in some way being 
brought to book, but for everv violent 
man that is not charged there is a woman 
at risk.
Another incentive to employ caution­
ing may be that it boosts the arrest and 
clear-up rates. Currently, while arrest 
rates are up, the number of charges and 
prosecutions have not increased. Arrest 
rates have increased because incidents of 
domestic violence are now being properly 
recorded instead of being ‘no-crimed’, 
but this does not mean that men are being 
charged. In fact, the way the figures are 
presented often causes the general public 
to believe — mistakenly — that clear-up 
rates represent charges and prosecutions.
There is still a long way to go before we 
can claim we are even containing domes­
tic violence. We cannot afford to be 
sidetracked by a cautioning policy while 
the overall response to the rising numbers 
in cases of domestic violence is still poor.' 
The £23,000 invested in establishing the 
Streatham project would have been bet­
ter spent on training and resources for the 
domestic violence units. Only a rigorous 
policy of arrest and prosecution will stem 
the tide of abuse.
As we go into a new decade, these are 
the measures which 1 would like to sec 
being taken;
•  Considerably more training, not only 
for police, but for the judiciary and all 
those who come into contact with bat­
tered women;
•  Consistent policies for domestic vio­
lence units;
•  Funding for civilian workers to work 
with police at incidents and at the police 
station, so that less police time is taken 
up by supporting women and allowing 
officers to concentrate on arresting and 
charging violent men;
•  Adequate support systems for women 
to enable them to go through court 
proceedings;
•  Realistic sentences for the men so that 
the violence is not repeated. O
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TABLE 1
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RECORDS - MAY TO DECEMBER 1989
MONTH TOTALS MAJOR BEAT IRB CUST ARRESTS ARRESTS AS 
A % OF TOTAL 
INCIDENTS
CHARGED CHARGE FROM 
ARRESTS AS A 
% OF ARRESTS
DEFERRED
MAY 47 5 42 20 (42%) 11 (55%) 5 (25%) 4
jyss 65 10 55 21 (32%) 9 (43%) 5 (24%) 7
JULY . 45 12 30 2 1 20 (44%) 11 (55%) 8 (40%) 1
AUGUST 64 13 51 28 (43%) 15 (54%) 10 (36%) 3
SEPTEMBER 48 9 39 25 (52%) 11 (44%) 8 (32%) 6
OCTOBER 59 12 17 31 (52%) 18 (58%) 8 (26%) 5
NOVEMBER 58 10 47 1 30 (52%) 12 (40%) 13 (43%) 5
DECEMBER 60 10 49 1 29 (48%) 18 (62%) 9 (31%) 2
TOTALS 446 81 360 2 3 204 (45%) 105 (51%) 66 (32%) 33
DEFERRED 
DECISION 
EXPRESSED 
AS A % OF 
ARRESTS
OTHER
vO
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TABLE 2
REASONS FOR NO CRIMING
TRANSFERRED: 20 = 13%
VICTIM UNWILLING TO PROCEED: 83 = 56%
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE: 33 = 24%
ALLEGATION WITHDRAlfN 3 = 2%
RECORD ONLY 8 = 5 %
149 100%
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TABLE 3
DETAILS OF CRIME ALLEGATIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
CRIME ALLEGATIONS CRIME CLASSIFICATIONS
Assault 19 Assault
Common Assault 2 Common Assault
C.A. Record Only 1 C.A. Record Only
Actual Bodily Harm A3 Actual Bodily Harm
Grevious Bodily Harm 1 Grevious Bodily Harm
No Crime
66
Unclassified
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TABLE 4
RECORDED INJURIES AND DEFERRED DECISION OUTCOME
Not included is 
or if there was
how
also
1. B2102 - AC
2. B3717 - AC
3. B3999 - AC
A. B2165 - AC
5. Custody 2458
6. B4206 - AC
8. B1730 - AC
9. B3273 - AC
10. B1169 - AC
11. B1232 - AC
12. B2117 - AC
13. B791 - AC
14. B1657 - AC
15. B2120 - AC
16. B2495 - AC
17. B2213 - AC
18. C2668* - AC
19. B3444 - AC
20. B3639 - AC
21. B3626 - AC
- Left eye swollen, bruising and scratches to left 
side of neck, bruising on upper left arm, scratches 
and graze to elbow. (Photographs)
Cuts to face at bridge of nose, 2 cuts & inch long 
(taken to hospital).
- Soreness to back.
- Hysteria.
- AC - None
- Victim 1. Cut face, black eye, grazed legs, bump on head.
Victim 2. Cut to lip and swelling, reddening to left
jcij^, various cuts (seen by police doctor).
Bruised and sore chest.
- Slight reddening to left elbow.
- Cut to left side of face, cut to left ear, bruise to
right eye (from statement 8, stitches to cut on cheek,
5 stitches to left earlobe, face swollen, problems 
with eyes), taken to hospital.
- Shock.
- Reddening to right cheek, right arm hurt slightly, 
pain in back.
Swelling and bruising around left eye.
- Reddening to neck, bruise to shoulder.
- Bruised right cheek, bruising right elbow.
- Bleeding from nose.
- Soreness to head.
- Severe back pain, paralysis
- Bruise to left eye (temple), distress.
- Swollen lip, bruising to head and right thigh.
- Bruising, swelling, black eye, swelling and tenderness
to left cheek, scratches around mouth.
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22. B3610 - AC - Bruised left eye, marks on neck.
23. B1631 - AC - Bruising, scratches, cuts (seen by police doctor).
24. B1903 - AC - Slight swelling to lower lip and graze.
25. B1580 - AC - Reddening and soreness to left ear.
26. B2154 - AC - Minor abrasion to right forearm.
27. B2500 - AC - Swollen mouth.
28. B2624 - AC - Shock.
29. B2730 - AC - Reddening to face.
30. B2936 - AC - Bruising and hysteria.
31. B3008 - AC - Bruising to face, arms, legs and back.
32. B3154 - AC - Cut to head, bruise to forehead.
33. B3552 - AC - Bloody nose, possible broken tooth, shock.
34. B3732 - AC - Lower back injuries.
35. B3827 - AC - Painful shoulder and ribs, swelling to left wrist.
36. B3867 AC H  inch and 1" scratch to left arm and wrist, scratch 
to left shoulder, 3 scratches to neck area, left 
breast 3 deep scratches.
37. B3860 - AC - Cut to right knee, cuts and bruises to face, nose 
bleed, scratchs to left hand, shock.
38. B4057 - AC - Hysterical.
39. B4193 - AC - Bruised right cheek, bruised breasts and right thigh, 
pain in right thigh, walking with a limp.
40. Custody 5673 - AC - Bruising to.shoulder.
41. B2734 - AC - Fright and distress.
42. B3557 - AC - Bruising to head, swelling to lip, bruising to back.
43. B3668 - AC - Bruising to right arm.
44. B1571 - AC - Bruised veins and scratches to right shin.
45. B2102 _ AC _ Soreness to right side of face.
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CHARGED
46. B2263 - CH - Tenderness to left forearm.
47. B2913 - CH - Bite to face, punch to eye.
48. B2979 - CH - Broken finger.
49. B3243 - CH - Bruising to face and legs.
50. B1303 - CH - Pain to forehead and side of head.
NO FURTHER ACTION
51. B1173 - NFA - Scratch to right sid eof nose.
52. B686 — NFA - Soreness and stiffness to body.
53. B1982 - NFA - Slight bruise and swelling to forehead.
54. B2688 - NFA - Scratches and grazes to hand.
55. B2894 - NFA - Swelling to face, perforated eardrum.
FAILED TO ATTEND
56. C1414* - FTA - Bruised right eye, bruised mouth.
57. B3041 - FTA - Reddening to left cheek.
58. B3349 - FTA - Bump on head, bruising to neck.
59. B3357 - FTA - Nosebleed.
60. B1516 - FTA - Slightly swollen nose causing bleeding.
61. B2857 - FTA - Cut lip and cuts and bruises to left eye, hysteria
62. B750 - FTA - Bruising to cheek, scratches to arms.
63. B3568 - FTA - Two black eyes.
64. B4036 - FTA - Bruise to right leg, reddening to face.
65. B4052 - FTA - Scratch, reddening to right eye.
66. B2738 - FTA - Cut and graze on left thigh.
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TABLE 5
DETAILS OF DEFERRED DECISION OUTCOME 
AND RE-OFFENDING RATES
6 MONTH PERIOD 21 MONTH PERIOD
NUMBER OF DEFERRED 
DECISIONS 66 135
NUMBER OF CAUTIONS 
NUMBER CHARGED 
NFA ON RETURN TO STATION 
FAILED TO ATTEND
44 (66%) 
4 (6%)
7 (16%) 
11 (16%)
89 (67%) 
9 (7%)* 
15 (11%) 
24 (18%)
66 137
(* Includes 2 who failed to attend and were subsequently charged)
There are a number of similarities between the two periods. Approximately 7% 
were charged, between 11-16% no further action was taken and 16-18% failed to 
appear. A similar pattern between the periods emerged from an assessment of 
the re-offending rates as follows:-
6 MONTH PERIOD 21 MONTH PERIOD
IN TWO MONTH DEFERMENT 
PERIOD
AFTER CAUTION
4 (6%)
5 (8%)
9 (7%) 
11 (8%)

TABLE 6 - INJURIES ON DUTY 1988
DATE TIME TYPE OF
DUTY
DISPUTE DETAILS INJURY HOW SUSTAINED PLACED SICK
16.2.88 9,35pm Uniform Domestic dispute Bruise to 
head
Butted in face 
by prisoner 
during arrest
Yes
6.5.88 8pm Uniform Domestic dispute and 
assault between man 
and friend. Man 
arrested for Breach 
of the Peace
Twisted right 
shoulder
Removing violent 
man from premises
Yes
J rVI
cr>
28.7.88 7.30pm Uniform Dispute between 
common-1aw husband and 
wife. Man arrested for 
Breach of the Peace
Nose bleed Prisoner became 
violent and 
struck officer 
with fist
No
20.10.88 10.30pm Uniform Husband threatened 
wife with machette
Cut on 
forefinger
Violent prisoner 
during struggle
No
O' ba
r*M
TABLE 7 - INJURIES ON DUTY 1989
DATE TIME TYPE OF
DUTY
DISPUTE DETAILS INJURY HOW SUSTAINED PLACED SICK
5.1.89 11.15pm Uniform Removal of child 
from home by husband
3" cut to right Violent prisoner 
shoulder -.12 pushed officer
stitches against broken 
window
Yes
16.6.89
16.7.89
9 pm
lam
Uniform
Uniform
Called to deal with 
a domestic found to be 
in possession of drugs
Father had assaulted child
Numerous 
abrasions and 
cuts
Bruise & cuts
Prisoner attacked 
officer with 
kitchen knife
Violent struggle 
when placing 
prisoner in 
police van
Yes
No
XT
15.9.89
15.9.89
12.30am Uniform
12.30am Uniform
Officers assisted person 
to remove property from 
home address
As above
Cuts to wrist
Broken nose
Prisoner threw 
mirror at police
Prisoner threw 
metal frame at 
officer's face
Yes
22.9.89 11.55pm Uniform
2pm
22.9.89
22.9.89
11.55pm Uniform
11.55pm Uniform
Called to deal with a 
family argument
As above
As above
Swelling left 
ankle
Bruising shins 
and cheek
Bruising
Struggle whilst
restraining
prisoner
Hit by prisoner 
during arrest
Struggle with 
prisoner
No
No
No ÿ
r*M
DATE TIME TYPE OF
DUTY
DISPUTE DETAILS INJURY HOW SUSTAINED PLACED SICK
25.11.89 6.50pm Uniform
25.11.89 6.50pm Uniform
25.11.89 9.30pm Uniform
Called to scene of domestic 
assault between boyfriend/ 
girlfriend. Arrested for 
assaulting officer
As above
As above
Cuts and 
grazes
Cuts and 
grazes
Grazes and 
scratches
Struggle during 
arrest
S ruggle during 
ax est
Struggle with 
prisoner in cell
No
No
No
oo
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TABLE 8
DETAILS AND OUTCOMES OF CHARGES
(i) Charges
103 suspects were charged during this period. Of those, 79 were 
remanded and 26 bailed. Of those charged and remanded the following 
crime classifications were recorded.
4 = Previous Bodily Harm
55 Actual Bodily Harm
3 » Criminal Damage
1 - Unlawful Wounding
1 = Kidnapping
1 - Assault
5 - Threats to Kill
1 Affray/Public Order Act
1 « No Crime (The allegation was theft)
2 = Breach of Bail
1 = Attempted Previous Bodily Harm
1 « Robbery
1 Common Assault Record Only
2 = Unclassified
(ii) Prosecution Outcomes
The final outcomes for the above cases are detailed below.
Prosecution outcomes were derived from police result records. This 
creates several problems. The first, police may use the term 
'withdraw* to cover victim withdrawal. Second, prosecutional 
discontinuance, withdrawal is commonly used to denote failure rather 
than the procedural legal specificity of withdrawal.
These problems may blur the precise accuracy of the outcomes the 
result outcomes as recorded by police are included and must be treated 
with that proviso.
Suspects were charged with Previous Bodily Harm
Reduced charge and a probation order 
Transferred to Crown Court, final result unknown 
Fine, compensation order and costs 
Fine, compensation order
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3 Suspects were charged with Criminal Damage 
= Bound over
= Conditional discharge, compensation order and costs 
= Unknown
Suspect was charged with Unlawful Wounding 
= Imprisonment 1 year
Suspect was charged with Kidnapping 
= Unknown
Suspects were charged with Threats to Kill
Bound over 1 year £100
Fine, compensation order, costs
Discontinued
Discharged
Withdrawn reason unknown
2 Suspects were charged with Breach of Bail
Transferred to Crown Court 
Conditional discharge, costs
1 Suspect was charged with Assault
Fine, compensation order, bound over
1 Suspect was charged with Affray/Public Order Act
Dismissed
1 Suspect was charged with Attempted Previous Bodily Harm
Discontinued
1 Suspect was charged with Robbery
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1 Suspect vas charged with Common Assault Record Only
Bound over
2 - Unclassified
Conditional discharge, compensation order 
(Allegation Criminal Damage)
Dismissed, bound over
(Allegation ABH and Threats to Kill)
55 Suspects were charged with Actual Bodily Harm
Withdrawn by victim
Withdrawn by CPS
Withdrawn - reason unknown
Withdrawn unknown - bound over
Fine, compensation order
Fine, compensation order and costs
Fine £75
Non-appearance
Bound over 1 year
Bound over, fine, compensation order 
Discontinued
No evidence offered, dismissed
No evidence offered, dismissed, bound over 
Discharged
Conditional discharge
Conditional discharge, compensation order 
Conditional discharge, compensation order, costs 
Conditional discharge 1 year, costs 
Compensation order or 5 days imprisonment 
Compensation order 
Reduced charge 
Probation order
Transferred to Inner London Crown Court
Imprisonment 10 weeks each of ABH and Threats to Kill 
Concurrent
80 hours community service, compensation order
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Charged and Bailed = 26
1 = Grevious Bodily Harm
18 = Actual Bodily Harm
2 = Criminal Damage
2 Actual Bodily Harm and Criminal Damage
1 = Indecent Assault
1 = Assault
1 = No Crime (Allegation Assault)
The outcome of the above cases are as follows:
Suspect was charged with Grevious Bodily Harm
Unknown
Suspects were charged with Criminal Damage
Non appearance at court 
= Conditional discharge
Suspects were charged with Actual Bodily Harm and Criminal Damage
= Non appearance at court
Fine and compensation order
Suspect was charged with Indecent Assault
= Fine, compensation order and costs 
Suspect was charged with Assault
Withdrawn - reason unknown
- No Crime
Unknown
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18 Suspects were charged with Actual Bodily Harm
3 = Transferred to Crown Court
= Non appearance at court
= Conditional discharge, compensation order
= Fined
= Fine and compensation order
= Dismissed
= Withdrawn reason unknown
= Withdrawn reason unknown, bound over
= Unknown
(iv) Victims and Prosecution
One of the main reasons often given for not prosecuting domestic violence 
suspects is that the victims change their minds, withdrawing the 
allegation and then refusing to appear at court, this is also the main 
reason give for 'No Criming' cases (see Table 2).
Case Withdrawn
It can be seen from the cases listed above that only 12 cases were 
recorded as being withdrawn at court by the victim. This is 11% of the 
total charged cases. Information from the court result sheets show that 
3 of these cases were withdrawn by the Crown Prosecution Service and 1 by 
the victim. No information was given as to why the other 8 cases were 
withdrawn.
A total of 13 cases were either discontinued (6), discharged (2) or 
dismissed (5), again the reasons for these decisions are not known. Nine 
suspects also received a conditional discharge.
Imprisonment
Only 2 suspects were imprisoned, 2% of total charged. Both had previous 
criminal records. One suspect was imprisoned for 1 year for Unlawful 
Wounding. The suspect hit his ex-girlfriend in the face with a glass, 
this resulted in the victim needing 30 stitches to the face. There is 
a history of previous violence involving the suspect and his ex-girlfriend 
and an injunction was recorded at the police station. A previous incident 
was also reported in June 1989. The crime classification was assault, the
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remanded. The outcome of the case was £100 fine, £100 compensation 
order, and he was Bound Over to Keep the Peace for 1 year in the sum of 
£500. The Unlawful Wounding took place in July 1989.
The second suspect was charged with S.16 and S.47 Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 (amended 1977). The crime sheet reports that the 
suspect strangled the victim around the neck with his hands three times 
causing bruising to the victim's neck and causing her to black out for 
several seconds. Then punching her in the back. This assault arose 
after an argument between common law husband and wife, the husband having 
returned home drunk. He then threatened to kill her. The victim 
reported the assault and the threats at the police station. The outcome 
of this case was that the suspect was given 10 weeks in prisonment for 
each charge, these were to run concurrently.
Compensation Orders
Twenty-one compensation orders were made to victims. This is 20% of the 
total cases charged.
One victim was given £1600.00 compensation, the suspect was also fined 
£350 and ordered to pay £50 costs. This suspect was charged with S. 18 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Although he was initially remanded 
in custody he was then granted conditional bail with a surety of £5,000.
The suspect is of 'No Fixed Abode'. "The suspect and victim had been 
arguing when he attacked her, beating her head against the wall then 
trying to strangle her, then placing her head in a bath full of water.
Her injuries were a fractured left shoulder, 2 black eyes, a badly 
bruised head, and scratches and marks to her neck showing signs of 
strangulation".
Another victim who was granted a compensation order had only known the 
suspect for 3 weeks. Her injuries were tenderness to right jaw, tenderness 
to left shoulder, reddening to neck, severe pain to lower back and an 
asthma attack. "Effected by suspect who was victim's boyfriend who 
became very aggressive because of a tiff. Suspect grabbed victim by the 
chest pulling her towards him then throwing victim across the room, the 
victim hitting her back on a radiator. When the victim attempted to
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leave the suspect refused to let her go and threatened to kill her, 
the victim believed him. The suspect detained the victim at the venue 
until the victim suffered a severe asthma attack, he then became 
frightened and after 4 hours he drove victim home, not allowing her to 
make her own way home. The victim lives in a nurses home, she then 
alerted security staff about the problem, but was too frightened to 
attend Streatham Police Station to make a statement." This suspect was 
charged with False Imprisonment, which was withdrawn and S.47 Offences 
Against the Person Act was imposed and the suspect was fined £200 with 
£40 costs and a £130 compensation order.
Transferred to Inner London Crown Court
A total of 8 cases were transferred, 8% of total. One case was classified 
as Grevious Bodily Harm, 6 as Actual Bodily Harm and 1 as Breach of Bail. 
The suspect was on bail for Grevious Bodily Harm, the conditions were 
not to attend the victim's home address, not to interfere with her or 
other witnesses. Surety of £500. The victim had left home and moved 
into a women's refuge. The suspect contacted the victim speaking to 
her in the street, she reported this to the police. She reported to 
the police that she was attending the County Court the next day to obtain 
an injunction, she also said that she had visited her flat and had found 
it smashed up, she felt that the suspect was responsible for this. He 
was arrested, remanded and charged under Section 7 of the Bail Act.
In addition to this he was charged with Criminal Damage and Dishonest 
Handling. These charges were all transferred to the Crowb Court. He 
was also charged with burglary, this was discharged.
The final outcome of these 8 cases is not known at the present time.
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TABLE 9 
DETAILS OF "NO CRIME”
The allegations on these "no crimed" records are as follows:
ASSAULT 38
ASSAULT/THEFT 
ASSAULT/CRIMINAL DAMAGE 
ASSAULT/HELD AGAINST WILL 
COMMON ASSAULT 1
ACTUAL BODILY HARM 4
ACTUAL BODILY HARM/CRIMINAL DAMAGE 
ACTUAL BODILY HARM/FALSE IMPRISONMENT 
GREVIOUS BODILY HARM 
UNLAWFUL WOUNDING 2
CRIMINAL DAMAGE 16
THREATS TO KILL
THREATS TO KILL/ATTEMPTED ABDUCTION 
ABDUCTION 
THREATS TO ASSAULT 
UNLAWFUL SEX 
THEFT/DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
THEFT
NON-ACCIDENTAL INJURY 
INCITEMENT TO MURDER
THREATENING BEHAVIOUR/OBSCENE PHONE CALLS 
THREATENING PHONE CALLS 
ATTEMPTED ARSON 
THREATS TO KIDNAP
ATTEMPTED UNLAWFUL DEMANDS WITH MENACES
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TABLE 10
RECORD OF CRIMES WHERE NO ARREST WAS MADE
COMMON ASSAULT/RECORD ONLY 39
COMMON ASSAULT 9
CRIMINAL DAMAGE 8
CRIMINAL DAMAGE/RECORD ONLY 2
ACTUAL BODILY HARM 30
THREATS TO KILL 4
RAPE 2
THEFT 1
VEHICLE INTERFERENCE 1
UNLAWFUL WOUNDING' I
UNCLASSIFIED 16
468
TABLE 11
CRIME CLASSIFICATION COMPARISON
CLASSIFICATION STREATHAM STREATHAM DIVISION 'A
1988 1989 1989
NO CRIME 47 32 60
ASSAULT 1 1 1
COMMON ASSAULT 1 3 0
COMMON ASSAULT RECORD ONLY 6 10 43
ACTUAL BODILY HARM 13 41 11*
GREVIOUS BODILY HARM 1 1 2
CRIMINAL DAMAGE 1 5 7*
THREATS TO KILL 0 3 1
RAPE 0 2 1
UNLAWFUL WOUNDING 0 0 1
AFFRAY 0 0 1
DOMESTIC DISPUTE 0 0 1
DOMESTIC DISPUTE RECORD ONLY 0 0 1
MALICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS 0 1 0
BREACH OF BAIL 0 2 0
UNCLASSIFIED 0 6 0
70 107 130
*3 crimes classified as ABH and 2 as Criminal Damage were originally classified 
as "No Crime". These were altered in line with National Rules defining 
offences that be regarded as "cleared up'\
Section 6/4.2 (viii) the guilt of the accused is clear but the victim 
refuses, or is permanently unable, or if a juvenile
is not permitted, to give evidence:

TABLE 12 - COMPARATIVE CRIME FIGURES
TOTAL RECORDS TOTAL ARRESTS CHARGED NO CRIMES VICTIMS SUSPECTS RESIDENCE
STREATHAM 1988 70 = 10 Major 21 = 30% 13 = 61% of arrests 47 = 67% Female = 58 Female = 7 Together = 31
SEPT/OCT. 60 Beat 18.5% of records Male = 12 Male = 63 Separate = 39
STREATHAM 1989 107 = 21 Major 56 = 52% 29 = 52% of arrests 32 » 30% Female = 90 Female = 5 Together = 42
SEPT/OCT 86 Beat 27% of records Male = 1 7 Male =102 Separate = 65
DIV. 1989 130 = 18 Major 16 = 12% 12 = 75% of arrests 60 » 46% Female =113 Female = 16 Together = 66
SEPT/OCT 112 Beat 9% of records Male = 1 7 Male =114 Separate = 64
gCd
r*ra
O'
vO
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